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Long-term, intractable conflicts present one of the greatest challenges to global security today.  
Sometimes referred to as "frozen," these conflicts between states (or aspiring states like the Palestinian 
Authority) are characterized by a persistent tone of animosity and a low but simmering level of mutual 
hostility that occasionally erupts into physical violence.  This continual tension fosters an atmosphere of 
insecurity and unpredictability that has ripple effects far beyond the populations of the adversary states 
themselves, shaping and limiting the potential for political and economic development across entire 
regions.  The conflict between the U.S. and Iran, now spanning more than four decades, is a prime 
example in the modern world.  Not only has the level of sustained hostility between these two powers 
been detrimental to their own societies, but periodic bouts of escalation have threatened regional 
stability and led to the brink of war.   
This dissertation will argue that the condition of intractability results when a conflict develops 
institutional properties that entrench patterns of action and resist attempts at change – an institution of 
animosity.  This occurs as the conflict fosters constituencies with an interest in perpetuating hostility.  
More than just transient actors or groups, these constituencies possess enduring power to draw and 
bind individuals in common purpose and shape values, perceptions, and opportunities.  When powerful 
constituencies take shape on both sides of the conflict, it creates a self-sustaining synergy that 
undermines all attempts at resolution and leads to intractability.   
As the U.S.-Iranian relationship will demonstrate, the mechanisms which drive this process can 
be identified and observed.  Institutions have impressive staying power, but they also develop and 
evolve according to timeless patterns.  Paradoxically, the very engine of their durability is a constant 
cycle of renewal and regeneration that adapts to changing conditions.  Institutional theory provides a 
window into how and why some conflicts, like the one between the U.S. and Iran, become intractable.  
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Just as importantly, because institutions are both constructed and deconstructed through this same set 
of mechanisms, this approach also promises new insights for the field of conflict resolution.  
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
Long-term, intractable conflicts present one of the greatest challenges to global security today.  
Sometimes referred to as "frozen," these conflicts between states (or aspiring states like the Palestinian 
Authority) are characterized by a persistent tone of animosity and a low but simmering level of mutual 
hostility that occasionally erupts into physical violence.  This continual tension fosters an atmosphere of 
insecurity and unpredictability that has ripple effects far beyond the populations of the adversary states 
themselves, shaping and limiting the potential for political and economic development across entire 
regions.  The conflict between the U.S. and Iran, now spanning more than four decades, is a prime 
example in the modern world.  Not only has the level of sustained hostility been these two powers been 
detrimental to their own societies, but periodic bouts of escalation have threatened regional stability 
and led to the brink of war.  The field of Security Studies is often well-equipped to explain why conflicts 
erupt, but it is much more difficult to discern why certain conflicts persist, while most are eventually 
settled.  This shortcoming makes it difficult to develop effective conflict resolution strategies. 
Intractable conflict, like that between the U.S. and Iran, is most often recognized as a violent 
struggle between two states (or aspiring states) that endures for more than a generation.  It can be 
generally observed that the longer a conflict continues, the more difficult it becomes to resolve with any 
sense of finality.  More significantly, the passing of the torch between generations illustrates an 
evolution in the nature of the conflict itself.  The views, goals, and values of the participants take on new 
or significantly altered dimensions from those present at the beginning of the hostilities.  Whereas the 
struggle may initially be framed in realist terms as a clash of national interests on both sides, this picture 
inverts, and national interests become increasingly defined in terms of the conflict.  Proponents of 
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continued hostility inevitably weave narratives which justify the status quo, but linkages with the 
greater good of society grow increasingly tenuous and debatable.    
This dissertation will argue that the condition of intractability is fundamentally caused by a set 
of institutional processes that work to entrench patterns of action and resist attempts at change.  The 
conflict itself becomes an institution of animosity with properties greater than the sum of its parts.  This 
occurs as the conflict develops constituencies on both sides with an interest in perpetuating hostility.  
More than just transient actors or groups, these constituencies develop enduring power to draw and 
bind individuals in common purpose and shape values, perceptions, and opportunities.  They have no 
fixed membership, but they have the ability to self-replicate, even across generational divides.  All 
conflicts develop constituencies to one degree or another, but when powerful constituencies develop on 
both sides of the conflict, it creates a synergy which causes intractability.  As the U.S.-Iranian 
relationship will demonstrate, the mechanisms which drive this process can be identified and observed.  
Intractability is never permanent, though.  Because institutions are both constructed and deconstructed 
through this same set of mechanisms, this approach also promises important insights to the field of 
conflict resolution.  
The application of institutional terminology to conflict analysis is not entirely new.  The words 
"institution" and "institutionalized" are bandied about frequently in discussions of intractable conflicts, 
and even conflicts in general.  However, there is a dearth of examination into what it really means for a 
conflict to be institutionalized, or the implications of such a statement.  This dissertation will argue that 
a rigorous application of institutional theory offers an ideal lens for the study of intractable conflict.  
Institutions, by nature, are self-perpetuating systems in which components mutually reinforce a 
common purpose while interacting with their environment.  They are not permanent, but they are 
sticky, sometimes remarkably so.  Change usually happens gradually, and the forces that drive it often 
work unseen, evident only in glimpses provided by specific historical events.  The fundamental question 
3 
 
of intractable conflict is why certain things stay the same in a changing world, even when the status quo 
no longer fits the new conditions – the very question that animates the study of institutions in the Social 
Sciences.   
The framework for evaluating intractable conflict will derive from a school of thought known as 
Historical Institutionalism.  Recognizing the reality of an ever-shifting world, this school views 
institutions in a constant state of evolution.  Paradoxically, it is the mechanisms of change that actually 
serve as the engine of stability, and the force behind the perpetuation of a status quo (in this case, 
conflict).  Historical Institutionalism reconciles the dichotomy between stasis and change using temporal 
analysis over broad swaths of history.  Because intractable conflicts are recognized by their longevity, 
this process-tracing methodology is ideal, and it allows the user to gain insight into underlying dynamics 
often masked by other issues.  This institutional approach to the study of intractable conflicts does not 
replace all other approaches, but as the following sections will show, it offers a new lens with unique 
explanatory power that provides a richer understanding. 
This dissertation will explore the application of institutional theory to the study of intractable 
conflict with an in-depth case study of the U.S.-Iranian relationship between 1979 and 2018.  The 
conflict between the U.S. and Iran is an ideal test case because it has spanned a full generational divide 
by any account, and some might argue a second, as well.  Just as importantly, as the next section will 
elucidate, the level of sustained hostility between the U.S. and Iran over the course of four decades is a 
puzzle.  Both sides have amassed legitimate grievances, but many authors believe that neither side has 
acted in its own national interest with regard to the other, according to realist standards.  This is a 
conflict that stands in need of a fresh perspective.  Additionally, unlike intractable conflicts between 
neighboring states, such as India and Pakistan, North and South Korea, or the Israelis and Palestinians, 
there are fewer compelling alternative explanations to mask the institutional forces under question.  
This dissertation asserts that institutional mechanisms work just as hard in other conflicts, but proximity 
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and competition over resources can overdetermine hostility and make these factors more difficult to 
isolate.  Third, unlike shorter conflicts, four decades is a long enough period for institutional forces to 
reveal themselves.   
The primary focus of the U.S.-Iran case study will be to highlight the institutional aspects of the 
conflict over a four-decade span.  The upcoming literature review will provide an overview of the 
primary and secondary sources used to research this period.  This work will provide considerable detail 
in some portions, but it is not intended to be a historical intervention.  An institutional theory of conflict 
deals with wide swaths of history and should not depend on obscure facts or hidden gems.  In fact, this 
dissertation contends that many authors have already been telling portions of the institutional story of 
this conflict without appreciating the broader implications of their work.  The following chapters will 
simply provide a new framework for the narrative of this story.   
The next section will set the stage for this case study by examining the intractable nature of the 
U.S.-Iranian conflict, using realism as a foil.  It will then examine leading explanations for this state of 
intractability and explain why this puzzle stands in need of a new lens for analysis.   
 
The Puzzle - 40 Years of Conflict Between the U.S. and Iran 
For some, the enduring state of conflict between the U.S. and Iran may appear quite natural.  
After all, haven’t U.S. headlines been filled, year after year, with stories about Iran’s nefarious activities?  
And doesn’t the Iranian media demonize the U.S., as well, referring to “global arrogance” and the “Great 
Satan?” At any moment in time, tit-for-tat exchanges of hostility might seem to explain the basis for the 
conflict very nicely.  As this dissertation will show, however, aggression has not consistently been met 
with aggression, and overtures of peace have not cooled the conflict as one might expect.  When 
viewing the relationship over a period of four decades, exchanges of malice fail to explain why the 
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conflict has endured in spite of the costs to both sides and clear benefits that might arise from a 
reduction in hostility.  This section will use realism as a starting point for examining the relationship, and 
it will show that this conflict is a puzzle that begs further investigation. 
Realism is rooted in the concept of power.  Hans Morgenthau (1955, 8) defined power as, 
“anything that establishes and maintains control of man over man.” States seek power, not just for its 
own sake, but because power is inextricably linked to the concept of “interest.” Power is the means to 
control one’s own destiny and fulfill the interests most important to the state.  Kenneth Waltz (1979, Ch. 
6), in his formulation of neorealism, argued that security is the primary interest of the state, and the 
anarchic condition of the international environment fuels insecurities that drive state conflict.  Thus, 
balance of power is the overarching theory of international politics because states are naturally 
threatened by the relative power of other states.  They will inevitably balance against greater threats by 
increasing their own power and capabilities or forming alliances with less threatening powers.  Realism 
(both classical and neorealism) is more than just Machiavellian good advice about how states ought to 
act on the world stage.  This school of thought purports to explain how states necessarily conduct 
themselves over the course of time.  Therefore, deviations from this behavior are worth considering. 
Using a realist perspective, there are three prominent reasons why a lasting conflict between 
the U.S. and Iran should be unlikely.  The first is geography.  The U.S. and Iran are on opposite sides of 
the earth.  There is no possibility that Iran could invade the U.S., and even ranging American territory 
with standoff weapons would require an unlikely combination of asymmetric tactics that could be 
orchestrated more successfully by any number of potential actors besides Iran.  On the other hand, U.S. 
force projection capabilities mean that it could invade Iran, if it so desired.  However, Iran’s major 
population centers are shielded by formidable mountains, deserts, marshlands, and vast expanses of 
terrain.  Even air attacks would have to be planned and executed with great care.  From a geographical 
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perspective alone, neither side has much cause for insecurity.  Of course, the same observation could 
have been made for the U.S. and Soviet Union during the Cold War, so this alone is insufficient. 
The second reason is relative power.  President Trump (Rouhi 2019) summarized this point 
nicely in a warning that he tweeted to Iran’s leaders, where he reminded them that the U.S. is “by far 
the most powerful Military Force [sic] in the world, with 1.5 Trillion Dollars” (invested over the past two 
years).  This compared with Iran’s $13.2 billion in military investment from 2018.  Even Iran’s regional 
neighbors Saudi Arabia and Israel outspent it by considerable sums.  This relative power disparity calls 
into question why the world's leading superpower would choose to balance against a country like Iran, 
or, on the other hand, why Iran would choose to pick a fight with the world's strongest military power.  
The third reason is that both the U.S. and Iran have far more pressing threats to focus on than 
each other.  The U.S. has faced a resurgent Russia and an ascendant China, both of which are nuclear 
powers directly challenging U.S. supremacy in a number of fronts on the world stage.  The “pivot to 
Asia” announced under the Obama administration reflected an acknowledgement of changing world 
conditions, but this policy has been stymied by the attention that the U.S. continues to focus on Iran.  
Vali Nasr (2013, 119-122) argued that the Obama administration sacrificed its strategic leverage vis-a-vis 
China and Russia to garner support for sanctions over Iran's nuclear program, and this trend only 
continued under President Trump.  The Washington Post (Editorial Board 2020) touted China as the only 
clear winner in Trump’s “maximum pressure campaign” against Iran.  Terrorism also remains a perennial 
threat, but after the 1980’s the most deadly and damaging terrorist attacks against the U.S. and its 
interests were perpetrated by Sunni extremists, not Iranian-sponsored Shiite groups.   
The Iranians, for their part, have always lived in a tough neighborhood.  Memories of the Iran-
Iraq War of the 1980’s have lingered, making it little wonder that they would devote so much effort to 
shaping their former adversary during the U.S. occupation.  Iran has been locked in a continued state of 
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tension with Israel and Saudi Arabia, and at least three of its immediately adjacent neighbors have been 
internally unstable for the entire duration of the conflict with the U.S.  The former Shah chose to partner 
with the U.S. as a means of balancing against his potential adversaries, a very realist position.  Realism 
has difficulty explaining why the rulers of the Islamic Republic would choose the opposite approach and 
isolate themselves so consistently.   
In fact, prominent realist authors have argued against the U.S. position in the Middle East, 
including with regard to Iran.  Paul Pillar (2016) wrote specifically about the U.S. relationship with Iran, 
explaining that the Iranian threat did not warrant the level of attention that the U.S. had focused on it 
(even accounting for the nuclear issue, which will be discussed further).  Barry Posen (2014) argued that 
the U.S. cannot afford to be the world’s policeman.  It should pull ground forces out of regions like the 
Middle East, allow the areas to reach their own natural balance of power, and deal with the new order 
that emerges.  John Mearsheimer (2018) made a similar argument that the U.S. preoccupation with the 
Middle East was a costly distraction from more important priorities.  Steven Walt (2018) went as far as 
to claim that this misguided focus was threatening the U.S. its position of leadership in the world.  The 
following discussion will examine interests on both sides of the conflict and make the case that realism, 







One of the first places one might look in relating U.S. national interests to Iran is energy security, 
or oil markets, to be more specific.  Bacevich (2016, 3-27) explained that by the 1970’s, the American 
way of life had come to be defined largely by a culture of freedom that depended on gasoline-powered 
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motor vehicles.  As the U.S. imported greater and greater quantities, especially from the Middle East, 
the country developed a new sense of vulnerability.  This reached a crescendo in the 1970’s leading to 
the “Carter Doctrine,” and the combination of the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1980 entrenched this policy for succeeding administrations.  President Jimmy Carter 
(Painter 2012) summarized the doctrine that would bear his name on January 23, 1980 in an address to 
Congress, stating that, “An attempt by any outside power to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will 
be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will 
be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”  To this effect, both Carter and Reagan 
would bolster U.S. forces in the Middle East, leading eventually to the establishment of U.S. Central 
Command.   
It is clear that concerns over energy security helped shape the conflict between the U.S. and Iran 
from the very beginning.  But did this continue over time? According to the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (2019), between 1950 and 2005, U.S. net petroleum imports (imports minus exports) 
generally increased to a peak of just over 60 percent, when the trend reversed.  After this point, 
however, this figure steadily declined to a mere 11 percent of total consumption in 2018, the lowest 
figure since 1957.  While the demand for oil imports is driven by a complicated array of economic 
factors, the increase in domestic production (along with decreases in consumption) has made a 
significant contribution to this shift.  Also, worth considering, the percentage of U.S. oil imports 
originating from OPEC countries has fallen from a 1977 peak of approximately 70 percent to around 29 
percent in 2018.  In 2018, the U.S. imported over four times as much oil from Canada as from Saudi 
Arabia.  Per Klare (2007, 38-42) both the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations placed significant 
priority on the global diversification of oil supplies, expanding support for oil production in the Caspian 
Sea region, Africa, and South America.  If the U.S. depended on the Middle East for oil in the 1970’s and 
1980’s, this markedly decreased over the following decades.   
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Has the U.S. ever been truly dependent on the Middle East for oil?  Energy analysts Gal Luft and 
Anne Korin (2013) pointed out that at no point in history did the amount of U.S. oil imported from the 
Middle East ever exceed 15 percent of consumption, but this was never a driver dependence in the first 
place.  Oil is fungible, meaning that its origin matters little to price or availability.  Further, the de facto 
U.S. alliance with Saudi Arabia (Pierce 2012, 92-96) (Kemp 2016) has helped to stabilize U.S. oil markets 
and undercut Iran's power to manipulate them.  Perhaps the greatest concern with regard to Iran and 
global energy security is the Strait of Hormuz, through which 21 percent of the world's petroleum 
products still transited in 2018 (Energy Information Administration 2019), only a fraction of which could 
have been routed by other means.  Iran has a long history of threatening to close the straits in response 
to tensions with the U.S., demonstrated anew in a 2019 rhetorical exchange with President Trump 
(Wilkie 2019).  However, assessments of Iranian capability (Katzman, et al. 2012) have consistently 
shown that blocking this waterway is no small feat.  At most, Iran could likely impede traffic for a short 
time, at great cost to itself.   
How much do concerns about protecting global oil supply really drive the U.S. conflict with Iran 
today?  Given the U.S. willingness to sanction Iran’s oil exports, the answer appears to be – not much.  
According to Secretary of State Michael Pompeo (Pamuk and Chiacu, 2019), as of August 2019, U.S. 
sanctions were removing almost 2.7 million barrels of oil per day from Iran’s exports.  While other 
producers like Saudi Arabia have been able to increase production to make up for the loss, the U.S. has 
demonstrated a surprising willingness to strain global oil markets in order to punish Iran.  Some analysts 
(Leverett and Leverett 2013, 6) have gone as far as to cite U.S. determination to keep Iran in a 
subordinate position as the source of the greatest risk to the security of the market for Gulf oil.  On 
balance, the conflict between the U.S. and Iran appears to have played out in spite of any national 






Another area in which Iran is often accused of violating the U.S. national interest is in its support 
for terrorism.  Iran’s support for groups like Hezbollah and Hamas is well documented, and this 
dissertation makes no apology for terror, especially in the form of indiscriminate attacks against civilian 
targets.  The question is not whether specific acts have warranted retaliation, but whether Iran’s pattern 
of behavior over the course of time has demonstrated a fundamental threat to U.S. national security.  Is 
Iran so dangerous that a global superpower on the other side of the world should consistently focus its 
foreign policy on balancing against it, to the detriment of other priorities and threats?   
Iran’s most brazen attacks against the U.S. mainly occurred in 1980’s Lebanon.  In April 1983 
(History 2019), a suicide bomber from an Iranian-sponsored group attacked the U.S. Embassy, killing 63, 
including 17 Americans.  In October, a larger attack targeted two barracks facilities, killing 241 U.S. and 
58 French servicemembers.  In September of the next year (Kifner 1984), these militias bombed the U.S. 
Embassy Annex, killing 23, including two Americans.  Iran was also complicit (Binder 1991) with these 
same groups in taking and holding a number of Americans hostage throughout the decade, including 
C.I.A. Station Chief William Buckley, who died under torture by his captors.  While, for many, these 
constituted unforgiveable acts of aggression, the historical context of this period is important to 
consider.  The U.S. had imposed sanctions on Iran and was starting to support Iran’s enemy, Iraq, with a 
greater degree of openness in the Iran-Iraq War.  They were also leading the international community in 
turning a blind eye toward Saddam Hussein’s introduction of chemical weapons into the conflict (Gibson 
2010, 90-120).  With regard to Lebanon, the Reagan administration ultimately discovered an insoluble 
quagmire of political interests and chose to withdraw U.S. troops.   
Iran’s headline attack against U.S. personnel in the 1990’s was the bombing of the Khobar 
Towers complex in Saudi Arabia, which housed military servicemembers, killing 19 and wounding 500 
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more (Hegghammer 2008).  After subsequent investigation, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia officially blamed 
Iran for the attack, but the findings have been disputed for years, as some continue to believe this was 
actually carried out by Sunni groups that Saudi Arabia chose to protect.  Assuming that Iran did sponsor 
the attack, their motive is also unclear, and this will be discussed again later in the dissertation.  Iran’s 
most damaging campaign against the U.S. occurred throughout the occupation of Iraq.  The U.S. Army’s 
official history of the Iraq War (Rayburn, et al., vol. 2, 2019, 222-227) explained how Iran conducted an 
extensive proxy war against U.S. and coalition forces throughout the occupation, primarily using Shiite 
militia groups and inflicting an estimated 603 casualties (Rempfer 2019).  Again, without excusing Iran’s 
actions, it should be noted that Iran had considerable interests of its own in the fate of their next-door 
neighbor and former enemy Iraq, and the U.S. explicitly shunned these interests.  In many ways, Iran's 
shadow war was not unlike the U.S. campaign against the Soviets in Afghanistan.   
Another point of perspective should be considered when determining the threat that Iran poses 
to U.S. national security.  Blood may cry for justice, but as realists would predict, this is often suppressed 
in the name of national interest.  One prominent example occurred in 1967 (Roberts, 2019) when Israeli 
aircraft and torpedo boats attacked the USS Liberty, killing 34 and wounding 174 sailors.  Whether this 
was intentional or not remains a matter of debate, but the Johnson administration covered up the 
incident, threatening sailors with punishment if they spoke about it openly.  Another happened in 1987 
(Zatarain 2008, 7-25) when an Iraq jet fired two anti-ship missiles at the USS Stark, ultimately killing 37 
sailors and badly damaging the ship.  Instead of holding Iraq accountable, the Reagan administration 
used the incident to inaugurate a “tanker war” with Iran.   
To this effect, Iranian blood cries out as well, as the U.S. killed a number of Iranian sailors in 
direct fire engagements during the tanker war in the Persian Gulf.  More importantly (Fisher 2013), Iran 
has not forgotten the 1988 shootdown of Iran Air Flight 655 which killed 290 civilians.  Although the U.S. 
paid reparations to the families, U.S. leadership, especially President George H.W. Bush, refused to 
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apologize for the incident.  Iran (Erdbrink 2019) has also suffered from terrorist attacks and 
assassinations throughout the previous decades on its own soil, some of which it attributes (rightly or 
wrongly) to the U.S., Israel, and the Mojahedin-e Khalq, a dissident group which receives considerable 
support from the U.S.  If terrorism is Iran’s primary weapon, one could also argue they have used it with 
some restraint by eschewing attacks on U.S. soil (with the exception of a bizarre and ham-handed plot to 
kill the Saudi Arabian Ambassador in 2011).  
Jefferson Morley (2019), contributor to The New Republic, investigated claims by leading U.S. 
officials and counterterrorism experts that Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was responsible for 
terrorist attacks that had killed Americans.  His finding was that the U.S. government continues to use 
1980’s Lebanon and the Iraq War as the basis for its accusations, while Sunni-affiliated groups have been 
far more dangerous since that time.  Morley’s point was not was not to let Iran off of the hook, but to 
show that official rhetoric on the U.S. side insinuates more than it delivers.   
Further complicating the issue, the term "terrorism" has been broadly expanded in the U.S. 
political lexicon to cover all forms of political violence that the U.S. selectively chooses to condemn.  
President Trump’s (The White House, 2019) 2019 designation of the IRGC as a foreign terrorist 
organization provides a case in point.  Reports suggesting that Iran has increased its support for 
terrorism (Iran’s Support for Terrorism Worldwide 2014) conflate the term with support for Assad's 
regime in Syria and support for Houthi insurgents in Yemen.  One comparison is especially telling.  U.S. 
officials (U.S. Department of State 2018) like Special Representative Brian Hook have been quick to point 
to incidents such as a foiled assassination plot against an Iranian dissident in Denmark in late 2018 as 
examples of the threat that Iran poses as a terrorist actor.  However, when Saudi officials murdered 
journalist Jamal Khashoggi in an embassy building in Istanbul less than one month earlier, President 





The country that has arguably borne the brunt of Iranian support for terrorism or proxy groups 
is Israel.  While Hezbollah has been Iran’s chief proxy in the conflict between Israel and its adversaries, 
Iran has even crossed the confessional divide and supported Sunni groups like Hamas, as well (Levitt 
2006, 6, 86).  Regardless of the actual level of Iran’s involvement in specific attacks, its complicity with 
these groups has tied it, to some degree, to most of the violence Israel has experienced since the 1990’s.  
The U.S. has long considered Israel its ally and partner in the Middle East, and some Americans 
(including not a few lawmakers) conclude the matter at this point, arguing that any threat to Israel 
automatically qualifies as a threat to U.S. national interests.  Realists, however, take a different view of 
Middle East politics.   
To begin with, is Iran is truly an existential threat to the state of Israel?  The corpus of Iranian 
rhetoric (Kessler 2011) includes the chant, “Death to Israel,” and radical Iranian leaders such as former 
President Ahmadinejad have been notoriously quoted (out of context in his case) as calling for Israel’s 
destruction.  Threats of violence should never be discounted, but a more detailed examination of 
statements by Iran's most prominent leaders, including Khomeini himself, reveal that their ideological 
issue is not with the Jewish people but with the Zionist project.  Antisemitism has been an issue at 
various historical periods in Iran (Amirpur 2012), but it is not a fixture of Iranian society, and Iran retains 
a small but loyal Jewish minority within the country.  Iranian policy has opposed the state of Israel since 
the inception of the Islamic Republic, but until Iran was excluded from the 1991 Madrid Conference 
(Haas 2019), most of this opposition was rhetorical.  Only when it saw its regional influence threatened 
did it expand its support for Hezbollah in Lebanon into a larger proxy war against Israel.  As this 
dissertation will show, none of Iran’s rhetoric (or even its creation of Hezbollah) in the 1980’s stopped 
Israel from blatantly supporting it throughout the Iran-Iraq War.  The difficulty with rhetoric is that one 
can never completely discount the threats that it carries.  However, in spite of proclamations of “death” 
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to both the U.S. and Israel, there is little evidence to suggest that Iran’s leaders have ever been willing to 
openly confront either foe in a direct manner. 
Assuming that Iranian leaders were serious about destroying Israel, could they do it?  The 
possibility of nuclear weapons aside (to be discussed in the next section), the answer is almost certainly, 
no.  Iran is not geographically contiguous to Israel, and it has little force projection capability.  Its military 
is primarily a defensive force (Chubin 2014, 79) (Cordesman 2015), and while it might prove adept at 
defending Iranian territory, it is poorly equipped in modern terms and has been stunted by years of 
sanctions.  Lacking conventional power, it has turned to asymmetric warfare and ballistic missiles as the 
cornerstones of its military power.  Iran’s best option would be to use Hezbollah, and while these forces 
showed well from a defensive standpoint in 2006 (Harel and Isacharoff 2008, 251-258), their offensive 
capability proved no match for Israeli forces.  They paid a high price for openly engaging Israel, and any 
claim on victory was pyrrhic at best.  Hezbollah undoubtedly has a large number of missiles that can 
range Israeli territory, but this was true in the 2006 campaign as well.  With Israel’s superior ground 
force and total control of the air, missile attacks were relatively limited in their effectiveness.  If Iran 
were to attack Israel, it would also find few allies, whereas Israel might quickly garner international 
support. 
Israel, on the other hand, has a state-of-the-art military.  Not only does it possess the most 
advanced warplanes available from the U.S. and Western firms, boasting stealth technology and the 
ability to range Iranian territory, but it also has the indigenous technological base to upgrade these 
aircraft further according to its own needs (Farley 2019).  Israel has its own array of ballistic and cruise 
missiles, some of which can range any part of Iran (Missile Defense Project 2018).  Additionally, Israel is 
developing a sophisticated ballistic missile defense shield with U.S. support (Williams 2019).  On the 
seas, Israel boasts a small, but formidable Navy, and its submarines can launch missiles (Boring 2019).  
Israeli land forces, while significantly smaller in number than those of Iran, have been seasoned by 
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numerous wars and skirmishes.  Finally, Israel’s intelligence and military forces have a strong track 
record for monitoring and countering the capabilities of both Hezbollah and Hamas. 
Could U.S. hostility toward Iran actually be making Israel’s security situation worse?  The 
principle behind the U.S. acting as an outside “balancer” within the Middle East is not inconsistent with 
realism, provided this balancing is required.  However, in the case of Iran, not only does Israel vastly 
overmatch them, but so do some of its Arab neighbors, as well.  In 2018, Iran spent $13.2 billion on its 
military, as opposed to Saudi Arabia’s $67.6 billion, and even the UAE, which spent $22.8 billion in 2014 
(the latest accurate figures available).  Even tiny Qatar spent $1.9 billion in 2010, and apparently a 
higher figure in the following years (Wezeman and Kuimova 2019).  Perhaps even more threatening in 
the long run, Iraq is rebuilding itself with U.S. assistance.  Each of these countries have access to U.S. and 
other Western weaponry and training.  It is widely understood that Iran’s emphasis on asymmetric 
warfare and missile capabilities is largely a product of its own attempt at balancing.  Realists like Barry 
Posen (2014) have argued that the U.S. should take a hands-off approach and allow the Middle East to 
develop a natural balance of power.  By realist logic, the U.S. may be tipping the scales too far, all but 
necessitating a military buildup by Iran.  Mahsa Rouhi (2019) made the argument in a Foreign Policy 
article that the U.S. might be wise to actually help facilitate the growth of Iran’s conventional forces, 
decreasing their sense of insecurity and turning their attention from ballistic missiles and proxy warfare. 
A final danger of tipping the scales too far with regard to Israel is danger of enabling what New 
York Times columnist Thomas Friedman (2010) referred to as “driving drunk in Jerusalem.” His point was 
that writing a blank check of support to Israel allowed them to continue building settlements and 
ensured that the Palestinian questions would never be settled fairly or peacefully.  This same principle 
could apply to international relations, as well, though.  By providing too much support to Israel, it allows 
them to stoke the fires with rivals like Iran instead of encouraging them to find more a more 
constructive approach.   
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Iran is certainly a threat to Israel.  Ideology aside, realism suggests that these two powers should 
naturally compete for regional influence and balance against each other.  While the nature and scope of 
Iran’s threat is up for debate, though, there is little indication that it has either the capability or the 
intention to carry through on threats to destroy Israel.  A U.S. policy of support for Israel does not 
require direct intervention in this conflict, nor does is necessitate an active posture of hostility against 




Perhaps the most high-profile explanation for U.S. hostility against Iran in recent years has been 
its development of a nuclear program with the potential to eventually produce nuclear weapons.  
Iranian leaders have consistently denied any intention of weaponizing its nuclear program, but until the 
signing of the Joint Comprehensive Program of Action (JPCOA) in 2015, neither did it express any 
willingness to accept constraints.  President Trump’s revocation of the JPCOA in 2018 quickly reversed 
this position (Kerr and Katzman 2018, 25-27).  The issues surrounding Iran’s nuclear program fill 
countless books and articles that far exceed the scope of this work, and this paper will not dispute that 
limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons is generally in the national interest of the United States.  
The question at hand is whether, for realists, the nuclear issue necessitates consistent U.S. hostility 
toward Iran. 
The first question to ask is whether Iran, in principle, can actually be stopped from developing 
nuclear weapons at any reasonable cost.  The examples provided by Pakistan and North Korea, both of 
which clandestinely developed nuclear weapons in collaboration with each other, suggest that 
determined actors with some level of access to state resources will eventually prevail.  The scientific 
knowledge required is unchanging and increasingly available.  Technological advances in other fields 
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create synergistic possibilities that increasingly favor aspiring entrants to the nuclear club.  President 
Obama was criticized for signing a deal with a lifespan of only 10 years, but his decision clearly reflected 
a view that delaying the inevitable was the best outcome that could be realistically achieved.  It would 
not be impossible to Iran’s progress, but the cost would apparently be very high.  To decide whether it 
might be worth it, one must consider the threat that a nuclear Iran would pose to the U.S.   
Kenneth Waltz (Sagan and Waltz 2003, 3-45), the founding father of neorealism, famously went 
on record advocating the proliferation of nuclear weapons as a positive.  He believed that these 
weapons were essentially unusable in an offensive manner, but they would have the effect of reducing 
insecurity for states like Iran.  In a manner reminiscent of the maxim that an armed society is a polite 
society, Waltz believed that nuclear weapons would encourage responsible behavior by raising the price 
of belligerent behavior to an unacceptable level, but also obviating its need for defensive purposes.  
From Waltz’s perspective, allowing Iran to acquire nuclear weapons would cause it to act more like a 
normal state.  With regard to Israel’s nuclear weapons, Iran would feel less threatened, but it would also 
be deterred.  Waltz would likely point to the example of North Korea, which geographically neighbors its 
key rival but has not remarkably increased its threat posture against it since developing nuclear 
weapons, as a case in his point.  Waltz’s position did not go uncontested, though. 
Steven David (1995) argued that, while having nuclear weapons might make some states more 
responsible, this must be judged on a case-by-case basis.  The prospect that states will become more 
rational requires the assumption that each state shares the same version of rationality, which they do 
not.  The specific concern that David’s position reflects is that states like Iran are governed by radical 
ideologies that could lead to dangerous or unpredictable decisions that defy Western conceptions of risk 
calculation.  With regard to North Korean example, they might behave today, but who knows about 
tomorrow?  Further, David (2013) contended that even rational Iranian leaders might find utility in 
employing nuclear weapons if the ruling regime were directly threatened.  Leaders prone to losing their 
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grip on power might behave in a manner that would otherwise appear erratic, and Iran’s stability has 
been in question since 1979.  Either scenario is certainly possible, and Iran is often accused of such 
forms of “irrationality.” On the other hand, observers like Paul Pillar (2016) argue that the Islamic 
Republic has demonstrated a high degree of rationality throughout its existence, within the framework 
of its own interest.  In spite of its blustering and brinksmanship, Iran has often been quite restrained 
when confronted with a direct threat.  At the state level, it certainly has not exhibited suicidal 
tendencies.   
In principle, any state (save one’s own) armed with nuclear weapons constitutes an existential 
threat to the others, not least of all Iran.  In practice, U.S. behavior has not suggested that most 
Americans view Iran this way.  It is readily apparent that the cost of preventing a nuclear Iran by 
coercion would almost certainly be military action, and even this might not achieve a lasting result.  In 
spite of considerable drum beating by lawmakers and pundits, the U.S. (since the 1980’s) has yet to 
come even close to realizing this option.  This suggests that policymakers not really considered Iran an 
existential threat (to the U.S. or Israel).  In fact, one of the keys to the Obama administration’s success 
(Cornwell 2015) in overcoming domestic opposition to the JPCOA was framing the deal as a choice 
between negotiation and war.  Obama correctly surmised that the U.S. population was not willing to 
attack Iran over its nuclear program.  Additionally, while many certainly disagreed with the JPCOA, the 
Trump administration scuttled a deal that was apparently successful in containing Iran’s nuclear 
ambitions (for the time being) in protest over other nefarious activities in the Middle East that very 
clearly did not pose an existential threat to the U.S., or even Israel for that matter.  In essence, the U.S. 
was willing to take the risk on a nuclear Iran in order to ratchet up tensions over a host of other, less 
important grievances.  This is hard to explain with realism.   
The key issue is not whether Iran’s nuclear program is actually an existential threat, but what 
U.S. behavior indicates that it believes.  If the U.S. were to treat Iran’s nuclear program like a matter of 
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national survival, worth making major sacrifices to prevent, then at least in this category, realism might 
present a more convincing argument.  Of course, President Trump’s overtures to North Korea, another 
menacing power already in possession of nuclear weapons, would then become more puzzling.  As it 
stands, the U.S.-Iranian conflict still requires another explanation.   
 
Threats to regional stability  
 A final category must be considered in order to rule out realism as a decisive explanation for 
U.S. animosity toward Iran.  Over the course of the conflict, perhaps accelerating throughout the 2010’s, 
Iran has demonstrated a thirst for regional influence.  Lacking conventional options for asserting itself, it 
has expanded on the model (and the platform) it developed with Lebanese Hezbollah and focused on 
asserting itself through asymmetric means, primarily through Shiite proxies.  This has manifested itself 
most prominently in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and (only more recently) in Afghanistan.  Tensions have 
occasionally flared with Saudi Arabia, as well, particularly in 2019 (Pamuk 2019) when an Iran struck an 
oil processing facility from an armed drone.  General Kenneth McKenzie, Commander of U.S. Central 
Command, echoed his predecessors in June 2020 (Vergun 2020) by calling Iran the “greatest threat to 
regional security and stability.” 
 The question of U.S. national interests in the greater Middle East is both complex and hotly 
contested.  Few would argue that the U.S. has any strong interest in Yemen, except for preventing Sunni 
terrorists from operating out of the country, and Iran is backing Shiites proxies with no love for Al 
Qaeda.  The Obama administration’s policy decisions with regard to Syria served to reinforce the 
argument that the U.S. has few interests in that country either, save the campaign against the Islamic 
State, which Iran supports.  Iraq is more complicated, but the U.S. had withdrawn combat troops before 
the rise of the Islamic State.  Iran deserves a great deal of the credit for saving Baghdad and reversing 
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this tide.  With regard to Iranian influence in the country, the U.S. Army’s official history of the Iraq War 
(Rayburn, et al. 2019b) concluded that the U.S., itself, had largely facilitated Iran’s gains.  If history is any 
guide, Iraqis will not long brook this level of Iranian manipulation after the U.S. leaves again, which could 
be soon.  Finally, in Afghanistan, Iran extends its interest through a long-oppressed Shiite minority with 
little expectation of significantly shaping Afghan politics.  The U.S. has been attempting to leave 
Afghanistan for nearly two decades, and President Trump promised to finish this process.   
 On the other hand, Iranian actions certainly threaten the status quo.  Iran is competing against 
the Gulf Arab States, Israel and Turkey, all generally aligned with the U.S., to foist its vision on the 
region.  Realism has no problem explaining competition between neighboring states.  The difficulty is 
ascertaining the core U.S. interests in the region and explaining how the current strategic alignment 
supports those interests in a productive manner.  Realist Critics such as Posen (2014) and Bacevich 
(2016) argue that this alignment is an artifact of days gone by, and the U.S. is wasting inordinate 
resources attempting to impose a regional order that, if it ever served U.S. interests, no longer does.  If 
this is the case, then Iran’s threat to “security and stability” is entirely subjective.  This does not excuse 
Iran’s behavior in any particular case, but it calls into question the U.S. motives for expending significant 
resources on their account. Regardless, this topic illustrates the point made previously in the discussion 
over the definition of intractable conflict.  One of the common characteristics of intractable conflict is 
that justifications driving the conflict become noticeably complicated, debatable, and potentially suspect 
in the court of public opinion.  
 This dissertation will also argue that the U.S.-led regional order in the Middle East is an 
institution, itself.  The alignment of this institution has made it virtually impossible for the U.S. to 
entertain a more productive relationship with Iran because instead of leading its clients, the U.S. has 
become trapped by their individual interest calculations.  Like any institution, this regional order has 
proven sticky, and while conditions have changed around it, this institution has perpetuated ossified 
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values and worldviews.  As Chapter 2 will explain in more depth, this has contributed to the intractability 
of the conflict between the U.S. and Iran.  Again, this does not excuse Iranian behavior, but it highlights 
a lack of strategic vision on the part of the U.S., where policymakers agree on the goal of preventing 
Iranian influence but little else in terms of a realistic positive endstate for the region.   
  
Iranian interest - What does Iran have to gain by picking fights with the U.S? 
 
That Iran would feel threatened by the U.S. is fully supported by realism.  U.S. sponsorship of 
the coup against Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953 and subsequent patronage of Shah Mohammad Reza 
Pahlavi gave Iranians a plausible concern that the U.S. might intervene directly in the Iran’s revolution 
from the very beginning of the Islamic Republic.  This has contributed to a lasting sense of insecurity 
among Iran’s rulers, especially as this new regime has struggled to establish its own legitimacy.  U.S. calls 
for regime change (implicitly but thinly veiled), throughout the years have only exacerbated this 
perception (Landler 2019).  The Carter doctrine, subsequently carried out by President Reagan, 
increased the U.S. presence and involvement throughout the Persian Gulf Region.  Two wars in Iraq, and 
one in Afghanistan have not only bolstered the U.S. presence in the region but hemmed Iran on two 
sides.  U.S. sanctions against Iran have damaged and even potentially crippled Iran’s economy, at times.  
Finally, Iran’s bellicosity against Israel has solidified a hostile relationship with what is arguably the 
region’s most powerful actor, and U.S. support for Israel has only fueled the sense of threat.   
While it may appear natural for Iran to feel threatened by the U.S., what realism cannot so easily 
explain is Iran’s reaction to this perceived threat.  From the time of the embassy takeover in 1979, Iran 
appears to have relished any opportunity to jab the U.S. in the eye.  Whether through fiery rhetoric, 
terrorism against the U.S. and Israel, attempts to undermine peace between the Israelis and 
Palestinians, or proxy wars against the U.S. and its Gulf allies, Iran has consistently provoked conflict and 
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made it easy for the U.S. to paint them as a bad actor on the world stage.  George H. W. Bush offered 
Iran that “goodwill begets goodwill” (Dowd 1989b).  This is a subjective term, and U.S. has not always 
honored the spirit of this promise.  Iran, however, seems almost deliberately to have chosen its path of 
international isolation and pariah status.   
If Iran truly considers the U.S. its greatest external threat, realism suggests that it would be 
courting allies to balance against this threat instead of isolating itself.  One could make the argument 
that Iran’s relationship with Venezuela, strong since the early 1980’s, and other non-aligned countries 
have been attempts to do exactly this.  However, these relationships have offered Iran little tangible 
benefit and appear to be little more than symbolic gestures, designed primarily to boost morale at home 
by making Iran look like it plays a global role.  Iran’s relationship with North Korea has been entirely 
transactional, and while this has helped to secure some weapons and technology, it does not appear to 
have bolstered its position within the region.  Iran’s most important alliance has been with Syria, a 
fellow pariah in the Middle East.  This partnership, especially in the development and control of 
Hezbollah, has facilitated Iran’s access to Lebanon and an avenue through which to credibly oppose 
Israel.  Syria has been the main beneficiary in this relationship, benefiting from Iran’s largesse while Iran 
has attempted to expand its influence.  None of these relationships has bolstered Iran against U.S. 
interference, and most have antagonized its foe to some degree.   
While it is true that Iran has derived certain tactical benefits from a limited array of 
partnerships, this pattern seems to represent a dearth of strategic thinking.  If Iran’s actions reflect an 
aspiration to regional dominance or hegemony, realism would predict an approach more like that of the 
former Shah – courting favor with the U.S. in order to undercut support for regional rivals and reduce 
the role that America plays as an external balancer.  Instead, Iran has played the provocateur, 
incessantly looking for opportunities to stir trouble within neighboring countries.  Rather than deriving a 
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benefit from these actions, they have effectively driven their adversaries into the arms of the U.S. and 
increased their own isolation.   
One could argue (as did Takeyh 2012) that it has always been in the interest of the Islamic 
Republic, especially its leadership, to have an external enemy, in order to unify the population and 
distract them from domestic grievances.  There is almost certainly merit to this argument, but this also 
challenges the realist worldview, which sees states as unitary actors with a coherent set of interests. 
This chapter will discuss theories that allow for a bifurcation of interest between the population and the 
leadership at a later point.  In the meantime, assuming a broad need for an external enemy might 
explain certain decisions during certain periods, but it cannot cover four decades, and it cannot answer 
the question – why the U.S?  Iran had an external enemy in Saddam Hussein throughout the 1980’s who 
was also an enemy of both the U.S. and Israel.  Would not an olive leaf toward the U.S. have helped 
ensure, if nothing else, that the Western world would have enforced their stated neutrality and 
refrained from supporting Iraq?   
Ultimately, the Iranian case for hostility against the U.S. is even weaker in light of realism than 
the other way around.  Debatable though they are, the U.S. can point to definable interests as a 
justification for its policies in opposition to Tehran.  Iran, on the other hand leans primarily on 
ideological arguments and historical narratives that simply do not fit the interest-based framework of 
realism.  It is worth noting, however, that realism is an inherently Western concept.  Neorealism in 
particular (rooted in the works of Kenneth Waltz), is anchored in a materialist worldview that assumes 
the modern nation-state system as a universal norm.  A discussion of Iranian views with respect to the 
concept of realism is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but it suffices to observe that Iranian leaders 
have rarely been compelled to articulate their national interests in a format compatible with Western 
sensibilities.  In any regard, Iran’s belligerence has acted like a self-fulfilling prophecy, increasing U.S. 
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opposition against it without attracting significant support for its cause.  Such behavior would be 
puzzling in any culture or society. 
 
Cost of the conflict to the U.S. 
 
The cost of the U.S. conflict with Iran is difficult to accurately quantify.  Military deployments, 
including land, air, and naval forces are very expensive, but it is almost impossible to parse out a 
percentage that should be attributed directly to Iran.  Most deployments serve multiple priorities, some 
are classified, and there is also a considerable sunk cost to account for (the same ships and aircraft 
would be operating somewhere else if not the Middle East).  You can measure the number 
servicemembers lost, but especially in Lebanon and Iraq, it was indigenous forces that primarily engaged 
U.S. troops.  They might have been less effective without Iranian support, but some of the same attacks 
would probably have happened regardless.  You can also measure the amount of military assistance 
provided to regional allies who help balance against Iran, but again, this reflects multiple agendas. 
Economic sanctions have been a key part of the U.S. policy toward Iran, though, and their 
effects are easier to estimate empirically.  Most studies regarding sanctions focus on the impact to the 
target country.  The National Iranian American Council (NIAC) (Leslie, et al. 2014, 3), however, examined 
the cost to the U.S. of its sanctions on Iran, specifically focused on lost export revenue.  In their 
assessment, between 1995 and 2012 alone, the U.S. sacrificed between $134.7 and $173.5 billion dollars 
in trade that never took place, and because the Iranian economy would have been healthier, these 
numbers could have been considerably higher in reality.  Further, this trade would have resulted in 
between 51,043 and 66,436 additional jobs each year for the U.S.  While the model used by this report is 
only one method for estimating the cost of sanctions to the U.S. economy, and the numbers can always 
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be disputed, the fact remains that long-term economic sanctions have been more costly for the U.S. to 
wield than commonly advertised.   
Another disturbing cost of the protracted use of economic sanctions against Iran is the 
likelihood that their use will weaken U.S. position centrality within the global economy.  As pointed out 
by Gjoza (2019), the U.S. benefits tremendously from the status of the dollar as a universal reserve 
currency, and it also controls the levers of the international banking apparatus that allows those dollars 
to move.  The U.S. has applied sanctions to entities in dozens of countries around the world, and the 
effectiveness of sanctions designed to target Iran have been particularly worrying to friends and allies 
alike.  This has prompted a number of powerful nations, especially China, but also increasingly European 
across Europe, to begin developing alternative financial systems that reduce their dependence on the 
U.S.  These efforts are still nascent, but they have the potential to vastly reduce the economic freedom 
of action that U.S. has come to take for granted. 
Perhaps the greatest costs to the U.S. of sustaining this conflict with Iran are actually the ones 
most subjective, opportunity costs.  These costs are better described than estimated empirically.  From 
an economic standpoint, lost revenue aside, Iran offers tremendous investment opportunities.  Their 
commercial aviation system has been antiquated and crumbling for years.  With many of Iran’s 
airframes originally built by Boeing, this corporation has long eyed Iran as a prime investment 
opportunity.  After the JPCOA, Boeing signed a $17 billion deal with Iran, but this was subsequently 
scrapped as the Trump administration re-imposed sanctions in 2018 (Mufson 2018).  Iran’s ground 
transportation networks have been similarly challenged, although recent advances such as the 
underground metro system in Tehran, have benefitted Chinese corporations instead American (TCA 
2019).   
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From a diplomatic standpoint, America’s row with Iran has consumed a tremendous amount of 
symbolic capital and goodwill.  Aside from the constant effort required to threaten and cajole existing 
NATO allies (at the cost of undermining the original purpose for the alliance), the U.S. has been forced to 
court Russia and China for favors in supporting its initiatives against Iran.  Realists would argue that 
these are the countries that the U.S. should be balancing against instead, and currying favors to help 
punish Iran is a distraction.  Finally, in staking its position against Iran, the U.S. has committed itself to 
sometimes unsavory alliances with actors like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, 
removing a degree of strategic flexibility to pursue other interests.   
When looking at opportunity costs, one should also consider some counterfactuals.  What if the 
U.S. had partnered with Iran during its operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria instead of fighting 
against the grain to counter Iranian influence?  Certainly, in Iraq, the number of casualties would have 
been lower.  One could argue that increased Iranian influence would have turned Iraq into an Iranian 
client state.  However, the U.S. Army’s official history of Iraq (Rayburn, et al. 2019b) concluded that this 
largely happened anyway.  Further, the rate limitation on effective Iranian power in Iraq has not been 
U.S. action, but instead, the sentiments of the Iraqis themselves (such Moqtada Al Sadr, who has both 
accepted Iranian largess and yet often held Iran at arm’s length).   
In Afghanistan, the U.S. could have used Iran as a counterweight to Pakistani interference.  The 
Iranians have long accepted that their own influence among the unruly Afghan tribes is limited, but their 
understanding of Afghan politics probably exceeds that of the U.S.  In Syria, the U.S. and Iran tacitly 
cooperated toward a common enemy, the (so called) Islamic State.  What benefits could open 
cooperation have provided?  Another important place to consider counterfactual analysis is with regard 
to Iran’s nuclear program.  If the U.S. had chosen to offer carrots instead of sticks, the U.S. might have 
provided very appealing incentives for Iran to place its nuclear program under international 
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accountability from an early stage, while still keeping the cost of these inducements far lower than the 
eventual costs of punishment and conflict.   
 
Cost of the conflict to Iran  
 
Iran has borne a direct cost for its belligerency toward the U.S. from the earliest days of the 
Islamic Republic.  Economic sanctions have been the most consistent and ever-present reminders of this 
price through the years, although varying in scope and form.  The most studied period of sanctions 
occurred between 2011 and the present (with a partial respite in 2016 and 2017 because of the JPCOA), 
when the U.S. successfully pressured the international community to isolate Iran economically.  Per the 
Congressional Research Service (Katzman 2019, 61-65), sanctions have hobbled Iran’s economy by 15-20 
percent per year, fostered an unemployment rate around 20 percent, spurred inflation as high as 60 
percent, and decimated the value of Iran’s currency.  Iran has the second largest proven oil reserve in 
the world, but export restrictions between 2018 and the first half of 2019 limited Iranian oil output to 
350,000 barrels per day and cost the country an estimated $50 billion dollars over the 2017 figure (when 
oil flowed unimpeded).  Iranian access the currency reserves it needs to conduct oil transactions has 
been limited or denied, and perhaps most damaging in the long run, Iran has not been able to garner the 
investment that its oil industry needs to maintain production levels in future years.  This economic 
damage and the lack of access to imported goods has impacted most areas of Iran’s economy including 
manufacturing, banking, and transportation, especially commercial aviation (Nadimi 2019). 
Does this mean that Iran is a basket case because of its propensity for conflict?  Some headlines 
have suggested this as the case when focusing on sensational figures or incidents of unrest.  However, 
Iran has also developed an extensive and ever-expanding array of coping mechanism for dealing with 
the sanctions.  This has included (Katzman 2019, 62-63) export diversification, import substitution, 
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partial privatization of economic interests, subsidy reductions, import restrictions, and currency 
controls.  Harris (2017) points out that, since the revolution, not only has Iran maintained a rate of 
growth consistent with many other developing nations, but it has also developed an impressive and 
effective welfare state, education system, and healthcare sector.  Iran’s economy has suffered from a 
number of ills since 1979, and both the sanctions and isolation resulting from its conflict with the U.S. 
have played a role in this.  But as even Katzman (2019, summary) acknowledged, sanctions have not 
brought the country to its knees or altered its behavior. 
In gauging the real cost of the conflict to Iran, one must turn again to counterfactuals.  With the 
world’s second largest proven oil reserves, what could Iran look like today if it had chosen a more 
cooperative path?  Certainly, if Iran has been able to scrape out middle-of-the-road status as a 
developing nation in spite of its international isolation, the massive revenues it has sacrificed could only 
have helped propel it far beyond this meager state of existence.  With proper investment, its oil output 
might rival Saudi Arabia by now.  If Iran had normalized relations with the outside world from the 
beginning of its revolution, it may have had access to Western technology and support, potentially 
shortening the Iran-Iraq War in its favor.  Much as the former Shah achieved de facto hegemony in the 
Persian Gulf, Iran’s current rulers might be realizing their apparent dreams of great power status, 
supported by, instead of contested by the Western world. 
A final point to consider when examining the cost of this conflict to Iran pertains to its stated 
goal of international independence, one of the chief values its revolution.  While Iran’s defiant stance 
has often attempted to portray its autonomy, its international isolation has instead made it more 
dependent on the countries willing to do business with it, China in particular (Siddiqui 2019).  Iran’s 
relationship with China may be transactional, but with limited options available, it is China that holds the 
cards.  International isolation has also forced Iran to consider dealing with Russia (Erlich 2019).  Russia 
and Iran have a tumultuous history, and Russian forces have occupied parts of Iran at various periods 
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during the past two centuries.  Not only would Iran’s reliance on Russia defy its policy of “neither East 
nor West,” but it would also defy the tenets of realism, as Russian power poses a more proximate threat 
to Iran than does the U.S.  If Iran was truly as concerned about independence as advertised, a path of 
international engagement and diversification would have been far more effective than conflict. 
 
Realism and the U.S.-Iranian conflict 
 This discussion has not been a direct critique realism itself, but a starting point for 
demonstrating that the intractable conflicts (particularly that between the U.S. and Iran) are a puzzle 
that requires a new framework for explanation.  Realism, like any theory or family of theories, is a lens 
for viewing the world.  It offers tools for analyzing situations – interstate conflict in this case.  For 
realism, these tools center around a materialistic, rational-choice conception of utility-based 
calculations regarding interest.  Its tenets and prescriptions fit most every case to some degree, and 
some particular cases to a much greater degree.  As with the previous discussion of interest, though, 
realism’s fit to a particular case will always be subjective.  Proponents of realism can bend the theory to 
support almost any position, and critics will always challenge their position.  This does not mean that 
theory development is a futile enterprise, though.  Analysts weigh the utility of lenses by their 
explanatory power.  They judge this capacity by applying the tools provided.  If the tools leave more 
questions than answers, then the utility of the lens is limited.  It must be replaced or augmented with 
another lens.   
 Intractable conflict offers such a challenge to realism.  Under this paradigm, conflict exists 
because of a clash of interests between states.  It continues until the interests are resolved or one side 
vanquishes the other.  Intractability is simply the space between.  In practice, though, this is not always 
how conflicts play out.  As the U.S.-Iranian conflict demonstrates, actors will sometimes perpetuate a 
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conflict even when a strong argument can be made on both sides that the cost is greater than any 
potential gain, leading to mutually hurting stalemates.  Hostility also shapes and crafts the interests of 
participants.  Further, the interests most served by a protracted conflict are often limited to smaller 
sections of society, belying the concept of a unified national interest as the justification for hostility.  The 
next section will show that this is well-trodden intellectual territory, but common theoretical 
frameworks designed to augment realism also fall short of a satisfying explanation.  It will also explain 
why an institutional approach to the problem provides greater utility.   
 
Explanations That Fall Short 
If realism has not ultimately triumphed over the course of this 40-year relationship, why is this 
the case?  This section will turn first to prominent realists and examine their own explanations for this 
apparent breakdown of their theoretical framework, then continue to examine other explanations 
commonly given for the intractability of this conflict.  It will explain why, though each is incisive to a 
degree, they ultimately fall sort of providing a comprehensive explanation.   
  
Liberal hegemony 
If the U.S.-Iranian relationship cannot be readily explained by realism, what then accounts for 
this aberration in international relations?  Leading realists argue that U.S. foreign policy has not 
conformed to the tenets of realism for several decades, especially in regard to the Middle East.  Instead, 
the U.S. has been seduced by a concept that has come to be known as “liberal hegemony.” While the 
precise origin of the term is difficult to ascertain, Barry Posen credited his own use of the term as a 
reference to G. J. Ikenberry’s “liberal hegemonic order” (Posen 2014, 5).  Ikenberry (2011, 2, 3, 8, 22-32, 
336-342), a leading proponent of liberalism, outlined the concept in in his Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, 
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Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order.  After World War II, the U.S., as the most 
powerful state in the international system, led the creation of a new world order reflecting its own 
political and economic values by agreeing to cede some of its power to a new set of institutions.  In 
allowing itself to be so bound, the U.S. made its own leadership palatable to weaker states and paved 
the way for international cooperation and prosperity.  While the Ikenberry used the term “hegemony” 
to describe the inexorable momentum of this system and its expansion, it was not, for him, a pejorative.   
This American-led system of order contrasted favorably against alternatives like imperialism and great 
power politics, and Ikenberry credited the liberal hegemonic order for much of the peace and prosperity 
experienced since WWII.  He also conceded that this world order was under challenge, and that the 
unilateral tendencies of the George W. Bush administration had exacerbated these difficulties, but 
ultimately, the liberal order remained both potent and unrivaled in its appeal. 
For realists, however, the term liberal hegemony represents a misguided exercise in utopian 
thinking.  John Mearsheimer, one of its foremost critics, explained why the application of liberalism to 
foreign policy is so dangerous.  Liberal hegemony is based upon three, seemingly benign tenets.  
Economic interdependence reduces the likelihood of conflict, democracies do not fight each other, and 
international institutions enhance the prospects of cooperation and reduce the likelihood of war 
(Mearsheimer 2014, 15-17).  While each of these tenets are eminently debatable, what is very clear is 
that their prospects depend upon a community of like-minded states.  For this reason, liberalism itself is 
inherently expansionist (Mearsheimer 2018, 137-139).  Further, the human rights values enshrined in 
liberalism undermine the entire concept of state sovereignty, as liberal states identify the need to 
advocate for rights of citizens in other states.  This combination can result in militarism and coercion, as 
illiberal states are deemed illegitimate and increasingly toxic to the world order (Mearsheimer 2018, 
152-156).  In a multipolar system, states are constrained by balance of power politics that limits the 
ambitions of liberal hegemony, however, as Mearsheimer pointed out, 
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… occasionally a liberal democracy encounters such a favorable balance of power that it is able to 
embrace liberal hegemony. That situation is most likely to arise in a unipolar world, where the 
single great power does not have to worry about being attacked by another great power since 
there is none. Then the liberal sole pole will almost always abandon realism and adopt a liberal 
foreign policy. Liberal states have a crusader mentality hardwired into them that is hard to 
restrain (Mearsheimer 2018, 2). 
Barry Posen (2014, 1-11) explained how this concept took root in U.S. politics.  Posen described 
liberal hegemony as a “grand strategy” for the U.S., or a unifying theory for how the U.S. addresses its 
national security threats.  A grand strategy is not always written, but it is often understood to reflect the 
prevailing consensus within the policy community.  According to Posen, the grand strategy of liberal 
hegemony took root with the fall of the Soviet Union but only fully blossomed after the attacks of 
September 11, 2001 with the convergence of two foreign policy camps.  The first advocated cooperative 
security, the liberal internationalist idea that institutions would bind states, and that this coalition would 
collectively address threats to its order.  The second camp called for U.S. “primacy,” seeing the U.S. as 
the key to global security and necessitating a significant overmatch against all potential competitors.  
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s summarized the resulting worldview succinctly when she 
dubbed the U.S. as the “indispensable nation.” For Posen, this grand strategy has been the primary 
driver of U.S. hostility toward its adversaries since the end of the Cold War, especially in the Middle East. 
Stephen Walt described liberal hegemony in perhaps the most damning terms, portraying U.S. 
foreign policy since the Cold War as a string of costly failures punctuated only occasionally by bright 
spots.  His work, The Hell of Good Intentions: America's Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. 
Primacy, questioned why the U.S. population has been willing to underwrite the poor performance of 
liberal hegemony for so long.  First, he pointed out (Walt 2018, 61) that liberal values are hardwired into 
the country’s political consciousness, and its rhetoric resonates with core American values. As noted by 
Mearsheimer (2014, 23-27) as well, Americans prefer to talk like liberals even when they are acting like 
realists.  Most importantly for Walt, however, it was the foreign policy establishment that sold liberal 
hegemony to the American people and sustained its momentum.  He stated that, “Liberal hegemony, in 
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short, was a full-employment policy for the foreign policy elite and a path of least resistance for groups 
seeking to convince the U.S. government to do something somewhere far away on behalf of somebody 
else (Walt 2018, 15).” To this end, the establishment inflated the threats posed by selected adversaries 
and exaggerated the benefits of action, while all the time concealing the true costs of their policies.  In a 
liberal, Manichean fashion, they painted adversaries as irrational or evil, operating on the wrong side of 
history (Walt 2018, 137-180). 
What does liberal hegemony have to do with the U.S.-Iranian relationship?  According to Posen 
(2014, 5), there are three main sources of threat to liberal hegemony: failed states, rogue states, and 
illiberal peer competitors.  Iran is not a failed state, and it is certainly does not qualify as a peer 
competitor with the U.S.  Rogue states, however, are dangerous because they have interests radically 
inconsistent with the liberal order and may use violence or develop nuclear weapons in order to pursue 
them.  Rogue states are also prone to becoming failed states because of the misguided policies of their 
leadership.  Whether using the term “rogue” or not, successive U.S. administrations since the 
establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979 have categorized Iran in exactly this fashion.  Liberal 
hegemony does not recognize the legitimacy of Iran’s government, it cannot tolerate its challenge to 
Western conceptions of human rights, and Iran’s nuclear ambitions and support for terrorism 
demonstrate that it is a danger to the liberal order.   
Realists like Mearsheimer, Posen, and Walt would undoubtedly argue that liberal hegemony is 
the root of hostility between the U.S. and Iran.  Further, while the U.S. and Iran clashed directly in late 
80’s, most of the confrontation has taken place in the diplomatic realm, where the U.S. has striven 
mightily to build international pressure on Iran while generally eschewing direct engagement.  Flynt and 
Hillary Leverett (2013, 301-307) explained how liberal hegemony advocates have undermined diplomacy 
from two directions.  Neoconservatives (representing Posen’s “primacy” camp) have preferred to pursue 
liberal hegemony through military might and direct pressure.  Liberal internationalists, on the other 
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hand, have pursued the same goals, but they have placed greater value on diplomacy.  The problem, 
according to the Leveretts, is that even this camp actually uses diplomacy as a fig-leaf to garner 
international support for blatant coercion.  Mearsheimer (2018, 157-158) postulated that liberalism 
makes it harder to conduct diplomacy, especially when liberal states feel they have the upper hand, 
because these states do not fundamentally respect illiberal states and recognize their legitimacy.  Some 
Iranians would doubtless agree with Mearsheimer that the chief stumbling block in the U.S.-Iranian 
relationship is this inability and unwillingness on the part of the U.S. to recognize and accept core 
Iranian interests.   
Ikenberry (2011, 245, 268) himself (a liberal, not a realist), as the leading proponent for liberal 
hegemony, did not directly address the conflict between the U.S. and Iran, but he did provide some key 
insights.  In Ikenberry’s view, the problem with U.S. foreign policy was not liberal hegemony itself, but 
the fact that the U.S. was steadily sliding away from this approach.  In Ikenberry’s view, unipolarity since 
the end of the Cold War had allowed the U.S. to focus more on hegemony and less on liberalism, 
coercing other countries but not allowing itself to be bound by rules it imposed.  Similar to the Leveretts, 
he argued that liberal hegemony had been supplanted by “conservative nationalism.” This tendency had 
always grown side-by-side with liberalism throughout the Cold War, but had been set aside at critical 
junctures, allowing for the construction of the liberal hegemonic order.  Ikenberry argued that, 
especially under the George W. Bush administration, the power of attraction had been replaced by the 
force of compulsion, calling into question the very foundation of the liberal hegemonic order.  If this 
were applied to the U.S.-Iranian relationship, Ikenberry might contend that the U.S. had removed the 
incentives for Iran’s cooperation while simultaneously forcing it into a corner, where hostility was its 
only option.1   
 
1 Authors from the liberal camp have spent little time dissecting the conflict between the U.S. and Iran.  Instead, they have 
produced extensive literature on the topic of democracy and political reform in Iran.  While these topics are beyond the scope 
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While the liberal hegemony arguments have merit in describing a strand of the conflict between 
the U.S. and Iran, it cannot provide a comprehensive explanation for its intractability.  It does not 
explain why the U.S. has consistently supported Saudi Arabia, an unapologetically authoritarian regime, 
throughout the same period of time that it has maintained hostility towards Iran.  For that matter, the 
U.S. has supported illiberal regimes throughout the Middle East, and the end of the Cold War did not 
change this.  By many accounts, Iran is one of the most democratic states in the region.  Iranian 
democracy is often criticized as a sham or a façade because ultimate power resides with the unelected 
organs of government, but this fails to account for developments like the surprise election of 
Mohammad Khatami in in 1997.  Far from being a rubber stamp for Iran’s supreme leader, Khatami’s 
reform movement championed many of the values cherished by liberals and sparked a power struggle 
that transformed Iranian politics in many ways.  According to the argument of libel hegemony, this 
opening should have prompted a softening in the U.S. position toward Iran, but this did not occur in any 
meaningful sense.   
Liberal hegemony also falls short of explaining the U.S.-Iranian relationship because it did not 
take shape until after the end of the Cold War.  Hostility between the U.S. and Iran began in 1979 and 
intensified over the next decade, reaching a peak during the tanker war in 1987 when military forces on 
both sides physically attacked each other.  It might be argued that Cold War exigencies took precedent 
prior to the fall of the Soviet Union, but both U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and the Iranian 
Republican Guard Corps developed into viable and mutually antagonistic forces during the decade prior.  
Mearsheimer argued that Soviet competition constrained the U.S. toward realism throughout the 
 
of this dissertation, the inference that one may draw is a belief that Iran’s external behavior is simply a byproduct of its 
anachronistic and illiberal governance.  However, various forms of autocracy are not uncommon, even in the modern world.  
There is little evidence to suggest that any particular type of government is especially prone to patterns of intractable conflict.   
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1980’s, but he did not explain the continuity between realists and liberals that maintained the 
antagonism toward Iran, even as Khomeini’s death reset conditions in Iran for the 1990’s.  
Even if liberal hegemony could explain the totality of the U.S. position during this time period, it 
has little explanatory power regarding Iranian action.  It cannot explain Iran’s commitment to Hezbollah 
and Hamas in their struggles against Israel.  It cannot explain why Iran would continue to support 
terrorism against the U.S. and its interests during the 1990’s, even while attempting to create openings 
for engagement.  It cannot explain Iran’s decision to restart its nuclear program, even while offering and 
olive branch to the U.S. after the attacks of September 11, 2001. 
An institutional approach to the conflict does not ignore the forces discussed within liberal 
hegemony arguments, but it incorporates them into a larger picture.  Liberal hegemonistic inclinations, 
along with conservative nationalist tendencies, influenced the development of institutions in the U.S. 
(and to some extent in Iran).  These combined in a synergistic fashion with institutional forces at work in 
Iran to develop a system.  The overarching institution of animosity requires mutual construction, so 
theories focused on the actions or ideologies of one side will not explain intractability.   
  
We made our own bed. 
An underlying theme to the argument of liberal hegemony is that the U.S. has created its own 
enemies.  This is a central premise of Andrew Bacevich’s work America’s War for the Greater Middle 
East: A Military History.  Bacevich (2016, 362-365) argued that the U.S., through its own policies and 
actions, has sparked or exacerbated much of the hostility that it has encountered since the Carter 
administration, especially in the greater Middle East.  The U.S. wrongly assumed that power to act came 
with the necessary wisdom required to successfully shape outcomes.  This was underpinned by a sense 
of the inevitability of the victory of liberal values.  Walt (2018, 137-180) expanded on this theme by 
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arguing that the U.S. foreign policy establishment deliberately downplayed the blowback or second-
order effects of foreign intervention, ignoring the role that the U.S. played in fueling the threats it faced. 
Applying this logic specifically to Iran, Bacevich and Walt would likely argue that Iranian hostility 
toward the U.S. has primarily been a reaction to U.S. provocation and interventions.  Certainly, the U.S. 
has applied sanctions and other forms of diplomatic and economic pressure against Iran since the 
inception of the Islamic Republic, orchestrating its isolation on the international stage.  The U.S. 
supported its mortal enemy, Iraq, in a devastating eight-year war, shot down a passenger airliner during 
a skirmish with Iranian naval forces, and perpetrated at least one cyber-attack of considerable 
proportions.  While this list of hostile actions could continue, perhaps most importantly, the U.S. has 
openly challenged the legitimacy of Iran’s leaders and their system of government and advocated 
regime change on numerous occasions.  One must concede that Iranian leaders might feel threatened 
and insulted with some cause. 
The first problem with this this approach to explaining the hostility between the U.S. and Iran is 
that it strips Iranians of their agency.  They are reduced to passive actors, merely reflecting the 
initiatives taken by the more powerful player in the game.  Such a view ignores the interests and 
intentions of Iranian power brokers and rests on the unsupportable assumption that, if the U.S. had just 
left Iran alone, there would be no reason for the present conflict.  The historical record, however, 
suggests that not only does Iran have agency, but as with the U.S., multiple factions seek their interests 
at the same time.  Numerous examples abound, but the Islamic Republic was born in the fires of 
factional conflict, largely between the leftists and Khomeini’s Islamists.  The takeover of the U.S. 
Embassy in November 1979 was perpetrated by students, probably without Khomeini’s knowledge.  
While the initial motivation of the students may have related to the U.S. decision to admit the deposed 
Shah for medical treatment, Khomeini’s support for the takeover, and the 444 day ordeal that resulted 
were almost entirely a product of Iran’s internal power struggle, in which Khomeini consolidated his 
38 
 
position as the undisputed leader of Iran.  Khomeini harnessed a well-spring of popular discontent 
having little to do with any recent U.S. action and weaponized it to defeat his leftist challengers. 
Second, if one were to accept such an approach, then one must also consider that the Iranians 
have shaped the U.S. by their actions just as much as the other way around.  For example, it is almost 
certain that the horror and humiliation produced by the hostage crisis reduced the political options 
available to the Reagan administration in dealing with Iran, and ripple effects have been felt by every 
administration since.  It would therefore be just as correct to say that Iranians have made their own bed 
through their hostility against the U.S.  In fact, Takeyh (2012) makes this argument that this was entirely 
intentional on Iran’s part.  Provocations against the U.S. were not just a tragic byproduct of factional 
infighting, but a deliberate campaign by Khomeini and his team to transform the U.S. into the image of 
the antagonist required by their revolutionary ideology.   
To explain how the conflict between the U.S. and Iran became intractable using this approach, 
one must simultaneously reconcile three key propositions.  First, we made our own bed.  Second, they 
made their own bed.  Third, events outside the bedroom transpired to make the bed look like this.  
Combining the first two propositions is the essence of mutual construction, a key principle in 
institutional theory.  Adding the third necessitates an understanding of the institutional dynamics that 
will be discussed in Chapter 2.   
  
We just don’t understand each other. 
Another common explanation for the inability of the U.S. and Iran to find a basis for cooperation 
is the assertion that the two sides misunderstand each other.  This is a culturally based argument which 
assumes that if either side could truly comprehend the other’s point of view, then both would find 
common ground.  In making these assertions, the onus is usually placed upon the U.S. to “get it.”  
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Rouhollah Ramazani (2013, 2-3), a leading scholar on Iranian foreign policy, lamented how the U.S. 
pattern of obtuse thinking with regard to Iran long predated the 1979 revolution and cost the U.S. 
multiple opportunities for a more productive relationship, especially in the early days of the present 
regime.  Ramazani (2013, 353) also decried America’s collective inattention to history.  This reflects both 
a lack of historical knowledge regarding the issues at hand and also a cultural disdain for placing 
importance on things that happened in the past.  An example of this might be criticizing Iran for fixating 
on America’s involvement in the 1953 coup against Mohammad Mossadegh.  To his credit, Ramazani 
(2013, 51) also brought up the fact that Iranians have their own mythology with regard to the U.S., and 
this started under the Shah’s regime. 
Does the U.S. suffer from a lack of understanding with regard to Iran?  It may, but literature 
explaining the Iranian viewpoint is not in short supply.  Ramazani’s (2013, 354-358) own book provided a 
laundry list of key points for officials seeking to understand Iran.  Ambassador John Limbert (2009, 
Chapter 6), one of the U.S. embassy hostages in 1979 and a lifelong scholar of Iran, outlined 14 points 
for success in a larger work that wrestled with the differences in perception between the two sides.  The 
list of academic and think tank resources offering similar perspectives is lengthy.  If the American side of 
the conflict has both the information and the experts required to understand Iran, what is preventing 
the U.S. from “getting it?” Anthropologist Negar Razavi (2019) answered this question by suggesting that 
those who find their way into positions of official influence tend to lack Iran expertise, and the coterie of 
trusted “Iranian experts” from which they routinely take advice lacks significant credentials and draws 
poorly on the available body of knowledge.  This is undoubtedly true in some cases, but credentials are a 
coveted commodity in policy circles, and expertise is not as rare as Razavi suggests.  Further, the policy 
community in D.C. is highly networked.  Silos certainly exist, but they are by no means rigid. 
Flynt and Hilary Leverett (2013, 285-327) provided their own explanation for this phenomenon 
in their work, arguing that the U.S. foreign policy establishment has fallen under the sway of “myths and 
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mythmakers” regarding Iran.  In the Leveretts’s view, the American understanding of Iran has been 
crafted by neoconservatives, liberal internationalists, expatriate groups (especially the Mojahedin-e 
Khalq, or M.E.K.), and Israeli interest groups.  Not only have these groups painted the Iranian regime as 
illegitimate, irrational, and dangerous, but they have stifled dissenting views by portraying those who 
disagree as Iranian apologists or collaborators.  In this case, the silos do not represent a lack of 
understanding but an unwillingness to consider other views. 
It is readily apparent that some degree of bifurcation exists between ideologues and those 
possessing a deep understanding of Iran in the U.S., but does this mean that a lack of understanding 
offers the primary explanation for the conflict?  First, with an open market for ideas and an academic 
community that ultimately educates each generation of America’s leaders, the lack of understanding 
would have to be willful.  A willful lack of understanding would require a deeper explanation than the 
seduction of a mythology.  Second, two parties can understand each other perfectly and still 
fundamentally disagree.  For instance, no degree of understanding with regard to Iran’s rights, 
grievances, or intentions is likely to convince hawkish American policymakers that a nuclear armed Iran 
is anything less than a threat. 
Another point that Ramazani missed is that Americans fixate on history, as well.  Most 
Americans today were not born yet when Iran took 52 American citizens hostage in the U.S. embassy in 
Tehran, but Americans still associate this incident with their image of Iran.  Further, the 1983 bombing 
of the Marine barracks in Beirut is never far from the discussion when Iran is described as the “leading 
state sponsor of terror” (Morley 2019).  One could argue that mythmakers have weaponized these 
events for their own purposes, but Iranian acts of aggression did occur, and the American memory is not 
so short as some would make it out to be.   
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An institutional approach to this conflict harnesses both history and mythology in a larger 
framework, effectively bypassing thorny questions regarding the line between the two.  
Misunderstandings and grievances serve as building blocks for the conflict.  Incessant arguments over 
culpability and blame need not be resolved, only properly identified for what they are.    
 
Israeli influence  
Yet another prominent explanation for the intractable nature of the conflict between the U.S. 
and Iran is the influence of the state of Israel and its lobbying apparatus on the U.S. government and 
society.  Trita Parsi, in his work, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the U.S., 
made the case that Israel has almost singlehandedly built the framework through which U.S. 
policymakers view Iran.  Parsi (2007, 2-4, 157-171) argued that the defeat of Saddam Hussein’s military 
by coalition forces in 1991 prompted a strategic pivot by both Israel and Iran.  Before this time, in spite 
of Khomeini’s anti-Israeli rhetoric and support for Hezbollah, the two states quietly cooperated and 
maintained extensive ties, especially during the Iran-Iraq War.  However, the neutering of Iraq as the 
primary source of threat to both parties changed their strategic calculus.  Iran was now free to explore 
its regional ambitions, and Israel shifted focus, identifying Iran as the greatest threat to its own position 
of regional dominance.  Perhaps more importantly, the Israelis feared that their international image as 
an embattled underdog was now in jeopardy, and without an existential threat, U.S. support would 
become more conditional, reducing Israeli freedom of maneuver with regard to the Palestinian 
question.  Recognizing the need to demonstrate a clear and present danger, Israel began to sow a new 
narrative with regard to Iran, pushing the mythology that Iranian leaders were irrational, fanatical, and 
even suicidal in their religious zealotry and hatred of both Israel and the West.   
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Parsi (2007, 175-189) described how Israel developed its influence campaign with the U.S. 
government.  Not only did it directly engage government officials through diplomatic channels, but it 
also leveraged civil society networks and especially its lobbying apparatus, spearheaded by the 
American Israeli Political Action Committee (AIPAC), which Parsi dubbed the “king of lobbies.”  Israel’s 
goal was to isolate Iran diplomatically and limit its regional influence, and especially to delegitimize any 
role it might attempt to play in negotiations with the Palestinians.  In response, Iran stepped up its 
terrorist activity and support for Palestinian terrorist groups in the 1990’s, a move which only bolstered 
the mythology that Israel intended to perpetuate.  For Parsi, this trend has largely continued unabated 
to the present day.  In a subsequent work, he (Parsi 2017, 156-160) explained how Israeli Prime Minister 
Benjamin Netanyahu pushed this strategy into overdrive with regard to the conflict over Iran’s nuclear 
program, even attempting to push the U.S. and Iran to the brink of war in an effort to undermine any 
possibility of a peaceful settlement.   
As with several other potential explanations for the endurance of the conflict between the U.S. 
and Iran, Parsi’s approach is compelling because it is based on widely accepted facts.  One need look no 
further than the newspaper headlines to recognize that Israel has demonstrated a tremendous amount 
of influence over U.S. politics, and AIPAC, in particular, has distinguished itself as one of the most 
powerful lobbies in Washington, D.C.  Israel’s own conflict with Iran is well documented, and politicians 
like Netanyahu have been beating the drum with remarkable consistency.  Israel must, therefore, play 
an important role in explaining the conflict between the U.S. and Iran.  The key question is whether 
Israeli influence is fully sufficient to account for the depth and breadth of the animosity that has 
endured between these states since 1979. 
The first problem one encounters in leaning primarily on Israeli influence to explain this conflict 
is one of temporality.  Parsi’s (2007, 95-109, 115-126) historical narrative explained that Iran and Israel 
were silent partners to a large degree during the 1980’s.  Israel provided arms to Iran, even irking the 
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U.S. at times, such as when Prime Minister Begin approved a shipment during the early days of the 
hostage crisis in 1980.  Israel also helped facilitate the ill-fated arms-for-hostages deal which turned into 
the Iran-Contra Affair.  For Iran’s part, most of its rhetoric against Israel remained just that during the 
1980’s, and Iran’s vitriol against Israel was confined primarily to the diplomatic realm.  For the U.S., on 
the other hand, the conflict with Iran began in 1979 and continued throughout the 1980’s.  It would be 
impossible to understand the perceptions of key leaders U.S. leaders looking at Iran in the 1990’s 
without considering the 444-day media event of the hostage crisis, Iran’s role in radicalizing dissident 
groups throughout the Middle East (especially in Lebanon), or the tanker war that brought the U.S. and 
Iran into direct military conflict.   
The second problem with giving primacy to the argument that Israeli influence has caused the 
conflict is that it downplays the actions and perceptions of leaders on the Iranian side of the conflict.  
Israel may have begun stoking the fire in the 1990’s, but Iranian memories went back further as well.  
The U.S. role in 1953 coup against Mossadegh, U.S. support for Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War, and the 
shootdown of Iran Air Flight 655, to name only a few events, all informed the viewpoints of Iran’s 
leaders.  The Iranian practice of chanting “Death to America!” and Khomeini’s vehemence in defying the 
“Great Satan” long predated Israeli efforts to turn the U.S. against Iran.  Many of the Islamic Republic’s 
founding fathers established their own political legitimacy on ant-American credentials.  Even after 
Israel’s influence campaign began in earnest, Iranian leaders were under no obligation to play the role 
they were assigned.  It would be hard to make a case that Israel was responsible for the Iranian 
decisions to support terrorist groups, continue their rhetoric against the United States, or restart their 
nuclear weapons program. 
Finally, even accepting a high degree of Israeli influence over U.S. politics, the Israelis could not 
have garnered the level of support they did if the conditions were not already favorable for the 
perpetuation of conflict between the U.S. and Iran.  The Israeli lobby has not been infallible, though.  
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Prime Minister Netanyahu’s failure to prevent the ratification of the JPCOA provided a prominent 
example.  U.S. politicians are beholden to American voters, not Israeli, and viewpoints regarding Israel 
are not homogenous in the U.S.  While lawmakers might be happy to take campaign funds from AIPAC, 
Israeli concerns compete with any number of hot-button issues for center stage in U.S. policy 
discussions.  Moreover, Iran is only one of the policy issues about which the Israelis lobby the U.S. 
government.  Simply put, even if perpetuating this conflict has been a high priority for Israel, there must 
have been other enabling conditions in both the U.S. and Iran which have allowed them to have their 
way.  An institutional approach to the conflict will place Israeli influence within the context of this larger 
structure and help to clarify when and why it was so successful at particular points in time. 
  
Two-level games - the closest cousin to an institutional theory of conflict 
Another approach that one might take to explain the U.S.-Iranian relationship is based upon the 
concept of the two-level game.  Robert Putnam (1988) applied this framework to his study of 
international negotiation.  Essentially, each player in the process of international diplomacy is managing 
two separate game boards simultaneously.  Not only are they maneuvering against their opponent, but 
they are beholden to a slate of domestic constituencies who ultimately determine the dimensions of the 
solution or “win-set” set that the negotiator is able to proffer.  Putnam (1988, 434) explained that, “The 
political complexities for the players in this two-level game are staggering.  Any key player at the 
international table who is dissatisfied with the outcome may upset the game board, and conversely, any 
leader who fails to satisfy his fellow players at the domestic table risks being evicted from his seat.” 
Putnam’s (1988, 436) work specifically referenced the Reagan administration’s attempt to negotiate an 
arms-for-hostages deal with Iran.  While both sides apparently supported such an arrangement behind 
closed doors, public disclosure subjected the negotiations to an impossible morass of domestic interests 
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that undermined any opportunity for success.  More recently, the two-level game dynamic found itself 
on full display in the nuclear negotiations between John Kerry and Mohammad Javad Zarif.  In this case, 
the process resulted in the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JPCOA), however, both 
negotiating teams faced stiff opposition from their own domestic critics, and these opponents ultimately 
succeeded in undermining the agreement after the fact. 
Steven David (1991) made a similar application of the two-level game concept in examining the 
external alignment of third-world states.  David, instead of looking at negotiations, focused on the 
calculations of state leaders with regard to balancing against threats.  On one hand, they are compelled 
to balance against potential external threats for the good of the state.  On the other hand, they are 
worried about sustaining their own position of leadership, and the greatest threats to their own power 
often arise from domestic factions or constituencies.  Therefore, leaders use a strategy that David 
dubbed “omnibalancing,” choosing a combination of internal and external alignment that best ensures 
their own longevity.  One can easily argue that Iran’s leaders have applied this concept in their relations 
with the United States.  Bound by Khomeini’s anti-American legacy, leaders have found themselves 
unable to seek rapprochement without undermining their own domestic legitimacy and revolutionary 
credentials, even when rapprochement would offer benefits.  Likewise, it is apparent that President 
Obama payed a heavy political price for his efforts to conclude a nuclear deal with Iran.  The common 
theme between Putnam and David’s work is that domestic constituents and institutions constrain a 
leader’s freedom of action on the international stage. 
The idea that narrowly focused special interest groups could capture the machinery of the state 
and undermine a government's ability to act in the broader interest of society is not new.  J. A. Hobson's 
(1902) classic work on imperialism argued that, especially for Great Britain, imperial projects were 
enormously costly endeavors that primarily benefitted a coterie of merchants and financiers at the 
expense of the British nation.  This influential group propagated a slew of misleading narratives that 
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captured public opinion and bolstered their position.  Jack Snyder (1991) expanded upon Hobson's work, 
explaining how this process operates in practice.  As politics becomes increasingly factional (or 
"cartelized"), interest groups revert to the practice of "logrolling," where bargains to secure their own 
position are paid for by concessions that draw upon societal resources.  When all sides engage in the 
practice, the direction of national policy can become more extreme than any one group would have 
chosen by themselves, but they all support the narrative that underpins this policy.   
David Keen (2012 & 2008) applied this concept of state capture by interest groups to ethnically 
charged conflicts in Africa.  Keen argued that some of these lingering wars were especially difficult to 
resolve, not because equitable agreements were out of reach, but because powerful actors gained more 
from perpetuating the conflict than they would from making peace.  Warlords, in particular, thrived on 
the chaos of bloodshed and insecurity, capturing and siphoning wealth from the natural resources of the 
countries involved.  The termination of a conflict would inevitably erode their privileged position in favor 
of popular accountability, so conditions that could satisfy all the parties to a conflict were especially 
difficult to engineer.   
Of the explanations discussed so far for the conflict between the U.S. and Iran, two-level game 
theory and its associates come the closest to an institutional theory of conflict.  As Chapter 2 will 
discuss, domestic politics is often the driver for the institutionalization of conflict.  Two-level games can 
be excellent for illuminating the art of the possible at any given moment, especially in regard to a 
particular negotiation or a discrete issue.  The argument of this dissertation, though, is that two-level 
games are insufficient to understand the totality of the problem.  They cannot explain how long-term 
patterns of counterproductive animosity take root and perpetuate over time, especially when multiple 
issues merge or compound. 
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Two-level games, along with game theory in general, are rooted in the concept of rational 
choice.  They view decision-makers as strict utility maximizers, and utility is a relatively objective and 
identifiable quality.  In this vein, Keen's (2012 & 2008) work commended the practice of "interest 
mapping," where the interests of all parties to a conflict are portrayed in relation to one another.  Taken 
to the extreme, a conflict can thus be reduced to a mathematical equation, and the solution to the 
equation would represent the requirements for resolution at any given time.  Bruce Bueno De Mesquita 
(1984) achieved near hero status applying mathematical modeling to the question of who would 
succeed Ayatollah Khomeini after his death.  While not interest mapping, per se, Bueno De Mesquita's 
game theoretic model successfully predicted Ali Khamenei's accession to the position of Supreme 
Leader five years before it occurred.  Unfortunately, game theory's track record for predicting world 
events, especially with regard to Iran, has rarely been so successful.  Critics of De Mesquita’s work might 
also point out that Khamenei was one of very few viable candidates when he was chosen.  As Jacques 
Mallet du Pan observed, revolutions devour their children.  Few of Khomeini’s closest followers survived 
the revolution and managed to stay within his good graces until his death.  Even the best of game 
theoretic models will only be as good as its programming, and this will always rely on assumptions and 
insights that cannot be produced scientifically.   
Applying a game theory approach to the study of intractable conflict suffers from a number of 
additional shortfalls, especially when considering interest mapping.  First, one must identify an 
appropriate level of analysis that accurately captures all of the key variables.  Individuals, groups and 
societies all make important contributions, so it becomes almost impossible to isolate an appropriate 
level.  Second, reducing a conflict to an equation requires near-perfect understanding of the players 
involved.  If actors are missed or inappropriately grouped, the project will be for naught.  Third, even a 
perfect equation would represent only a brief moment in time as events would continually shift the 
sands.   
48 
 
This brings up perhaps the greatest shortcoming of such an approach.  Game theory can model 
the present, but it is not equipped to explain how the current state came into being.  It may incorporate 
patterns of action borrowed from history, but it deals poorly with emotion, habit and other factors that 
muddy the water of rationality and skew the concept of utility in the eyes of the beholder.  Further, it 
fails to account for the mutually constructed nature of the conflict.  Domestic constituencies, which 
Putnam refers to as “Level 2” of his game, are not always mediated through centralized leaders or 
negotiators (Level 1) in the effects they have on the overall process.  These constituencies often have 
the power, not only to tie the hands of Level 1, but to directly affect or enflame their own Level 2 
counterparts.  For instance, political rhetoric and maneuvering in the U.S. Congress and the Iranian 
Majles prior to the JPCOA went beyond signaling an unwillingness to ratify a deal over Iran’s nuclear 
program.  Both parties aimed directly to heighten tensions between the two states with threats and 
accusations. 
The concepts of two-level games, omni-balancing, and other domestically rooted explanations 
for international conflict do not require complex mathematical modelling to produce useful insights.  
However, intractable conflicts are more than just static sets of actors and programmed lists of rules for 
how they interact.  Sometimes the game takes on a life of its own, ignoring the artificial boundaries used 
to model decisions and events.  There may be hidden rules that make little sense in the context of the 
question at hand, yet they prove binding.  Rules from other games may bleed over in ways that are 
difficult to anticipate, or outside actors may join the game, uninvited.  Rules might change (and 
frequently do) or fail to constrain actors in the same ways they previously have.  Of course, players 
change over time, as well.  Just as one can never cross the same river twice, one will never face the 
same adversary again.   
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What an institutional approach to a theory of conflict has to offer 
The field of security studies is not short on theories that tie international conflict to domestic 
politics, but viewing intractable conflict as an institution offers a number of key advantages.  First, by 
taking a broad historical perspective, it accounts for the cumulative effects of decisions and events over 
time, which continually alter the game itself.  Where rational choice approaches explain conflict through 
the balance of interests at any particular time, an institutional approach traces continual evolution.  This 
provides a vehicle for incorporating less-tangible factors which are difficult to model.  It also addresses 
the question of why transient actors in a changing world retain particular worldviews and interest 
calculations that defy objective analysis.  Ultimately, viewing constituencies as institutions, both shaped 
by and shaping the actual conflict, provides a clearer view of role played by domestic politics in 
producing intractability.2 
Second, an institutional approach accounts for the mutual constitution of a conflict.  Even if one 
can explain the enduring interest in animosity on one side of the conflict, why should the other side 
keep playing the game?  In some wars, national survival might be at stake, but this is an unlikely 
explanation for conflicts that simmer and spurt for long periods of time.  If one side had the capability 
and will to destroy the other, then conflict would never have become intractable.  What these conflicts 
demonstrate instead is that constituencies on both sides actively stir the pot in synergistic fashion, 
undermining potential opportunities for rapprochement.  This unconscious collaboration suggests a 
larger institutional force that binds adversaries who possess little else in common. 
Third, institutional analysis accounts for both structure and agency.  Neither actors nor interests 
are perfectly discrete in any conflict.  Almost every conflict has its peacemakers, and this approach 
 
2 This dissertation will also show that constituencies can encompass more than just domestic political groups 
within two sides of a conflict.  Third-party actors can develop constituencies which bear upon the perpetuation of 
the same conflict, as well.   
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explains why they have been unsuccessful while also accounting for the long-term impact of their voices 
in shaping the relationship over time. 
Fourth, an institutional lens harnesses the best features of interest-based analysis.  It removes 
cultural arguments and ideology from the equation, while accounting for affective contributions to the 
construction of interests.   Anthropologist Thomas Barfield (2010) pointed out that even in the oldest 
and most traditional societies in the world, historical narratives are malleable and quickly bent to serve 
pressing interests, especially in the case of conflict.  Ideology is likewise flexible.  This approach also 
favors interest over the concept of trust.  Mistrust is a theme that permeates common explanations for 
the perpetuation conflicts.  However, trust is rare in international relations and is almost never a basis 
for rapprochement.  When it develops, it happens later, over the course of a cooperative relationship.  
Lastly, conceiving intractable conflict as an institution helps to homogenize the concept of interest.  
Instead of dealing with the gordian knot of various factional interests, this dissertation will focus on the 
stake that participants develop in the conflict itself.  This is more easily comparable across parties and 
time. 
An institutional theory of intractable conflict is complementary to other approaches, especially 
those rooted in rational choice.  Whereas interest mapping might elucidate the current state of affairs, 
the institutional lens will reveal the tectonic plates that shift underneath the game board and shape 
those interests over time.  Where game theory offers predictions about what will happen in the future, 
based on the best information available today, an institutional theory would instead describe the 
mechanisms driving events and explain the manner in which events are likely to unfold, regardless of 
what eventuality occurs.  Perhaps most importantly, institutional analysis can assist in the generation of 
assumptions upon which other theoretic models rely. 
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Such a theory will also have important implications for conflict resolution.  If conflict behaves 
like an institution according to predictable mechanisms and patterns even some of the time, and these 
dynamics can be identified, then peacemakers can develop more effective tools.  Conflict resolution 
strategies that account for these mechanisms will prove more likely to succeed, and opportunities for 
cooperation will be more readily apparent.  Charles Kupchan (2010) offered one of the seminal works on 
the topic of rapprochement between adversaries.  He explained that rapprochement starts with realism 
and requires an alignment of interest on both sides as a necessary condition.  However, this alignment 
alone is not sufficient to start the process, and Kupchan’s work could not explain why it begins in some 
cases and not in others.  Additionally, he cited elite buy-in as a necessary condition for long-term 
cooperation.  By conceptualizing conflict as an institution in its own rite, this approach can illuminate the 
process by which elites build their interests around a conflict.  Understanding how interests are 
constructed may provide insight into how they can be diverted or deconstructed as well.   
  
Literature Review for the U.S.-Iran Case Study 
  One of the chief contentions of this dissertation is that the conflict between the U.S. and Iran is 
not driven by a lack of knowledge or available information between the two sides.  There is a 
tremendous body of literature available in the West with regard to Iran and the U.S. relationship with 
Iran.  In spite of sometimes draconian restrictions by the government of Iran, the Iranian people also 
have considerable access to Western media and knowledge repositories.  This dissertation will show 
that many authors have been telling an institutional story of the conflict all along, without fully 
appreciating the implications of their insights.  What this work will do in Chapters 3-6 is organize an 
account of 40 years of conflict that highlights the institutional aspects of the relationship, using the 
existing knowledge and information.  As with any work on Iran, it will only be able to scratch the surface 
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with regard to available literature.  For every important work discussed, many more will necessarily be 
left out.  While this dissertation draws on a range of primary and secondary sources of information, this 
review will focus most heavily on the books and memoirs that have impacted the field, identifying both 
seminal works and key contributions.  It will also mention news and journal articles, think-tank pieces, 
and government documents, but with less specificity.  Lastly the general discussion of institutional 
theory and its foundational works will wait until Chapter 2. 
This review will begin with a short discussion of the challenges and opportunities that one faces 
in researching Iran, and the U.S.-Iranian relationship.  The next section will focus on literature specific to 
Iran, accepting that this literature will overlap with other sections, as well.  Next, the review will 
consider works that examine the U.S.-Iranian relationship from a holistic or multi-decade perspective.  
Finally, it will look at works that offer significant contributions to each decade of the conflict. 
 
Challenges and opportunities in studying Iran 
  One of the challenges of compiling this type of work as an American researcher is accurately 
capturing the Iranian perspective.  Ideally, when studying two sides of a conflict, one would gather 
information equally from primary and secondary sources on both sides.  With regard to Iran, this is 
challenging for a number of reasons.  The language barrier presents an obvious challenge, even for 
researchers with some skill in Persian Farsi.  This dissertation will refer to a small handful of articles and 
a memoir in Persian, but this will admittedly be a shortcoming.  This challenge is compounded by a lack 
of physical access to Iran, where archival information and publications not available in the West might 
contribute significantly to this type of effort.  Perhaps the most difficult challenge, though, is that 
publication in Iran has long been restricted and controlled.  This was true under the Shah, before the 
1979 Islamic Revolution, but since that time, it has only gotten worse.  Consequently, while Iran has an 
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extensive media and publishing industry, the veracity of the knowledge it produces is questionable, at 
best.  It is not that accurate information is unavailable in all circumstances, but it is often buried in or 
drowned out by propaganda, political correctness, and conspiracy theories.  For their own protection, 
Iranians have developed their own particular brand of nuance and doublespeak which can make it 
difficult for outside researchers to identify or appreciate significant arguments or facts.   
There are a number of factors which mitigate these challenges, though.  To begin with, Iran has 
a thriving expatriate community in the U.S. and Europe, and they are well represented in the academic 
community.  In the years following the revolution, many of Iran's leading scholars and best educated 
citizens simply relocated to the West.  While Iranians within Iran were limited in their ability to 
document and assess the revolution and its aftermath, academics like Mohsen Milani (1994), with 
intimate knowledge of the people and events, were publishing the work that their countrymen could 
not.  Over the course of decades, the salience of their personal connections to Iran faded (especially 
among second-generation expatriates), but they still provide an invaluable resource for the academic 
and journalistic communities.  In spite of social restrictions and personal security concerns, Iranians also 
travel to and from the West with surprising frequency, and some Western journalists and researchers 
have travelled to Iran on semi-regular basis, refreshing the societal links between Iran and West.  For 
this reason, certain reputable news agencies like the New York Times, Los Angeles Times, BBC, and the 
Guardian, can often add value when they discuss reporting from the Iranian press because they can 
navigate the obstacles that might stymie most Westerners and highlight the nuggets of significance.   
For these reasons among others, some of the best work on Iran is done from the outside, and 
the picture of two bifurcated sets of knowledge and experience is deceiving.  In reality, these knowledge 
sets overlap, and the question of whether a work was produced in Iran or the West is not the deciding 
factor when considering the authenticity of an Iranian viewpoint.  Even considering the author's cultural 
heritage is dangerous territory.  One cannot assume that Iranian heritage necessarily confers authority, 
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or that the lack of this heritage limits insight or expertise.  Academic work will always benefit from 
greater access to information, and one notable shortfall of this dissertation is the lack of access to 
government documents in Iran, but there is no guarantee that Iranian researchers in Iran would gain 
access to these resources, either.  Overall, the events considered by this dissertation are well 
documented from a variety of sources and points of view, and these sources are more than sufficient to 
paint a reasonable picture of the institutionalization of the conflict. 
The next challenge to consider when outlining this body of work is organization.  Most of the 
information used by this dissertation came from journalists and media reporting, historians and other 
social scientists, analysis by think tanks and other private organizations, and U.S. government 
documents.  Some covered specific events or relatively discrete topic areas, while others were broader 
in scope.  These individuals and the issue areas they cover overlap at almost every conceivable point.  
Some of the best books on the history of the U.S.-Iranian relationship were written by journalists like 
Barbara Slavin (2007), who has covered the topic for years.  Some government officials, like Suzanne 
Maloney (2015) have moved to think-tanks, or vice-versa.  This review will next consider some key works 
and authors in a few broad categories, starting with literature specific to the Islamic Republic.   
  
Literature on the Islamic Republic 
With a history that dates back before the first dynasty of the Persian Empire and the reign of 
Cyrus the Great in the sixth Century B.C., there is no shortage of literature on Iran.  The Islamic Republic, 
in its short but controversial existence, has spawned considerably more.  This section will narrow the 
focus to key works that provide substantive input to historical development of Iran since 1979 in the 
political and military realms.   
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Yale University's Abbas Amanat (2017) provided an excellent starting point for examining the 
Islamic Republic.  Amanat's (2017) work is a historical account of Iran from the beginning of its first 
systemically Shiite dynasty in 1501 through the early 2010's.  This frames the 1979 revolution and its 
aftermath in the larger themes and currents of Iranian history.  Exeter University's Michael Axworthy 
(2007) offered a somewhat similar experience, taking Iranian history all the way from antiquity to the 
mid-2000's, although with far less detail than Amanat.  Axworthy's (2013) best-known book has become 
a seminal work on the Islamic Revolution and the first three decades of political and military history in 
Iran.  In particular, it provides considerable detail on the Iran-Iraq War and its effect on Iranian politics 
and society.  University of Florida's Mohsen Milani wrote perhaps the most seminal work (Milani 1994) 
on the revolution and the first decade and a half of the Islamic Republic.  His background and personal 
connections allowed him to describe the inner workings of Iranian politics under Khomeini (and shortly 
after his demise) with a clarity few could match.  In a completely different style of information, 
Boroujerdi and Rahimkhani (2018) offer an encyclopedic compendium of influential Iranian politicians 
and formal power structures wit in the Islamic Republic since its inception.    
The rise and relative decline of Iran's reform movement in the late 1990's through the first half 
of the 2000's spawned another generation of writing on the Islamic Republic, focused less on the 
Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War, and more on the questions which followed.  Journalist Robin Wright, 
who has covered Iran variously since the 1970's and written a book (Wright 1989) about Iran's 
experience under Khomeini's rule, wrote a more influential book (Wright 2000) about the social and 
cultural transformations that ushered reform-minded President Mohammad Khatami to office in 1997.  
Wright would go on to become the editor for the U.S. Institute of Peace Iran Primer project, which 
published a hardcopy in 2010, and has since continued making online updates.  This project covers a 
wide spectrum of Iranian politics, military, economic, and social issues.  Journalists Geneive Abdo and 
Jonathan Lyons (2003) took readers behind the scenes in the politics of the Khatami's administration, 
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helping to explain why the reform movement produced such disappointing results.  Professors Gheissari 
and Nasr (2006) examined the prospects for democracy in Iran, looking back as far as the Constitutional 
Revolution of 1905-1911 but primarily focused on the politics of reform under the Islamic Republic.  
Georgetown University's Shireen Hunter (2014) examined the political machinations and societal divides 
that resulted as the Islamic Republic travelled through its second and third decades, attempting to 
translate Khomeini's edicts to succeeding generations with little or no memory of his rule.  Ray Takeyh, 
who has been criticized for his advocacy of regime change in Iran, has also written prominent works 
including (Takeyh 2012), in which he explained how hardliners had developed an iron grip on Iranian 
politics, unlikely to be broken by peaceful attempts at reform.   
Certain authors have also distinguished themselves by focusing on niche areas of Iranian politics.  
The University of Virginia's R. K. Ramazani has been publishing essays on Iran's foreign policy since the 
early 1980's, which he compiled into a book (Ramazani 2013), examining Iran's relations with the 
outside world by period.  Shireen Hunter (2010) made her own contribution to the analysis of Iran's 
foreign relations, specific to the post-Cold War era.  Suzanne Maloney, of the Brookings Institute 
(formerly a U.S. State Department official) wrote the definitive work on Iran's political economy since 
the 1979 revolution (Maloney 2015), explaining how economic factors within the Islamic Republic 
affected the political realm at key junctures over almost four decades.  Kevan Harris (2017) wrote the 
history of the Islamic Republic's social welfare state, a work which helps explain some of the stability 
and success that Iran has Iran has experienced, even in the midst of political repression and turmoil.   
The Iranian military, especially the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is another key 
niche in literature on Iran.  Many works touch on these topics, but far fewer focus specifically.  Central 
Intelligence Agency analyst Steven Ward (2009) authored one of the seminal works on Iran's military, 
explaining how it evolved through the revolution and the Iran-Iraq War.  Kenneth Katzman, a longtime 
researcher with the Congressional Research Service, has authored a number of important pieces, 
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including (Katzman 1993), which described the foundation and early history of the IRGC.  The Rand 
Corporation has also sponsored research on the IRGC, including Schahgaldian and Barkhordarian (1987) 
and Wehrey (2009).  Steven O'hern (2012), a retired military intelligence officer, authored a more recent 
work on the IRGC specifically, which especially highlights the growth and development of the 
organization over the 2000's.  While not an academic work, it is well-researched and provides some 
useful insights.  Johns Hopkins' Narges Bajoghli (2019) provided an otherwise unprecedented inside view 
into the information operations of the IRGC, as well as generational and ideological divides within the 
organization.   
Much of the research available on the IRGC is sponsored or generated by think tanks.  This 
contribution is invaluable in many ways, but it also means that information is sometimes presented 
within the framework of a biased agenda.  Ottolenghi (2011), published by the Foundation for the 
Defense of Democracies, and Alfoneh (2013) from the American Enterprise Institute are examples of 
relatively balanced and solid analysis of the IRGC, focused on the research and information.  Berman 
(2005), representing the American Foreign Policy Council, is a book that tilts so heavily toward a hawkish 
agenda that the information it presents is virtually unusable in an academic work.  Almost every fact 
presented is somehow woven into a narrative of Iran's imminent threat to the U.S. 
  
Literature on the U.S.-Iranian Relationship 
  The U.S.-Iranian relationship has also generated a wide body of literature, often overlapping 
with the literature more specific to Iran.  Department of Defense senior historian David Crist (2012) 
offered perhaps the most far-ranging account of the political, military, and intelligence conflict between 
the two countries.  His work drew upon official sources unavailable to most researchers that provided 
insights into both the U.S. and the Iranian sides, largely through intelligence information.  Brookings 
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Institute scholar and former C.I.A. analyst Kenneth Pollack (2004) also wrote a seminal history of the first 
two decades of the U.S.-Iranian relationship.  Pollack has been criticized for his advocacy of the U.S. 
invasion of Iraq and his hawkish stance toward Iran, but (Pollack 2004) is a balanced and historically 
grounded work that has been widely cited since its publication.  University of Minnesota's William 
Beeman (2005) offered an anthropological perspective into the mutual demonization by the U.S. and 
Iran and the generation of narratives. 
Former government officials have made key contributions to the literature, as well.  Diplomat 
John Limbert, who was held by Iran during the 1979 hostage crisis, provided some observations (Limbert 
1987) into how Khomeini came to power in his revolution and began to defy the U.S., as well as some 
very practical insights (Limbert 2009) into the particularities of negotiating with Iran.  Former State 
Department and CIA officials Flynt and Hillary Mann Leverrett (2013) authored one of the most critical 
accounts of U.S. policy toward Iran available in the West.  Their work took aim at many of the common 
myths that have guided U.S. officials and argued that the government of Iran is neither illegitimate nor 
weak.  Their combative approach drew predictable opposition from many corners of the U.S. policy 
community, but their points were well-researched and supported.  On the Iranian side, Seyed Hossein 
Mousavian (2012), who served in a number of high-level positions in the Iranian government, offered his 
perspective on more than a decade of conflict between the U.S. and Iran over the nuclear issue.  While 
offering few apologies for Iranian behavior, his position represented the more dovish and reflective 
camp typical of the Khatami administration.   
Journalists have also taken a leading role in chronicling the U.S.-Iranian relationship, not only in 
newspaper reporting but in the books they write.  Robin Wright, who has already been mentioned as 
one of the most prominent names in the Western literature with regard to Iran, has closely covered the 
U.S.-Iranian relationship, as well.  Barbara Slavin's (2007) book narrated the story of the U.S.-Iranian 
relationship, especially in the 2000's and 2010's, as a tragedy of two states with common interests that 
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just cannot overcome their differences.  Jay Solomon (2016) dug into the secretive military and 
intelligence arenas of conflict between the U.S. and Iran over several decades, demonstrating linkages 
between known events and political competition that was quietly shaping them.  Other works by leading 
journalists cover shorter periods of time and include the U.S.-Iranian relationship among other issues.  
David Sanger (2012) examined President Obama's foreign policy during his first term in office, and this 
included his overtures toward Iran as well as more provocative actions like the 2010 Stuxnet cyber-
attack against Iran's nuclear program.   
Scholar Trita Parsi, who has been associated with several think tanks and prestigious 
universities, has carved his own niche in the area of research on the U.S.-Iranian relationship.  Parsi's 
(2007) work focuses on the role that the state of Israel has played in stoking the fire between the U.S. 
and Iran since the early 1990's, linking the conflict to other Israeli priorities.  In doing so, Parsi provides 
insights into the U.S. policymaking apparatus, as well as Iran's.  Parsi's (2017) book provides the most 
detailed and comprehensive account available of President Obama's efforts to reach a nuclear 
agreement with Iran, including the negotiation process that took place both in private and within the 
public eye.  This book heavily complements Parsi's (2007) earlier work.  Parsi (2012) covered Obama's 
attempts at rapprochement with Iran during his first term in office, but the book is largely redundant 
with material provided in the (2007) and (2017) offerings.   
  
The first decade: 1979-1989 
The first decade of the U.S. relationship with the Islamic Republic is by far the best documented 
and provides the widest body of primary source documents.  This is both because there has been more 
time to do so, but also because it was marked by high-profile events.  Leading U.S. newspapers closely 
followed many of key events of the decade.  Also, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (a 
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translated extract from primary source newspapers) provided almost daily reports of major stories in 
Iranian newspapers, and these are available online.  Additionally, many U.S. government documents 
from the Carter and Reagan administration have been released, offering a large repository of primary 
source documents.   
Some of the events of this first decade have inspired seminal works of their own.  National 
Security Council Staffer (and later professor) Gary Sick (1986) authored a largely first-hand (primary 
source) account of the Carter administration's reactions to the fall of the Shah and the subsequent 
hostage crisis.  Author Barry Rubin (1980) provided early insight into this period, placing the Islamic 
Revolution in a historical context for Western audiences.  William and Mary's James Bill (1988) offered a 
post-mortem analysis of the U.S. relationship with the Shah and the anatomy of an intelligence failure.  
Journalist Mark Bowden (2007) narrated the hostage crisis from the perspective of the hostages using 
extensive interviews.  Historian Bryan Gibson (2010) provided a unique account of the covert U.S. 
relationship with Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War.  Blight, et. al (2012) is an oral history compiled by a 
collection of academic authors who conducted group interviews with U.S. officials who were active 
during the first eight years of the Islamic Republic and discussed the path by which the U.S. policy 
establishment turned irrevocably against Iran.  Judicial scholar Lee Allen Zatarain (2010) offered a 
comprehensive historical narrative of the Tanker War between the U.S. and Iran in 1987 and 1988.  The 
Iran-Contra Affair also generated reams of official reports (including those collected in Walsh 1994) and 
outside analysis (including Draper 1991). 
Another important primary resource available only to the first decade, so far, is the collection of 
President Rafsanjani's memoirs.  The volumes released to the public now cover the revolution through 
1989, but they have not yet been translated from Persian.  These writings are presented on a daily diary 
format.  While they provide an important and only partially tapped resource for understanding points of 
context behind key events, their release did not reveal any major bombshells of previously unknown 
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events, nor did they force historians to reconsider accepted history.  A brief perusal of these volumes in 
their original Persian portrays the fairly mundane existence of a politician.  Rafsanjani listed daily events 
in a rather matter-of-fact fashion, often detailing who he met with and where, but with little description 
of the details of those conversations.  Rafsanjani was also very guarded in expressing his feelings and 
opinions, for the most part, which make for sterile reading.  One observation that might be made from 
these memoirs is that Iran's clerical leaders lived relatively cloistered lives, spending much of their time 
in their homes or other private spaces.  Like much of Iranian literature, there is undoubtedly a treasure 
trove of potential discoveries to be made by reading between the lines and applying detailed historical 
analysis, but this is not a task for beginner or even intermediate Persian speakers, and most of the 
results would be too finely-grained to contribute to a big-picture study of four decades. 
A final primary resource to consider was the Last Will and Testament of Ayatollah Khomeini 
(1989).  This document has translated to English and published.  It offered not only Khomeini's unique 
perspective on the Islamic Republic as his own project, but it gave guidance to future generations and 
would be a reference point, especially for hardliners in Iran, for years to come.     
 
The second decade: 1989-2000 
The second decade of the U.S.-Iranian relationship was less headline-grabbing than the first.  
However, newspapers still covered key events as a primary source.  The Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service (FBIS) (a translated extract from primary source newspapers) provided their almost daily reports 
of Iranian media until 1996, at which time it was discontinued.  Its successor offered only a sparse 
collection of occasional reporting from Iran, a huge loss to researchers.  Journalists like Robin Wright 
(1992) speculated about potential rapprochement between the two countries, even as the relationship 
was worsening behind the scenes.  Some U.S. government documents have also been declassified, but 
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not as many as those from the 1980's, and congressional hearings provide insight into the worldview of 
U.S. policymakers during the period.  Researcher Marian Paules (2003) studied congressional hearings 
throughout this period in her doctoral dissertation, identifying themes and narratives that would guide 
U.S. actions with regard to Iran for years to come.  Award-winning journalist Richard Sale (2009) also 
chronicled the Clinton administration's "secret wars," and while Iran was rarely the center of attention 
in U.S. foreign policy, the points of intersection were plentiful. 
Some of the works already outlined in previous sections provide the baseline for an account of 
this time period.  Additionally, though, memoirs by certain U.S. officials add considerable context to the 
story.  These memoirs offer a combination of primary and secondary source information.  Secretary of 
State James Baker's (1996) memoir speaks volumes by what it does not say with regard to Iran - a 
country largely ignored by the first Bush administration.  Senior diplomat Martin Indyk (2009) provided 
one of the most revealing accounts of the Clinton administration policy of "dual containment," which 
treated Iran as a "rogue state."  Secretary of State Madelene Albright's (et al. 2003) memoir recounted 
her attempts under the Clinton administration to build bridges with Iran after the election of President 
Khatami in 1997.   
  
The third decade: 2001-2008 
The third decade of the U.S.-Iranian conflict was considerably more storied than the second.  
Again newspapers and media outlets offered primary source coverage of key events, and their reporting 
sometimes preceded policy shifts on the U.S. side, such as with the disclosure of Iran's nuclear 
enrichment program in 2002 and the mounting evidence in 2005 that Iran was sponsoring attacks 
against coalition troops in Iraq.  FBIS had long ceased providing publicly available summaries of Iranian 
newspapers, but internet advances over the course of the decade made Iranian news more accessible to 
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the West, and particularly to Western journalists, who could now scour Iranian media outlets in real-
time.   
Because the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the invasion of Iraq generated so much 
historical literature, researchers of the U.S.-Iranian relationship received a tangential benefit, and these 
works are just a sample.  George W. Bush (2011), explained in his own words why he chose to increase 
the pressure on Iran and brand them among the "Axis of Evil."  Journalist Bob Woodward (2002) and 
(2004) complimented Bush's statements and helped to fill in the details.  City University of New York's 
Ervand Abrahamian (2004) provided the Iranian perspective on the "axis of evil" concept and U.S. policy.  
Friedman (2004) helped explain the cooperation between the U.S. and Iran after the initial invasion of 
Afghanistan.  With regard to Iran's proxy war against the U.S. in Iraq, former intelligence officer Steven 
O'hern (2008) provided a first-hand account (with some primary source data) of the U.S. struggle against 
this unseen adversary.  The U.S. Army's official history of the war in Iraq (Rayburn, et al. 2019 a,b) gave a 
comprehensive rollup of the struggle between the U.S. and Iran, although this was by no means the 
central focus of the war effort.  Ray Takeyh (2006) provided an analysis of Iran's internal politics and 
regional intentions during the first half of the decade, including their plans for Iraq.  Scholar Thomas 
Mattair (2008) outlined the "grand bargain" that Iran proposed to the U.S. in 2003, among other key 
issues of policy analysis for the Iranian side throughout the decade.   
The international controversy over Iran's nuclear program, and the first term in office of the 
firebrand President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad also generated considerable press, as well.  Media and 
think tank reports and speculation over Iran's program abounded, but Chief of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency Mohamad El Baradei's (2011) memoirs (a partially primary source) provided a less partial 
view and additional insights with regard to his own interaction with Iranian leaders.  Mousavian's (2012) 
memoirs (previously mentioned) also complimented this account.  With regard to Ahmadinejad and the 
internal politics of Iran under his leadership, Iranian journalist Kasra Naji (2008) provided a 
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bibliographical account of this president and his rise to power.  University of Saint Andrews' Ali Ansari 
(2007) authored an insightful analysis of Ahmadinejad's politics of confrontation and controversy.   
  
The fourth decade: 2009-2018 
The fourth decade of the conflict was every bit as eventful as any that preceded it, especially as 
it produced the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JPCOA), the nuclear agreement between Iran and 
the West.  As these events were relatively recent, books and memoirs are still being drafted for this 
decade, so this section will draw more heavily on news reporting for primary sources, along with 
analysis by the media and think tanks, as well.  However, a considerable amount of secondary work is 
already available, as well.  Journalist Hooman Majd (2010) gave an account of the Iranian point of view 
as Barrack Obama campaigned for the presidency and defeated his rivals, carrying into the 2009 election 
controversy in Iran and the rise of the Green Movement.  Investigative journalism by Murtaza Hussein 
(2019) provided one of the best accounts available of Iran's role in the fight against the Islamic State in 
Syria and the dynamics of having U.S. and Iranian troops on the same battlefield.  Another investigative 
piece by Dexter Filkins (2013) has become the seminal work on the influential Iranian commander 
Qassem Soleimani.  A think tank piece by Michael Eisenstadt (2016) compiles otherwise disparate 
accounts regarding Iran's bourgeoning cyber warfare program.  Journalist Jason Rezaian (2019), who had 
been held prisoner in Iran from 2014 to 2016, provided unique insight into Iran's practice of imprisoning 
dual nationals as a new form of hostage taking.   
Four sets of memoirs (partially primary sources) are particularly useful for helping to understand 
Obama's initial efforts at rapprochement and unravel the nuclear negotiations with Iran from the U.S. 
side.  Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (2014) presided over U.S. foreign policy as Obama attempted to 
thaw relations with Iran, only to see the process interrupted by the 2009 election controversy in Iran.  
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Among other things, Clinton discussed Obama's reaction to the Green Movement in Iran and the 
challenges of dealing with Israel throughout the process of attempting to bring Iran to the negotiating 
table.  With regard to the nuclear negotiations, Senior diplomat Wendy Sherman (2018) devoted the 
most pages of her memoir to Iran, giving a feel for the human and cultural dimensions of the negotiating 
process.  Senior diplomat William Burns (2019) dedicated a short but revealing portion of his memoir to 
his efforts in establishing a "back channel" for the stalemated negotiations to succeed.  Secretary of 
State John Kerry's (2018) comments on the nuclear negotiations were relatively short, as well, but he 
provided important details of the overall process and the final push to achieve a deal during the publicly 
disclosed rounds of negotiations.   
As already mentioned, Trita Parsi's (2017) work remains one of the most comprehensive 
account of nuclear negotiations between the U.S. (and its international partners) and Iran.  His work 
offered both U.S. and Iranian perspectives, and it examined the role that Israel played in attempting to 
spoil the process.  This prominence is rivalled only by Penn State’s Dennis Jett (2018), who also provided 
a detailed account of the deal, although his work focused more on the politics of the U.S. side.  For 
understanding the role that sanctions played in the U.S.-Iranian conflict and the nuclear issue, 
Cordesman (et al. 2014) provided one of the best summaries available of decades of both U.S. and 
international sanctions against Iran.  Suzanne Maloney's (2015) work on Iran's political economy helped 
to elucidate the impact of these sanctions on the Iranian end.   
Another resource that becomes especially salient in examining the fourth decade is the United 
States Central Command's (CENTCOM) annual posture statement (another primary source) to the House 
Armed Services Committee.  This statement is largely a formality, but as an official report to the body 
that provides all of CENTCOM's funding, it often paints a revealing description of the command's 
priorities.  By tracing the language used to describe the threat from Iran, one can get a feel for the way 
that not only CENTCOM, but the larger national security establishment, views the country.  As Chapter 6 
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will show, these statements demonstrated a trend toward increasing hostility, even as the nuclear 
agreement went into effect.   
  
Plan of the Dissertation 
This dissertation will propose a framework for evaluating conflict from an institutional 
perspective, using the innovation of "constituencies to the conflict" as the primary vehicle.  It will then 
conduct a trial application of this framework through an in-depth study of one prominent example of 
intractable conflict, the U.S.-Iranian relationship from 1979 to 2018.  Finally, it will draw insights and 
conclusions from the exercise, evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of the institutional approach 
for studying intractable conflict, and consider the next appropriate steps toward the broader application 
of institutional theory within conflict analysis.   
Whereas this chapter has spoken in general terms, Chapter 2 will develop a model for using the 
institutional approach to assess conflict.  It will examine how institutional theory has been previously 
utilized within Political Science and will discuss the challenges of applying this this theoretical framework 
to the analysis of international conflict.  It will introduce the nature and importance of constituencies to 
the conflict, and it will introduce five specific constituencies that have developed within the U.S.-Iranian 
relationship. 
Chapter 3 will cover the first decade of the U.S.-Iranian conflict.  This time period contains the 
roots of the institutionalization process that would unfold over the coming decades, and it will focus on 
key events that influenced this process.  It will briefly describe how these roots preceded the 1979 
Islamic Revolution.  It will cover the U.S. embassy hostage crisis in Tehran, the bombings and 
kidnappings in Lebanon during the early 1980's, U.S. support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War, the Iran-
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Contra scandal, the Tanker War in the Persian Gulf, and the transition process that surrounded the 
death of Ayatollah Khomeini.   
Chapter 4 will examine second decade of the U.S.-Iranian Conflict.  It will show 
institutionalization taking hold, driven less by specific events and more by the constituencies outlined in 
Chapter 2.  It will be organized by period instead of events, covering the presidential administration of 
George H. W. Bush, the first term of President Bill Clinton, and the first time of President Mohamad 
Khatami in Iran.  Each period will demonstrate key opportunities for rapprochement between the U.S. 
and Iran that came to naught.   
Chapter 5 will look at the third decade of the conflict, again taking a period approach.  It will 
examine the first term of President George W. Bush, during which time the U.S. and Iran had perhaps 
their greatest opportunity for rapprochement during the 40-year conflict, only slide into deeper 
hostility.  It will then move to the first term of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, where the 
dispute over Iran's nuclear program began to take center stage in world politics and Iran sponsored a 
proxy war against the U.S. in Iraq.  In spite of these developments, though, both sides demonstrated a 
desire for a more cooperative relationship, only to be stymied by institutional forces. 
Chapter 6 will cover the final decade in a similar fashion.  President Barrack Obama brought new 
hope as he attempted to thaw relations with Iran, but domestic politics on both sides made this all but 
impossible.  During his second term, the successful negotiation of a nuclear agreement between Iran 
and the U.S. (and its international partners) called into question the entire premise of intractable or 
institutional conflict.  The peacemakers had carried the day.  Yet the subsequent deterioration of 
relations, culminating in President Donald Trump's abnegation of the nuclear deal, demonstrated that 
institutional forces continued to shape the conflict through the end of the period in question. 
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Chapter 7 will conclude the dissertation by considering some key questions.  It will examine the 
implications of the case study findings with regard, first to the U.S.-Iranian relationship, and second to 
the institutionalization of conflict in general.  It will assess the utility of the institutional lens for conflict 
analysis and critique the model introduced in Chapter 2.  Finally, it will consider areas for further 





CHAPTER 2 - THEORY AND METHODOLOGY 
This chapter will explain how conflicts become intractable by harnessing the tools of 
institutional theory.  Conflict is endemic to the human condition and a fixture of the international 
system, but most interstate clashes are relatively short-lived.  Only a minority maintain a high degree of 
hostility for decades or even generations.  This persistence is often difficult to explain, especially when 
key actors change and participants on both sides may argue that a resolution would be in the best 
interest of all parties.  This chapter will show that a conflict becomes intractable when it develops the 
qualities of an institution.  Institutions foster durability in a changing world by creating their own 
frameworks of rules and expectation that are largely impervious to external influence.  They develop 
constituencies which subordinate larger societal interests to a common cause, becoming greater than 
the sum of their parts.  When constituencies with an interest in perpetuating the conflict and the power 
to influence the policies of their state develop on both sides, the conflict becomes intractable.  The U.S.-
Iranian relationship between 1979 and 2018 provides an example of this process. 
The following sections will develop an institutional lens for the study of conflict and propose a 
model for use in examining the nature of intractability.  It will then apply this model to the U.S.-Iranian 
conflict, introducing five specific constituencies and describing their place within an institutional 
framework.  This will lay the groundwork for the next four chapters, which will follow their stories over 




Toward an Institutional Theory of Conflict 
What sort of a framework can institutional theory offer to the study of conflict?  Institutions are 
largely abstract in nature, and institutionalization is a quality better described than measured.  In 
essence, this dissertation will take an abstract concept and use it as a lens for examining concrete 
realities.  Lenses may not be easily falsifiable, but they can be judged for their within-case explanatory 
power and their utility in comparison to other lenses.  A good lens consistently illuminates the dynamics 
of a case and reasonably accounts for outcomes that defy the logic of the theory.  It offers a unique 
contribution, but instead of supplanting all other lenses, it may be complimentary to some existing 
approaches.  This particular lens will embody the concept of an institution for practical application and 
demonstrate how institutions develop within the context of an international conflict.   
This section will proceed with a brief examination of the intersection between institutional 
theory and Political Science.  It will introduce several schools of thought that have developed with 
regard to institutions and argue that Historical Institutionalism offers the most promise for the study of 
intractable conflict.  It will discuss some of the challenges of making this application and propose a 
model for harnessing the power of tools to understand cases like the conflict between the U.S. and Iran. 
 
Institutional theory in International Relations 
The word "institution" is often used but rarely defined.  Organizations or governing bodies are 
commonly referred to as institutions with little delineation between the two concepts, except that the 
word institution is usually associated with longevity or staying power.  Within Political Science, usage of 
the term has run the gamut from describing tangible bodies, such as the U.S. Congress (Riker 1980, 444) 
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to intangible concepts, such as secure property rights (Acemoglu, et al. 2005).  Institutional arguments 
have also been commonly extended to explain complex effects like economic inequality (Hacker and 
Pierson 2010).  Barnett and Finnemore (1999) proposed a theoretical distinction between organizations 
and institutions, suggesting that organizations become institutions when they develop autonomy from 
their original scope and purpose, effectively taking on a life of their own.  This criterion is inherently 
subjective, better described than strictly defined, but the idea that an institution is greater than the sum 
of its parts is central to most discussions of the concept.   
In the field of International Relations (Rixen and Viola 2016, 6-7), the study of institutions has 
primarily focused on international regimes, related to either political economy or security, that have 
emerged in the post-World War II era.  This has also run a similar gamut from concrete to abstract.  
Solingen and Wan (2016) offered the International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank as 
tangible examples of successful international institutions.  Krasner (2016) described the intangible 
primacy of state sovereignty within the international system as another type.  Krasner's (1982) earlier 
work, along with Keohane (1984), did not use the term institution, but both authors described 
international regimes in institutional terms.  They explained that these formal and informal sets of rules 
and conventions generate utility that often outweighs the short-term gains that might be accrued by 
defection, again becoming more powerful than the sum of their parts.  This force of attraction can 
sometimes effectively bind the actions of states even without the need for strict enforcement 
mechanisms.  Ikenberry (2001) extended this discussion (using the term "institutions") and presented 
institutions as the underpinning of durable and effective systems of international order.   
Regardless of where an author falls conceptually in their treatment of institutions, one common 
denominator unites them all.  The study of institutions is fundamentally a study of rules.  This idea 
derives from a family of sociological theories, in which rules are seen as the binding agent for societal 
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organization.  One particularly illustrative theoretical framework is known as "practice theory," 
developed by sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. 
Bourdieu (1977) theorized that human groups develop a "habitus," which is a collective set of 
rules that place individuals into a larger social framework and govern appropriate behavior.  The habitus 
effectively encodes the values and worldview of a group, and it has tremendous implications for the 
distribution of power.  The habitus is self-replicating, perpetuating patterns of action (or "practice") 
through generations.  However, the habitus is also a site of contestation.  As Cornut (2017) pointed out, 
the process of replicating the habitus constantly exposes it to new external inputs, and while a habitus is 
broadly shared, each individual brings unique interpretations which have ripple effects across the group.  
Thus, even though the habitus provides a high degree of continuity through succeeding generations, it 
also has a dynamic quality.  Paradoxically, the very act of replication through practice is also a process of 
continual reinterpretation and change, though it often takes place slowly and imperceptibly.  Although 
modern institutional research predates Bourdieu, his "practice theory" and its articulation of the nature 
of rules in human behavior have widely impacted the field (See Lyke 2017 for an example). 
Like Bourdieu, Social Scientists from across the spectrum took an interest in the systemic study 
of institutions in the 1960’s and 1970’s (Hall and Taylor 1996), when researchers began to ask why 
certain systems of practice in government and civil society become entrenched over the course of time.  
They wrestled with the question of how human agency interacted with the structure of society, 
primarily attributing stasis to structural factors.  The field of study developed simultaneously along three 
broad lines, separated by disciplinary divides but overlapping in certain assumptions, namely that rules 
govern human behavior.  Sociological Institutionalism argued that rules are culturally based, where 
socially developed systems of meaning shape human perception and action.  Stasis is therefore a 
product of deeply ingrained habits and worldviews.  Rational Choice Institutionalism (Greif and Laitin 
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2004), on the other hand, viewed humans as self-interested utility maximizers.  When the rules of 
behavior drive each participant to seek their own benefit, an equilibrium results, much like the 
operation of Adam Smith's "hidden hand" in economics.  Stasis is a condition of equilibrium, where 
relevant actors view the status quo as more beneficial than change.  Sociological and Rational Choice 
Institutionalism are not opposites, however.  Proponents of rational choice idealize the concept of utility 
as an objective value, but in practice, human interests and utility are conditioned by individual 
perception, which is influenced by culture.  Advocates of the sociological approach likewise accept that 
humans will act rationally within their socially constructed framework. 
Historical Institutionalism, although separately derived, combines certain aspects of the 
Sociological and Rational Choice alternatives.  Hall and Taylor (1996, 938) define institutions under this 
school of thought as, "formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the 
organizational structure of the polity or political economy." Instead of viewing institutions as derivative 
of culture or the structure of interests, Historical Institutionalism embodies and animates them in their 
own rite, giving them a leading role in the drama of human behavior.  From a rational choice 
perspective, they provide information and shape the perception of utility.  From a cultural perspective, 
they provide meaning and purpose.  So where do these (virtually) embodied institutions arise from?  
One of the foundational concepts (Fioretos 2011) of Historical Institutionalism is that of "path-
dependence." Today's choices shape tomorrow's options, and so on, and so forth.  Institutions are 
historically constructed over time, carrying forward bits of the past in an iterative fashion, much like 
Bourdieu's concept of the habitus.  Where rational choice focuses on ends, and the cultural approach 
focuses on beginnings, Historical Institutionalism requires a comprehensive study of the journey to 
explain institutions.  This dissertation will primarily utilize the Historical Institutional approach. 
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Regardless of the school of thought, the study of institutions is an examination of why certain 
things stay the same in an ever-changing world.  Institutions manifest themselves as islands of unusual 
stability in the shifting sand.  But even the most established islands change, and it sometimes happens in 
dramatic and unexpected ways.  Accounting for change within institutions is therefore one of the main 
challenges for institutional scholars.  Perhaps the neatest and most common explanation, as put forth by 
(Greif and Laitin 2004), is that institutions change because of external shocks.  This envisions institutions 
as internally insulated systems functioning as unified actors within their environment.  These bodies 
have evolved to suit particular environmental conditions, and they resist change within a tolerable band 
of varying conditions.  Major events or changes that exceed the tolerable range, however, will prompt a 
new round of evolution (or simply destroy the institution altogether).  This explanation fits neatly with 
Rational Choice Institutionalism, which argues that institutions are sets of rules that produce and 
maintain equilibrium.  When new forces exceed the capacity of the institution to maintain balance, the 
rules adapt to a new equilibrium.   
The shortcoming of this theory of change, however, stems from the observation that institutions 
do change over time, even in the absence of notable external shocks, and sometimes in ways that 
appear inconsistent with a reaction to external pressures.  Greif and Laitin (2004) addressed this 
"endogenous" institutional change by suggesting essentially that the wiring of an insulated system can 
become defective at various times, reducing an institution's ability to replicate itself and magnifying the 
effect of external shocks.  Unfortunately, their model did not explain how or when internal wiring 
changes, and it still relied on external shocks, which are not always directly correlated with change.    
Mahoney and Thelen (2009) (also see Thelen and Streeck 2005) took a completely different approach.  
Harnessing Historical Institutionalism, they argued that institutions evolve over the course of time in a 
path dependent fashion and that understanding this evolution requires temporal analysis.  Like 
Bourdieu's concept of the habitus, replication and evolution are processes that go hand in hand, 
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producing change at an often-imperceptible pace.  Unlike Greif and Laitin's (2004) model, where change 
happens fitfully, interrupting a status quo of stasis (a pattern known as "punctuated equilibria"), 
Mahoney and Thelen (2009) envision institutions that are always in motion.  Punctuated equilibria are 
not the process of change but only the outward manifestation of changes that were occurring beneath 
the surface all along. 
How does endogenous institutional change occur for Mahoney and Thelen (2009, 14-16)?  First, 
their work quietly broke the distinction between endogenous and exogenous change which shackled 
Thelen and Streeck's (2005) preceding work.  Institutions do not operate in a vacuum, so delineating 
between internal processes and external shocks is unhelpful and often misleading.  Institutions change 
according to certain patterns in relations to their environment, regardless whether shocks are internal 
or external.  Second, their work viewed institutions as sites of continual contestation over the rules of 
the game, and for them, "What animates change is the power-distributional implications of institutions." 
Third, the results of this power struggle inevitably play out through four consistent modes or processes 
(verbatim from Mahoney and Thelen 2009, 15-16):  
1. Displacement: the removal of existing rules and the introduction of new ones 
2. Layering: the introduction of new rules on top of or alongside existing ones 
3. Drift: the changed impact of existing rules due to shifts in the environment 
4. Conversion: the changed enactment of existing rules due to their strategic redeployment 
Thelen and Streeck (2005, 29) also offered a fifth mode of institutional change, exhaustion.  This mode 
might best be described as a failure of evolution, where the inability of a rule set to adapt to changing 
environmental conditions leaves the institution so devoid of utility that it faces extinction.  Even in 
death, however, institutions rarely disappear without a trace, and some trace elements can usually be 
found in other institutions that carry on.     
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As the next section will show, these mechanisms of institutional change are paradoxically the 
same mechanisms by which institutions are originally constructed, and through which they maintain 
their stability.  When institutional dynamics are operating, these processes turn inward, building new 
structures of resistance to change in response to a shifting environment.  The old adage, “the more 
things change, the more they stay the same,” comes into full effect.  Therefore, when one can detect 
and identify these processes at work, they serve as an indicator that a problem set is becoming 
institutional in nature.  Rixen and Viola (2016, 4-6) argued in the introduction to their edited volume 
that Historical Institutionalism has considerable untapped potential for illuminating complex issues in 
the field of International Relations.  This dissertation asserts that the analysis of international conflict is 
an area that is particularly ripe for institutional research.  Mahoney and Thelen's (2009) model will serve 
as a basis for developing and institutional model that explains why conflicts become intractable.   
  
Applying institutional theory to international conflict   
Protracted international conflicts, especially those that seem to simmer at a low boil for years 
on end, are often said to be institutionalized, but can conflict itself become an institution?  At first 
glance, the application appears more than apt.  As the previous section has shown, the umbrella of 
institutionalism has been broad enough to encompass everything from specific organizations like the 
U.S. Congress to abstract concepts like secure property rights, that can only be seen or touched in 
derivative form.  If one were to distill a working definition of institutions from this field of study within 
Political Science, it might look something like this: 
 An institution is a rule or set of rules with the power to inspire and organize human behavior in a 
particular direction, providing the impetus for its own self-replication, and operating with relative 
autonomy from other sets of rules within the scope of its writ.   
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Put in analogical terms, an institution develops its own gravitational pull on human behavior and 
becomes greater than the sum of the parts within its orbit.  This dissertation asserts that intractable 
conflicts in the international realm display these properties very consistently.  Further, Historical 
Institutionalism lends itself particularly to the study of conflict because it highlights the contested nature 
of power that animates institutional growth.  It is tautological to even mention that interstate conflicts 
are contests of power.  They also incorporate power struggles at various levels of the societies involved.  
The energy that animates an institution is generated from the engine of competition over the rules of 
society.   
This brings up another key observation about intractable conflict, in general.  It must be 
mutually constructed, which means that parties on both sides of the conflict have to be invested in 
continuing the hostility.  Great Britain and the people of Iran have a tortured history that long predates 
the Islamic Republic.  Since the 1979 revolution, Iran has periodically provoked the British, for example 
by attacking their embassy (Worth and Gladstone 2011), harassing their naval patrols (Crist 2012, 559-
560)), supporting Hezbollah's kidnapping of British citizens in Lebanon (Ranstorp 1997), and fighting a 
proxy war against British forces in Basra (Rayment 2008).  Yet few observers would describe the 
relationship between Britain and Iran as intractable conflict.  The British showed little interest in 
confronting Iran (outside the context of multilateral sanctions over their nuclear program), so Iran's 
provocations gained little traction in stoking sustained hostility.  For conflict to be an institution, both 
sides have to be linked by a common rule or set of rules.  Intractable conflicts, however, do adhere to 
this principle, at least to some degree, especially the U.S. conflict with Iran.   
The rule set underpinning institutionalized conflict need not be complex.  The institution of 
secure property rights can be explained in a sentence or two, but its effects are far reaching and 
profound, spawning an endless stream of difficult questions and controversies.  One might suggest 
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mutual defiance, hostility, or mistrust as rules that define intractable conflict.  Further, as the U.S.-
Iranian conflict will demonstrate in coming chapters, both sides have consistently treated the 
relationship as a zero-sum game, making concessions on either side very difficult.  Few would argue that 
any of these potential rules fails to apply to a broad range of simmering conflicts, including India-
Pakistan, Israeli-Palestinian, and a divided Korea.  Instead of choosing one of these rules in isolation, this 
dissertation will consider the set together as a potential habitus for the institution of international 
conflict.   
The next key question is how a conflict becomes an institution.  Every conflict does not become 
intractable, and some are resolved quickly, suggesting that they never assumed a high degree of 
institutional properties in the first place.  Each of the three institutional schools of thought discussed so 
far provides a different perspective on this question.  The rational choice approach focuses on actor 
interests in the present.  Trends perpetuate because a structure exists that makes defection from the 
norm either more costly or less certain than defending the status quo.  Using the U.S.-Iranian 
relationship as an example, proponents of rational choice might argue that maintaining the conflict is 
more comfortable for both sides because they can better estimate the cost.  This works best on the U.S. 
side of the conflict, where one can use a material basis for interest calculations.  As the last chapter has 
shown, containing Iran is expensive.  However, political leaders and their domestic supporters have 
become comfortable with these costs, whereas making peace with Iran carries risks.  What if they 
renege on the deal?  What would be the price of having to turn around and face an Iran reinvigorated by 
the dividends of peace?   
The inadequacies of the rational choice approach are more apparent on the Iranian side.  The 
price of conflict to Iranian society is proportionally higher.  Of course, deprivation is a status quo 
embraced by revolutionary regimes, and one could argue that these costs have already been counted.  
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The real difficulty, though, is that most of the benefits accruing to Iranians for maintaining hostility are 
intangible.  Making peace with the U.S. might improve the quality of life in Iran, but it would probably 
come at the cost of sacrificing Iran’s regional aspirations or subordinating the country to an American-
led system of world order.  How does one measure the price of prestige or the value of legitimating a 
revolutionary ideology?  This approach begs questions of how rationality and utility are judged.  In fact, 
U.S. leaders have accused the Iranians of irrational behavior for decades, but as the following chapters 
will show, both sides have been affected by emotion and historical baggage in their interest calculations.  
Rational choice does not deal well with intangible motivations or explain the construction of interest 
perceptions.  Also, even if rational choice explains the perpetuation of an institution, it offers little 
insight into why a particular state of equilibrium developed in the first place.   
The cultural approach (Sociological Institutionalism), on the other hand, embraces the challenge 
of dealing with interest construction.  In evaluating an institution of animosity, it would focus on societal 
roots, considering differences in history and culture that long predate the conflict.  For the U.S. and Iran, 
it would certainly compare and contrast the Judeo-Christian worldview and that of Shiite Islam.  It might 
look to ancient Persian history to help explain the Iranian self-conception with respect to their place in 
the region and the world.  The ideological roots of Iran’s revolutionary leaders would also be pertinent, 
as would the development of the U.S. as a world superpower after World War II.  All of these factors 
could prove useful in helping to decipher the interest calculations that have underpinned four decades 
of hostile behavior, but the cultural approach is poor at predicting outcomes.  Taken to the extreme, it 
lends itself to the argument that conflict between two incompatible cultures or religions is simply 
predetermined when they collide.  This "clash of civilizations" (See Huntington 1993) viewpoint provides 
a seemingly neat explanation for the U.S.-Iranian conflict, but it is completely confounded by years of 
partnership between the U.S. and other Muslim countries like Egypt, or even Saudi Arabia, during the 
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same period.  Institutions are constructed by decisions and events, not just ancient history or culture, 
and so are conflicts.   
When searching for the roots of an institution of animosity, an approach guided by Historical 
Institutionalism offers the ideal lens.  All conflicts have historical roots, whether deep or shallow, and 
most studies of conflict already involve some degree of historical analysis.  This approach involves 
tracing developments over time, identifying critical junctures at which important choices create path 
dependence.  In the case of the U.S.-Iranian relationship, it ties the past to the present and explain why 
a specific event that happened decades ago is still relevant to the conflict today.  Far from discounting 
the utility of rational choice analysis, a historical approach can help to illuminate the true nature of the 
structure in which actors exercise their “bounded rationality” (see Simon 1979, 502).  As this chapter will 
later show, a model based upon Historical Institutionalism will also cast light into which actors are 
having the greatest impact on the intractability of a conflict.   
To understand how conflicts become institutions, one must first ask the broader question of 
where institutions come from, in general.  This is where the modes of institutional change described by 
Mahoney and Thelen (2009, 15-16) and Thelen and Streek (2005, 18-29) demonstrate a utility far 
greater than their original conception.  These are the fundamental mechanisms by which institutions 
evolve under any environmental condition, internal or external.  The short answer is that institutions 
arise from other institutions that have evolved, merged, or been otherwise repurposed.  Institutions are 
manifestations of the social habitus, which is always in motion, but rarely forgets its past.  For this 
reason, they carry trace elements of the institutions that precede them, often in quirky or unpredictable 
ways.   
Given this broader application, modes of “change” becomes a misleading label for these 
dynamics.  Instead, this dissertation will consider them modes of institutional operation.  They are the 
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mechanisms that first build, and then defend an institution.  Once built, these dynamics operate like 
antibodies in the human immune system.  They constantly evolve so the body does not have to, actively 
developing new forms of resistance against change.  The following will describe how these modes will be 
repurposed toward the analysis of intractable conflict. 
 Displacement & Conversion are both closely related and describe how changing conditions 
challenge an institution’s original raison d’etre or present the people associated with the institution 
with new and potentially more pressing threats or opportunities.  In operational terms, 
displacement is a change in the rules that might happen quickly in some cases, but often lacks 
staying power when it does.  Conversion is a more gradual and fundamental transformation.  
Because the line between the concepts is fuzzy, this dissertation will combine the two except 
where a distinction is warranted.  For examples of displacement and conversion, America’s Cold 
War military and foreign policy apparatus shifted heavily to the Persian Gulf and largely against Iran 
in the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union.  Iran’s Islamic Republican Guard Corps 
(IRGC) shifted focus after the Iran-Iraq War to anti-Israeli and anti-American activities.  On a more 
abstract level, the U.S. replaced Great Britain as the exemplar of imperial behavior in the eyes of 
the Iranian populace in 1953.  Iran also replaced Iraq during the early 1980’s as America’s adversary 
and threat in the Persian Gulf. 
Layering is a process whereby new developments are added or previously unrelated issues become 
linked to the conflict.  Layering is most evident when one sees that the core issue of a conflict has 
changed over the course of time without lessening hostility.  U.S. grievances against Iran shifted 
from terrorism in the 1980’s, to human rights in the 1990’s, to the nuclear issue in the 21st Century, 
to regional destabilization in the late 2010’s.  No layer was ever removed, however, and U.S. 
officials still mention all four as supporting evidence of Iran’s overall malfeasance.  Iran, likewise, 
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frames today’s issues in yesterday’s events, such as the 1953 Mossadegh coup and the 1988 
shootdown of Iran Air 655.   
Drift, as previously described, occurs when conditions gradually change but the rules remain rigid, 
causing the institution to function differently in its environment than it once did.  In practice, it is 
the rotation of personnel associated with an institution that most engenders gradual change.  New 
blood adopts the established interests and carries them forward, but their ideas will also be shaped 
by a different set of circumstances and societal pressures that the old guard they replace, and the 
application of these ideas will play out differently.  The result can be an institution simultaneously 
both more and less congruent with the contemporary environment than it was in the past.  As 
succeeding chapters will show, the changes of presidential administration in both the U.S. and Iran, 
as well as the evolution of leadership in Iran's IRGC provide examples of drift.   
Exhaustion occurs when the conditions driving an interest in conflict change, but the adherents to 
the institution cannot or will not renew it through the other three processes.  The constituency dies 
a natural death, and its energies are absorbed by communities with different interests.  This has 
not occurred yet in the U.S.-Iranian relationship, but an example of exhaustion might be the 
royalists (supporters of the Shah’s monarchy) from Iran after 1979.  These individuals did not 
disappear, but their cause eventually became so hopeless and discredited that they dissipated to 
other political groups, leaving an empty shell of their former institution behind. 
At the theoretical level, these modes of institutional operation are responsible for building 
institutions, but in the physical world, where does one pin down and locate the institutions of animosity 
that they create?  Most of the literature that examines institutions focuses on specific organizations 
because they are tangible manifestations that can be bounded and studied.  Where would an institution 
of animosity reside?  The logical starting point might be the state level, where both sides would be 
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considered unitary actors.  This is problematic when considering intractable conflict, though.  Conflict is 
best identified as intractable when history produces examples of state leaders on both sides arguing 
that resolution of the conflict is in their national interest, but neither side has been able to accomplish it.  
Thus, an institution of animosity almost necessarily implies a bifurcation of interest between the states 
themselves and some other set of actors.  Another solution might be to focus on a set of "special 
interest groups," but this would tie the conflict too closely to transient actors, and it could fail to explain 
historical continuity that spans decades.  
Instead, this dissertation contends that conflicts develop communities of interest, hereafter 
referred to as constituencies, which foster and nourish institutional animosity on both sides of the 
conflict.  Constituencies have one or more common identifying feature and an interest in perpetuating 
the conflict, meaning the conflict is the primary factor influencing the incentive structure of its 
members.  As such, constituencies are by nature institutions themselves – drawn into the orbit of a 
larger and less tangible institution which shapes their habitus (and vice-versa) in systemic fashion.  
Constituencies are not discrete.  They have fuzzy borders, their membership shifts over time, and they 
may overlap with other communities.  They are recognizable, though.  For example, John Mearsheimer 
(2018) identified “foreign policy elites” as the chief culprit in perpetuating the concept of liberal 
hegemony.  Mearsheimer spelled out broad categories of inclusion and gave some examples, but his 
argument did not depend on spelling out whether person “A” was or was not a “foreign policy elite.” 
Finally, in order to be significant, a constituency must include actors with some power to influence the 
course of the conflict.   
Where do constituencies come from?  They evolve through the same mechanisms already 
discussed.  In many cases, they come from preexisting communities that were interested in something 
else before they were drawn into the conflict in question.  The Israeli lobby functioned in the U.S. prior 
84 
 
to DESERT STORM, but they developed a new stake in the U.S.-Iran conflict during the 1990’s.  In other 
cases, the conflict itself served as a magnet around which various individuals and groups coalesced.  As 
this chapter will later the discuss, the Iranian Republican Guard Corps (IRGC) and its affiliates had 
institutional roots that predated the Islamic Revolution, but it was conflict with the U.S. and paranoia 
regarding a repeat performance of the 1953 Mossadegh coup that bound disparate groups into a single 
constituency.  Again, Mahoney and Thelen's (2009) (and Mahoney and Streeck 2005) insights have 
demonstrated their versatility.  While attempting to explain “endogenous” change, they actually 
discovered a blueprint for institutional development and evolution in general (because each mechanism 
requires a degree of exogenous input by definition).  There is an old adage that the more things change, 
the more they stay the same.  These authors’ work reveals the manner by which institutionalization 
happens.  A process of change paradoxically functions to solidify habits and patterns over the course of 
time, while constantly incorporating new inputs. 
 
The implications of institutional conflict and expected outcomes 
This dissertation contends that conflict becomes intractable to a greater degree as it assumes 
the properties of an institution.  Conflict becomes institutionalized when the gravity it generates draws 
pre-existing institutions (constituencies) into its orbit and binds them with a habitus geared toward 
perpetuating hostility.  For the conflict to become a full-fledged institution of animosity, this must take 
place simultaneously on both sides.  Constituency development need not happen at the same rate on 
both sides, but it must converge at some point in order to achieve the synergy required for self-
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replication.3  A conflict may also spawn its own, apparently original constituencies, but even these must 
ultimately draw their substance from somewhere else, in institutional fashion.   
The degree to which a conflict becomes institutionalized depends upon two factors.  First, the 
power of constituencies within the institution of animosity to influence foreign policy on either side of 
the conflict will determine their overall effect.  Second, the symmetry of the constituencies arranged on 
both sides of the conflict will provide the mutual reinforcement necessary to perpetuate hostility.  A 
conflict with powerful constituencies on each side will be highly resistant to resolution, regardless of the 
costs imposed on the societies involved.  In studying a conflict, this condition should produce three 
expected outcomes: 
1. Constituencies will consistently and actively undermine opportunities for cooperation or 
rapprochement, even when these options present a greater good for society, as long as the 
institution of animosity is operative. 
2. Breakdowns in cooperation or rapprochement will not be arbitrary.  They will result from a 
preceding chain of events, demonstrating path dependence.  Present failures will also 
contribute to future outcomes. 
3. Efforts to scuttle cooperation or rapprochement will be evident on both sides of the conflict, 
regardless of who initiates the opening, demonstrating the mutual construction and 
reinforcement of the institution.   
 
3 A conflict inevitably impacts the habitus of various social groups on both sides.  This will not happen in the same manner or 
the same rate for every group.  Constituency development will almost certainly occur faster on one side than the other.  
However, a conflict with constituencies on only one side is not an institution.  The individual constituencies may be institutions, 
but when these dynamics are unilateral, the other side is not compelled to act against its interests in furtherance of the conflict.  
The conflict only becomes intractable when the obstacles to peace are spread across both sides and begin to act in concerted 
fashion, and constituencies then feed off of each other’s energy to fuel the conflict. 
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On the other hand, what conditions would challenge the central claims of this dissertation?  If a 
conflict identified as intractable exhibited developments inconsistent with the behavior of institutions, 
then this must be closely examined.  Major breakthroughs in negotiations or peace accords should 
demand an explanation, and close cooperation on any major issue should also raise attention, although 
these occurrences would not automatically disprove the operation of an institution of animosity.  
Institutions live in an uncertain world where unexpected events can change circumstances in short 
periods of time.  Like Goliath in the Biblical account of his showdown with David, constituencies do not 
always win, even when they appear to hold the winning cards.  However, constituencies do not just lie 
down and die.  Functioning constituencies will challenge unprecedented steps toward rapprochement or 
cooperation, even when those measures initially appeared successful.  Institutional analysis requires a 
long-term view of the relationship and does not consider events at face value.  Also, constituencies do 
not just disappear.  They have mechanism by which they might shift their priorities, but just as their 
interests came from somewhere, they have to go somewhere.  A vanishing constituency that cannot be 
accounted for would be problematic for an institutional approach to conflict analysis.   
Finally, one might challenge the very premise of an institution of animosity by noting its 
essential similarities to other theories.  After all, should it be surprising if conflict becomes intractable 
when powerful actors on both sides wish it to be so?  What an institutional lens makes clear is these 
actors do not arbitrarily appear on the scene.  Nor is their success a foregone conclusion.  Intractability 
is a paradoxical condition in which parties that ostensibly hate each other act in concert as part of a 
larger system.  If conflict becomes institutional, then these parties are subject to a set of rules and 
mechanism that determine the manner of their evolution.  The significance to such a theory lies not only 
in the explanation of how conflicts become intractable but in how they might eventually be resolved.  
Understanding the evolutionary process and the life cycle of constituencies can illuminate the art of the 
possible because constituencies are necessarily deconstructed through the same processes by which 
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they were constructed.  Further, it might be possible in some cases to anticipate and prevent the 
formation of constituencies altogether.   
 
The challenges of this approach  
The primary challenge to developing an institutional theory of intractable conflict, and the key 
focus of this dissertation, is discovering why some conflicts become intractable, whereas most do not.  
All conflicts involve institutions, and they inevitably impact the evolution of those institutions, but only 
some conflicts actually become an institution.  Presumably, most conflicts develop constituencies to one 
degree or another, as well.  What conditions drive the tipping point in which one can say without a 
doubt that powerful constituencies on both sides of the conflict have produced an institution of 
animosity?  This dissertation will examine the role of constituencies on either side of the U.S.-Iranian 
conflict over four decades to determine the nature of their role in causing conflict intractability.  By 
tracing the development and impact of these constituencies, it will seek insights into the conditions by 
which constituencies lead to intractable conflict.  Theorizing this causal relationship will allow the 
dissertation to offer suggestions into the most productive routes for constituency deconstruction and 
conflict resolution. 
A secondary challenge, and one that is far more easily surmountable, is the appropriate 
selection of constituencies to study.  Unlike organizations, which can sometimes be studied empirically 
to develop insights into the abstract institutions that drive them, constituencies are less tangible.  On 
one hand, this provides an advantage over the approach taken by rational choice models of conflict.  If 
one were to employ interest mapping, using key individuals or organizations as the actors in the conflict, 
one could reduce the conflict to a single (albeit complicated) mathematical equation, the solution to 
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which would be a state of equilibrium among the interested parties.  However, an accurate solution to 
such an equation would require perfect knowledge and representation of the parties involved in the 
conflict.  If an actor were misplaced within the equation, or worse yet, missed entirely, it would change 
the entire outcome.   
Constituencies, on the other hand, remain theoretical constructs, even though they are semi-
tangible and historically traceable.  Constituencies, following institutional logic, will also tend to 
converge, as various social groups and institutional processes overlap and affect each other.  This does 
not mean that the selection of constituencies will not affect the outcome, but it means that it will be 
less consequential whether person "A" is grouped with person "B" or person "C."  The constituencies are 
a lens for viewing mechanisms of institutional change operating at the system level, and these 
mechanisms will overlap groupings "A&B" and "A&C."  One could verify this by historically tracing 
different combinations of constituencies, and this would undoubtedly produce some additional insights, 
but the returns to additional iterations would diminish quickly because the researcher would only be 
looking at the same system mechanics from different angles.  This dissertation will use one set of 
constituencies, as outlined in the following sections. 
  
Harnessing the U.S.-Iranian relationship as a case study 
The merits of using the U.S.-Iranian relationship from 1979 to 2018 as a case of intractable 
conflict have already been explained, and with four decades of tumultuous history to examine, it spans 
multiple generations.  This is a story that has been told many times (usually not in its entirety) from 
different perspectives, but the lens of Historical Institutionalism will offer a new approach.  This 
dissertation will tell the institutional story of the conflict using the previously discussed model to process 
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trace each decade of the conflict, focusing on critical junctures, or key points at which a decision by one 
or both sides would have lasting implications for the direction of the relationship.  It will especially 
examine the impact of path dependency on moments that presented an opportunity for cooperation or 
rapprochement between the two parties.   
This study will follow five specific constituencies and focus consistently on the mechanisms of 
institutional change that shaped the conflict.  It will collect observations about the functioning of 
constituencies, and in doing so, it will also serve as a test case for the institutional model presented in 
this chapter, considering challenges to the claims put forth within that model, as well.   This will offer 
insights into the unanswered questions regarding the conditions under which a conflict becomes 
intractable, and it will facilitate an assessment with regard to the efficacy of the institutional lens to 
conflict analysis and implications for future theoretical work.   
  
Constituencies to the Conflict 
The purpose of this section is to introduce five constituencies to the institution of animosity 
between the U.S. and Iran.  As previously explained, constituencies to the conflict are more than just 
interested parties.  Much like DNA in human beings, they embody the defining characteristics of the 
relationship, and the structure of worldviews and incentives within the constituencies compels them to 
reproduce the conflict, even while accounting for an infinite number of variables in terms of possible 
events and outcomes.  Even if you could bribe a constituency to leave the conflict, no one-time payment 
would likely be enough.  Like DNA, constituencies change all the time (the very nature of their 
replication requires it), but this change happens according to consistent patterns and rules that govern 
the way they interact with the surrounding world.  On the other hand, constituencies are unlike DNA 
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and human bodies in another critical sense; they are not discrete entities with fixed boundaries or 
shape.  Individuals, and sometimes even groups, come and go from these constituencies over time, and 
there is no hard or fast criterion for determining exactly who is in and who is out.  This makes defining a 
given constituency challenging.  Ultimately, constituency itself is an abstract analytic tool applied to 
conflicts where institutional conditions obtain in order to better to understand the dynamics of that 
conflict.  When a conflict can be studied over a long period of time, distinctions begin to emerge, and 
individual constituencies can be distinguished by patterns of behavior and action.   
At what point, then, do interested parties become constituencies to a conflict?  Again, there is 
no hard and fast rule.  The guideline that this dissertation will use is that a party becomes a constituency 
when institutional processes give it a stake in perpetuating the conflict that is no longer directly tied to 
security interests based on rational choice.  For example, the state of Israel has always had legitimate 
security interests and concerns with regard to Iran.  However, it became a constituent to the U.S.-
Iranian conflict in the 1990's when interests unrelated to its own physical security motivated its 
government leaders to increase their animosity toward Iran.  These two sets of interests often coincided 
in a mutually reinforcing fashion, but there were clear cases in the 2000's and 2010's where Israel would 
have been more secure with a reduction in hostility toward Iran.  The fact that its leaders would not 
countenance such a course correction suggested, not just ulterior motives, but a deeper 
institutionalization of the conflict - a growing degree of constituency over time.   
How are constituencies delineated, one from another?  In some cases, this is relatively intuitive.  
The U.S. Congress and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have almost nothing in common 
except a shared interest in defying each other.  On the other hand, the IRGC and Iran's clerical 
establishment share links that are often difficult, even for Iranians, to untangle.  Yet these two also have 
distinct roles and motivation, making their separation analytically useful.  For the purposes of this 
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dissertation, constituencies can be delineated when they each possess at least one prominent and 
distinctive binding characteristic unrelated to the conflict, and most importantly, when it is useful to do 
so.  As stated in the introduction, constituencies are not examined for their own sake.  The purpose of 
identifying and studying constituencies is to gain a window into the larger institutional dynamics of a 
conflict and to help understand why some conflicts become intractable.  Keeping this in mind will 
alleviate the burden of having to consider every possible candidate or combination of potential 
constituencies in order to generate usable knowledge and insights.  A good model will produce a good 
picture.  An alternative model may help refine the picture.  Successive iterations will yield diminishing 
returns.   
The model chosen by this dissertation includes five constituencies to the conflict.  It deliberately 
excludes the presidents of the United States and Iran.  This does not mean that there have been no 
institutional forces acting upon the presidents themselves, their administration, or especially the 
executive branch agencies under their control.  However, presidents on both sides have consistently 
been bombarded with such a range of competing demands regarding their national interest that stoking 
mutual animosity has rarely been a high priority.  In fact, even the most bellicose presidents (George W. 
Bush on the U.S. side and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on the Iranian side) made at least some effort to 
resolve the U.S.-Iranian conflict.  For this particular model, juxtaposing the actions and intentions of the 
executive branches on both sides against the influence of the constituencies to the conflict is the most 
illuminating route for explaining how the constituencies have been responsible for perpetuating the 
conflict.  The constituencies this dissertation will examine on the Iranian side are the clerical 
establishment and the IRGC.  On the U.S. side, it will focus on U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) along 




Iran's clerical establishment 
Iran's clerical establishment was arguably the primary instigator of and the first true constituent 
to the conflict between the U.S. and Iran.  This constituency was born of Ayatollah Khomeini's clerical 
supporters who took a leading role in the overthrow of the Shah, coming to power themselves with the 
establishment of the Islamic Republic.  This group was both fractious and diverse in its own rite, and its 
internal power struggles would shape the course of Iranian policy for four decades.  Where they united, 
though, was first in their loyalty to Khomeini's vision, and second in anti-Americanism, which developed 
into a guiding principle.  As a constituency to the conflict, the clerical establishment (as it will be referred 
to for the remainder of this work) broadly includes the leaders with religious credentials or ties who 
were active in Iranian politics.  Some clerics, including critics of Khomeini, chose not to enter the political 
realm (many of the more prominent retreating to seminaries in Qom), and they will not be included.  
Some politicians had no religious training or credentials, but their ties to clerical families or patronage of 
politically active mullahs qualified them for inclusion.  This delineation of the clerical establishment 
benefits from a key feature of the Islamic Republic's constitution.  It established that the Council of 
Guardians (Thaler 2010, 29) will officially vet all candidates for national elections.  The criteria for 
excluding candidates are often vague or arbitrary, drawing criticism from democracy advocates 
worldwide, but this also has the effect of homogenizing Iran's government.  Politicians may disagree 
about a lot of things in Iran, but they will not serve in public office unless they are recognized by their 
peers as supporters of Khomeini's doctrine and vision. 
The clerical establishment, as a constituency, owes its roots to the Islamic Republican Party 
(IRP), a political party specifically sanctioned by Khomeini (Milani 1994, 147-167) after his return to Iran.  
The IRP leadership was a who's-who of the Islamic Republic's founding fathers, including Ayatollah 
Mohammad Hosseini Beheshti (who chaired Iran's Supreme Court until his 1981 assassination), 
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Hojatolislam Seyyed Ali Khamenei (who became Iran's President and then Supreme Leader), and 
Hojatolislam Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (who would eventually hold most of the senior positions in the 
Iranian government except for Supreme Leader).  The IRP became the nucleus around which Khomeini's 
supporters coalesced as they struggled to secure the reins of power in Iran, first against the secular 
nationalists, and second against the leftist factions.  Secular nationalists (Milani 1994, 147-151) 
(Axworthy 2013, 157-158) advocated Western-style republican democracy, which hearkened back in 
Iran to the Constitution of 1906.  This faction was led by Mehdi Bazargan, the Prime Minister of the 
provisional government after the fall of the Shah, and if left unchecked, they would have limited the 
influence of the clergy in Iranian politics.  While both the leftists and nationalists competed with the IRP, 
the leftists threw in their lot with the IRP against Bazargan's government.  As Chapter 3 will show, the 
student takeover of the U.S. Embassy in November 1979 was the key milestone in the total defeat of this 
faction.   
In early 1980, Abolhassan Bani Sadr (Amanat 2017, 793-798), a non-clerical intellectual, was 
elected Iran's first President.  Bani Sadr was a supporter of Khomeini, and for a time enjoyed his 
blessing, but he also had liberal leanings and was intent on building a viable, functioning government.  
As Bani-Sadr attempted to assert presidential authority, he immediately butted heads with the clerics of 
the IRP, who preferred to treat political power as the spoils of the revolution.  While Khomeini 
supported him occasionally (usually not), he steadily lost ground to his rivals, eventually casting about 
for support from nationalists and leftists.  This power struggle continued until June 1981, when Bani 
Sadr (who had already fled the country in hiding) was impeached on charges of treason.  Khomeini 
outlawed all political parties except the IRP (Fairbanks 1998, 20-22) and cracked down on dissent.  The 
leftists, led primarily by the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), had been steadily sidelined from Iranian politics 
and now found themselves locked out entirely.  They struck back (Milani 1994, 187-189) by bombing an 
IRP conference, killing or wounding a number of Iran's senior leaders and beginning a campaign of 
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terror.  This inaugurated a civil war which raged for the next year, leaving the MEK defeated and 
effectively driven from Iranian soil.  With the regime's most dangerous enemy vanquished, Khomeini 
then turned on the more passive leftists, the Tudeh Party (Gheissari and Nasr 2006, 95-96)  (Amanat 
2017, 805-806), with a campaign of arrests, torture, and forced recantations which finished communist 
influence in Iran, as well. 
Each stage in the consolidation of the clerical establishment’s power generated new utility for 
stoking Iran’s conflict with the United States.  Chapter 3 will explain how the clerical establishment 
began to coalesce into a full-fledged constituent to the U.S.-Iranian conflict, beginning with Khomeini's 
decision to support the takeover the U.S. embassy and resulting hostage crisis.  It will show that victory 
on the domestic front did not unite Khomeini's supporters, but instead exacerbated factional divides.  
Within this power struggle, radicalism became a form of currency, and this was directed largely at the 
U.S. - a trend that continued through Khomeini's death in 1989.  Chapter 4 will then explain how 
President Rafsanjani attempted to bring Iran back into the international fold and thaw relations with the 
West.  It will show that, in many ways, he was stymied by his own clerical establishment, which 
developed an interest in keeping Iran isolated.  In 1997, Iran had another opportunity as reform-minded 
President Mohammad Khatami came to office.  Again, the clerical establishment saw its own interests 
threatened and undermined rapprochement with the West.   
Chapter 5 will follow the end of the Khatami years and show how a conservative resurgence 
suppressed hopes of reform in Iran, leading to the election of the hardline President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad.  Ironically, the many of the hardliners wanted rapprochement with the West, as well, but 
they wanted it on their own terms.  They proved consistently willing to undermine relations with the 
U.S. when it served their domestic interests.  The second half of the 2000's proved to be one of the most 
contentious periods between the U.S. and Iran, with increasing conflict over the nuclear issue and a 
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proxy war against the U.S. in Iraq.  Chapter 6 will explain how a second conservative consolidation 
undermined the efforts of U.S. President Barrack Obama to improve relations and garner a nuclear deal.  
It will also show that, in spite of the unexpected breakthrough with a 2015 nuclear deal between Iran 
and the West, the clerical establishment still fostered sinister currents in domestic politics that would 
bode poorly for relations with the U.S. 
  
IRGC and the clerical security forces 
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) emerged from the Islamic Revolution to become 
the premier security force (against both domestic and foreign threats) for Khomeini's regime.  The IRGC 
was not the only security service directly to linked to the clerical establishment, so this constituency 
must include other clerical security forces, as well, particularly the Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS) and 
the Basij paramilitary force (which would formally merge with the IRGC in 2007, but maintained a 
distinction until that time).  Like the clerical establishment, the story of their constituency to the U.S.-
Iranian conflict also dates back to the formative days of the Islamic Republic, but it is more difficult to 
pick a specific event.  These organizations were themselves products of institutional processes, and U.S.-
Iranian hostility entwined with their development and maturity.  The common theme for this 
constituency was that conflict with the U.S. provided a ready-made vehicle for ensuring their place of 
prominence in Iranian politics and defending against challenges to their relevance or legitimacy.  Anti-
Americanism was often less about actually defeating the U.S. or even protecting Iran’s homeland, and 
more about a domestic struggle for power and interest.  This section will briefly trace the early 




Ayatollah Khomeini (Ottolenghi 2011, 5) (Axworthy 2018, 34) (Schahgaldian et al. 1987, 17-27) 
began to establish the IRGC almost immediately upon his return to Iran in February 1979 as a hedge 
against the former Shah's military and a loyal force through which to exert power.  Literature on the 
Islamic Republic often seems to suggest that the IRGC sprang into existence, almost from nowhere.  
While it is true that soldiers of the Shah were specifically excluded from the group, this image of an 
influential organization suddenly appearing flies in the face of the institutional theory upon which this 
dissertation is grounded, and it is misleading.  Khomeini might have birthed the IRGC in name and form, 
but its initial membership and experience drew heavily from a network of existing resistance and militia 
groups.   
The most influential precursor (Katzman 1993, 32-35) was the Mujahedeen of the Islamic 
Revolution (MIR), which broke from the leftist Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) starting in 1977 because its 
members preferred Khomeini's brand of Islamism to the more secular orientation of their parent group.  
This foundation was important because the MIR brought its own set of values to the fledgling IRGC.  
Although rejecting secularism, MIR was still rooted heavily in the radical Marxist movements of the 
period, embracing concepts like egalitarianism, support for the oppressed, economic justice, and 
opposition to the superpowers, institutional layers which contributed to the doctrine of the IRGC.  Some 
of the MIR members had also trained with the PLO in Lebanon and had experience as urban guerillas 
resisting the Shah.  These radicals were instrumental in starting some of the factional militias that 
coalesced into the IRGC, and they did not need Khomeini to tell them they should dislike the U.S.   
The turbulence resulting from the fall of the Shah led to the proliferation of private militias, 
mostly armed (Schahgaldian et al. 1987, 17-27) by raiding the Shah's army depots, which jockeyed for 
influence in the future of Iran.  Buoyed by Khomeini's support, the IRGC established dominance (Ostovar 
2016, 57) in this chaotic environment, consolidating its own ranks and disarming other groups.  The 
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IRGC's first notable military mission (Ottolenghi 2011, 8-9) was the suppression of an ethnic uprising by 
Kurdish separatists that had been spurred by the revolution.  The IRGC found itself woefully unprepared, 
but with a combination of zeal and enthusiasm, they eventually distinguished themselves in comparison 
to Iran's regular army.  In a bitter campaign that lasted until well into 1982, the IRGC cemented its 
reputation, killing an estimated 5,000 fighters and 1,200 civilians, and bringing the Kurds to heel.  The 
IRGC also developed a strong role in domestic security.  After the June 1981 bombing that killed a 
number of prominent IRP members (O'hern 2012, 32-33) Khomeini unleashed the guards against to the 
MEK.  By the end of the year, they had killed an estimated 2,500 MEK supporters and imprisoned 
thousands more.  Within a year, the MEK ceased to function in Iran, and its effective forces were driven 
into exile.  In the process, the IRGC developed its own intelligence unit (Katzman 1993, 80-83) to ferret 
out enemies of the regime.  This was supposed to be merged with the MOIS after its formal founding in 
1984, although this was never completed in practice.  As Chapter 3 will explain, the IRGC developed its 
own land, naval, and air (primarily missile) capabilities and took the leading role in Iran's military 
confrontations.   
While the IRGC served as the leading proponent of Khomeini's ideology, most Iranians lacked 
the credentials to join this elite unit, even if they wanted to.  The task of proliferating regime ideology 
throughout Iranian society fell to the paramilitary Basij organization.  At the end of 1979 (Wehrey, et al. 
2009, 26), Khomeini called for a 20 million-man army to defend the regime from its external enemies 
(especially the U.S.) and internal enemies of the revolution.  While the Basij never reached this scale, it 
did manage to mobilize an impressive portion of the population (Ostovar 2016, 84-86), enrolling an 
estimated three million Iranians by 1986 with 600,000 actively serving.  Most of its members hailed from 
the rural poor (O'hern 2012, 31), so the Basijis did much of their fighting in the Winter months, outside 
of crop seasons when they returned to their lands.   
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Khomeini formally placed the Basij under IRGC control in 1980 (Schahgaldian et al. 1987, 87-
100), and its members served as foot soldiers in a variety of roles during the Iran-Iraq War, often bearing 
the brunt of the most brutal combat.  With limited resources, the training and equipping of Basijis 
generally took a backseat to ideological indoctrination.  Aside from ensuring a steady flow of manpower 
to the front lines, the Basij operated as a system of social organization and control in every area of the 
country.  For the first six years of the war (O'hern 2012, 37), patriotism and ideological zeal swelled the 
ranks of the Basij, but by 1986, the population was growing weary, and the Basij was forced to draft 
recruits and recall former members to active service.  Unlike the IRGC, the Basij never engaged the U.S. 
directly and had little inherent reason for anti-Americanism.  However, their ideological indoctrination 
translated Khomeini's international crusade so that even the poorest Iranians, with little concept of 
Americans in their own experience, would come to see the U.S. as the key enemy of Iran.    
The last organization to consider within this category is the MOIS.  This organization was less of 
an anti-American project than the IRGC, but it was important to the institutionalization of conflict for 
three reasons.  First, the MOIS was responsible for tracking and countering enemies of Iran's regime 
both at home and abroad.  In this role (Crist 2013, 82), U.S. intelligence attributed more than 80 
assassinations of Iranian dissidents to the MOIS between 1980 and 1995, with many taking place in 
countries allied to the U.S.  American observers have usually made little distinction between terrorism 
and the targeted assassination of dissidents, so this clearly fueled animosity.  One particular RAND 
report was telling in this regard (Hoffman 1989, 3), stating: "So far as terrorism is concerned, there are 
no moderates or radicals in Iran. Terrorism is a state policy, agreed upon by most Iranian clerics because 
it was sanctioned by the Ayatollah Khomeini himself. Not only is terrorism endorsed by the government 
as a whole; but the various contending factions within the Iranian ruling elite have long used 
international terrorism as a tool to gain leverage against their internal rivals." 
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Second, the MOIS competed (Wehrey, et al. 2009, 30) with the IRGC in the factional politics of 
Iran, so this likely prompted the IRGC to become more radical and increase its overseas activity.  While 
the IRGC's mandate to export the revolution could be seen as complimentary to MOIS mandate to 
protect the regime (Wedge 2013, 141-142), both services answered to different clerical factions and 
masters, and both competed for resources and prestige.  Third, the MOIS was itself an exemplary 
product of the institutional patterns under study throughout this dissertation, especially displacement 
and conversion.  The Shah's intelligence and security service, SAVAK (Wedge 2013, 141-146), was a 
symbol of oppression for the Iranian people, and the revolutionary courts arrested and killed some of its 
top leadership in 1979.  However, this organization possessed detailed files on the Shah's opponents, 
many of whom would become Khomeini's opponents in the first two years of the Islamic Republic.  It 
also had readily established informant networks and a professional cadre of intelligence officers, some 
trained by the U.S. and Israel.  In spite of revolutionary rhetoric, SAVAK was far too grand a prize to be 
squandered.  Certain clerics within Khomeini's camp brought the organization under their wing, gave it a 
new name and a fresh purpose, and kept many of its personnel securely employed in their original line 
of work.  There is no shortage of irony in the fact that many of the Islamic Republic's counter-
intelligence successes in disrupting U.S. spy networks since the 1980's traced a direct lineage to training 
and professionalization that U.S. advisors once provided. 
Chapter 3 will explain how the Iran-Iraq War, and to a lesser degree, Lebanon, shaped the IRGC 
(inclusive of the other clerical security forces) into an institution unto itself and made it a constituency 
to the U.S.-Iranian conflict.  Chapter 4 will explain how these forces redefined their role in the peaceful 
years of the 1990's, becoming the power behind the throne for the clerical establishment and deepening 
their own interests in Iran's external isolation.  Chapter 5 will show how the IRGC confronted the U.S. 
militarily through a proxy war in Iraq, and in the process defied the U.S.-led security architecture of the 
Middle East.  They also developed Iran's nuclear weapons program, in direct defiance of both the U.S. 
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and international community.  Chapter 6 will explain how the IRGC expanded Iran's influence across the 
Middle East, especially propping up the Assad regime in Syria, and how it confronted U.S. designs for the 
region.  It will also explain how the 2015 nuclear agreement factored into its long-standing conflict with 
the U.S. 
  
CENTCOM and the U.S. national security establishment 
The conflict between the U.S. and Iran has fundamentally shaped the U.S. national security 
establishment, developing a strong constituency for perpetual hostility with Iran.  While these effects 
have occurred far and wide, there is no single organization that has so embodied the institutionalization 
of this conflict on the U.S. side than the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), which is 
responsible for the greater Middle East region.  For simplicity's sake, this dissertation will also consider 
other national security activities related to Iran that were not technically controlled by CENTCOM in the 
same category, as they mutually reinforced the trends displayed most prominently through the 
command itself.  Unlike the IRGC, which overtly indoctrinated its members to oppose the U.S., 
manifestations of institutionalized conflict were more subtle and less deliberate on the American side, 
masking the power of institutional forces to shape events and creating a false sense of objectivity.  
However, conflict with Iran provided arguably the greatest impetus for the formation of this command, 
and these processes fundamentally shaped the character and development of the U.S. national security 
architecture to situate Iran as one of America's primary adversaries throughout the world.  As seen with 
the IRGC, new institutions do not simply appear from nowhere.  This section will show how CENTCOM's 
formation and early roots helped position it to become a primary constituency to the U.S.-Iranian 
conflict.   
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Following World War II (Gold 1988, 8-10, 27), the Cold War division of labor left the security of 
the Middle East region primarily to Great Britain.  As the British divested themselves of colonial 
interests, the U.S. gradually inherited this role, but only in piecemeal fashion.  U.S. attention to the 
Middle East lagged behind other regions for decades, and instead of developing an overarching strategy, 
U.S. policymakers primarily reacted to emerging events and threats.  With regard to Iran, the U.S. built 
close relations with Shah after helping return him to power in 1953, and in spite of limited pressure by 
the Kennedy and Carter administrations (Amanat 2017, 584, 646) with regard to human rights, Cold War 
exigencies almost completely defined the relationship.  Richard Nixon (Kimball, 2006) perhaps best 
epitomized this focus with his "Nixon Doctrine," establishing that the U.S. would support overseas allies 
with economic and military aid instead of ground troops.  This doctrine played out in the Middle East by 
relying on Iran as an enforcer of regional stability.  In a 1972 phone conversation (Foreign Relations of 
the U.S. 2006), Nixon offered the Shah advanced weapon systems and famously beseeched him to, 
"protect me." The Nixon administration also courted Saudi Arabia as one of the "twin pillars" of Middle 
East security, but the Saudis were far less amenable than the Iranians.  Gold (1988, 18, 25-26) pointed 
out that Nixon's primary concern with regard to Soviet intentions in the Middle East was subversion and 
opportunism.  The threat of a massive invasion diminished, but the presence of 15-20 Soviet Divisions in 
the Transcaucasia region provided ample incentive for caution.   
When Jimmy Carter took office in 1977, U.S. policymakers (Cordesman 1998) had already begun 
to question the adequacy of the Nixon Doctrine as a replacement for U.S. force projection capabilities, 
recognizing a gap in U.S. abilities to respond to crises in the Middle East.  Responsibility for the region 
rested uncomfortably in the seam between European Command and Pacific Command (Bliddal 2009, 
59), neither of which considered it a priority.  One of Carter's earliest presidential directives (The White 
House 1977) started the process of building what would become the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force 
(RDJTF) which would allow for, "a deployment force of light divisions with strategic mobility 
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independent of overseas bases and logistical support, which includes moderate naval and tactical air 
forces, and limited land combat forces." The incremental establishment of this new organization 
required organizational changes within the Department of Defense (Davis 1982, 14-19) that included 
establishing the position of Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, which would steadily evolve into a 
leading power center within the department.   
As with any organizational (and in this case institutional as well) change, the development of the 
RDJTF faced opposition from defenders of the status quo.  This separate organization would draw its 
forces from the same pool of troops as existing commands, almost certainly fostering a competition for 
resources.  Record (1983, 11-16) distilled many of these dissenting views, arguing that this enterprise 
was a costly distraction from Cold War priorities and would raise tensions in the Middle East if the U.S. 
brought troops into the region.  World events, however, favored the project.  The fall of the Shah and 
the hostage crisis in Iran, along with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which brought the Soviet Union 
to Iran's doorstep, shook the entire worldview of the U.S. national security establishment.  A 1979 
National Security Council assessment (U.S. NSC 1979) placed Iran and Afghanistan at the center of an 
"arc of instability," threatening the entire region.  In January 1980 State of the Union Address, Carter 
(1980) established what would become known as the "Carter Doctrine," stating clearly that , "An 
attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on 
the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means 
necessary, including military force." 
In March 1980 (Davis 1982, 14-19), the RDJTF established its headquarters under the command 
of Lieutenant General Paul X. Kelley as a subordinate to U.S. Readiness Command (USREDCOM).  
Regardless of the 1979, Islamic Revolution (Record 1983, 12), the key focus of RDJTF planning remained 
preparation to defend Iran against occupation by the Soviet Union.  The Carter administration (Gold 
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1988, 33-34) began laying the diplomatic groundwork for this organization by securing access 
agreements that provided air and naval logistics hubs in Kenya, Oman and Somalia, as well as securing a 
tacit agreement with Egypt.  In the final days of the administration, they played heavily upon regional 
anxieties regarding Iran to make inroads with Gulf states (Armstrong 1981), as well, especially Saudi 
Arabia and Pakistan.  Just prior to Ronald Reagan's inauguration in January 1981, Carter signed another 
two directives (The White House, PD 62 & 63, 1981) clarifying the direction of U.S. policy.  Significantly, 
stabilizing the Middle East now took a leading role in countering the Soviet threat, NATO allies would be 
expected to shoulder a larger share of their own defense as the U.S. shifted focus, and the U.S. would 
look to new regional partners for support, mainly Saudi Arabia.   
Even while openly denouncing the policies of his predecessor, Ronald Reagan quietly embraced 
almost every aspect of the Carter doctrine.  Crist (2012, 55) argued that, "Reagan understood the havoc 
Iran wreaked upon his predecessor, and the president took an unusually keen interest in the formation 
of a military command for the Middle East." In his first year in office, Reagan's administration made the 
RDJTF an autonomous command (no longer subordinate to USREDCOM) (Davis 1982, 14-19) and 
secured an additional $700 million (Crist 2012, 51) for base construction in the Middle east Region.   The 
RDJTF (Cordesman 1998) also expanded its area of responsibility, to include most of the Middle East and 
the horn of Africa, along with Afghanistan and Pakistan.  In January 1983 (Gold 1988, 37-38), the RDJTF 
officially became a four-star regional combatant command, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).   
CENTCOM's first two years under General Robert Kingston (Cordesman 1998) (Gold 1988, 45-
53), in spite of bureaucratic hurdles, saw troop allocations almost double.  Under the RDJTF (Cordesman 
1998), U.S. forces had already begun conducting training exercises throughout the region with partner 
nations, including Bright Star, hosted by Egypt, which became a fixture of the military relationship for 
decades to come.  CENTCOM (SASC 1986, 624-625) increased the scope and pace of these efforts, and 
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by 1985, it was conducting multinational exercises in the Middle East that included over 60,000 U.S. 
servicemembers at a cost of $58 million.  Congress also supported the effort to build regional security 
partnerships by steadily increasing the amount of money allocated to security assistance within 
CENTCOM's area of responsibility.   
Concurrently with the organizational development of CENTCOM, the Reagan administration also 
continued Carter's diplomatic efforts to build support within the Middle East.  Power projection required 
basing and overflight rights.  The administration (Oberdorfer 1981) began aggressively courting Pakistan, 
offering a package of $500 million in military aid, and in spite of considerable opposition within Congress 
(Associated Press 1981), secured approval to sell them 40 F-16 fighter aircraft.  Saudi Arabia (Ottaway 
1981a) was quick to request advanced military equipment from the U.S.  The Reagan administration 
obliged (Goshko 1981), fighting a pitched battle with Congress to secure approval of an $8.5 billion 
package including five Airborne Warning And Control System (AWACS) aircraft (this sale was opposed by 
Israel).  It is unlikely coincidental that less than two years after the 1979 revolution led to the 
cancellation of the Shah's order for seven AWACS aircraft (Branigan 1979), Saudi Arabia's bid for five of 
the same models was approved.  American manufacturers (Anderson 1981) lobbied for the deal, and 
this clearly suggests an example of institutional continuity that transcended geopolitical events.  In total, 
a Washington Post (1981a, Nov 1) report estimated a sum of greater than $47 billion in weapons 
contracts, support, and facilities applied to cooperation with the Gulf Arab States alone, beginning under 
the Carter administration.   
This influx of American weapons and personnel into the Persian Gulf region was not without 
controversy.  In order to placate their own populations, the Gulf Arab States walked a delicate tightrope, 
pretending to hold the U.S. at arms' length.  A Washington Post (Armstrong 1981) exposé on the secret 
military relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia brought swift denials from both Saudi Arabia 
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and the U.S. (Washington Post 1981b, Nov 2), although the original story turned out to be largely 
correct.  In what may have been a face-saving gesture, Saudi Arabia (Ottaway 1981b) offered Oman $1.2 
billion to cancel a partnership agreement with the U.S. that allowed access for U.S. forces to Omani 
facilities.  In public, Saudi Arabia preferred to keep U.S. forces over the horizon.  In private, however 
(Crist 2012, 98), the U.S. had servicemembers working in civilian clothes and billeted in Saudi hotels for 
most of the Iran-Iraq War.  Like Carter before him (Gold 1988, 62-65), Reagan astutely utilized threats 
emanating from the Iran-Iraq War, such as Iran's attacks on shipping and the 1984 aerial gunfight 
between Saudi Arabia and Iran to increase U.S. influence in the Persian Gulf.  This had the follow-on 
effect, however, of drawing the U.S. into pre-existing rivalries between Iran and the Gulf States, an 
inadvertent institutional layering of the conflict between the U.S. and Iran. 
CENTCOM began the decade (as the RDJTF) as a child of the Cold War.  Changes in Iran provided 
the impetus developing a new combatant command because they altered the strategic calculus within 
this worldview.  The new focus on the Middle East (and ironically defending Iran from a Soviet invasion) 
required a set of regional partners with expanded capabilities.  Conversely, it was the threat of Iran, not 
plans for its defense, that drove Gulf Arab States into the arms of the U.S., and CENTCOM became the 
vehicle for developing these partnerships.  By partnering closely with Iran's hostile neighbors, however, 
the U.S. built a regional security architecture that increasingly bifurcated the Middle East, entrenching 
conflict with Iran and making it almost impossible to improve relations.  Further, Iran helped propel this 
new command from a global backwater to the center of U.S. national security priorities (and spending), 
and the business of countering Iran would help ensure it retained this status, even as other conflicts 
ebbed and flowed.   
Chapter 3 will explain how events in the U.S.-Iranian conflict overlaid the institutional 
development of CENTCOM, and by the end of the 1980's shifted its focus from the Soviet Union to Iran 
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through the process of displacement and conversion.  Chapter 4 will show the deepening of this 
institutionalization which occurred in the 1990's, as war with Iraq prompted a massive and permanent 
expansion of the U.S. presence in the region.  Chapter 5 will explain how CENTCOM's wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan during the 2010's changed the regional balance, invited interference from Iran, and 
deepened Iran's international isolation.  Chapter 6 will explore why the U.S. and Iran could not 
collaborate in the fight against ISIS in the 2010's, and how CENTCOM increased its hostility toward Iran, 
even as the historic nuclear agreement should have lowered it.   
 
Israel 
The state of Israel has undeniably been a key player in fostering and maintaining the conflict 
between the U.S. and Iran over the first four decades of the Islamic Republic, and the benefit certain 
leaders have derived from perpetuating hostilities has made it an important part of the picture.  Trita 
Parsi, whose body of work will form the backbone of the Israeli analysis in later chapters, argued (Parsi 
2007) that Israeli influence was the primary obstacle to better relations between the U.S. and Iran.  
Defining Israel as a constituency presents a challenge, though.  From an institutional standpoint, there is 
no problem with a third state acting as a constituent in a conflict between two other states, and one can 
readily find examples where this has been the case in world affairs.  The difficulty is defining the scope 
of the actual constituent.  The state of Israel is not monolithic, and like the U.S., its governmental 
leaders and views have changed over time.  One could choose to focus specifically on the influence of 
the Israeli lobby in the U.S., but this ignores the direct and overt role that some Israeli leaders, especially 
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, have played in stoking the fires between the U.S. and Iran.  
Therefore, in describing Israel as a constituent to the conflict between the U.S. and Iran, this dissertation 
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is referring to a nexus between Israel’s foreign policy establishment and the wide range of levers by 
which Israel has directly and indirectly influenced U.S. policy toward Iran.  In institutional fashion, this 
nexus carried a set of interests entirely external to the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and Iran 
and enmeshed them into the very habitus of a conflict not its own.   
It is important to consider that Israel’s position on Iran during the 1980’s was almost a polar 
opposite of the position it would stake out for the next three decades.  Israeli leaders deliberately and 
sometimes openly pressed the U.S. to improve its relationship with Iran throughout the Iran-Iraq War, 
resisting Reagan's "tilt" toward Iraq.  Understanding how the state of Israel could make such a 
monumental shift during the 1990's requires an examination of the institutional forces and processes 
operating within its foreign policy establishment in the decades prior.   
From its very foundation as a state, Israel appreciated the need for strategic partners.  
Surrounded by Arab states (Samaan 2018, 67), Israel began courting a relationship with the Shah of Iran 
as early as 1949.  In the 1950's (Alpher 1989, 156), Israeli founding father David Ben-Gurion began to 
articulate what would come to be known as the "periphery doctrine."  With hostile neighbors on all 
sides, it sought alliances with states two or three countries removed from its own borders to help 
balance against its immediate adversaries.  The periphery doctrine evolved over time (Alpher 2015, 4-7), 
but it was consistently nested within the framework of Israel's political and strategic goals.  These 
included building alliances with great powers, ultimately the U.S., and the network they developed gave 
them a Cold War bargaining chip with Washington.  Another goal was the return of the Jewish diaspora 
to Israel, which it helped facilitate.  More than just a means to an end, though, the doctrine of the 
periphery (Shlaim 2000, 194-195) was also an ideological response to Gamal Abdel Nasser's Pan-Arabist 
doctrine.  The movement this inspired temporarily united Israel's adversaries, Syria and Egypt in 1958 
and helped overthrow the Iraqi monarchy the same year, all increasing the threat on Israel's borders.   
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Israel formed a tripartite intelligence association in 1958 that included itself, Turkey, and Iran, 
variously known as the "Triangular Pact" (Samaan 2019, 279-280) and "Trident" (Alpher 2015, 13-15).  
The members carved out regional responsibilities for each other that focused on monitoring and 
countering the rise of Pan-Arabism and Soviet influence.  Because of the sensitive nature of the 
Triangular Pact (Samaan 2018, 33-34), most of the coordination that occurred was handled through 
intelligence agencies, with Mossad as the chief proponent for Israel.  This also reflected the culture of 
secrecy within Israel's political leadership and defense establishment.  Per Shlaim (2000, 195), for Israel, 
Iran was the "jewel in the crown of the alliance of the periphery." Israel and Iran cooperated in a broad 
range of intelligence and security activities.  Israel helped the Shah build his own intelligence service 
(SAVAK), partnered with the Shah in supporting the Iraqi Kurds, and facilitated the development of Iran's 
missile program.  Iran provided Israel with a secure source of oil.  Overall, however, Alpher (2015, 18-19) 
pointed out that the Triangular Pact was a lopsided alliance, with Israel giving more than it received in 
return.  In many ways, the Shah kept Israel at arm's length (Samaan 2018, 67-70) (Parsi 2007, 54-60, 62), 
and while their cooperation was an open secret, distrust and anti-Semitism were never completely 
absent.  
Alpher (2015, 18-19) surmised that, in many ways, the Triangular Pact was largely symbolic for 
Israel.  It signaled to superpowers and regional actors alike that Israel was not alone, nor was it 
beholden to any one patron.  It took on new importance (Parsi 2007, 68-72) in 1977, though, as 
Menachem Begin became Prime Minister of Israel.  Under Begin's policies, the Israelis became more 
aggressive and less conciliatory to their neighbors.  Unfortunately, this increased Israel's reliance on Iran 
at precisely the time the Shah began to lose his grip on power.  Israeli leadership did not have a backup 
plan when the Shah fell in 1979. 
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Like the U.S. (Alpher 2015, 20-23), Israel was caught off guard by the fall of the Shah.  Israeli 
intelligence, for all of its reach, had not bothered to penetrate Iran's religious establishment.  Bakhtiar's 
provisional government cast about for help that Israel could not (and the U.S. would not) provide, even 
asking the Mossad to assassinate Khomeini.  The Israeli diplomatic mission was forced to flee the 
country and Khomeini supporters burned its headquarters.  Yet in all the turmoil and anti-Israeli rhetoric 
(Samaan 2018, 74 - 77) that followed the revolution, Israel strove mightily to maintain its relationship 
with Iran and build bridges with the new regime.  In one example, only months after the revolution 
(Parsi 2007, 94), Israel returned tanks that the Shah had sent them to be refurbished.  Rhetoric aside, 
even Khomeini and his supporters proved surprisingly receptive to some of Israel's overtures.  Ibrahim 
Yazdi, a close confidant of Khomeini (Sobhani 1989, 143), quietly assisted Israeli officials during their 
rapid departure from Iran.  In early 1980 (Kaye, et al. 2011, 14-15), a representative of Khomeini actually 
travelled to Iran and met with Prime Minister Begin, who approved shipments of both weapons and F-4 
Phantom jet tires in direct contravention of stated U.S. policies, infuriating the Carter administration.  In 
return, Khomeini allowed a large number of Jews to emigrate to Israel or the U.S.  Chapter 3 will show 
that in the Iran-Iraq War, Israel consistently sided with Iran.  They also helped embroil the U.S. in the 
Iran-Contra Scandal.   
Another dimension of the tie between Israel and Iran concerned the Jewish diaspora in that 
country.  Judaism in Iran (Bahgat 2005, 519-521) dates back to the sixth century B.C. when King 
Nebuchadnezzar sacked Jerusalem and forcibly resettled the Jewish nation.  Jewish communities have 
existed in Iran since that time and prospered during various periods, though subject to the vicissitudes 
of different ruling dynasties.  The rule of Reza Pahlavi (Shah), who came to power in 1926, inaugurated a 
time of relative peace and prosperity for Iranian Jews.  Both Reza and Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (Shah) 
promoted secularism and modernity, and Jews in Iran became more integrated into society.  Perhaps 
surprisingly, given this fact, many Jews actually developed leftist-intellectual leanings toward the 1970's 
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and opposed the monarchy.  When the revolution arrived, Jews were split between support for the Shah 
and the opposition, with some even embracing Khomeini - rather naively assuming that he would 
promote democratic governance.  Regardless, the Jewish community attempted to position itself 
politically for their greatest possible advantage.  Many openly disavowed Zionism, and some attempted 
to position themselves in the new parliament, in which they were granted nominal representation.   
Khomeini's rhetoric against Israel and Zionists was supposedly not aimed at Iranian Jews (Bahgat 
2005, 521), but life still got harder for this population.  Some were imprisoned and even executed.  
Axworthy (2013, 207-209) pointed out that under Khomeini, lower level preachers would stir the pot of 
anti-Semitism with relative impunity in order to make a name for themselves.  In this environment of 
uncertainty (Foreign Office 1979, 8), many of the estimated 60,000-80,000 (some estimates go higher) 
preferred to emigrate.  Supporting this repatriation became a high priority for the Israeli government in 
the months and even years following the revolution.  Ironically, the exodus of some 20,000-30,000 Jews 
only fed into the Islamist narrative that Iranian Jews were Zionist sympathizers, making life more 
difficult for those who chose to stay.  Ram (2007, 107-113) brought out the point that the emotional ties 
that Israelis felt toward Iran were distorted by a mismatch of worldviews.  Most Iranian Jews valued 
their Persian identity as much or more than their Jewish identity, and many were frankly opposed to the 
Zionism altogether.  The Israelis, on the other hand, tended to view Iranian Jews through the lens of 
their own cultural and religious project - lost sheep to be gathered back into the fold.  In some cases, 
Israel even provided financial incentives (funded by evangelical Christian groups) to emigrate, confident 
that the diaspora would be converted.  For the first half of the 1980's, this made Israeli leaders reticent 
to antagonize Iran and potentially endanger the remaining Jewish population.   
All accounts of the periphery doctrine suggest that this concept was nothing short of an 
institution.  It was never formally codified in writing, but it developed succeeding generations of 
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adherents who made it their own, adopting and defending the values and assumptions that 
underpinned the doctrine.  The periphery doctrine shaped and molded the incentive structure for 
Israel's political elite, partly because participation in this level of diplomacy was a status symbol reserved 
for the highest echelons, and partly as well because it shaped the way that these leaders built and 
leveraged their own networks of personal contacts.  The entrenchment of the doctrine was path 
dependent.  It started as a small intelligence partnership with mostly symbolic value but took on new 
dimensions at junctures over time, including energy security, weapons development, and the rescue of 
Israel's diaspora.  For Prime Minister Begin's government, the periphery doctrine was a seemingly 
indispensable enabler of a bold shift in Israeli security policy.  From the 1950's until the 1980's, the 
institution changed primarily through drift and layering.  Drift occurred where successive governments 
inherited the doctrine and applied it within their own vision and context (dealing with a compliant Shah 
in the 1960's versus a megalomaniacal Shah in the 1970's, for example).  Layering occurred when new 
inputs were added to the institution, such as the decision to support the Iraqi Kurds in the 1960's.   
Given this institutionalization of the periphery doctrine, it should come as little surprise that it 
was resistant to the external shock of the 1979 Islamic Revolution.  Chapter 3 will show that Israel 
stubbornly clung to its hopes for an alliance with Iran throughout the Iran-Iraq War, even in the face of 
blistering rhetoric from Khomeini and his supporters, and perhaps most surprisingly, in spite of Iran's 
sponsorship of attacks against its troops in Lebanon.  Regardless of how ossified institutions become, 
however, they are still being constantly transformed below the surface by the passage of time.  By the 
end of the decade, the periphery doctrine had largely run its course.  As Chapter 4 will explain, what 
remained of this defunct institution reincarnated itself in new form during the 1990's - one that would 
prove hostile to Iran.  From this point forward, Israel would be a key player in the U.S.-Iranian 
relationship and a spoiler of any kind of rapprochement.  Chapter 5 will show how Israel drummed up 
U.S. and international hostility toward Iran over its nuclear program, yet undermined efforts at 
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negotiation throughout the 2000's.  Chapter 6 will describe how Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu desperately sabotaged President Obama's efforts to engage with Iran.  In 2015, he lost this 
fight with the signing of nuclear agreement, but even then, he persisted and helped destroy the deal 
with the help of President Trump. 
  
U.S. Congress 
The final constituency this dissertation will consider is the U.S. Congress.  The legislative branch 
of the U.S. government, including both the Senate and the House of Representatives, is tricky to 
consider as a unit.  U.S. lawmakers, by nature, represent a plurality of interests almost as diverse as the 
American population itself.  Unlike the clerical establishment within Iran, there is no international 
conflict that constitutes a defining interest or value.  Further, the U.S. Congress has traditionally limited 
its role in foreign policy, ceding this ground largely to the executive branch.  Except in certain specific 
cases where lawmakers have taken a collective interest, usually regarding discrete issues, Congress has 
exercised its power over foreign relations through control of budgets and its oversight authority to 
conduct investigative hearings.  Why then, should the U.S. Congress be considered as its own 
constituency?  The short answer is that, starting especially in the 1990's, Congress has collectively 
played an outsized role in undermining potential opportunities for any U.S. president to mend fences 
with Iran.  While rarely unanimous, this effort has often been bipartisan in nature, and it has been 
remarkably consistent.   
In examining the U.S. Congress as a constituency, this dissertation will focus entirely upon its 
role as a unified actor in the U.S.-Iranian conflict.  It will examine trends within Congress only as far as 
they drove the body in particular directions.  This will especially come into play at key points in the 
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1990's and 2010's when partisan politics became particularly salient in helping to institutionalize the 
conflict with Iran.  An in-depth examination of U.S. politics or Congressional trends is beyond the scope 
of this work, but Congress is an institution in its own rite.  If one were to examine the U.S. legislative 
branch from an institutional perspective, it is likely that the findings would dovetail nicely with the 
macro-level trends identified in this work. 
The next logical question in considering the U.S. Congress as a constituency regards the 
influence of Israel.  This small state (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007, 112-114, 199-203) has developed one 
of the strongest lobbying apparatuses in U.S. national politics, prominently led by the American Israeli 
Political Action Committee (AIPAC) influencing both the executive and legislative branches.  Why then, 
should Congress be considered a separate constituency?  First, the Israeli lobby is not entirely Israeli.  It 
draws influence (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007, 112-114) from a broad cross-section of groups with 
intersecting interests, especially conservative Christian organizations in the U.S.  Second, while Israel has 
exerted influence, it would be a mistake to think that any lobbying group has control of Congress.  
Lobbying groups are successful when political conditions are ripe for them to succeed.  Often, as 
explained by economist Mancur Olson (2000, 92-97), this means they are pressing for action on issues 
about which the voting public is generally unaware or uniformed, leaving lawmakers a free hand to 
accept money to support the cause.  Olson (2000, 93) described typical voters as "rationally ignorant" on 
most issues.  Few Americans have the time or the motivation to study Iran or the dynamics of the U.S.-
Iranian relationship.   
Conversely, lobbyists may succeed when they champion a cause that is already popular or 
generally accepted with the American people.  "Rationally ignorant" voters are still affected by headlines 
and sensational stories that break through the static of everyday life.  As discussed in Appendix A, 
beginning with the hostage crisis in 1979, the U.S. public has received a steady flow of negative 
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information regarding Iran.  This includes not only events themselves, but the tone in which Iran is 
discussed.  Americans, by-and-large, have not spent much time thinking about Iran, but when they have 
paid attention, they have been conditioned to view Iranians as irrational extremists bent on destroying 
the Western way of life.  Thus, politicians have been happy to take Israeli money because there has 
been little to lose and everything to gain by being seen as "tough on Iran." Of course, Congressional 
leaders have, either intentionally or unintentionally, spurred this demonization process themselves.  
Regardless, Congress and Israel have usually been linked on the issue of Iran, much in the same fashion 
that Iran's clerical establishment is linked to the IRGC and security forces.  Because constituencies serve 
as lenses into the process of institutionalization, they need not be neatly separated.  If one accounts for 
relevant linkages, then viewing the problem through lenses of a different tint will only add value to the 
analysis. 
Congress's role in demonizing Iran is also worth considering.  Marian Paules' (2003) dissertation 
from Syracuse University is one of few comprehensive works to examine Congress's role in constructing 
and maintaining U.S. hostility toward Iran.  Paules (2003, 66-69, 77) argued that Congressional hearings 
are a forum for working the national narrative of America's place in the world.  This narrative does not 
play out in a planned fashion or any particular order, but testimonies by members of Congress and those 
invited to speak, when taken in aggregate, both reflect and define the American worldview.  Her work 
examined 78 committee hearings between 1987 and 2001, specifically focused on discursive practices.  
One important observation is that the hearings primarily served two purposes.  The first was to hold the 
President accountable for enforcing Congressionally mandated sanctions when administration officials 
began to view them as counterproductive and started to ease off.  The second was to justify hardline 
policies and show why the U.S. should not take a more conciliatory approach to Iran.  Both served a self-
reinforcing role for U.S.-Iranian hostility.   
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Paules (2003, 92-95, 103-105) also noted that any discussion of Iran, or the Middle East in 
general, was framed within a triumphalist, post-Cold War, neoliberal narrative that place the U.S. at the 
center of the free world.  Individual lawmakers disagreed at times on what to do about Iran, and some 
did favor a more cooperative approach, but the common denominator was that Iran was a deviant 
outlier to the proper world order, and it should be dealt with as such.  The U.S, on the other hand, was 
innocent of wrongdoing with regard to Iran.  Congress did not invent neoliberalism, nor did it start the 
conflict with Iran, but it served as a national echo chamber, amplifying both concepts for the American 
people.  Paules (2003, 107-113) also noted how discursive patterns emerged during the Iran-Contra 
hearings in 1987 that established the language for almost every hearing that followed.  Iran was 
described as inherently deceitful and antagonistic.  By the same token, any attempt to engage with Iran 
was misguided, foolish, and doomed to fail.  In this regard, Congress also became a national repository 
for historical analogues regarding the conflict.  Lawmakers continually reminded each other of Iran's 
misdeeds and likened current actions to those of the past.  Further, attempts at cooperation were 
automatically compared to the futile effort that ended in the Iran-Contra scandal.  A full examination of 
discursive practices in Congress is beyond the scope of this work, but these patterns of action clearly 
helped to inoculate U.S. policymakers against hopes of rapprochement with Iran and entrench the 
conflict over time.   
Another key factor that drove Congress as a constituent to the U.S.-Iranian conflict was partisan 
infighting.  Over the course of four decades, Iran drew a considerable amount of bi-partisan opposition, 
but this masked the dynamics of the struggle between the parties.  Constituencies, by their very nature, 
gain utility from a conflict that has little to do with the conflict itself.  This played out in the partisan 
realm most clearly during the Presidencies of Democrats Bill Clinton and Barrack Obama.  Republicans 
worked hard to challenge the national security credentials of these presidents, and as a result, they 
undermined efforts at cooperation and forced those presidents to take a harder line with Iran than they 
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otherwise might have.  Of course, it was not always Republicans using Iran.  As Chapter 3 will show, the 
Iran-Contra Scandal played out in a Senate (U.S. Senate 2020) that had just flipped from Republican to 
Democrat, and they were eager to reign in the Republican President Ronald Reagan during his second 
term.  Chapter 4 will explain, though, that Congress did not really become a constituent to the conflict 
until 1994, when Republicans took control of both houses.  Chapter 5 will explain how this constituency 
carried into the presidency of Republican George W. Bush and became entwined in the controversy over 
Iran's nuclear program.  Chapter 6 will then show how Iran played into Republican's vehement 
opposition of President Obama. 
  
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that conflicts become intractable when they become institutionalized. 
This happens when powerful constituencies develop that view the national interest in their own 
parochial terms and have a key stake in the perpetuation of the conflict.  Over time, this commitment to 
the continuation of the conflict becomes ingrained – an institution of animosity — so that changing 
events and circumstances have little or no impact on the desire of these constituencies to ensure that 
the conflict does not end.  By understanding the dynamics of institutions in general, one can gain 
insights into when and how conflicts become intractable, along with potential off-ramps through which 
this condition might be reversed.  The tenets of Historical Institutionalism offer a model that can be 
applied to the study of conflict, highlighting recognizable processes that can be used to identify and 
trace the development of institutional animosity.  This dissertation will apply this model to the U.S.-
Iranian relationship between 1979 and 1989.   
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This chapter has introduced five constituencies that developed in the course of this conflict.  The 
next four chapters will tell the institutional story of four decades of animosity using these constituencies 
as the main actors.  This story will demonstrate that the power of the constituencies to keep the conflict 
going is so strong that even when the leaders of the US and Iran sought to tamp down hostilities, they 








CHAPTER 3 - THE FIRST DECADE, 1979-1989 
  The first decade of the Islamic Republic, which coalesced under the rule (or "guidance") of 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, laid the foundation for three decades of institutionalized conflict between 
the U.S. and Iran.  While the two sides entered open confrontation by the end of the first year, 
institutionalization is never an instant process.  As this chapter will show, even after multiple clashes on 
various levels, both sides continued to hold out hope for improved relations for much of the decade.  In 
a path-dependent fashion, each event made positive developments less likely, but they never became 
impossible.  Only when taken together over the course of time did these events combine to generate a 
type of gravity capable of transcending national interest that would carry into future decades.  This 
dissertation will cover four decades of the conflict, but this first decade was markedly different from the 
ones to follow.  Whereas succeeding chapters will tell the story of how constituencies to the conflict 
shaped events in the U.S.-Iranian relationship, this first decade is the story of how events produced and 
shaped those constituencies in the first place.  Many of the key actors in the drama of the 1980's U.S.-
Iranian relationship were important players in nascent or developing constituencies, but the institutional 
processes that bound them as such were still in development, so treating them in a unified fashion 
would be premature.   
This chapter will begin with a short examination of the historical roots that allowed enmity for 
the U.S. to spring forth with such surprising speed during the Islamic Revolution of 1979.  This is a story 
of tectonic plates moving slowly into position, unnoticed for many years by the U.S.  The chapter will 
then cover key episodes within the U.S.-Iranian relationship over the course of the decade, highlighting 
institutional processes as they occur.  The first will be the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in 1979, leading 
to the hostage crisis.  Next it will look at the Iran-Iraq War, which lasted from 1980 to 1988, running 
concurrently with most of the other events in the chapter.  These included the U.S. mission in Lebanon, 
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during which Iranian proxies bombed the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut.  Lebanon also produced a 
hostage crisis of its own, and this led to the arms-for-hostages negotiations that became the Iran-Contra 
Affair.  In 1987 and 1988, U.S. and Iranian forces clashed directly and openly for the first (and arguably 
the last) time on the waters of the Persian Gulf in the "Tanker War." Khomeini's death at the end of the 
decade was another key inflection point with lasting consequences.  This chapter will then take stock of 
each of the five constituencies at the end of the decade, in light of the preceding events. 
 
Historical Roots of Iranian Resentment 
The primary root of Iranian hostility against the U.S. stemmed from one specific event, 
operation TP AJAX, in which the U.S. sponsored a coup against the elected Prime Minister, Mohammad 
Mossadegh, in 1953 which returned Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to his throne.  This is curious in 
some ways because before this event, U.S. forces physically occupied a portion of Iran (splitting the 
country with the British and Soviets) during World War II, using the country as a transshipment point for 
war materiel to the Soviet Union.  Further, the Allied Forces were directly responsible for deposing and 
exiling the Shah's father, Reza Pahlavi, when he unwisely declared support for Nazi Germany.  After the 
war, the U.S. withdrew completely and openly pressured the Soviets to relinquish their position in Iran, 
one of a succession of moves throughout the decade which ingratiated America to the new Shah (Bill 
1988, 18-37).  Regardless, the World War II occupation is rarely mentioned as a source of grievance for 
Iran.  The Mossadegh coup, on the other hand, is rarely forgotten. 
Mohammad Mossadegh (Amanat 2017, 519-555), a charismatic but eccentric nationalist 
politician, rose to the forefront of Iranian politics in 1950, becoming Prime Minister in 1951.  
Mossadegh's original platform was relatively straightforward.  He advocated the complete 
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nationalization of Iran's oil industry, a position which put Iran in bitter conflict with the Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company (AIOC) and the British government.  While Mossadegh was popular with the Iranian people, 
his stubbornness and zeal eventually alienated him from virtually all of Iran's domestic power brokers.  
By the end of 1952, he amassed unprecedented powers to rule by decree and began purging his political 
opponents, including supporters of the royal family in the judiciary, military, and bureaucracy.  This 
culminated in a 1953 referendum which overrode the Iranian constitution and directly usurped the 
powers of the young Shah.  Meanwhile, the British were in no mood to compromise with Mossadegh, 
especially not on his terms.  British imperialist claims received little attention from the Truman 
administration, but they found Dwight Eisenhower's cabinet far more amenable to intervention.  Key 
American policymakers, including Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) Allen Dulles, viewed the Middle East strictly in terms of the emerging Cold 
War.  Concerned that Mossadegh's recklessness would pave the way for Soviet opportunism, the CIA 
executed TP AJAX in August 1953, in coordination with the Shah, himself.  Its first push was a dismal 
failure, but after several tense days and some limited bloodshed, Mossadegh was imprisoned and the 
Shah firmly reestablished on his throne. 
The American-led coup against Mossadegh became, quite literally, the stuff of legends.  Stephen 
Kinzer (2003, 209-215) provided a gripping historical narrative of the political intrigue and cloak-and-
dagger exploits which returned the Shah to power.  While the U.S. did not openly acknowledge its role 
in the coup for 47 years, its involvement became quickly apparent to interested observers, especially in 
Iran.  Moreover, the success of the operation emboldened the U.S. foreign policy community to adopt 
foreign regime change as viable tool of statecraft during the Cold War.  Kenneth Pollack (2004, 67-71) 
pointed out that the tragedy of TP AJAX was that, even for the purposes of the day, U.S. involvement 
was likely unnecessary.  The conditions that led to Mossadegh's downfall were already in place, so all 
the CIA really did was "strike the match." In fact, although Iran’s clerical establishment would eventually 
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take the lead in condemning the U.S. for the coup, clergy members disaffected by Mossadegh’s rule 
took CIA money and played an integral role in restoring the Shah.  Unfortunately, because the U.S. 
implicated itself in the event, it spawned two lines of mythology on the Iranian side.  First, Iranians 
idealized Mossadegh's problematic leadership and blamed the U.S. for inhibiting the development of 
democracy in Iran.  Second, they began to envision the CIA as an all-powerful boogey man, pulling the 
strings behind every unfortunate turn of events.   
In its relationship with the Shah, the U.S. started a chain of events that would culminate in the 
1979 Islamic Revolution.  This is not to say that the U.S. caused the revolution, or that any number of 
possibilities might not have altered the course of history along the way, but the U.S. and the Shah tied 
their fortunes together in 1953.  As is often the case, the perception this created was more important 
than the reality.  Iranians began to view the Shah as a U.S. puppet, and they associated the U.S. with all 
the failures and shortcomings of the Shah's modernization policies, regardless of the degree to which 
either picture was accurate.  Increasing oil revenues in the 1960's and 1970's exacerbated this effect.  As 
pointed out by Najmabadi (1987), oil wealth gave the Shah a degree of independence that allowed him 
to isolate himself from Iran's traditional bases of power: the clergy, landowners, and merchants.  This 
made his state brittle, and when crises hit in the late 1970's, his only ally was a United States 
government that was decreasingly able or willing to intervene again on his behalf.  In spite of this 
reluctance, when the revolution brought ordinary Iranians to the streets, the U.S. became a de facto 
symbol of everything that the people were protesting against.   
In institutional terms, this sequence of events demonstrated displacement and conversion, the 
process through which social groups collectively transition their perception and focus.  Mossadegh's 
own rise to power owed almost entirely to popular resentment against the British, which though they 
never colonized Iran, treated the country as though they had.  For all his faults, Mossadegh's stand 
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against AIOC regarding Iranian sovereignty over its oil resources was almost unanimously viewed as a 
struggle against injustice and oppression by the Iranian people.  The overthrow of Mossadegh sparked a 
new round of displacement and conversion whereby the sins of the British were largely forgotten in light 
of a new animosity toward America.  In true institutional fashion, the shift took years to complete, but it 
both reinforced and was reinforced by the popular perception of the Shah as a symbol of foreign 
domination.   
Finally, this new animosity was reinforced by layering, the institutional process by which new 
developments and previously unrelated issues become intrinsically linked to a specific grievance or 
problem set.  The Shah led Iran (Harris 2017, 46-79) on a difficult journey toward social and economic 
modernization, based upon the Western model epitomized by the U.S. model.  Rapid change created 
winners, but it left many Iranians insecure and discontent.  Additionally, increases in communications 
technology began connecting many Iranians with outside world for the first time in history, again 
challenging cultural norms.  Jalal Al-e Ahmad's book, Gharbzadehgi [Westoxification] (Amanat 2017, 
690) popularly expressed the anxieties felt by Iranians as their culture and society faced new influences 
emanating from the West.  None of these issues were inherently sufficient to turn the Iranian people 
specifically against the U.S. by themselves, but when layered upon the belief that America had replaced 
Great Britain as the regional puppet master, they became especially potent. 
 
A Decade of Animosity 
The fall of the Shah in early 1979 completely reset the U.S. relationship with Iran, but this event 
by no means preordained four decades of hostility.  Neither side apparently envisioned a permanent rift, 
but in the short-term, stoking animosity proved expedient for both sides.  The conflict between the U.S. 
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and Iran was constructed by institutional processes.  Displacement and conversion worked over the 
course of the decade to transfer attention in both camps from other issues and conflicts to toward a 
mutual focus on each other.  Layering took key issues and events that may or may not have been 
directly related to the conflict and transformed them into enduring facets of the relationship, relics of 
the past endowed with the power to shape future events.  Each historical juncture presented a new set 
of possibilities that included improving the relationship, but both sides entered these junctures with 
baggage from the past which influenced the outcome.  The events of the 1980's set the stage for a 
protracted conflict between the U.S. and Iran.   
 
U.S. Embassy hostage crisis 
 After the Islamic Revolution of 1979 toppled the Shah, the U.S. government (Bill 1988, 278-281, 
284, 291-292) (Sick 1986, 219-222) attempted to rebuild its ties with the Iran and make inroads with the 
new government, focusing diplomatic efforts almost entirely on the secular nationalist faction, which 
advocated republican democracy.  The U.S. embassy sustained several attacks during the revolution, the 
most serious of which (FBIS 1979a) (FBIS 1979b) occurred on February 14, 1979, when a Marxist faction 
assaulted the compound and took 70 U.S. personnel hostage.  This incident only lasted a matter of 
hours, and Ayatollah Khomeini personally intervened to resolve the crisis.  Meanwhile Khomeini's 
supporters struggled against the secular nationalists to implement their vision of an Islamic government 
in Iran.  Leftist factions (Tabaar 2017), with their own vision for Iran's future, threw in their lot with 
Khomeini against the democratic camp, but with armed militias and broad support, they proved the 
greatest threat to Khomeini's long-term position.  In October 1979, President Carter (Sick 1986, 215) 
made a controversial decision to allow the former Shah to come to the United States for cancer 
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treatment.  The situation in Iran was already volatile, and on November 4, 1979, a student group that 
supported Khomeini besieged the embassy.  Apparently, Khomeini was not involved in this decision 
(Bowden 2006, 12-14)(Milani 1994, 165-166), and a member of his circle had quietly advised the 
students that it would be better for them act without permission than involve the Ayatollah ahead of 
time - a likely attempt by radicals to force Khomeini's hand.  What initially appeared to be a peaceful sit-
in (Bowden 2006, 15, 55-58) escalated into a full-scale seizure of the U.S. Embassy, and the students 
took the occupants captive (including several from a different location).  After a number were initially 
released, the attackers held a total of 52 American citizens for the entire duration of 444 days.  
Khomeini reacted to the situation in a stepwise manner.  His statement (Library of Congress CRS 
1981, 34-35) following the U.S. acceptance of the Shah was relatively constrained, but a week later, by 
November 1, he called for his student supporters to "expand their attacks against the U.S. and Israel." 
Per Axworthy (2013, 168-169), when the students seized the embassy on November 4, Khomeini waited 
to gauge both public opinion and the U.S. reaction.  Sensing an opening, Khomeini (FBIS 1979b1) 
expressed his support for the students the next day, dubbing the embassy a "lair of espionage and 
plotting" which the U.S. intended to use as a base for returning the Shah to power.  As many expected 
(Milani 1994, 166, 173), the secular nationalist Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan strongly opposed the 
embassy takeover and ran afoul of Khomeini, who effectively forced him to resign in frustration.  
Bazargan's fall signaled the beginning of the end for secular moderate influence in the Iranian 
government.   
The Carter administration (Houghton 2001, 76, 101, 106-109), lacking a paradigm for the crisis 
that was unfolding, reverted to a playbook based on previous historical events, which suggested that 
calmness and the firm but gradual application of pressure would bring the Iranian government to its 
senses.  Khomeini, on the other hand, smelled weakness, and his open defiance of the U.S. was proving 
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popular with the public and useful for sidelining his adversaries.  The crisis (Axworthy 2013, 170-171) 
became a platform to silence his critics and pave the way for the enshrinement of velayat-e faqih (the 
rule of jurisprudence, making a religious leader the supreme leader and guide for Iran) in the new 
constitution, which was adopted the next month.  According to Tabaar (2017), not only was the hostage 
crisis a vehicle for victory over secular opponents, but it also allowed Khomeini to seize the initiative 
from his leftist competition.  The leftists had curried a great deal of public support in Iran by touting 
radical Marxist slogans against the U.S. and the West.  In one blow, Khomeini stole their thunder and 
become the leading symbol of Iranian resistance against Western imperialism.   
For the next year, the Carter administration struggled (Sick 1986, 266, 282-284) in vain to 
resolve the crisis, exhausting its predictable inventory of sanctions, threats and diplomatic overtures, 
while Khomeini remained aloof and intransigent.  In Iran, this drama played out against the backdrop of 
a domestic struggle for control of the government which the U.S. was not capable of penetrating or 
influencing.  In early 1980, Abolhassan Bani Sadr (Amanat 2017, 793-798), was elected Iran's first 
President.  Bani Sadr was a supporter of Khomeini, and for a time enjoyed his blessing, but he also had 
liberal leanings and was intent on building a viable, functioning government.  As Bani-Sadr attempted to 
assert presidential authority, he immediately butted heads with Khomeini's clerical supporters 
(represented by the Islamic Republican Party (IRP)), who preferred to treat political power as the spoils 
of the revolution.  While Khomeini supported him occasionally (more often not), Bani-Sadr steadily lost 
ground to his rivals, eventually casting about for support from nationalists and leftists.  Bani-Sadr openly 
advocated the return of the hostages, but his adversaries used this to undermine the presidency.  
Khomeini established a predictable pattern (Sick 1986, 281-321) of suggesting support for his president, 
then pulling the rug afterward with fiery speeches denouncing compromise. 
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In April 1980, Carter lost patience with diplomatic efforts and authorized a military operation to 
rescue the hostages.  Unfortunately, Operation Eagle Claw distinguished itself as one of the most 
prominent disasters in U.S. military history.  The complex, multi-stage effort (Kreisher 2000) was fraught 
from the outset, and the commander aborted the mission en route because of technical problems.  At 
the refueling site for the return journey, in an isolated section of Iranian desert, two U.S. aircraft 
collided.  The ensuing explosion killed eight Americans and severely burned four more.  Forced to leave 
bodies and wreckage in Iran, the operation was a propaganda coup for the Iranian government.  Iranian 
leaders irreverently held press conferences with bodies in the background, and Khomeini (FBIS 1980a & 
1980c) delivered vitriolic speeches claiming that God had intervened on behalf of Iran.  Amanat (2017, 
828) claimed that this projected an aura of invincibility on Khomeini, and the incident seemed to prove 
Khomeini's point that the U.S. could not "do a damn thing."  
On the U.S. side, though planning continued for a second try, the failure Eagle Claw effectively 
foreclosed on the option to solve the crisis with military force.  Eagle Claw also drew widespread 
international criticism (Ryan 1985, 97-100), even from European allies, and a military commission led by 
Admiral James Holloway III (Special Operations Review Group 1980) to in investigate the operation 
exposed a litany of systemic problems that not only led to the failure of Eagle Claw but continued to 
plague the military more widely.  Some of the committee's recommendations would eventually drive 
major institutional changes within the U.S. military, as this chapter will discuss further.  In the meantime, 
the failure cost Carter politically in an election year. 
Iran's first positive overtures for a negotiated solution corresponded closely with Iraq's invasion 
of Iran in September 1980, but Axworthy (2013, 180-183, 202-204) argued that it was not the Iraqi 
threat that brought Iran to the table.  In the Spring and Summer of 1980, Khomeini's IRP supporters 
sidelined leftist politicians almost completely from parliament, secured the position of Prime Minister, 
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and foisted of their members upon Bani Sadr as cabinet officials.  At this point, clerical control of the 
government was almost entirely complete, and the hostages had outlived their usefulness.  In spite of 
an enthusiastic opening, likely engineered to some degree by future president Hashemi Rafsanjani, and 
Carter's complete cooperation, negotiations languished for months.  According to Pollack (2004, 171) it 
was apparent in hindsight that Iranian leaders attempted to game the U.S. presidential election, in 
which Ronald Reagan defeated Carter, and Iranian leaders gloated (FBIS 1981c) (FBIS 1981d) about their 
role in Carter's downfall, delaying the release of the hostages until immediately after Reagan's 
inauguration as a parting jab.   
Reagan's election also gave Iran a new deadline (Sick 1986, 376-377, 395-402), as they gained no 
further advantage from dealing with this new president.  However, their own side was hamstrung by 
factional infighting and they frittered away their bargaining position in the waning days of the Carter 
administration, unable to accept a series of relatively generous offers.  The final settlement of $4 billion 
cash was one third of its original claim against Iranian assets held by the U.S., and it did not include any 
of the military equipment purchased by the Shah, although Carter had offered this three months before.  
Sick (1991, 189-191) estimated the dollar cost of the hostages to Iran as roughly $8 billion in lost assets, 
amounting to $150 million per hostage, or $300,000 per day per hostage.  Predictably, Iranian leaders 
claimed victory (FBIS 1981a, b, d).  Bani Sadr (Milani 1994, 182-183) (Axworthy 2013, 205) used the 
negotiations debacle as ammunition against his IRP rivals, scoring a short-term win but sealing his own 
eventual downfall.  After the crisis (Bowden 2007, 593), Iran converted the embassy chancery into 
permanent anti-American museum in Tehran. 
This foundational moment of the U.S.-Iranian conflict was rife with institutional processes.  
Perhaps the most prominent example was Khomeini's decision to endorse the embassy takeover.  In 
spite of his anti-Western and anti-American rhetoric, Khomeini's original movement had one defining 
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goal, the overthrow of the Shah.  When the Shah fell sooner than most expected, it opened the space 
for competing visions regarding the future of Iran, and Khomeini's prominence was no longer assured.  
Blustery rhetoric aside, Khomeini had taken little action against the U.S. or its interests that would 
endanger the possibility of a future relationship, but in the heat of a domestic power struggle, defining 
himself in opposition to the U.S. became a political expedient.  Takeyh (2012, 55) argued that 
"Khomeini's internationalism needed to have an antagonist, a foil against which to define itself." In 
essence, the process of displacement and conversion replaced the Shah with the U.S. as Khomeini's 
(ergot Iran's) primary adversary.   
The prolongation of the crisis also demonstrated how the domestics politics layer of the U.S.-
Iranian relationship began to form, where an issue that had nothing to do with the U.S. had a notable 
effect on the direction of the international conflict.  One might argue that the chief lesson Iranian 
leaders took from this process is that radicalism sells.   They established radicalism as a baseline which 
would provide the safest path forward in domestic competition and to which they could always retreat 
under pressure.  Of course, the object of radical discourse would now be the U.S.  In addition, the 
ensuing hostage crisis added at two more notable layers on the Iranian side that would complicate its 
relationship with the U.S.   
First, the episode entrenched a predilection for bold and decisive action within the 
organizational culture of the Islamic Republic.  Just as the students who stormed the embassy preferred 
to beg forgiveness than permission, the newly empowered elites of all ranks would find that initiative 
was rewarded more often than punished, providing an incentive for radical action.  In the years to come, 
it would be difficult for Western observers to tell when a provocative action by Iran derived from central 
planning or the initiative of subordinates, and it also appears in hindsight that Iranian leaders had less 
control over their officials than commonly believed.  Second, Iranians learned that the U.S. had no good 
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answer for the problem of hostage taking.  Hostages were easy to take and valuable commodities.  This 
would be especially problematic for the relationship with the creation of Hezbollah later in the decade, 
and it would continue for decades as Iran would sporadically detain dual national citizens on the 
flimsiest of charges and hold them for political purposes.  Davar (2019) argued forty years later that Iran 
was still "addicted to hostage-taking" as a foreign policy tool. 
For the U.S., the hostage crisis began processes of displacement and conversion as well, 
transforming Iran from a friend to an adversary, but the objects of transference (Iraq and the Soviet 
Union) would only become clear as the decade unfolded.  More important to the hostage crisis itself, 
the U.S. formed the basis of new layers for the developing conflict.  First, the U.S. began to apply 
sanctions to Iran, and it froze Iranian assets.  This started as a tactical move in reaction to hostility, and a 
single act would not be considered an institutional process.  However, the U.S. would maintain varying 
degrees of sanctions (and sponsor international sanctions, as well) for the entire 40-year period under 
examination.  Sanctions became a layer of the conflict because they established habitual patterns of 
action on both sides of the conflict, shaping the economy and inspiring resistance in Iran, while 
becoming a symbol of assertiveness on the U.S. side.  The sanctions themselves layered upon each other 
over the years, complicating opportunities for diplomacy, even when the original impetus for specific 
sanctions had become muddled by history.  Additionally, Iran's frozen assets, especially those previously 
controlled by the former Shah, became a mythical beast, with the disposition and amount disputed for 
decades by the two sides.  The Carter administration (Sick 1986, 282-284) also experimented with extra-
territorial sanctions, freezing Iranian assets held by U.S. banks in foreign countries, betting that litigation 
in foreign courts would tie the assets up indefinitely.  This innovation foreshadowed the move three 
decades later when the U.S. enforced secondary sanctions on Iran by threatening removal of foreign 
financial institutions from the SWIFT banking system.   
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The second layer on the U.S. side was the assumption that Iran could not be negotiated with.  
The U.S. cut diplomatic ties and lost the means to dialogue with Iran.  This was a temporary, tactical 
move spawned by hostage crisis, but it had generational effects.  The U.S. would not have diplomatic 
representation in Iran again for any of the 40 years under study.  The third layer on the U.S. side was 
that Iran became associated with the politics of blame.  The Shah's political allies in the U.S., especially 
Henry Kissinger (1979), lambasted the Carter administration over its foreign policy by framing the fall of 
the Shah with debate over "who lost Iran?" The incessant media coverage of the hostage crisis 
perpetuated this debate, leaving the Carter administration vulnerable to a tremendous amount of 
criticism.  Reagan clearly learned from Carter's misfortunes, and Iran would be a political hot potato on 
the U.S. side since that point.  Animosity would always be safer than engagement.   
Lastly, the U.S. media coverage added additional layers to the conflict with Iran, including a set 
of narratives that would come to largely define the relationship.  This is a complex and multi-faceted 
topic, beyond the scope of this work, and an expanded discussion is included in Appendix A.  However, 
the hostage crisis occurred at a juncture in the history of the news media when the technology and 
platforms were becoming available to deliver an unprecedented amount of televised news to audiences, 
both in the U.S. and around the world.  The crisis generated daily coverage and spawned the ABC News 
program Nightline, which endures to this day.  This style of coverage, with soap-opera-like narratives, 
eventually paved the way for the emergence of the 24-hour news cycle a decade later.  This news 
coverage tied a broad cross-section of the American public intimately to the human drama of the 
hostage crisis.  It also exposed them to the prevailing narratives of Western commentators, which Said 
(1997, 81-123) described as having overtly imperialistic overtones.   
Media commentators reduced the political and cultural dynamics occurring in Iran to simple 
tropes, such as the "mad mullah" narrative which viewed Iranians as wild-eyed extremists, impervious to 
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reason and bent on destroying Western civilization.  These narratives would continue to build and 
proliferate throughout the duration of the conflict, shaping the American worldview with regard to Iran 
and influencing policymakers, in particular.  On the Iranian side Rubin (1980, 340-341, 356-364), leaders 
scoured Western media coverage for reflections of their own impact on the world.  Hyperbole and 
sensationalism in the American press had the indirect effect of fueling tensions with Iran as its leaders 
developed and exaggerated sense of their own centrality to American life and also homed in on 
perceived offenses and slights.   
As this section has shown, the hostage crisis sowed a number of the seeds that would eventually 
lead to the institutionalization of conflict between the U.S. and Iran.  For the U.S., it was a traumatic 
event that turned Iran decisively from friend to foe and began a number of processes that would solidify 
this position in coming years.  Chief among these was the generation of new narratives that redefined 
Iran in U.S. eyes.  For Iranians, the experience provided a mixture of catharsis and empowerment.  The 
rupture with the U.S. was never meant to be permanent, but it was so politically expedient for Iran’s 
new rulers that it entrenched new patterns of action with hostility as a default position.  Radicalism 
became the coin of the realm, and the benefits of goading the U.S. usually outweighed the costs for 
ambitious leaders.  The Iranian people quietly paid the price.   
  
Iran-Iraq War 
The Iran-Iraq War, which began in September 1980, suffered no shortage of historical roots 
(Murray and Woods 2014, 9-15), but neither was it a foregone conclusion.  In 1975, the Shah had 
stripped Iraq of its claim to the Shatt al-Arab region linking Iraq's rivers to the Persian Gulf, along with 
the oil rich province of Khuzestan, but in return, he withdrew his support for Iraq's restive Kurds in the 
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north.  When the Islamic Revolution toppled the Shah in 1979, Saddam Hussein (Karsh 1990, 265-267), 
the de facto ruler and soon-to-be president of Iraq, initially welcomed the change and sent peaceful 
overtures to Iran's new rulers.  However, Ayatollah Khomeini, whose years in exile in Iraq had cemented 
his relationship with the country's oppressed Shiite majority, denounced the Baathist regime and began 
actively supporting dissident Shiite groups in Iraq.  This led to an escalatory chain of events (Crist 2012, 
86) as militias attacked government officials and Saddam Hussein (Aziz 1993, 207) cracked down on Iraqi 
Shiites, eventually executing Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, a prominent clerical leader who shared 
Khomeini's revolutionary views and belief in valayat-e faqih.  By the Spring of 1980 (Karsh 1990, 265-
267), both sides were actively shelling each at points along their common border, and in June, Iran's 
leaders openly called for a Shiite uprising to overthrow Saddam Hussein.  Iran called up its military 
reserves (Pollack 2004, 186-188) two days prior to Iraq's invasion, and the only real surprise to Iran was 
the intensity and scope of the Iraqi onslaught.   
Iraq attacked Iran with a force of 45,000 troops along multiple axes (Axworthy 2013, 189-202, 
207-209) (Pollack 2004, 186-188), catching Iran woefully unprepared.  Iran's clerical leaders had 
decimated the Shah's military through revolutionary purges, and their forces relied on U.S. technology, 
to which they no longer had access.  Iran's superior air force scored some initial successes, but with 
limited maintenance capacity, they could not afford to decisively commit these assets.  Yet even in its 
sorry state, Iran's military gave the Iraqis more resistance than they expected.  Apparently hoping to lock 
in some quick gains, Saddam Hussein accepted a U.S.-sponsored ceasefire resolution a week after the 
invasion, but Iran was not prepared to accept defeat.   Revolutionary zeal and nationalistic fervor (Ward 
2009 244-256) swelled the ranks of Iran's ground forces even beyond their ability to effectively absorb 
the troops, and they fought the Iraqis to a standstill, stalemating the conflict for the next year.  In 
September 1981, Iran began an offensive campaign which gradually pushed the Iraq forces back to the 
pre-war border.  This also marked Iran's first use of human wave tactics, where large numbers of highly 
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motivated troops would overwhelm defensive positions, usually with a high loss of life.  Volunteers from 
the Basij auxiliary, some of whom were young teenagers, bore the brunt of this sacrifice.  This produced 
some of the stories of Iranian fanaticism that gripped and appalled Western observers, adding to the 
narrative layer of the U.S.-Iranian conflict.  Another defining feature of the Iran-Iraq War which emerged 
from its earliest days was competition between Iran's regular army (Artesh) and the newly formed IRGC 
(Sepah).  Both fought valiantly and earned the respect of the Iranian people, but the rift would hamper 
Iran's war efforts throughout the conflict. 
In June of 1982 (Axworthy 2013, 226-232) Saddam Hussein withdrew all forces from Iran and 
sued for peace.  Iran rejected the offer.  On the surface, it appeared that this was a vindictive move by 
an intransigent Khomeini, however historical research has revealed this to have been the product of 
factional politics.  IRGC commanders and at least some of Khomeini's supporters (the question of whom 
remains in debate) strongly pushed for an offensive to try and topple Saddam's regime.  Further (Takeyh 
2009b, 93-94), many of Iran's clerical leaders distrusted Saddam so thoroughly that they were convinced 
he would attack again at first opportunity.  Khomeini acquiesced and fostered rhetorical chants of "war 
until victory!"  Like Saddam Hussein at the beginning of the war, Iran’s hawks severely underappreciated 
the difficulty of fighting on their neighbor's soil and overestimated their own offensive abilities.  Their 
initial advances (Ward 2009, 256-261) into Iraqi territory were costly failures leading to a state of trench 
warfare not seen since World War I.  The Iraqis fought more effectively when defending their homeland, 
and even the Shia chose solidarity with their countrymen over sympathy for foreign invaders.  
Nevertheless, decisive victories appeared to be waiting just around every corner, and Iran launched 
numerous offensives over the course of eight years, slipping into a pattern of one major operation per 
year with several iteratively named subordinate efforts.  Iran achieved some successes (Murray and 
Woods 2014, 263-275, 286-288), including the capture of the Fao Peninsula in 1986 which nearly cut 
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Iraqi access to the Persian Gulf, but these gains always proved fleeting.  By the summer of 1988, Iraq had 
retaken all of its original territory.   
The ground combat between Iran and Iraq played on both sides as a drama of human courage, 
sacrifice, and brutality, but other aspects of the war would also prove important.  First, the two sides 
fought a "war of the cities" between 1984 and 1988 (Murray and Woods 2014, 257, 275-276) in which 
Bagdad and Tehran (along with other major population centers) became the targets of intense air 
attacks.  Starting primarily with aircraft, but shifting to cheaper and less accurate ballistic missile attacks, 
both sides indiscriminately killed thousands of each other's civilian populations.  Iran suffered the 
heavier cost, and this vulnerability spurred the IRGC's ballistic missile program, which would become a 
contentious layer of the U.S.-Iranian conflict for decades afterward.  Second, the Persian Gulf (Ward 
2009, 170-173) became a battleground as the two foes targeted shipping, which eventually drew the 
U.S. into the "tanker war" which will be discussed later in the chapter.  Finally, Saddam Hussein (Director 
of Central Intelligence 1988, 1-6) began using chemical weapons, especially mustard gas in 1983.  While 
Iraq always denied these attacks (sometimes thinly), they became frequent occurrences and were 
clearly integral to Iraqi battle plans.  It should also be noted that, even though the Iranians were often 
accused of using chemical weapons themselves, little evidence ever emerged to corroborate these 
accusations.  A U.S. intelligence report from 1988 (Director of Central Intelligence 1988, 1) stated that 
Iran only used chemical weapons "on a very limited scale beginning in 1985, probably for testing and 
training." It also conducted several small-scale mustard gas attacks at the end of the war. 
While the hostage crisis demonstrated displacement and conversion on the Iranian side, the 
Iran-Iraq War did so just as prominently for the U.S.  In 1980, Iraq was a Cold War adversary and Iran 
only recently a close ally.  By the middle of the decade, Iran became the enemy, and while relations with 
Iraq never reached the level of an alliance, Reagan's "tilt" toward Iraq drew the U.S. into de facto 
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partnership with Saddam Hussein.  Carter's initial reaction to Iraq's invasion was shaped entirely by the 
Cold War (Eaton 1980) (El Azhary, 1984, 96-98), even though the hostage crisis was still ongoing.  The 
Soviets had only recently invaded Afghanistan, and the Carter administration worried that the conflict 
might give them a foothold in either Iraq or Iran, so the U.S. declared neutrality and advocated a strict 
return to status quo borders, rallying the international community to condemn the conflict.   
When Reagan entered office (Gibson 2010, 55-64), his Cold War focus was just as sharp, but his 
staff initially toyed with the idea of arming Iran through third parties, showing that the conflict was not 
yet institutionalized.  Since supporting Iran looked too problematic, the U.S. and Iraq began to quietly 
court each other, even while Reagan openly promoted neutrality.  Rapprochement with Iraq (Crist 2012, 
96-97, 104) (Pollack 2004, 206-208) had strong critics as well, both in the foreign policy establishment 
and the U.S. Congress, but what tipped the scales was Iran's decision to invade Iraqi territory in 1982.  
The U.S. intelligence community (Gibson 2010, 73-79, 83-84) began to question Iraq's internal stability 
and contemplate the implications of a decisive Iranian victory.  None of the scenarios were promising for 
U.S. policy, and regional partners including Egypt, Jordan, and the Gulf States all campaigned 
vociferously for greater U.S. support.  Takeyh (2009, 99) quoted Secretary of State George Shultz as 
saying that, "Our support for Iraq increased in rough proportion to Iran's success."  
Between 1982 and 1988, the U.S. gradually but deliberately implemented an unstated policy of 
contravening its declared neutrality in favor of Iraq.  The U.S. government (Pollack 2004, 207-208) (Crist 
2012, 98) removed Iraq from the official list of state sponsors of terrorism.  Reagan could not provide 
war material directly, but the U.S. offered credits and loans that freed Iraqi resources to purchase arms 
from other sources, and U.S. diplomats (Crist 2012, 100-101) (Gibson 2010, 79, 88, 104-120, 145) skirted 
the neutrality and embargo rules by actively facilitating weapons deals for Iraq with America's allies and 
partners.  The administration also allowed the sale of dual use helicopters and trucks to Iran, even 
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drawing admonishment from Congress.  In 1984, the U.S. (Crist 2012, 104-105) (Gibson 2010, 209, 213-
214) restored full diplomatic relations with Iraq, and this helped to facilitate an extensive intelligence 
sharing program that aided Iraq against Iran until the very end of the war, an open secret only thinly 
veiled in official statements.   
The other side of this displacement and conversion was that the U.S. began to actively oppose 
Iran.  The same U.S. diplomats (Crist 2012, 101-103) that facilitated weapons transfers for Iraq worked 
just as diligently to build support for enforcement of the weapons embargo against Iran.  The U.S. 
launched Operation Staunch (Gibson 2010, 112-113, 125-126) - a coordinated diplomatic and military 
effort to close off the transfer of weapons to Iran, which forced Iran to turn to a network of shady and 
high-priced gray arms merchants for its supplies.  Perhaps most tellingly (Associated Press 1984), in 
January of 1984, the U.S. State Department officially designated Iran as a state sponsor of terrorism 
(connected largely to Iranian sponsored attacks in both Lebanon and Kuwait during the preceding 
months).  The same year the U.S. resumed full diplomatic relations with its former adversary, Iraq, its 
former ally, Iran, now took its place as a pariah state.     
Some of these U.S. actions during the Iran-Iraq War added enduring layers to the conflict with 
Iran, but the most prominent layers from this period emerged in the context of U.S. inaction.  The U.S. 
intelligence community (Gibson 2010, 104-120, 127-138) was fully aware of Iraq's "almost daily" use of 
chemical weapons beginning in 1983.  Iran's complaints to the U.N. produced token action on the U.S. 
side, but America never fundamentally altered its support for Iraq or forced its hand over this issue.  
Further, the U.N. Security Council (influenced by the U.S.) took little action, producing "statements" 
instead of resolutions, which invariably admonished both sides of the conflict on almost equal terms.  A 
full examination of this controversial failure is beyond the scope of this work, but it does provide two 
key insights useful in understanding the institutionalization of the conflict between the U.S. and Iran.  
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First, Americans viewed Iran's suicidal human wave tactics and the use of children in combat (along with 
the innovation of suicide bombing within the terrorist arsenal) with a mix of horror and fixation.  
Chemical weapons may have been repulsive, but compared with fanaticism, it did not seem so bad.  One 
sentence from a presidential directive in 1984 (The White House 1984a, 3) is particularly revealing: "Our 
condemnation of the use of CW munitions by the belligerents should place equal stress on the urgent 
need to dissuade Iran from continuing the ruthless and inhumane tactics which have characterized 
recent offensives." Therefore, even in the most strongly worded U.S. or international condemnation of 
chemical weapons use, Iran would always somehow continue to emerge as the villain.   
Second, the U.S. was developing a narrative (layer) with regard to Iran that superseded factual 
analysis.  The U.S. (Gibson 2010, 149) began to accuse Iran in 1985 of developing its own chemical 
weapons program.  While this was true to a very limited degree (Director of Central Intelligence 1988, 1-
6), Iran conducted no chemical attacks until the end of the war, and even then, none of significance.  
The rumor-mill in Washington policy circles, however, took on a life of its own.  Richard Murphy, a 
senior State Department official during this period (Blight, et al. 2012, 107-109), state that "the rumor 
was all over Washington, that Iran used CW on the southern front." Murphy explained how these beliefs 
made it easy for policymakers to stop worrying about human rights.  In spite of the bad things Iraqis 
were doing, Iranians were seen as "crazy zealots."  In short, Iranians had been dehumanized, and facts 
were no longer as important as collective beliefs. The concepts of narrative creation and 
dehumanization will be central to understanding the institutionalization of conflict over the course of 
four decades. 
One additional layer that emerged from the conflict on the U.S. side was the development of a 
U.S.-sponsored regional security architecture within the greater Middle East region.  While Carter 
advocated strict neutrality between Iraq and Iran at the beginning of their war, he also deftly leveraged 
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the conflict (El Azhary, 1984, 89-91) (Gibson 2010, 51-52) and the growing fears of both Iran and the 
Soviet Union to pull regional actors, including the Gulf Arab States and Pakistan, into the U.S. orbit.  As 
later sections and chapters will show, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) would become the lynchpin 
for this architecture in future years.  The important implication, however, was that this architecture 
both excluded and aligned naturally against Iran, making it increasingly hard for the U.S. to restore 
relations with Iran without upsetting its own arrangement.  This became an extension of the diplomatic 
isolation of Iran that started during the hostage crisis.   
The Iranian side added a number of key layers to the U.S.-Iranian conflict during this period as 
well.  The first layer was the war itself.  Much of the literature on the Iran-Iraq War focuses primarily on 
Saddam Hussein's decision to start the war, largely forgetting Khomeini's role in instigating the conflict.  
Why would Khomeini and supporters push for war with a neighboring state during such a precarious 
moment of national transition?  If Khomeini's decision to alienate the U.S. was a product of domestic 
political calculations, the same logic likely held with regard to Iraq.  Khomeini's supporters had pushed 
their rivals out of formal government, but the leftists, especially the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), remained 
a potent force.  In 1981 (O'hern 2012, 32-33), they fought an armed insurgency against Khomeini, only 
to be defeated.  As the coming years would show, the Islamic Republic thrived on maintaining a 
continual state of emergency which allowed Khomeini to crush his rivals.  This was probably a factor 
(Takeyh 2012, 54) in the decision to continue the war in 1982, as well.  For all the reasons discussed so 
far in this section, the Iran-Iraq war did not stay a family matter between two brothers.  The U.S. was 
sucked in, as well. 
This inevitable involvement led to a second layer of the conflict, a crusade against Western 
imperialism.  Iran considered the U.S. to be an integral part of the adversary it faced in the Iran-Iraq 
War.  From the beginning, Iranian media (FBIS 1981e) and the public speeches of its leaders painted 
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Iraq's invasion as having been, if not engineered by the U.S., certainly encouraged by it.  Khomeini 
termed the struggle against the Iraqi invasion as Iran's "Sacred Defense," but by tying the U.S. to all 
Iran's external enemies, the "Sacred Defense" could be situated in a larger holy war against the West.  
This became especially important in 1982, when Iran switched from defense to offense.  Regardless of 
the rationale for this decision, Khomeini (Takeyh 2012, 54) clearly seized the opportunity to continue 
consolidating his position.  He termed the offensive Iran's "third revolution," claiming it would cleanse 
the country of all secular influences.  Takeyh (2012, 53-54) observed that Khomeini could never have 
rallied the Iranian people to conduct a limited war with limited objectives.  This offensive had to be a 
crusade against a universal adversary larger than Saddam Hussein.  The U.S. tilt toward Iraq could hardly 
have played better into Khomeini's narrative. 
A third layer on the Iranian side was a heightened sense of injustice, which expanded on 
narratives regarding the Mossadegh coup and a uniquely Shiite sense of oppression.  This started when 
the international community (Axworthy 2013, 195-202, 207-209) pressured Iran to accept a ceasefire at 
the beginning of the war that would have forced it cede territory.  When Iran held Iraqi land (Freedman 
2008, 201-203), the demand was a return to the status quo.  Also, while Iran was largely responsible for 
its own international isolation, the fact that the world was supplying its adversary while enforcing an 
embargo against it fueled oppression narratives.  Finally, Iran blamed the U.S. for Iraq's use of chemical 
weapons.  In an indirect sense, there was considerable merit to this accusation, but Iranian leaders were 
not concerned about nuance.  In the absence of a smoking gun, Iranian newspapers (FBIS 1984_Jul 3) 
simply fabricated reports that the U.S. was supplying chemical weapons to Iraq, based upon rumors and 
flimsy evidence.  With no way to disprove such claims, most Iranians probably took for granted that the 
U.S. was responsible for Iraq's chemical arsenal.   
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A final layer that became engrained on both sides of the U.S.-Iranian conflict throughout the 
Iran-Iraq War was the battle of threats and rhetoric.  In general terms, Khomeini was famous for 
taunting the U.S. and predicting its demise at every turn, and his lieutenants followed suit.  Perennial 
threats to block the Strait of Hormuz (FBIS 1984_Jan 03), which Iran had at best a limited capability of 
doing, became a ritualistic posturing exercise throughout the war.  The institution of anti-Americanism 
in Iran also developed its own language, authored primarily by Khomeini, himself.  The U.S. (Khomeini 
1989b) (FBIS 1983, October 24) was the "Great Satan," characterized by "global arrogance" and 
"imperialism." Israel was the "Small Satan," and the term "Zionism" was applied to every affront to the 
Muslim world, including (curiously) Saddam Hussein's Baathist (somehow Zionist?) regime, which was 
underpinned by the "Great Satan."  Iranian leaders and masses alike ritually chanted "Death to America" 
(Nada 2015) at all manner of official functions and mass demonstrations.  This was frequently 
accompanied by the burning of the American flag.  These rhetorical and ritual devices predated the Iran-
Iraq War, but it was the constant state of war and emergency that allowed such practices to retain 
salience over time. The eight-year gestation period of the Iran-Iraq War was sufficient to imprint 
reflexive anti-Americanism into the very D.N.A. of the regime.   
It is worth noting that Iranian propaganda developed a counterpart in the U.S., as well.  This 
manifested itself more subtly than in Iran.  Americans (though not above crude chants on occasion), 
were not given to ritual slogans calling for "Death to Iran." Instead, as pointed out by Beeman (2005, 40-
43), references to Iran in everything from official statements to news commentary pervasively employed 
adjectives and word choices that carried negative connotations.  This ensured that any discussion of 
Iran, even when couched as objective, was framed by overtones that automatically cast judgement.  
One particular word that became associated with Iran was "terrorism." As the following sections will 
discuss, Iran's own actions invited this label.  However, the term "terrorism" grew to encompass almost 
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any form of political violence (including warfare) that might be associated with Iran.  This would be a 
lasting legacy of the rhetorical battle of the 1980's. 
Like the hostage crisis, the Iran-Iraq War did not directly cause the institutionalization of conflict 
between the U.S. and Iran.  What it did was vastly widen the breadth of issues that became linked to the 
conflict on both sides.  The menu of grievances available to leaders wishing to cash in politically on 
hostility toward the opposite side expanded considerably.  The narratives shaping public perception 
created a well-spring of popular support that opportunistic leaders could draw upon for their own 
benefit.  The conflict between the U.S. and Iran was working its way into the habitus of social groups on 
both sides.   
  
Lebanon 
Lebanon was an episode of the U.S.-Iranian conflict that never should have been.  Iran's 
involvement in Lebanon initially had nothing to do with the U.S., and the U.S. peacekeeping mission in 
the country proved a futile and costly effort.  Yet when Israel invaded Lebanon in June 1982 with the 
intent of defeating the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), it drew both parties into the fray and 
started a chain of events that would help institutionalize the enmity between the U.S. and Iran.  
Lebanon (Freedman 2008, 126-127) had been plagued by factional infighting and civil war since the mid-
1970's, inviting the machinations of its neighbors (especially Syria), and the PLO had had established 
their base in the war-torn country.  Israel's invasion (Varady 2017, 84-87) was meant to score a quick 
victory against its adversary, but instead they became bogged down in protracted struggle and mired in 
the factional politics of Lebanon.  Their invasion had nothing to do with the Shiite population of 
Southern Lebanon (Freedman 2008, 141-142), who bore them little animosity, but Israelis forces 
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callously trampled the Shiites in pursuit of the PLO, and when the operation dragged on, tensions grew.  
This was bound to pique Iran's interest. 
Why did Iran choose to become involved in Lebanon?  After all, they were fighting a war with 
Iraq, in which they were about to begin a major offensive, and having just recently vanquished the MEK 
insurgency (Axworthy 2013, 224-226), Khomeini was still consolidating his rule.  First, Iran's clerics 
(Hamzeh 2004, 17-19, 22-26) had deep and historic familial ties with the Shiites of Lebanon.  Second, the 
Lebanese militia Amal (Ranstorp 1997, 28-29), which had been active in that country's civil war, was 
closely tied to the network of Khomeini supporters in both Iraq and Iran that had originally propelled 
him to prominence.  Some of Khomeini's lieutenants (Attai 2013, 139-142) and the founders of the IRGC 
had gained their initial experience fighting in Lebanon.  Third, Lebanon offered an opportunity to export 
the revolution, which Khomeini had rhetorically advocated and many of his followers were anxious to 
do.  This new front offered several enticing advantages.  To begin with, it supplanted Saddam Hussein 
(Pollack 2004, 191) in his claim to lead the Islamic world in the fight against Israel.  Beyond this, it 
supported the narrative that Iran's revolution was larger than just the overthrow of the Shah.  It was a 
pan-Islamic movement with universal aims.  By demonstrating that Shiites outside of Iran embraced 
Khomeini, it affirmed and legitimized the doctrine of valayat-e faqih, which had been largely foisted 
upon the Iranian people in 1979. 
Lastly, the IRGC was on the ascendant after defeating the Kurdish uprising, crushing the MEK, 
and playing a leading role in expelling Iraq from Iranian soil.  They constituted a large, professional, and 
well-funded organization of young radicals with dangerous skills in guerilla warfare, counterintelligence, 
and subversion.  If forced to demobilize, this pillar of the regime could have become the clerics' biggest 
headache.  To this effect, Axworthy (2013, 226-232) pointed out that it was the IRGC that most strongly 
advocated for continuing the war with Iraq, and one can only imagine that they clamored for an 
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opportunity to strike at Israel, as well.  Exporting the revolution kept Khomeini's most dangerous 
supporters busy, while simultaneously proselytizing the Shiite world with his views.  None of these 
issues had anything directly to do with the U.S., but they led to the formation of Lebanese Hezbollah, 
which the U.S. would come to know as one of its primary adversaries in the Middle East region, a new 
layer in the relationship with Iran.   
In the immediate aftermath of Israel's invasion (Ranstorp 1997, 34-38), the IRGC deployed 
approximately 1,500 troops to Lebanon.  These groups recruited and united Shiite factions that had 
splintered from Amal, training and equipping them for guerilla warfare, but also supplanting the 
Lebanese government by providing basic social welfare services to the local population.  Spiritually, 
Lebanese clerics (Hamzeh 2004, 30-36) did not uniformly agree with Ayatollah Khomeini, but the IRGC 
recruited clerics, including Ayatollah Sheik Sayed Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, to support their cause, 
increasing the legitimacy of the fledgling organization.  For the first few years, Hezbollah was an 
umbrella for a decentralized network of factions, but the organization would always retain this 
character.  Ranstorp (1997, 63-65) explained that this confused the outside world and allowed for 
deniability, in addition to empowering key operatives to exercise initiative.  The Iranians (Crist 2012, 
122-125) supported and directed operations through a network that included diplomatic personnel in 
both Lebanon and Syria.  They quickly discovered a particular talent in the form of a young militant 
named Imad Mugniyah.  Mugniyah would become a prominent player in many of Hezbollah's most high-
profile attacks.  Although a clandestine operative, Iran formally commissioned Mugniyah into the 
Revolutionary Guard, an action that would compromise Iran's thin layer of plausible deniability as his 
profile increased.  Hezbollah (Harik 2004, 40) focused their initial operations against Israeli forces, but in 




Why was the U.S. in Lebanon?  When Israel's campaign against the PLO led to a siege of Beirut, 
the Lebanese government (Freedman 2008, 131-132) called for an international peacekeeping force to 
supervise the evacuation of the PLO.  Bawley and Salpeter (1984, 111-122) argued that Reagan, viewing 
the world through a Cold War lens, sensed an opportunity to assert leadership in the region at the 
expense of the Soviet Union and its client, Syria.  The initial mission (Bolger 1995, 171) lasted only a 
matter of weeks, but in September 1982, the assassination of the Lebanese Prime Minister  (Bawley and 
Salpeter 1984, 151-155) (Harik 2004, 34-36) led to a massacre at the Sabra and Shatillah refugee camps.  
Prompted by an international outcry, and U.S. peacekeepers returned.  Reagan (1982) intended the 
deployment to be a short mission with the limited goal of bolstering the Lebanese government, but 
reality proved far more complicated.  U.S. forces found that factional divisions ran so deep that it was 
impossible to support the government without becoming entangled in the confessional conflict.  Over 
the course of 1983 (Bolger 1995, 182-184), U.S. Marines increasingly skirmished with various militias, 
even calling naval gunfire on several occasions.   
In this context, Hezbollah's first attack against the U.S. (Friedman 1983) was a bombing of the 
U.S. Embassy in West Beirut that occurred on April 18, 1983, killing 63, including 17 Americans.  Iran's 
involvement (Farell 1983) became a publicly accepted fact in the coming months, but in the complicated 
environment the U.S. now faced, policymakers (Varady 2017, 127-134) chose not to retaliate.  
Hezbollah's second attack has become one of the most remembered events in the U.S.-Iranian 
relationship.  On October 23, 1983 (Freedman 2008, 141), Hezbollah suicide bombers attacked the 
compound that housed the U.S. Marines, killing 241 (a simultaneous attack killed 58 French 
paratroopers).  U.S. intelligence (Crist 2012, 133-135, 141) (Pollack 2004, 203-204) clearly attributed the 
attacks not only to Hezbollah but directly back to orders from Tehran.  Reagan (Farrell 1983) promised 
not to let the act go unpunished, but as the U.S. invaded the island nation of Grenada (Molotsky 1983) 
two days later, a complex set of Cold War calculations complicated the issue.   
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Ultimately, paralysis (Pollack 2004, 204) (Freedman 2008, 143) within Reagan's own staff caused 
the U.S. to back out of a joint retaliatory strike planned with the French and Israelis.  However, in 
response to harassing fire directed toward U.S. aircraft, the Reagan administration (Crist 2012, 148-149) 
directed a strike at Syrian anti-aircraft batteries in early December.  The operation was poorly 
coordinated, and the U.S. lost two planes in the process.  The next month, in January 1984, the U.S. 
declared Iran a state sponsor of terrorism, a relatively impotent gesture in the face of its inability to 
respond to aggression.  In February (Freedman 2008, 144-145), under intense public pressure, Reagan 
pulled U.S. troops out of Lebanon.  Hezbollah (Wright 1984) took another shot at the U.S. in September 
1984, bombing the U.S. Embassy annex, and killing two more Americans.  Again, U.S. intelligence (Crist 
2012, 151-153) linked the attack squarely to Iran, but Reagan dithered and did not retaliate. 
Institutionalization of the U.S.-Iranian conflict from the U.S. perspective started with another 
process of displacement and conversion.  The U.S. entered Lebanon fixated on the Soviets, Syria, and the 
Arab-Israeli conflict.  Iran was a distraction, at most, and this helped explain why Reagan attempted to 
ignore its provocations.  By the time the U.S. left, all salient links between the Lebanon mission and its 
original priorities had faded out of view.  Instead, the U.S. became fixated on Iran, with which it had 
unfinished business that has yet to be resolved. This helped propel Iran to the top of America's list of 
adversaries in the Middle East.  Simultaneous to this process, the issue of terrorism became a new and 
potent layer in the relationship.  Iran was not the first country to sponsor Islamic terrorism in modern 
times, and it did not invent suicide tactics.  However, by combining martyrdom with vehicle-borne 
explosives, Khomeini's disciples created a form of poor-man's smart bomb that revolutionized the way 
in which guerilla tactics would be applied against both the West and Israel.  Not only were Iranians 
viewed as extremists by the West for their human wave martyrdom operations against Iraq, but they 
became associated with suicide bombing in general.  The Iranian-sponsored kidnapping operations in 
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Lebanon, which will be discussed in the next section, only added to the linkage that would increasingly 
be made between Iran and terrorism.  
The terrorism layer brought a new complication with it as well, which would plague the U.S. for 
years to come.  Iranian-sponsored terrorist attacks, as pointed out by Freedman (2008, 146) were meant 
to be deniable, and the fractious nature of the groups involved increased the complexity of attribution.  
The Western concept of justice relies on a considerable burden of proof before retribution is seen as 
legitimate, but how much proof was required to attribute an attack.  A shadow of doubt could always be 
raised.  Even if attribution can be positively determined, what kind of response is appropriate?  
Terrorists themselves often hide in populated areas, dispersed instead of concentrated.  How much 
collateral damage is acceptable in response for a terrorist attack before the U.S. would begin to look just 
as guilty as the terrorists?  The Reagan administration was not prepared to wrestle with these questions 
as it encountered Iran in Lebanon, and succeeding administrations have struggled just as mightily.  
Regardless, by 1985, Iranian-sponsored terrorist actions prompted Reagan (Latham 1985) to call on U.S. 
allies to join him in a "declaration of war on international terrorism," a foreshadowing of how this layer 
would evolve in the coming decades.  
As incidents of terrorism (of which Iranian-sponsored act were only a portion) multiplied 
through the 1980's, the Reagan administration attempted to take a hard line.  After the hijacking of TWA 
flight 847 in 1985 (Latham 1985), Reagan called on U.S. allies to join him in a "declaration of war on 
international terrorism," a continuation of tough talk that he issued throughout his presidency.  Less 
than a year later (Wilson and Hoffman 1986), in support of this policy, he authorized the April 1986 
bombing of Libya in retaliation for its leader, Muammar Qadhafi's, sponsorship of terrorist acts.  It is 
worth considering, however, that Libya was not Iran.  Qhadaffi could not close the Strait of Hormuz or 
threaten other major oil producers, and with few resources of its own, it had relatively small value on 
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the Cold War chess board.  Iran, on the other hand, was far more complicated, and its actions in 
Lebanon brought out issues that would haunt America's counterterrorism efforts for decades to come. 
From an Iranian perspective, this episode in Lebanon looked like an unmitigated success, but in 
many ways, the Iranians would become victims of this success.  First, in the terrorism layer, the Iranian 
experience taught them that the U.S. was unlikely to retaliate for terrorism and politically unable to 
sustain casualties.  This strengthened hardline elements within the Iranian government and emboldened 
the IRGC.  What they did not account for is that the U.S. would not forget Iran's actions, and this would 
play into future interactions, where the U.S. would show no sympathy for Iran.  This became especially 
evident in 1988 after the U.S. accidently shot down an Iranian passenger plane, with little more than a 
tepid apology afterward.  Second, in the same layer, the Iranians correctly perceived that attribution 
was an Achilles Heel for the U.S., but this caused them to overplay their hand.  Covert action is hard to 
hide, and ultimately, it is just no fun if one does not eventually take credit for it, at least on some level.  
The presence of Iran's Revolutionary Guards (Apple 1983) in Lebanon was hardly secret.  The New York 
Times accurately reported their numbers in October of 1983, along with their sponsorship of militant 
groups.  Iran formally denied responsibility for the Lebanon bombings, but their role was so universally 
accepted that by 1987 (Boroumand and Boroumand 2002, 18), IRGC Chief Mohsen Rafiqdoust openly 
boasted to an Iranian newspaper that, "both the TNT and the ideology which in one blast sent to hell 
400 officers, NCOs, and soldiers at the Marine headquarters have been [sic] provided by Iran.” The 
cumulative effect of Iran's overreliance on the thin veil of deniability was that America and much of the 
West just simply assumed that Iran was guilty and stopped listening to its denials.   
Lastly, one could argue that Hezbollah was its own layer of the relationship.  One problem for 
Iran is that, while it would be held responsible for Hezbollah's actions, it did not fully control its creation.  
Even loyal assets like Imad Mugniyah could prove embarrassing.  Mugniyah (Crist 2012, 155) helped to 
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engineer the hijacking of TWA flight 727 in June 1985 in order to free militia members (one was his 
brother) held in Kuwait for the December 1983 bombings in Kuwait City.  Even if Khomeini or any faction 
in Iran's government approved the operation, they clearly did not intend to be become so openly 
implicated in the event.  It cost the Iranians considerably in terms of international opinion, and Speaker 
Rafsanjani personally intervened to end the crisis. (Ranstorp (1997, 91-95, 116-130) also noted that 
Syria's interests diverged with Iran considerably in the late 1980's and Syria retained considerable 
influence over Hezbollah, as well. 
  Iran’s activities in Lebanon and early sponsorship of terrorism against the U.S. did not happen in 
a vacuum.  It took place in the context of the previous hostage crisis and concurrently with the Iran-Iraq 
War, in which the U.S. steadily increased its involvement.  In a path-dependent fashion, actions by both 
sides scoped the menu of options available for future decisions.  The institutional process of layering 
linked previously unrelated issues so actions in one arena would necessarily constrain actions in others.  
As the U.S. and Iran became increasingly tangled, the conditions were ripe for displacement and 
conversion, which moved the focus of either actor toward the other and facilitated the development of 
constituencies, which would eventually stake their own interests within the perpetuation of the conflict. 
 
Iran-Contra Affair 
Another layer of the U.S.-Iranian conflict exacerbated by Iranian proxies in Lebanon was hostage 
taking.  This layer was first established by the embassy hostage crisis, and Iranians learned that this 
practice struck at a key vulnerability within the West.  Hostage taking in Lebanon was a time-honored 
tradition before the 1980's, but Hezbollah elevated the practice to the international stage.  Exact 
numbers of hostages vary, but by one account (Crist 2012, 154), Iranian-sponsored groups kidnapped 
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almost 100 Western hostages throughout the decade, 25 of them American.  The first U.S. hostage of 
the decade (Ranstorp 1997, 88-89) was David Dodge, the President of American University, who was 
abducted in July of 1982 at the direction of Revolutionary Guard personnel.  Near the end of his captivity 
in 1983, the Iranians moved Dodge to Tehran, where he spent time in Evin Prison.  This was a costly 
mistake because it clearly revealed Iran's hand in the operation.  This would be the last time (Crist 2012, 
154) Iranian operatives would participate directly in kidnapping.  From that point on, the IRGC provided 
training and resources, but used Hezbollah as a surrogate for hostage-taking.  Starting in 1984, 
Mugniyah and his Hezbollah compatriots (United States. Congress… 1987, 160) began an aggressive 
campaign of kidnappings that included the murder of CIA Station Chief William Buckley.  By June 1985 
(Library of Congress 1985, 8), they were holding seven U.S. hostages, along with a number of British and 
French.  These hostages provided the impetus for another key moment in the U.S.-Iranian relationship, 
the Iran-Contra Affair. 
Much like Carter before him, Reagan (Pollack 2004, 215) took a deep personal interest in the 
fate of these U.S. hostages.  Just as importantly, a camp developed within his administration (United 
States. President's Special Review Board… 1987, 112-121) (Draper 1991, 148-151), led primarily by the 
CIA and his own National Security Council (NSC) Staff that worried that the Soviets were better poised 
than the U.S. to make inroads with post-Khomeini Iran.  This was a clear sign that the conflict with Iran 
was not fully entrenched at this point, and some officials viewed the Islamic Revolution as a bump in the 
road instead of a permanent change in Iranian politics.  In fact, Crist (2012, 181) pointed out that Reagan 
himself had sent three letters to Iranian leaders before his 1984 reelection, urging them to improve 
relations with the U.S. - all unanswered.  Influenced in part by Israeli officials and contacts, some of 
Reagan's staff (Draper 1991, 151-154) believed that a "moderate" faction was developing in Iranian 
politics that dissented from Khomeini's radicalism.  They felt that if they could negotiate with these 
"moderates," they could undermine Khomeini and secure the release of the hostages.  Israel was 
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already selling weapons to Iran and had an interest in expanding the scope of their sales (United States. 
Congress… 1987, 163-165), so a shady Iranian-born merchant and gray arms dealer named Manucher 
Ghorbanifar (whom the CIA had previously rejected as an asset for failing polygraph tests) began to 
broker introductions with Iranian officials regarding the possibility of trading arms for hostages.   
These U.S. officials were entirely correct (Crist 2012, 182-183) that factional politics were 
playing out in Iran, but they had no way of understanding the nature or scope.  Speaker of Parliament 
Hashemi Rafsanjani indeed led a "pragmatist" camp within the clerical establishment, and given the 
exigencies of the Iran-Iraq War, he advocated improving relations with the West.  However, Rafsanjani 
and his followers were entirely loyal to Khomeini and his valayat-e faqih, and he viewed engagement 
with the West entirely in transactional terms.  Khomeini himself approved the arms-for-hostages 
negotiations, but when he did so, it threatened the influence of the hardliners, who had previously held 
the greatest sway and fiercely opposed Rafsanjani.  It was this faction that ultimately unhinged the 
negotiations. 
The Reagan administration was divided in its support for this effort, and the Secretaries of 
Defense and State (United States. Congress… 1987, 163-165) both consistently opposed any opening to 
Iran.  However, the CIA Director approved, and NSC staffer Marine Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North 
(Walsh and U.S. 1994, 1-10, 21-24, 71) had already built an impressive covert infrastructure he was using 
to skirt Congressional mandates and equip the Contra rebels in Nicaragua, a conflict that never should 
have involved Iran in any way.  Armed with vague and waffling guidance from Reagan himself (Draper 
1991, 156-160, 166-169, 315-331), the NSC and the CIA pursued the Israeli connection, negotiated with 
Iran, and proceeded to deliver weapons and equipment (most notably anti-tank and anti-aircraft 
missiles).  The results were unimpressive, and Hezbollah released only one hostage between August 
1985 and July 1986.  In May 1986, a delegation including North secretly traveled to Tehran, hoping to 
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negotiate directly with Iranian leaders and eliminate the abounding roadblocks to progress.  After 
several days on the ground, it became apparent that the effort languished at the mercy of factional 
politics within Iran, and Iranian leaders might not have completely controlled Hezbollah at all.   In the 
end, the Americans (Crist 2012, 190-195) were rushed to the airport when hardliners attempted to rally 
a violent protest against their presence.  The abortive Tehran mission notwithstanding, Iran released 
two more hostages as the weapons shipments continued.  North also successfully brokered a direct 
channel with Iranian leaders (Draper 1991, 394-416) (Secord 1986), avoiding the confusion of Israeli 
middlemen.  In September, he personally gave a relative and representative of Rafsanjani a tour of the 
White House, probably the zenith of this exercise in positive engagement with Iran.  It would be short-
lived. 
In September and October, Hezbollah took three more American hostages (Pollack 2004, 213), 
completely negating the effect of the three they had released.  In November 1986, an Iranian hardline 
supporter who had fallen out of favor with Khomeini sponsored an article in the Lebanese newspaper al-
Shiraa (FBIS 1986c) that exposed the U.S. mission to Tehran the previous May.  While not entirely 
accurate, it also provided a rare and unauthorized glimpse into the murky world of factional infighting in 
Iran.  Ayatollah Montazeri (FBIS 1986d), who had been widely seen as Khomeini's designated successor, 
made a public statement referring to the matter that embarrassed Khomeini.  The ensuing scandal 
(Amanat 2017, 860) led to the execution of the story's sponsor and eventually to Montazeri's political 
demise.  Not only did the incident politically damage everybody involved on the Iranian side, but secrecy 
unraveled within the U.S., as well.  As scrutiny increased, it became apparent that, not only had the 
Iranians been stringing U.S. negotiators along with no accountability (United States. Congress… 1987, 
168-170), but North had illegally diverted the proceeds of weapon sales (Walsh and U.S. 1994, 1-10, 21-
24, 71) to Iran to support the Contra rebels.  This led to months of dramatic investigations and 
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Congressional hearings that could potentially have led to Reagan's impeachment, had not North very 
publicly perjured himself (the opinion of most) to obscure the president's culpability.   
For both the U.S. and Iran, the key institutional innovation presented by the Iran-Contra episode 
was the new layer of scandal, and this layer was larger than the sum of its parts.  On the U.S. side, 
Pollack (2004, 216) and Crist (2012, 203-205) pointed out that Reagan's double-dealing created a 
massive credibility gap with the Gulf partners the U.S. had been courting since 1979.  Further, while Iraq 
would still accept U.S. help (Gibson 2010, 179), the relationship became more militarized and 
transactional.  The U.S. lost most of its diplomatic clout with Saddam Hussein.  Another result was that 
Reagan was forced to publicly get tough on Iran, foreclosing any future cooperation, and this change 
became apparent during the end of his administration as the U.S. engaged in open naval combat against 
Iran.   
Beyond issues of credibility, the Iran-Contra scandal tainted the entire concept of engagement 
with Iran.  The story might have been different if Iran had actually secured the release of more hostages, 
but Reagan was played for a fool on the world stage, and Iran showed that it could not be trusted.  
Openings toward Iran became a political third rail for U.S. politicians.  As coming years would show, even 
when they made sense from a geopolitical standpoint, they were not worth the risk for political leaders.  
Tough talk against Iran, on the other hand, would always sell.  Ironically, the actual crimes of the Iran-
Contra Affair related more to support for the Contras and financial malfeasance, yet it was the U.S.-
Iranian relationship that would be haunted by the legacy of this scandal for years to come.  
In Iran, the scandal layer deeply intertwined with the domestic politics layer.  Khomeini himself 
had personally fostered the radical, reactionary elements that undermined his own efforts to support 
Rafsanjani in a pragmatic opening to the West.  In doing so, he effectively tied his own hands.  Like 
Reagan, he was forced to defend his credibility by doubling down on tough action and policies against 
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America.  Amanat (2017, 860) argued that this contributed to some of the more extreme decisions at 
the end of his life, including the February 1989 fatwa for the death of Salman Rushdie.  Speaker 
Rafsanjani was a much savvier political actor, deflecting blame (FBIS 1986b) and distancing himself from 
the effort, all while leaving a door open for future engagement.  As future president, Rafsanjani would 
attempt a general thaw in relations with the West, but his hardline rivals would always be able to accuse 
him of hypocrisy.  In a similar fashion to U.S. politics, engagement with the U.S. became a toxic subject.  
Absolving themselves of responsibility for the scandal, Iranian leaders added a new twist to their 
narrative concerning the U.S.  They claimed that the U.S., operating from a position of weakness, had 
attempted to entice Iran into a dubious rapprochement deal.  Iran had exposed their duplicity and 
rebuffed the offer.  Until the U.S. accomplished some impossible gesture of "good faith" and contrition, 
it could never be trusted…  Iran's narrative could neatly accommodate any manner of real or perceived 
wrongs by the U.S. 
Finally, another piece of displacement and conversion took final form as the public scandal of 
Iran-Contra unfolded.  Crist (2012, 201) observed that, "In truth, the arms-to-Iran initiative continued a 
five-year-long strategy, one deeply rooted in Cold War fears of revolution Iran falling under the Soviet 
sphere." However, by the time the Iran-Contra investigations concluded in 1987, U.S. officials no longer 
thought of Iran in terms of the Soviet threat.  Iran was a menace in its own rite.  Perhaps this was 
inevitable as Mikhail Gorbachev took the helm of the U.S.S.R. in 1985, quickly introducing the concepts 
of glasnost and perestroika.  Certainly, the Soviet Union appeared less menacing, but even still, nobody 
predicted the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 or the subsequent dissolution of the U.S.S.R.  It might have 
been expected that, stripped of its Cold War utility, Iran would be seen in a different light.  Animosity, 
however, was not a foregone conclusion.  The Iran-Contra Affair helped insure that as fears of the Soviet 
Union subsided, they would be redirected squarely to a new regional adversary, Iran.   
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The events surrounding the Iran-Contra Affair did much to help institutionalize the conflict 
between the U.S. and Iran.  Iran’s complicity in hostage taking entrenched patterns of action on the 
Iranian side and perceptions within the U.S.  The scandals that ensued after the U.S. and the Islamic 
Republic made their first attempt at engagement led to political polarization on both sides.  Gone were 
the days when pragmatists in either camp could afford to advocate rapprochement.  An institution of 
animosity was taking shape, but it did not yet have a clearly defined address.  These developments laid 
the groundwork for constituencies to take hold on both sides and provide the missing ingredient for 
intractable conflict.   
 
Tanker War 
Another facet of the Iran-Iraq War involved attacks on shipping in the Persian Gulf.  Both sides 
conducted attacks throughout the war (Glenn and U.S. 1987, 8-9) (Gamlen and Rogers 1993, 125), but 
the preponderance were perpetrated by Iraq.  Iran found itself disadvantaged in this arena.  First 
(Johnson 2011, 139-141, 145) (Pollack 2004, 224), Iraq primarily used aircraft to attack ships, and it 
benefitted from the tacit support of its Gulf Arab neighbors who allowed overflight of their airspace, 
whereas Iran's air capabilities deteriorated throughout the war; it relied on a rag-tag navy to interdict 
shipping.  Second, Iran transported most of its oil by its own flagged carriers, making its ships legitimate 
targets under international conventions.  Third-party nations trafficked Iraqi oil, so even though Iran 
conducted fewer overall attacks, its accosted nominally neutral parties and drew widespread 
condemnation.   
For most of the war, attacks in the Persian Gulf drew little more than verbal condemnation from 
the international community, even as they increased.  There were several reasons, but chief among 
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them, the price of oil (Johnson 2011, 140) remained unaffected.  Beyond this, tankers are difficult to sink 
and were rarely sent to the bottom (Glenn and U.S. 1987, 8-9), and Iraq (Library of Congress 1984, 12-
14) inadvertently absorbed most of the risk premiums associated with its own actions.  This situation 
changed after Iran captured the Fao Peninsula in 1986 (Gamlen and Rogers 1993, 125-127) within 
missile range of Kuwait City.  Kuwaiti tankers (Johnson 2011, 147-148) previously absorbed only a small 
fraction of Iran's attacks, but seeking superpower patronage against the expanded Iranian threat, Kuwait 
requested that the U.S. reflag and escort its tankers in the Persian Gulf.   
The U.S. reacted coolly at first to Kuwait's request (Pollack 2004), having little to gain for putting 
U.S. ships at risk.  Kuwait then forced Reagan's hand by making the same request of the Soviets, who 
accepted and conducted a number of reflagging operations.  This rapidly changed U.S. calculus, and the 
Reagan administration scrambled to become Kuwait's leading patron.  However, before ascribing Cold 
War motives as the chief impetus for U.S. involvement, it should be considered that the Soviets were on 
their heels in Afghanistan and Gorbachev's leadership was making the Soviet Union far less menacing.  
Freedman (2008, 196-197) pointed out that some U.S. officials even advocated cooperating with the 
Soviets in Persian Gulf security.  More importantly, this drama played out in the throes of the Iran-
Contra scandal.  As Gamlen and Rogers (1993, 131-133) deduced, the enthusiasm with which Reagan's 
administration latched onto the mission almost certainly suggests that they jumped at the opportunity 
to assert U.S. dominance in the region vis-a-vis Iran and reestablish credibility with the Gulf Arab States.  
Nevertheless, while the U.S. increased its Persian Gulf presence, it apparently did not expect open 
confrontation.   
Iran had a far different perspective, viewing Persian Gulf disputes as family matters.  Its leaders 
excoriated Kuwait for the "evil act" (FBIS 1987_JUL 27) of bringing superpowers into the conflict and 
threatened the country (Ward 2009, 283) by deploying a Silkworm battery to the Fao Peninsula.  In 
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Iran's halls of power, a familiar struggle continued (Crist 2012, 241-242).  The IRGC strongly advocated 
open warfare with the U.S. Navy.  Rafsanjani recognized the counter-productive nature of such an 
approach, but unable to fully stem the influence of the radicals, he sold Khomeini on an asymmetric 
strategy that gave Iran some plausible deniability, using naval mines.  Ironically, it was not Iran but Iraq 
that struck the first blow in the "Tanker War" between the U.S. and Iran.  In a confluence of tragic errors 
(Wilson 1987) (Zatarain 2008, 7-25, 37-54) (Wise 2013, 14-51), an Iraqi aircraft seeking Iranian tankers in 
May 1987 targeted the U.S.S. Bridgeton with an anti-ship missile, killing 37 sailors and wounding 21.  
Iranian leaders gloated over the tragedy (FBIS 1987_May 18), predicting the U.S. would be driven out of 
the Gulf as they had been from Lebanon, and fed conspiracy theories (FBIS 1987_May 20) regarding 
responsibility.  The incident served as a wakeup call to the U.S. Navy but also an inflection point for the 
Reagan administration (Freedman 2008, 201-203).  Facing increased pressure over its Persian Gulf 
policy, Reagan was forced to double down.  Iran, not Iraq, would take the heat for the U.S.S. Stark 
incident. 
The details of the Tanker War between the U.S. and Iran are well covered by Zatarain (2008) but 
beyond the scope of this dissertation.  This section will provide a short overview in order to discuss the 
institutional aspects.  The Iranians employed mines (Zatarain 2008, 63-74)(Wise 2013, 52-73) against the 
first U.S. escort convoy in July 1997, denying responsibility (FBIS 1987_JUL 24) but crediting "invisible 
hands" for exposing U.S. vulnerability and damaging its credibility in the region.  In the ensuing months, 
Iran conducted a series of provocative naval maneuvers, along with missile attacks against Kuwaiti 
facilities and neutral shipping.  The U.S. quickly built up its own naval forces in the region, even 
repurposing an oil exploration barge as a mobile base, and it deployed Special Operations troops and 
helicopters.  The U.S. (Wise 2013, 92-116) (Zatarain 2008, 101-124) very publicly captured and 
destroyed an Iranian frigate caught in the act of mining, and it attacked Iranian oil platforms used as 
military bases.  The climax came in April 1988 (Cushman 1988), after the U.S.S. Roberts struck a mine 
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and nearly sank.  In response, the U.S. conducted Operation Praying Mantis (Johnson 2011, 173-174) 
(Zatarain 2008, 205-221) (Wise 2013, 188-218), which ultimately destroyed three Iranian naval 
platforms, sank an Iranian frigate and several smaller vessels, and severely damaged a second frigate.  
This significantly reduced Iran's naval power in a single day, coincident (Ward 2009, 283) with Iraq's 
successful push to drive the Iranians from the Fao Peninsula.   
The IRGC did not give up, though, and they continued (Johnson 2011, 175) (Zatarain 2008, 379-
382) their provocations and attacks on shipping until July 1988.  On July 3, 1988, the U.S.S. Vincennes 
conducted an aggressive patrol against Iranian fast boats, and in the resulting confusion, mistook the 
commercial flight Iran Air 655 for a hostile aircraft.  The Vincennes destroyed the aircraft, killing all 280 
civilians on board.  The Reagan administration (Gibson 2010, 221-222) (Zatarain 2008, 311-328) (Wise 
2013, 219-232) and the U.S. Navy admitted that this was a tragic accident but largely blamed Iran for 
creating the conditions conducive to mistakes.  Based upon initial reports, most which turned out to be 
wrong, the U.S. population viewed Iran as more to blame than the U.S. Navy.  Public sentiment against 
Iran had also hardened Americans to the human cost of this tragedy.  The ensuing "Fogarty Report" (U.S. 
Department of Defense 1988) generated years of controversy for the U.S. Navy, but little of this 
discussion suggested contrition toward Iran.  Iranian leaders expressed all the outrage demanded by 
such an occasion, but when they (Gibson 2010, 221-222) sent a delegation to speak at the U.N., it found 
little international sympathy and was instead bombarded by demands to accept U.N.S.C.R 598 and end 
the war.  Depleted and diplomatically isolated (Wise 2013, 233-234) (Johnson 2011, 176), Iran withdrew 
its final forces from Iraqi territory on July 14, 1988.  It requested a ceasefire on July 17. 
The Tanker War clearly added layers to the conflict between the U.S. and Iran.  On the U.S. side, 
America had been building a significant security architecture of regional partnerships and agreements, 
but its credibility was damaged by the Iran-Contra scandal.  This layer compelled Reagan to assert U.S. 
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dominance in the region.  Prior to this episode, the U.S. did not have a regular presence in the Persian 
Gulf, keeping its naval forces outside the relatively confining waters of the Gulf.  After the Tanker War, 
the U.S. maintained a near permanent presence for the entire duration under study.  The U.S. and Iran 
had become neighbors, a trend that would grow in coming decades, and a significant new layer to the 
relationship.  Naval brinksmanship was another layer that rose from this development.  Challenged by 
the U.S. presence (Nadimi 2020, 43-44), Iran consistently disputed the right of U.S. forces to patrol the 
Gulf and declared themselves the rightful guarantors of Gulf security.  Iranian fast boats would provoke 
U.S. naval vessels so frequently in coming decades that incidents simply ceased to make the news. 
Layering from the Tanker war occurred even more thickly on the Iranian side.  First, the Iranians 
again demonstrated the predilection toward radicalism and initiative that had manifested itself in the 
embassy hostage crisis, Lebanon, and the domestic political infighting surrounding the arms-for-
hostages deal.  Per Crist (2012, 244-245), after Khomeini's council decided to proceed with a mining 
operation against the first U.S. convoy (turning down the frontal assault recommended by the IRGC), 
Khomeini himself had to intervene to reign in Guard  Commander Mohsen Rezai, who personally 
authorized a boat strike against the convoy in contravention of the council decision.  One could view this 
as mere insubordination, but Khomeini had fostered a climate which encouraged subordinates to pursue 
contradictory policies, only intervening when he thought necessary.  Throughout the approximately 12 
months of naval conflict, Iran continued to press its attacks and provocations, even at times to the point 
of futility.  It is difficult to ascertain how much of this derived from centrally directed strategy and how 
much was driven by the personalities of individual commanders.  This belligerence fed the U.S. narrative 
that Iran was irrational, and it called into question the utility of trying to negotiate with Iran about 
anything, especially if nobody appeared to be in control.   
159 
 
Perhaps the strongest layer on the Iranian side was that of grievances.  Iran had already 
amassed a lengthy list of grievances (real and imagined) against the U.S. before the Tanker War, but this 
added more.  First, the Iranians saw themselves as unfairly persecuted by the international community 
for targeting neutral shipping.  They believed (with some validity) that the Gulf Arab states were siding 
with Iran, and because they claimed the Persian Gulf as their territory, they believed they had the right 
to retaliate for Iraqi attacks on its own shipping by targeting the interests of those states.  Second, as 
previously mentioned, they viewed direct intervention by the U.S. in Persian Gulf matters as meddling in 
their sphere of influence.  This is why Iranian leaders were so incensed at Kuwait for asking for U.S. help.  
The fact that the U.S. Navy established a continual presence along the Iranian coastline afterward only 
exacerbated this grievance.  Most importantly, the shootdown of Iran Air 655 was an unforgivable sin 
for many Iranians, still commemorated today, much the way the U.S. remembers the Marine barracks 
bombing in Lebanon.  It is telling that Iran's accidental shootdown of a Ukrainian passenger jet on 
January 8, 2020 (Zraick 2020), while out of the scope of this dissertation, drew so many parallels for 
both American and Iranian observers.  In spite of otherwise heated U.S. rhetoric, there was little that the 
Trump administration could say in response to Iran's mistake, considering Iran Air 655.   
 For most military historians, the tanker war between the U.S. and Iran amounted to little more 
than a skirmish.  Casualties were low (from a comparative standpoint), and posturing aside, direct 
combat was limited.  The campaign garnered press coverage in the moment but was quickly overtaken 
by other events.  However, the framework by which this action would be evaluated by the U.S. and 
Iranian publics had been set by previous events.  Instead of being forgotten as militarily insignificant, the 
memories were subsumed into the larger picture of a conflict that now appeared less like an anomaly 
and more like a natural state of affairs.  As the Cold War entered its final days, both the U.S. and Iran 
were now building their worlds around this new conflict between each other.     
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Death of Khomeini 
The death of Ayatollah Khomeini was an inflection point in the history of Iran.  Khomeini both 
represented and largely embodied the regime that he established, and given the power he amassed to 
his own position, his successor was poised to gain considerable latitude in determining the future 
direction of Iran.  Before he died however, Khomeini made two significant decisions that would have 
lasting institutional consequences for the U.S.-Iranian relationship.  First, on February 14, 1989 he 
proclaimed his infamous fatwa condemning author Salman Rushdie to death for writing the book 
Satanic Verses, adding a new and unsavory layer to the U.S.-Iranian relationship.  Second, Khomeini 
formally dismissed his designated heir, Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri, on March 26.  Both of these 
decisions were intrinsically linked, and Iran’s domestic politics layer weighed again on the U.S.-Iranian 
conflict.    
Ayatollah Montazeri manifested himself as the logical choice of successor to Khomeini from the 
early days of the Revolution.  He was one of few individuals with the religious qualifications for the 
position (Akhavi 2008, 645-650).  Unlike some Shiite jurists in 1979, he openly supported Khomeini's 
concept of valayat-e faqih, even chairing the original Assembly of Experts which helped enshrine it in 
the Iranian constitution.  But Montazeri's vision for the role of the faqih had always been more limited 
than Khomeini's, and his writings and speeches suggest that it narrowed over time.  Like Khomeini, 
Montazeri was radical in advocating the politicization of Islam and the export of the revolution, but 
unlike the Supreme Leader, he was passionate about social justice and protecting people.  In 1984 
(Abrahamian 1999, Chapter 3) for instance, he openly challenged the regime's treatment of political 
prisoners, taking over the prisons for a period and instituting some reforms.  Thus, while both railed 
against the West, Montazeri's animus arose from a different place.  At several points through the early 
years of the Islamic Republic, Montazeri raised a dissenting voice and subtly challenged Khomeini.  This 
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spilled into the open after the revelations surrounding the Iran-Contra Affair, leading to an open rift and 
the execution of his lieutenant, Hashemi.   
In July 1988 (Office of Imam Khomeini 1989), the MEK (the Marxist-Islamist militant group that 
challenged Khomeini unsuccessfully in 1981) conducted a brief but bloody offensive from Iraq into 
Iranian territory, and Iran decisively defeated its forces.  In the aftermath of the operation (FBIS 
1989_Mar 31), Khomeini approved a mass purge of thousands of political prisoners, many associated 
with the MEK, but including others, as well.  Montazeri publicly called attention to this act and 
challenged Khomeini, leading to the release of several hundred prisoners that might otherwise have 
faced execution.  Multiple factors likely contributed to Khomeini's endorsement of genocide, not the 
least of which was his own personal ire against the MEK, but there is another important factor to 
consider.  For most, the 1979 revolution was not originally about establishing valayat-e faqih.  The 
binding force among the people was the legacy (deserved or not) of oppression by the Shah.  Most of 
the Islamic Republic's first leaders drew legitimacy from their credentials as prisoners of the former 
SAVAK.   
Khomeini's regime, however, had proven more brutal and repressive than the former Shah, 
arresting political prisoners in waves (supporters of the Shah, then the MEK, then the Tudeh Party), 
along with anybody else deemed threatening to the government.  Some were killed, the regime going to 
great lengths to erase their existence, but many more were held for years in appalling conditions and 
tortured.  For a time, the strategy of the regime was (like the Shah before) to discredit its adversaries by 
forcing them to make public recantations, but soon these events became a source of embarrassment, 
only drawing attention to the regime's harsh methods.  As the Iran-Iraq War drew to a close, these 
political prisoners became a liability.  It would now be more difficult to hide them from public scrutiny, 
but if they were released, their stories would testify to the hypocrisy of the Islamic Republic.  The MEK 
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offensive in late July provided an only-to-convenient excuse to solve this problem by murder.  
Therefore, when Montazeri took his stand, he was not only challenging Khomeini on a specific point, he 
was airing the regime's dirty laundry and undermining the very legitimacy of the Islamic Republic.   
On February 12, 1988 (FBIS 1989_Feb 13), in a ceremony marking the 10th anniversary of the 
Islamic Republic, Montazeri made a series of critical remarks regarding the direction the revolution and 
called on Iranians to admit mistakes and help curb its excesses, which would also help mend its 
relationship with the outside world.  Khomeini was incensed (FBIS 1989_) and two days later, he issued 
his fatwa against Salman Rushdie - one of the most apparently arbitrary acts of his tenure.  A number of 
authors, such as Edelman and Takeyh (2018, 109), have diagnosed this move as Khomeini's final attempt 
to radicalize his own population and secure his legacy.  Controversy over the fatwa polarized the Muslim 
world and drew a sharp contrast between Islam and the West, painting Khomeini as the champion of 
Islam and making life uncomfortable for moderates of all stripes.  Most authors, however, fail to 
connect the fatwa to the internal power struggle taking place within Iran. 
The Rushdie fatwa was more than just a shot across the bow to an errant protégé.  Given the 
factional rivalry that raged behind the scenes (Wright 1987) (Milani, Abbas 2010) (Ehteshami 1991, 148-
149) for the first 10 years of the Islamic Republic, especially between Rafsanjani's pragmatists and 
Montazeri's radical followers, Khomeini's imminent demise can only have intensified the competition.  
Montazeri (FBIS 1989_Feb 25), perhaps in an attempt to placate Khomeini, openly expressed support for 
the Rushdie fatwa, but it mattered little.  The die had been cast.  However, Khomeini must have known 
that dethroning his heir apparent meant handing an unqualified victory to the pragmatist camp.  
Throughout his tenure, Khomeini had exercised power by maintaining a balance between rival factions, 
and this final act would leave the equation unbalanced - in favor of the camp that he had generally 
favored least until that point.  This fatwa deliberately complicated Rafsanjani's efforts to normalize 
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Iran's relations with the outside world and provided other radicals a final boost to help them undermine 
his state-building efforts.  When Khomeini formally dismissed Montazeri in March 1989 (Khomeini 
1989b), his blistering letter lashed out against "liberals" as specific enemies of the Islamic Republic, 
perhaps as much a rebuke to the pragmatists as the erstwhile hardliners.   
The Salman Rushdie fatwa had enduring institutional consequences for the both the U.S. and 
Iran, adding a new layer which affected both for years to come.  Western countries were horrified, but 
apart from condemnation, there was little they could do.  Rushdie (Rushdie 2012), a famous author, 
began a personal odyssey of years in hiding under various levels of police protection, always fearing for 
his safety.   His apologies and entreaties fell on deaf ears while radicalized individuals threatened to 
carry out this fatwa.  Iranian leaders have since alternated between downplaying and reaffirming the 
fatwa, but it has never been rescinded.  Even if Khomeini's successor, Ali Khamenei, decided to 
countermand it, there is no guarantee that he would have had the clout (in the eyes of radical Islamists) 
to effectively do so.   
Khomeini's attempt to drive a symbolic wedge between Islam and the West could hardly have 
been more successful.  U.S. audiences needed little convincing that Khomeini (and hence Iranians in 
general) stood starkly opposed to both Western values and modern conceptions of human rights.  This 
directly fed narratives like Samuel Huntington's (1993) "The Clash of Civilizations?"  Another such voice, 
Rauch (2005), opined that the "war on terrorism" began with the fatwa against Salman Rushdie and the 
idea that Islamic leaders like Khomeini could impose Sharia law on the rest of the world through 
violence and intimidation.  He drew a direct line of descent from Khomeini to later Islamic radicals like 
Osama Bin Laden (ignoring the Sunni-Shia divide).  For Americans, who had experienced a taste of 
helplessness and insecurity at the hands of Iran through the hostage crises in both Tehran and Lebanon, 
Khomeini's fatwa brought these feelings one step closer to home.  In Iran, the factionalism that fuels 
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constituency development was stronger than ever, and in the U.S., the narratives and perceptions that 
made opposition to Iran a winning political position had taken root. 
  
Constituencies in the First Decade 
The first decade of conflict between the U.S. and Iran had a formative impact on all the 
constituencies that would later serve to perpetuate animosity over the course of 40 years.  
Constituencies, as repositories of institutional conflict, take time to develop.  Iran's clerical 
establishment and the IRGC manifested themselves much earlier than the others, but even still, the 
long-term role they would play was hardly set in stone.  The U.S. Congress and Israel, on the other hand, 
would not begin to behave as recognizable constituents until a decade later, but the forces shaping their 
role were actively at work throughout the 1980's.  CENTCOM occupied a middle ground between the 
two sides.  It developed the characteristics of a constituent in the 1980's, but its broad mission and 
competing priorities could have pulled it in other directions had events played differently in the 
following years.  This section will examine each constituency in turn.   
  
Clerical establishment 
The clerical establishment was arguably the first constituency to the U.S.-Iranian conflict.  
Khomeini made a deliberate choice to leverage the embassy takeover and hostage crisis for his own 
domestic political advantage, and his supporters followed suit.  This led to a spiral of competing 
radicalism and established a long-term trend in which anti-Americanism became the lowest common 
denominator for politicians - the safe option.  It also demonstrated the institutional process of 
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displacement and conversion, as Khomeini replaced the Shah with a new threat to rally his countrymen 
against.  This played into the Iran-Iraq War and Iran's involvement in Lebanon, both of which 
strengthened Khomeini's grip on power.  After defeating the secular nationalists, the MEK, and Iran's 
Tudeh Party within the country, the IRP swept the 1984 parliament elections (Farhi 2015), ensuring firm 
clerical control of all aspects of the Iranian government.  However, moving to a single-party system did 
not unite Khomeini's supporters; it only exacerbated factional divides.  It also built a false sense of 
support for the Iran-Iraq War because dissenting voices had been removed.  Additionally, while Iran's 
war against the world had been a boon to the IRP, the pressures and privations wrought by the war with 
Iraq were taking their toll.  International isolation was not good for Iran, as a whole. 
Speaker of Parliament Rafsanjani was the most prominent politician in Iran to recognize this 
fact.  Rafsanjani (FBIS 1986b) lectured the U.S. rhetorically at every opportunity, apparently hewing to 
the party line of the IRP, but his speeches almost always kept a door open for some kind of 
improvement in relations.  This was a form of deliberate ambiguity that Iranians (always subject to 
censorship and reprisals) read far more significance into than did Western audiences.  He was also 
known for providing eloquent rationalizations or apologetics for the regime's hardline positions, making 
concepts like "export of the revolution" (FBIS 1984_Oct 31) sound less threatening to Western 
audiences.  Over the course of his career (Wright 2017), Rafsanjani developed a reputation at home and 
abroad as a consummate politician and master manipulator.  Rafsanjani's reputation as a pragmatist 
came not from any affinity toward the U.S., but because, like mafia bosses in popular crime movies who 
claim to deplore violence because it is "bad for business," he generally viewed the export of the 
revolution and ideological antagonism against the West as counterproductive for Iran.  This put him at 
odds with the hardline ideological element of the clerical establishment, which came to be led by 
Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, who was once expected to replace Khomeini after his death.   
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One small example illustrates, first Rafsanjani's pragmatism, but also the depth to which conflict 
with the U.S. had been institutionalized by the middle of the decade.  Rafsanjani (2007, 173) 
(Mohammadi 2013) published a short, somewhat cryptic passage in his 2007 memoir which suggested 
that he went to Khomeini in 1984 and advocated dropping the rhetorical practice of shouting "Death 
to…," specific enemies of the regime, especially America.  Khomeini agreed, pending an “opportunity” to 
do so.  A brief exchange in Parliament then echoed this decision for the public record.  The Iranian press 
ignored the exchange and published nothing about it.  Instead, the international headlines in Iran’s 
conservative-dominated newspapers that week offered a fabricated story (FBIS 1984a) (Ettelaat 1984, 
Jul 4) about the U.S. supplying chemical weapons to Iraq, a "historic announcement" (Jomhouri Eslami 
1984b) by Ayatollah Khomeini that blamed the U.S. for Iran’s economic woes, and a laundry list of other 
threats and accusations levied toward the U.S.4 Tellingly, even in 2007 (Tait, 2007), Rafsanjani’s 
revelation drew a storm of controversy from the hardline press (specifically Kayhan newspaper) which 
accused Rafsanjani of deliberately distorting Khomeini's views. 
What this story shows is that, regardless of Khomeini’s actual views (or even the veracity of the 
story), the “opportunity” to adjust course was never to be.  Khomeini had made himself a captive to his 
own hardline rhetoric, and the radical supporters that he personally fostered were not about to allow an 
opening for the Iranian government to walk back its narrative.  Rafsanjani continued to push 
pragmatism at various points, intervening (Crist 2012, 155) to resolve the TWA 727 hijacking when 
Hezbollah embarrassed Iran on the international stage, and creating the impetus for Iran’s participation 
in the arms-for-hostages (Iran-Contra) debacle.  However, Rafsanjani’s pragmatism only thinly veiled his 
political cunning and ambition.  It was little accident that the fallout from the arms-for-hostages dealing 
 
4 Additional stories (Ettelaat 1984d) (Jomhouri Eslami 1984c) linked the U.S. to Iraq's war effort, fostered conspiracies about 
U.S. designs for the region (Ettelaat 1984a) (Jomhouri Eslami (1984a), and conveyed threats from Iran's top naval commander 
(Ettelaat 1984b) that Iran would not tolerate transgressions by the U.S. in the Persian Gulf. 
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damaged his rival, Montazeri (whom Khomeini publicly chastened) (Amanat 2017, 860).  Rafsanjani 
continued to strengthen his political position throughout the second half of the decade, as Khomeini 
dissolved the IRP (Fairbanks 1998, 21), ensuring that it could not develop a base of power rival to his 
own.  In 1989, Rafsanjani (Wright 2000, 21) (Wright 2017) (Milani 1994, 222-225, 228-229) helped to 
engineer the elimination of the position of Prime Minister, and he orchestrated his own rise to the 
presidency while positioning his more malleable partner, Ali Khamenei to succeed Khomeini as Supreme 
Leader.    
Had Rafsanjani's blatant power grab afforded him complete and unfettered control of Iran, the 
clerical establishment might have lost its relevance as a constituency to the U.S.-Iranian conflict with the 
passing of Khomeini.  This was not the case, though.  As Rafsanjani amassed power and prestige, Iran’s 
hardliners became even more reliant on radicalism as a tool to check his power.  Khomeini’s fatwa 
against Salman Rushdie, one of the last acts of his life, served this cause and gave Rafsanjani’s 
opponents ammunition.  Rafsanjani (Takeyh 2012, 56-57) (Hunter 1989, 138) at first attempted to 
distance himself from this edict but was ultimately compelled to openly support it, at the cost of any 
goodwill he might have garnered with the West.   
This pattern would continue after Khomeini's death, as the clerical establishment staked its own 
fortunes to a legacy of anti-Americanism.  The domestic politics layer was making it impossible for Iran 
to speak with a single voice, and Khomeini's (1989a, 14, 22, 45) last will and testament helped to 
perpetuate this state of affairs.  Mostly a fiery recap and defense of the doctrine he promoted in life, 
Khomeini emphasized two key themes.  One was resistance against the U.S., which was "by nature the 
master of international terrorism." This document preemptively undermined the legitimacy of any 
future leader attempting to negotiate with the "Great Satan." The other was disdain for proponents of 
liberalism in Iran (Khomeini labeled those advocating a separation between religion and the state as 
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"ignoramuses").  Though Iran’s founders may not have originally envisioned permanent hostility with 
the U.S., a path-dependent process ensured that by the end of the decade the clerical establishment 
had been codified as a constituent to the conflict. 
  
IRGC and clerical security forces 
If the clerical establishment was the first constituent to the U.S.-Iranian conflict, the IRGC (along 
with the other clerical security forces) was a close second.  Since its inception, the IRGC was a pillar of 
Khomeini's revolutionary ideology, and it embraced anti-Americanism and export of the revolution with 
exceptional fervor.  The IRGC confronted the U.S. directly (or by proxy) in Lebanon, Kuwait (its proxies 
bombed the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait City, among other targets in December 1983 (Gibson 2010, 112-113, 
125-126)), and over the waters of the Persian Gulf, adding institutional layers to the conflict in each 
campaign.  The Iran-Iraq War, however, was the defining event for the IRGC, and while the U.S. did not 
consider itself at war with Iran, the IRGC considered itself at war with the U.S. 
 The IRGC (Ostovar 2016, 64-75, 86-88) (Katzman 1993, 82, 89-91) began the Iran-Iraq war 
completely unprepared as a military organization, a hodgepodge of militias run by ideologues instead of 
professional soldiers.  By 1986, it had grown to 350,000 personnel (not including the larger Basij), and by 
the war's end, it had fully eclipsed the conventional military within Iran's power structure.  Over the 
course of the war, it amassed armor and artillery, along with developing modest naval and air (focused 
largely on missiles) branches, as well.  To build its power and prominence, it leaned heavily upon its 
comparative advantage in guerilla warfare and other unconventional tactics.  Perhaps more importantly, 
it also harnessed the power of ideology.  In order to propel its rise, the war had to be greater than the 
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“imposed war” against a neighboring state.  Khomeini couched the war in universalist terms, and the 
U.S. featured centrally in this Manichean narrative.   
Propaganda and education were central to the IRGC (and especially the Basij), and these would 
have ripple effects throughout society.  The IRGC (Katzman 1993, 82) initially developed an education 
program in response to the low level of education possessed by its recruits.  However, this provided an 
ideal platform for indoctrination.  The core ideology of the IRGC was the lynchpin of its cohesion, and 
this focused on creating the ideal Islamic warrior, "warriors of Karbala." This ideology quickly spawned a 
wide range of publications, followed by think tanks and libraries.  In the 1980's, the IRGC took its first 
steps toward becoming the central repository for the official narrative of the Islamic Republic.  There 
was no way that an organization that made its bones by opposing the U.S. could fail to help 
institutionalize the U.S-Iranian conflict, and the IRGC was perhaps the most natural of its constituents.  
A final point to consider, especially in light of the Tanker War with the U.S., was the value of the 
pyrrhic victory to the IRGC, an underappreciated layer of the conflict with the U.S.  From a U.S. 
perspective, the IRGC lost its naval campaign against the America in almost every category of evaluation.  
Yet the Iranians claimed victory, and this victory boosted the power and prestige of the IRGC.  Zatarain 
(2008, 87-88) argued that Iran's provocative "martyrdom" naval maneuvers in August 1987 were a 
"substitute for war, not a prelude to it."  Iran recognized its own weakness in the face of U.S. combat 
power and chose to wage a largely symbolic campaign of resistance.  This same logic of a "substitute for 
war" applied just as much to the brinksmanship of Iran's fast boat skirmishes, mine attacks, and isolated 
missile strikes.  The symbolism of these attacks fed Khomeini's narrative and bolstered the legitimacy of 
his ideology, which had been damaged by the Iran-Contra scandal.  It also played into Shiite traditions, 
which venerate the martyrdom of Hussein (Nasr 2006, 31-61), the son of the Imam Ali and grandson of 
Muhammad.  Khomeini's teachings innovatively translated the concept of martyrdom in the face of 
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injustice to the modern world.  The IRGC might have preferred a major victory against the U.S., but the 
mere fact that they faced their adversary without blinking, even while taking casualties, afforded them 
considerable honor in the eyes of the Iranian public.  The prestige they gained from this episode was 
one more building block in turning the IRGC into a political force of its own.   
Khomeini's (Khomeini 1989a, 14, 22, 45) last will and testament also addressed the IRGC.  While 
they were discouraged from participating in politics, they were simultaneously admonished to uphold 
the values of the revolution, providing a less than subtle writ to oppose or defy political leaders who 
compromised those values.  This dichotomy would play out over the next decade, because the IRGC 
would not content itself to simply return to its barracks following the Iran-Iraq War. 
  
CENTCOM and the U.S. national security establishment 
CENTCOM was born (starting as the RDJTF) at the beginning of the U.S. Iranian conflict.  While 
its original purpose was to counter Soviet designs on the Middle East, even defending Iran if necessary, 
by the end of the 1980's, it became the central pillar of U.S. plans to counter Iranian influence in the 
Middle East.  As outlined in the previous chapter, this started by building a regional security architecture 
based upon partnerships with Iran's hostile neighbors, a layer of the U.S.-Iranian conflict that shaped the 
course of events for decades to come.  In many ways, this layer helped make the U.S. tilt toward Iraq in 
the Iran-Iraq War inevitable, as these partners favored Iraq and feared Iran.  CENTCOM also involved 
itself indirectly in the war by providing intelligence to Iraq and conducting Operation Staunch, which 
prevented the shipment of weapons to Iran. 
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In 1985, when General George Crist assumed command of CENTCOM (Dawson 2010, 7) (Hines 
2000, 44-45), he began transitioning the organization away from its fixation on a Soviet attack of Iran.  
By 1987 (Woodward and Morgan 1987), even the U.S. public was questioning the validity of the 
assumptions that underpinned this fear.  In official statements (SASC 1986, 616-618), Crist still framed 
CENTCOM's mission entirely in a Cold War context, but in practice, the command was intent on 
projecting U.S. power into region.  To support this effort, Crist (Cordesman 1998) (Crist 2012, 169-172) 
pushed his own diplomatic offensive to build military-to-military ties throughout the Middle East.  When 
revelations surrounding the Iran-Contra Scandal damaged broader U.S. relations with Arab countries 
(Crist 2012, 206), CENTCOM officials quietly continued their liaisons with little interruption, fully 
accepted by their partners.  This likely fed both the growing influence of CENTCOM and the 
militarization of U.S. foreign policy in the region, as military channels supplanted diplomatic ones - 
another layer which would affect the U.S.-Iranian relationship. 
As fears of the Soviet Union receded, it was replaced by the Iranian threat, a new raison d'etre 
for CENTCOM fueled by the insecurities of America's regional clients.  This was a clear example of 
displacement and conversion at work, and this was accelerated by the Tanker War in 1987.  CENTCOM 
did not ask for Operation Ernest Will, the escort of Kuwaiti tankers, but the ensuing naval combat pitted 
the new American command directly against its regional adversary in battle.  Before this point, U.S. ships 
generally stayed out of the Persian Gulf.  Now, along with aircraft and limited ground forces, they were 
there to stay.  After the Iran-Iraq War, Crist's successor (Crist 2012, 372), General Norman Schwarzkopf, 
resisted pressure to draw down U.S. forces in the region, and the U.S. Navy even continued escorting 
tanker ships until 1990.  The displacement and conversion of adversarial relationships from the Soviet 
Union to Iran was larger than CENTCOM itself, but the fledgling command became America's main effort 
against one of America’s chief adversaries.  CENTCOM's activities during the 1980's added layers to the 
U.S.-Iranian conflict because they fostered a new set of allies, interests, and obligations.   
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Additionally, CENTCOM was not the only member of the national security establishment 
engaged against Iran in the 1980's.  Ronald Reagan (Crist 2012, 69-82) directed the development of a 
considerable intelligence effort pointed at Iran, and both the CIA and the Pentagon tasked secret units 
to penetrate and undermine the Iranian government and military.  This included covert action designed 
to promote moderate factions within Iran, and it also included reconnaissance for potential military 
action, but Reagan stopped short of actively fomenting a counter-revolution.  These operations fell 
outside the immediate responsibility of CENTCOM, but they furthered the institutionalization of the 
conflict with Iran, and as CENTCOM grew in influence, more of these sensitive programs came under its 
purview.  One of the long-term institutional results of the Operation Eagle Claw failure in 1980 (Cogan 
2003, 216) was that it eventually led to the Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization 
Act of 1986.  This act removed the military service chiefs from the chain of command and greatly 
empowered the regional combatant commanders, including within CENTCOM.  It also established 
Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC's) which consolidated control (or at least coordination) of 
all special operations and activities for a region under the combatant commander.  Indirectly, through 
the hostage crisis and America's failed response, Iran helped create the conditions for the rise of 
CENTCOM three years before it was even established.  Whether CENTCOM was a full-fledged 
constituent by the end of the decade is debatable, but it was certainly poised to become so.   
  
The state of Israel 
Israel was not yet a constituent to the U.S.-Iranian conflict in the 1980, still clinging to its 
doctrine of the periphery (the strategy of balancing against hostile Arab neighbors by building 
relationships with countries just outside the Arab world).  Changes that took place over the course of 
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the decade, however, set the stage for Israel to become one of the most influential constituents within 
the conflict by the early 1990's. 
With the onset of the Iran-Iraq War (Parsi 2007, 94,105), Israel immediately and openly sided 
with Iran, fearing any gains by its own adversary, Iraq.  Three days after the invasion, in the midst of the 
hostage crisis, Menachem Begin (rather callously) called for the Carter administration to put aside its 
differences with Iran and support Iraq.  In November 1980, Begin again declared his intention to support 
Iran, and although Carter did not budge in his enforcement of the embargo, Reagan later proved more 
pliable, turning a blind eye to Israeli weapon sales.  By the end of 1981 (Samaan 2018, 74 - 77), U.S. 
intelligence estimated that Iran had sold at least $28 million in military equipment to Iran.  Also (Parsi 
2007, 107), the Israelis collaborated with Iran in a June 1981 air attack that destroyed Saddam Hussein's 
nuclear reactor at Osirak.  The Iranians provided intelligence regarding the facility, as well as advice from 
their previous, unsuccessful attempt, and they agreed to overflight and landing rights if needed.   
This pattern continued through much of the war (Axworthy 2013, 207-209), and by 1983, Israel 
had sold an estimated $500 million in arms to Iran.  Israel also provided technical assistance in helping 
Iran fabricate its own military spare parts, and Israeli operatives are known to have travelled to Iran as 
late as 1985.  As previously discussed, Israel played a prominent role in instigating Reagan's ill-fated 
arm-for-hostages deal with Iran, and Israeli officials (Draper 1991, 151-154) were largely responsible for 
seeding the mythology of a "moderate" faction in Iran.  Tellingly, although Israel (Parsi 2007, 125) did its 
own damage control in the wake of the scandal, Prime Minister Shamir still refused to stop arms 
transfers to Iran, claiming that these were an American idea to begin with.  He also urged Reagan to 
continue building relations with Iran. 
By 1987 (Alpher 1989, 159-164), Israelis were finally questioning the periphery doctrine.  Israeli 
leaders stood firm through the Iran-Contra Scandal, but the public revelations brought a wave of 
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veterans and Iranian experts from within the national security establishment that began to openly 
question the underlying assumptions of the doctrine, subjecting it to public scrutiny and debate for the 
first time.  Iran's support for Hezbollah's attacks in Lebanon was increasingly difficult to passively accept.  
Additionally, the Palestinian uprising in 1987, instead of uniting Arab opposition against Israel as it had 
in the past, drew muted support and suggestions that both sides should peacefully coexist.  The Arab 
threat now looked less potent.  Perhaps just as importantly, the U.S. had broken its neutrality in the 
Iran-Iraq War and was conducting combat actions against Iran in the Persian Gulf (Tanker War).  It was 
problematic for Israel to openly side against its most valuable patron.  Besides, America's growing 
regional power and budding alliances with the Arab Gulf States suggested ample opportunity for 
bandwagoning.  All this said, the periphery doctrine was down but not out.  Interestingly, even after 
Israel turned decisively against Iran in the 1990's, some authors (Alpher 2015, 105-123) (Samaan 2019) 
continued to cast about for new applications of the concept (highlighting the durability of institutions). 
Why did the Israelis cling for so long to a dying doctrine during the 1980's?  Some authors (such 
as Parsi 2007, 103) have pointed out that, despite its rhetoric, Iranian action against Israel was 
restrained in the 1980's.  Besides, even in the halcyon days of the alliance with the Shah, Israel had 
endured Iran’s open disavowal of the relationship.  Khomeini's cooperation with Israel, however, proved 
transactional at best, and the relationship was more lopsided than ever.  Parsi (2007, 108) also pointed 
out that Israel attempted to manipulate Iran into becoming dependent on the relationship, but again, 
Iran proved more of an anchor than an asset.  Alpher (2015, 80-85) argued that Israel suffered during 
the 1980's from "periphery nostalgia" which blinded them to the fundamental change which had taken 
place in Iran itself.  During the arms-for-hostages episode, Israeli leaders were convinced that there 
were moderate elements in Iran who would inevitably triumph over Khomeini's radicals, and Alpher 
pointed out that even decades later, some Israeli leaders continued to believe exactly the same thing 
(underpinning their case for promoting regime change).   
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Ram (2009, 52-62) suggested that there was a deep psychological underpinning to Israel's 
attachment to Iran.  The Israelis viewed themselves as vanguards of the Western modernization project 
in the Middle East.  While more advanced than Iran, they viewed the Shah's quest for Western-style 
modernization and willingness to partner with Israel as a validation of the Israeli project.  Much like 
Francis Fukuyama viewed liberalism as the "end of history" in the 1990's the Israelis viewed the 
modernization of the Middle East as fait accompli.  Therefore, Khomeini's Islamist regime could only be 
seen as atavistic, a knee-jerk reaction against modernization that was doomed to fail.  While Ram does 
not go this far, his description provides a compelling explanation for the pervasive belief that a 
moderate element that would ultimately triumph in Iran.   
All of these explanations are consistent with the institutionalization of the periphery doctrine.  
However, by the end of the decade, this doctrine experienced the institutional mechanism of 
exhaustion.  It had lost its utility and self-regenerating force.  It was not dead yet, but it was ground to a 
rump.  It was also fully ripe for the process of displacement and conversion to repurpose what remained.  
This would take place during the following decade, turning Iran into an enemy and making Israel one of 
the key constituencies in the U.S.-Iranian rivalry 
 
U.S. Congress 
Congress was not a full-fledged constituent to the U.S.-Iranian conflict during the 1980's.  
However, it was not entirely absent from the equation, and the events of the decade helped position it 
to make this jump in the 1990's.  One example that foreshadowed the role congress would later play in 
stoking the conflict occurred in May 1979, after the fall of the Shah but before the hostage crisis.  
Republican Senator Jacob Javits (Kifner 1979) sponsored a bill, approved by the Senate, which 
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condemned Iran for its execution of some of the former Shah's leading officials and labelled the leaders 
of Iran's revolutionary courts as human rights observers.  The move drew a furious reaction from many 
of Iran's emerging leaders, especially Ayatollah Khomeini, who labelled the U.S. as a "defeated and 
wounded snake."  Iranian leaders delayed their acceptance of the newly appointed U.S. ambassador to 
Tehran over the issue.  James Bill (1988, 284) pointed out that this act undermined the Carter 
administration's efforts to foster ties with the new government by increasing the pressure faced by 
secular nationalist leaders fighting for their political lives in Iran.  This controversy also spurred the 
Marxist Tudeh party (Milani 1994, 164), whose anti-American rhetoric would compete with Khomeini's 
in the coming months.  This was an early manifestation of the human rights layer of the U.S.-Iranian 
conflict that would appear in full force in the late 1990's, then again in 2009. 
Neither was it insignificant that Iran played an outsized role in derailing the reelection and 
presidential legacy of Jimmy Carter.  This is not quantifiable, but it certainly helped ensure that 
opposition to the Islamic Republic carried Democratic support, as well as Republican.  Partisan politics 
featured more prominently in other aspects, though.  Through the first half of the decade, Congressional 
Democrats served as a counterweight to Reagan's Middle East policy.  Largely inspired by the Israeli 
lobby, they mounted considerable resistance (Goshko 1981) (Associated Press 1981) to weapons sales 
across the Muslim world, especially to Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.  Congress, especially the Democrat-
controlled House of Representatives did not broadly share Reagan's vision for a new Middle East 
security architecture (even though it was Carter who first initiated the project).  Before ascribing too 
much of the credit to Israel, however, one should also note that Democrats successfully campaigned to 
tie Reagan's hands with respect to support for the Contra rebels in Nicaragua during the same period.  
Congress also resisted the U.S. "tilt" toward Iraq (Gibson 2010, 88, 150-151), admonishing Reagan for 
violating neutrality on multiple occasions, as early as 1982.  In 1985, they attempted to return Iraq to 
the official list of state sponsors of terrorism.   
177 
 
The Iran-Contra Affair was the watershed moment that turned this political infighting decisively 
against Iran.  The scandal unfolded just as the Democrats secured both houses of Congress in the 1986 
elections, and it provided the newly empowered Democratic leadership with their first opportunity for 
an offensive against the Reagan administration.  It may have been Reagan's support for the Contra 
rebels which most flagrantly violated U.S. laws and circumvented the authority of Congress, but it was 
the negotiations with Iran that offered political points to be scored.   
Paules (2003, 108-113) described how Congressional leaders used the hearings as a platform for 
censuring and embarrassing the Reagan administration for its attempt to engage with Iran.  The 
resulting narrative painted Iran as an irredeemably reactionary state that could not be negotiated with 
and would only exploit any openings it was afforded.  Thus, when an Iraqi aircraft attacked the U.S.S. 
Stark that Spring, and the same Democrats (Zatarain 2008, 54) lambasted the Reagan administration for 
its reckless Middle East policy, Reagan's smartest course of action was to increase pressure on Iran.  
Congressional leaders could hardly advocate backing down in the face of threats and taunting from the 
same Iranian leaders they had just demonized.  Naval operations in the Tanker War over the next year 
faced little opposition from Congress, and the establishment of a near-permanent U.S. presence in the 
Persian Gulf became a fait accompli.  In the next decade, Congress would become a staunch advocate of 
U.S. military power in Middle East and a key constituent to the U.S. conflict with Iran.   
  
Conclusion 
The first decade of the U.S.-Iranian conflict is a story about events that drove institutional 
processes.  It was never preordained that hostility between these two states should last for 40 years, 
with no end in sight.  On the Iranian side, however, tactical decisions made for the expedience of the 
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moment altered the game in stepwise fashion, building momentum and weighing on future decisions – a 
classic case of path dependency.  With the sudden fall of the Shah, the institutional processes of 
displacement and conversion began turning the U.S. into the adversary that both the clerical 
establishment and its associated security forces could rally against to consolidate their rule.  Thus, 
patterns of action became entrenched as leaders habitually resorted to hostility to secure their own 
positions.  Along the way, new developments and previously unrelated issues worked their way into the 
fabric of the conflict through the institutional process of layering.  By the end of the first decade, this 
conflict had two distinct and identifiable constituencies in Iran.  For an institution of animosity to 
develop, though, constituencies must crystallize on both sides. 
Institutional processes worked heavily on the U.S. side of the conflict, as well, although in a 
slower and more subtle manner.  Both the Carter and Reagan administrations leveraged the fall of the 
Shah to increase U.S. influence in the Persian Gulf and build a new security architecture, first at the 
expense of the Soviets, then in spite of waning Soviet power.  CENTCOM was the vanguard of this effort, 
and though it lacked an ideological focus on Iran, it was shaped by the Iranian threat at almost every 
point from its inception.  In terms of displacement and conversion, the U.S. exchanged Iraq for Iran as a 
new adversary, and then prepared to shift Cold War concerns to Iran as the Soviet Union teetered.  Like 
Iran, the U.S. layered numerous issues onto the conflict, and after a brief but blatant military 
confrontation in the Persian Gulf, CENTCOM was poised to become a full-fledged constituent.   
Not to be outdone, the U.S. Congress began to polarize itself against Iran, as well.  Both sides of 
the aisle developed grievances against Iran, and the Iran-Contra Affair demonstrated that either side 
could utilize Iran effectively as a weapon of partisan warfare.  Congress was not yet a constituent, but 
the patterns of action it developed in the 1980’s would become entrenched by the next decade.  Israel 
was the slowest to form as a constituency, but the 1980’s witnessed the almost complete exhaustion of 
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its “periphery doctrine.” It would take only a nudge for Israel to turn against Iran with the same 
stubborn zeal that used to characterize its support.   
The next three chapters will tell the story of how constituencies to the conflict internalized the 
developments of the 1980's and began to shape the course of events, instead of the other way around, 
eventually leading to a state of intractable conflict.  The next chapter will begin with the administrations 




CHAPTER 4 - THE SECOND DECADE, 1989-2000 
  The 1990's were a pivotal time for the U.S.-Iranian relationship.  In spite of the turbulence of the 
previous decade, there were relatively few practical conflicts of interest that necessitated the 
perpetuation of hostilities between the countries.  U.S. and Iranian forces did not significantly engage 
each other except for the attack on Khobar Towers, an important event, but also an outlier.  Leaders on 
both sides openly recognized the value of developing a more cooperative relationship throughout the 
decade, and the mutual benefits of rapprochement appeared plainly to all.  In short, conflict between 
the U.S. and Iran did not have to continue, and it did not have to get deeper.   
Instead, this is exactly what happened.  The ghost of the 1980's continued to haunt the 
relationship in new and sometimes revitalized form.  This chapter will trace three time periods that each 
offered a different potential opening for improved relations.  The first will be the presidency of George 
H.W. Bush, whose term coincided with major changes in the Islamic Republic, as well.  The second will 
be the first term of President William J. Clinton, which coincided roughly with the second half of 
President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in Iran.  The third will cover the period from the election of Iranian 
President (Seyyed) Mohammad Khatami in 1997 to the 2000 presidential election in the U.S.  For each of 
these periods, the chapter will cover the key events in the U.S.-Iranian relationship, followed by an 
institutional analysis of each, centered around the five key constituencies to the conflict that are under 
examination by this work.  
Each of these time periods, both the U.S and Iran could have benefitted from a reduction in 
hostilities, but institutional forces were at work inhibiting positive change.  In some cases, constituencies 
directly sabotaged an opening or conducted a hostile act to further its own interest.  In other cases, the 
pursuit of separate priorities indirectly generated drag on the U.S.-Iranian relationship that simply made 
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rapprochement increasingly unlikely over time.  Constituencies tied the hands of their own national 
leaders, limiting follow-through on any positive moves.  The presence of constituencies on both sides of 
the conflict also meant that even when one side made overtures toward reconciliation, leaders on the 
other side were unable to follow suit.  The spiral of conflict always had fuel to continue.   
This chapter will highlight the operation of institutional processes, first displacement and 
conversion, in which a constituency's core priorities and focus shift from one adversary or threat to 
another, more current or immediate.  Layering will be the most common throughout the chapter, in 
which events and issues that may not even be directly related to the conflict become enmeshed within 
the fabric of the relationship in ways that will not be quickly untangled.  Layering fosters path 
dependency because otherwise separate issues develop new constraints in relation to each other.  Drift 
is a long-term process that happens as important personalities central to a conflict change over time, 
and new leaders reinterpret the conflict they inherit within their own context.  It often becomes evident 
only at key points after working silently long periods of time.   
  
Goodwill Begets Goodwill… 
  The inauguration of President George H. W. Bush in 1989 marked a notable opportunity for 
change in the U.S.-Iranian relationship.  In his inauguration address, Bush (1989) offered new 
"engagement," and while he did not mention Iran by name, he made a thinly veiled promise that, "There 
are today Americans who are held against their will in foreign lands, and Americans who are 
unaccounted for. Assistance can be shown here, and will be long remembered. Good will begets good 
will. Good faith can be a spiral that endlessly moves on." Ayatollah Khomeini was still alive at the time, 
and less than a month later, he issued his infamous fatwa against Salman Rushdie, in an apparent 
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attempt to scuttle any future rapprochement with the U.S.  The Bush administration (Hunter 2010, 45-
46) was relatively restrained in its reaction, and it chose to wait and see, as Khomeini passed.   
In Iran, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (Axworthy 2013, 305-310) successfully captured the 
presidency in August 1989, a position which he himself had laid the groundwork to empower.  Leading a 
country that had been ravaged, first by the revolution and then by eight years of war, Rafsanjani was 
eager to promote a pragmatist agenda that included building ties with the outside world.  Internally, 
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had recently taken the position of Supreme Leader, following the passing of 
Khomeini, but Khamenei lacked both the religious credentials for the position and the cult of personality 
enjoyed by his predecessor.  In short, Rafsanjani arguably held the most formal and informal political 
power that any popularly elected leader has enjoyed in the history of the Islamic Republic.  Given the 
events of the previous decade, the situation could hardly have been more auspicious for a new start.  
Instead, the period marked by the Bush presidency failed to generate a "spiral of good faith," and it left 
the conflict more entrenched than before.  Understanding why this played out the way it did requires an 




Less than two weeks after Rafsanjani's inauguration (Dowd 1989a), Bush stated, "we don't have 
to be hostile with Iran for the rest of our lives," and that a "clear signal" from Iran could reopen ties.  He 
defined this term explicitly by the release of the remaining U.S. hostages.  Only one day prior, Khamenei 
had denounced the U.S. and stated that, "No one in the Islamic Republic will hold talks with you." 
Ignoring this rhetoric, the U.S. began negotiating (Hunter 2010, 46-47) with Iranian officials indirectly 
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the same month through Italian diplomat Giandomenico Picco, who had been tasked by the U.N. 
Secretary General to serve as an intermediary for the hostage issue.  Rafsanjani sent a message to Bush 
through Picco agreeing to assist with the release of hostages if the U.S. released 10 percent of the frozen 
assets and compensated the families of the Iran Air 655 victims.  Instead of responding directly, Bush 
allowed Secretary of State James Baker to send a cool response through U.N. channels, feeling that 
anything more would be rewarding terrorism.  Regardless, in November (Associated Press 1989) the 
Bush administration liquidated an escrow account that returned $567 million in frozen Iranian assets, 
while emphasizing publicly that this action was not specifically related to hostage negotiations.  The U.S. 
government (Crist 2012, 384-385) also allowed Iran to open an interest section in the Pakistani embassy 
in Washington, D.C.  The Iranians helped to secure the release of two U.S. hostages in April 1990.  
Hunter (2010, 47) pointed out critically that the Iranians received no reward for this assistance, but Bush 
had also been fairly explicit that a "clear signal" involved the release of all the hostages. 
The U.S.-Iranian relationship was directly impacted after this point by a crucial development in 
world events, Iraq's August 1990 invasion of Kuwait.  Iraq received considerable regional and 
international support during the Iran-Iraq War, mostly because of fears regarding Iran.  With the war 
over, Saddam Hussein's oppressive regime became far less palatable to all concerned, and his crimes 
against the Kurds received greater attention.  The U.S. Congress endeavored to impose new sanctions 
on Iraq, which they succeeded in doing in July 1990.  The Bush administration (Hiro 1992, 94-95) initially 
strove to maintain Reagan's foreign policy gains with regard to the U.S.-Iraqi relationship, hoping to 
maintain leverage over Saddam Hussein.  He fought Congressional sanctions, pushed for expanded aid, 
and continued intelligence sharing (Crist 2012, 384-385) with Iraq (Iran was aware of this through an 
Iraqi double agent).   
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A discussion of why Saddam Hussein chose to make his fateful decision is beyond the scope of 
this work (Yetiv 1992, 195-212), but in short, Iraq found itself with the most powerful army in the region, 
yet saddled with debt that his Kuwaiti creditors were not willing to forgive.  Military action was far too 
tempting, and Saddam Hussein underestimated the resolve of the international community, especially 
the U.S.  With the Cold War ending, Iraq could no longer play the superpowers off against each other.  In 
response to Iraq's action (Crean 2015), the Bush administration rallied broad support from the United 
Nations and developed a coalition of 35 partners, deftly navigating a myriad of both domestic and 
international concerns.  Exorcising demons from the Vietnam War (Freedman 2008, 234-253), the U.S. 
military conducted an unprecedented air campaign, followed on February 24, 1990 by a 100-hour 
ground war that roundly defeated Iraqi forces and ejected them from Kuwaiti soil.   
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait provided Iran with an interesting dilemma.  On one hand, its most 
dangerous adversary had increased its strength by grabbing Kuwait's oil resources and extending its own 
share of Persian Gulf coastline.  Rafsanjani (Hunter 2010, 49) described the prospect of leaving Iraq in 
Kuwait as "suicide" for Iran.  However, Iran's hardliners were not prepared to condone foreign 
interference in the Persian Gulf.  Khamenei (Hiro 1992, 181, 437) issued a fatwa against any U.S. 
deployment.  Ultimately, Rafsanjani engineered a compromise position.  Iran declared itself neutral in 
the conflict and played the situation to its own greatest advantage.  It bolstered its diplomatic position, 
making inroads with Kuwaiti officials (Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 323) and hosting talks (Hiro 1992, 366-
367) between the Iraqi government and the Soviets in Tehran.  It also (Krause 1991) selectively allowed 
trade with Iraq to cross its borders.  However, in spite of public proclamations of neutrality and 
condemnation of U.S. actions, Iranian policies quietly favored the coalition and attempted to capitalize 
on the situation.   
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Iran allowed U.S. aircraft (Crist 2012, 386) access to Iranian airspace and established a special 
communication channel through the Swiss to deconflict air operations.  It helped facilitate the return of 
several U.S. citizens who had been trapped in Kuwait and fled to Iran, and it hosted (Parsi 2017, 16-19) a 
large number of refugees from the conflict.  In another odd turn of events (Wilkinson 1991), Saddam 
Hussein sent a large portion of his air force to Iran prior to the onset of hostilities, and Iran impounded 
137 aircraft, refusing to return them to Iraq even after the war.  Perhaps the greatest support that Iran 
lent the coalition was symbolic in nature.  By accepting the U.N. resolution against Iraq (Hunter 2010, 
48-49) and remaining neutral, this made it easier for Muslim countries to join the coalition, and it 
undercut Saddam Hussein's claim that he was fighting for Islam.   
A final point of consideration with regard to Iran's policy toward the Gulf War involved less what 
Iran did and more what it refrained from doing.  By his own accounts (Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 472, 
488-489), Bush was torn over the question of whether Saddam Hussein should have been allowed to 
stay in power.  Allowing him to remain meant perpetuating a threat to Persian Gulf security, but his 
administration feared the disintegration of Iraq.  Bush openly suggested that the Iraqi people should 
consider overthrowing Saddam, hoping that this might inspire a military coup that would replace the 
leader while leaving the structure of the Iraqi state intact.  What transpired instead were uprisings by 
the Shia and Kurdish populations (Gerstenzang and Ross 1991), threatening Iraq's integrity and 
potentially opening a door for Islamic extremism.  Iranian trained fighters (Takeyh 2009b, 136) (Indyk 
1992, 73) had a hand in these uprisings, and Iran clearly could have pushed harder to topple Saddam 
Hussein.  Why they refrained is a matter of debate, and it is possible that Iranian leaders also feared a 
breakup of Iraq, but either way, their decision benefitted U.S. policy. 
The Bush administration's attitude toward Iran through this period was one of restraint.  From 
the earliest days of the conflict (Hiro 1992, 181, 437), the U.S. reassured Tehran through the Swiss 
186 
 
embassy that it had no intention of keeping forces in the region.  The Bush administration also generally 
ignored the rhetoric of Iran's hardliners and pursued a cooperative attitude, probably concerned that 
friction with Iran might detract from the delicate process of coalition-building.  On the other hand, as 
pointed out by (Hunter 2010, 48-49), the U.S. refused to offer Iran any incentives unless it joined the 
coalition, which it could not do because of domestic political constraints.  As the U.S. quickly gained the 
upper hand in the conflict, any willingness the Bush administration may have had to offer concessions to 
Iran dwindled.  For the Bush administration ("War Over…" 1991), the decisive victory over Iraq allowed it 
to return its focus to pressuring Iran and Hezbollah over the hostage issue.   
Also frustrating for Iran (Takeyh 2009b, 137), the Gulf Cooperation Council states plus Syria and 
Egypt put forth the Damascus Declaration in March calling for an "Arab Peace Force." Not only was 
Iran's cooperation discounted by Washington's coalition, but this new initiative (which included Iran's 
ally Syria) was clearly aligned against Tehran.  Moreover, the momentum gained by U.S. military success 
fueled a greater ambition to shape the Middle East.  Only days after completing the ground war, Bush 
(Friedman 1990) doubled down on his push for renewed peace talks between the Israelis and 
Palestinians.  Over the coming year, this path unfolded simultaneously with the hostage issue, further 
complicating the U.S. relationship with Iran.  Regardless, in the immediate wake of the Gulf War, Bush 
(Meisler 1991) stated clearly, "We want better relations with Iran.  We have no animosity." 
For the Bush administration (Office of the Historian… 2020), efforts to broker Israeli-Palestinian 
peace led to months of shuttle diplomacy by Secretary of State James Baker, culminating in the Madrid 
Conference at the end of October 1991.  This conference brought together a wide range of regional and 
international actors, and most significantly, it was the first such event to simultaneously include all 
parties (as dubbed by Washington) to the conflict.  Iran was not invited to this event.  The Leveretts 
(2013, 4, 109) argued that the Bush administration made a point of excluding Iran.  Other authors, such 
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as Parsi (2017, 20) describe this less as a deliberate snub and more the product of an attitude by 
administration officials that Iran had no legitimate stake in the conflict and nothing to offer.  Either way, 
getting the eventual participants involved was a significant undertaking in itself, and adding the Iranians 
to the equation might have undermined this effort.  Iranian leaders reacted furiously to this conference 
(Ibrahim 2006, 63) (FBIS 1990) and quickly rallied a conference of their own in opposition to the peace 
talks with Israel, bringing 400 delegates from 45 countries (these largely represented Islamic 
fundamentalist groups and not the governments of their parent countries) to Tehran.  They also offered 
subsidies to Palestinian groups willing to reject the peace process.   
Pollack (2004, 254-255) argued that Iran was necessarily hostile to an Israeli-Palestinian 
settlement, not only for ideological reasons but also geopolitical.  If the Palestinian question were 
answered to Syria's satisfaction, then Iran's one Middle East ally would have little reason to continue 
cooperating with it, especially regarding Lebanon.  Iran would have stood to lose its foothold in Middle 
East affairs.  On the other hand, Parsi (2017, 20-21) viewed the situation differently.  Iran had reduced 
its support for Hezbollah in the previous years.  The Madrid conference included a variety of regional 
issues beyond just the peace process, and Iran's leaders expected to be included in all of these 
discussions.  Had they been afforded this level of respect on the international stage, they might have 
played a more constructive role.  The Bush administration's decision was therefore a "critical inflection 
point" in the U.S. Iranian relationship.  Regardless of what Iran might have done otherwise, it now 
reversed course and increased its support for Hezbollah.  It also began courting other rejectionist 
Palestinian groups across the Sunni-Shia divide, including Hamas, which it viewed as a natural ally.   
On the hostage front, the Bush administration increased its efforts to secure the release of U.S. 
citizens through U.N. channels.  While Baker was conducting shuttle diplomacy in support of the peace 
process, Picco (Crist 2012, 387-388) conducted a flurry of meetings in New York, Cyprus, Beirut, and 
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Damascus.  Iranian officials facilitated these meetings but did not take part directly, maintaining that 
Iran was not involved in hostage taking.  Picco's primary interlocutor was a shady representative of 
Hezbollah, who was probably Mughniyeh himself.  Negotiations were complicated not only by the 
number of groups involved (Tyler 1991), but because the fate of the U.S. hostages was intertwined with 
those of other countries, including Israeli servicemembers who had been captured in Lebanon.  
Revelations that a group associate with Hezbollah had killed U.S. hostage Lieutenant Colonel William 
Higgins in 1989 also dampened the mood, as did the August 1991 (Ausseil 1995)  assassination of former 
Prime Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar in Germany, which was eventually linked directly to Iranian officials. 
Regardless, the final U.S. hostages (Sciolino 1991, Dec 5) were released by the end of 1991.  The 
Bush administration returned approximately $278 million in frozen Iranian funds from another escrow 
account, again denying any link between this money and the release of hostages.  White House 
Spokesman, Marlin Fitzwater, acknowledged Iran's support and left open the possibility of goodwill, but 
added, " "Nevertheless, they are still a terrorist state and there's still no change in that."  The New York 
Times described the Bush administration's position on Iran as "ambivalent," noting that they had also 
recently blocked the sale of British-made planes with American components and urged India not to build 
a nuclear power plant for Iran. 
Ambivalent or not, the conditions for an improvement in U.S.-Iranian relations had not been 
more propitious since the fall of the Shah.  Journalist Robin Wright (1992) authored an optimistic 
assessment with regard to rapprochement, citing Rafsanjani's pragmatic revival, the growth of cultural 
ties and affinity, and increases in business relationships.  She pointed out that in spite of sanctions, the 
U.S. had become Iran's sixth largest trading partner.  Exports to Iran had more than tripled between 
1990 and the beginning of 1992 ($166.5 to $527 million, although still down from its peak under the 
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Shah of $26 billion).  Oil imports from Iran jumped from $7 million to $265 million in the same period 
(although proceeds went into an escrow account per the terms of the sanctions).   
What Wright could not have known was that even as her article went to print, the relationship 
was souring behind closed doors.  Picco (Crist 2012, 388-389) met with National Security Advisor Brent 
Scowcroft in April 1992.  Scowcroft informed him that, "There will be no goodwill…" from the Bush 
administration.  He cited the assassination of Bakhtiar, along with other terrorist acts including the 
March 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires.  Picco broke the news personally to 
Rafsanjani, who was furious and recommended to Picco that, "I think it is best if you leave Tehran very, 
very quickly.  The news of what you told me will travel fast to other quarters, and they may decide not 
to let you go."  Shortly afterward, Rafsanjani attempted one more outreach to the U.S. through a 
channel they had established with the Germans.  The Bush administration was not interested.   
Per Hunter (2010, 47), Rafsanjani's failed attempts to restore relations with the U.S. hurt him 
domestically and weakened his political position vis-a-vis his hardline opponents.  Many authors have 
been quick to point out (perhaps rightfully so) that the Bush administration not only went back on its 
word but failed to seize a potential opportunity to establish a more cooperative relationship with Iran.  
Before assigning blame, however, there are some key points of to consider.  First, Iran barely registered 
as a policy priority for Bush or his team.  Upon taking office (Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 305-306), Bush's 
concerns for the Persian Gulf centered entirely around energy security and a concern for U.S. hostages, 
so Iran was only visible in relation to these two issues.  As his presidency unfolded, the breakup of the 
Soviet Union, the Gulf War, and the Middle East peace process took center stage.   
James Baker (Baker and DeFrank 1995), in his entire memoir reflecting on his time as Bush's 
Secretary of State from 1989-1982, only mentioned Iran in passing, within the context of discussions 
over other issues.  Additionally, as pointed out by Indyk (1992, 70), the Bush administration was flush 
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with success in in the foreign policy arena.  It viewed the release of the hostages as another triumph of 
American power and will, not an overture that required a response.  Moreover, from the perspective of 
the Bush administration (Litwak 2002, 185), Iran's words and actions were still contradictory.  Even aside 
from the fiery rhetoric of its leaders, Iran's support for terrorism and opposition to the Israeli-Palestinian 
peace process disqualified any gestures of goodwill.  What these explanations fail to consider, though, is 
that institutional forces and processes were at work throughout this period, actively undermining steps 
toward peace and making a more cooperative relationship increasingly unlikely. 
 
The institutional development of constituencies  
The historical period coinciding with the George H. W. Bush presidency witnessed 
unprecedented changes in world history.  The Fall of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War transformed the 
geopolitical landscape for the U.S., and the death of Khomeini ushered a new era in Iran.  Iran needed 
reengagement with the outside world to rebuild its war-torn economy, and relations with the U.S. were 
the lynchpin to this effort.  The U.S. benefitted from Iranian oil, burgeoning commercial opportunities, 
and Middle East stability (with Iran as a balancer against Iraqi ambition).  In hindsight, this period 
seemed like a golden opportunity for a reset in the U.S.-Iranian relationship.  Instead, both sides 
continued down a now familiar path of hostility, a testament to the power of institutional forces that 
had been building for the past decade.  The conflict was shaping the habitus of four key constituencies 
that were now taking shape: Iran’s clerical establishment, the IRGC and clerical security forces, 
CENTCOM, and the state of Israel.  New historical inputs were therefore translated into old patterns 
through the mechanisms of displacement and conversion, layering, and drift. 
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The death of Khomeini was a pivotal moment for the clerical establishment he had carried into 
power.  It was well known that (Milani 1992, 175), though Ali Khamenei had Khomeini's blessing, and 
Khomeini had doctored the criteria for succession before his death, Khamenei lacked the religious 
credentials that would have made him eligible.  Further, leaked footage (Radio Farda 2018) of the 
Assembly of Experts session that confirmed Khamenei as Supreme Leader showed that the body 
originally intended to appoint Khamenei as only a temporary caretaker for one year.  Rafsanjani 
commandeered the proceedings and in, what Axworthy (2013, 308) described as a "classic Machiavellian 
move," ensured that Khamenei was installed as Khomeini's permanent replacement.  This brought about 
a situation where Iran's Supreme Leader was (at least temporarily) beholden to its next President.  
Khamenei was beginning from a position of weakness and would have to claw his way to a position of 
strength, even if it meant undermining Rafsanjani to do it.   
Pollack (2004, 251) pointed out that Khamenei's legitimacy derived fundamentally from 
Khomeini's legacy.  This meant perpetuating Iran's opposition to Western imperialism, and especially the 
United States.  Khamenei needed to cater to his own base of power, the clerical establishment and the 
IRGC.  Bajoghli (2020) pointed out that the Islamic Republic had created a new set of elites in Iran, 
derived primarily from the clerics and their lower- and middle-class supporters who had been largely 
disenfranchised under the Shah.  These individuals remembered what it was like to be marginalized, and 
they did not want to go back.  Khomeini's ideology was the basis for their newfound status.  By-and-
large, they proved willing to rally around Khamenei, so the new Supreme leader could not afford any 
radical changes of direction.  This was an example of layering where a new domestic struggle attached 
itself to the U.S.-Iranian relationship, while the previous layers remained as repertoires of rhetoric and 
action.  It also demonstrated drift as the drama experienced a change in its cast of characters, each 
playing the same role, but with slightly different motivations than the previous.    
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Rafsanjani, although certainly a member of the clerical establishment and a founding father of 
Iran's revolution, was no longer a constituent to the conflict between the U.S. and Iran.  After personally 
helping end the Iran-Iraq War (Maloney 2015, 192-196, 205, 218, 223-227), he took the helm of a 
country ravaged by war and revolution.  Nothing in his litany of speeches suggested love or respect for 
the U.S., but his strategy for reconstructing Iran required rebuilding ties with the outside world, and this 
became central to his own success.  He also favored a generally liberal model of economics, selling off 
cumbersome state industries and empowering private actors.  This alienated him from leftist clerical 
rivals who preferred state control of the economy.  In many cases, these were hardliners in foreign 
policy, opposing engagement with the West as compromise with imperialism.  It also alienated him from 
an up-and-coming generation of conservatives who were clawing their way up the social ladder under 
the rubric established by Khomeini and were loath to see his ideology changed.  They viewed Rafsanjani 
as a corrupt politician, whose liberalism preyed upon the resources of the state for the benefit of his 
own supporters.  For both groups, attacking Rafsanjani's engagement with the West was a convenient 
way to undermine him.  With help from Khamenei in using the Council of Guardians to disqualify 
candidates, Rafsanjani sidelined the left from Iranian politics by 1992.  However, this gamble depended 
on the ability to demonstrate the benefits of successful engagement with the West.  With little to show 
for his engagement attempts, Rafsanjani’s vulnerability to remaining hardliners increased, and his 
influence ebbed.  The layer of domestic politics in Iran began increasingly undermining any hopes at 
reconciliation with the U.S. 
Rafsanjani's (Maloney 2015, 239-243) reconstruction of Iran also added an additional economic 
layer to the U.S.-Iranian conflict by fostering a new elite within the clerical establishment.  He was not 
above directly granting economic favors in return for political support, enriching himself and opening 
the door for all manner of corruption and embezzlement.  Clerically controlled parastatal enterprises 
known as bonyads sprang up in the early days of the revolution to expropriate the wealth and assets of 
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the former Shah and his supporters, and they gained momentum as state industries were sold through 
privatization.  Khomeini's Foundation for the Oppressed was one of the largest and most powerful of 
these organizations, falling under the direct control of Khamenei and providing him with an additional 
base of power.  But as much as these actors may have owed Rafsanjani for their path to wealth, Iran's 
nouveau riche had little interest in engagement with the West.  Isolation shielded domestic industries 
from foreign competition, giving clerical elites yet another incentive to undermine rapprochement, and 
the patronage networks they built gave them considerable clout with which to do it.  An example of this 
would play out in 1993 and 1994 as bonyads disrupted Iranian agreements with both Coca-Cola and 
Pepsi Cola.   
During this time period, the IRGC and clerical security forces also displayed a vested interest in 
the U.S.-Iranian conflict.  With the end of the Iran-Iraq War and their country in desperate need of 
reconstruction, the role of these forces should by all rights have diminished, but this is exactly what they 
were afraid of.  The war had created a path (Amanat 2017, 868-871) to upward mobility and elite status 
within the Islamic Republic, through the revolutionary credentials gained by military service in the IRGC 
or Basij.  Reacting to suggestions that the IRGC should be folded into the regular military (Alfoneh 2013, 
26-27), the guard went on a political offensive, accusing Rafsanjani of selling out the revolution by 
ending the war.  In September 1988, they convened a meeting of all IRGC commanders in Tehran's Azadi 
Stadium to "survey their future plans regarding the revolution." This sent a pointed message to Iran's 
rising leaders that they were a force to be reckoned with and they would not be sidelined.  The action 
prompted the ailing Khomeini to admonish the IRGC in his will to stay out of politics (Khomeini 1989a, 
45), but his wording suggested to many IRGC commanders that non-interference should be mutual.  
They were charged with defending the revolution, so upholding Khomeini's ideology gave them a raison 
d'etre, and this was rooted in anti-imperialism and anti-Americanism.  Regardless, Khamenei needed the 
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support of the IRGC to shore up his own position.  From this point forward, he became their patron, 
rarely siding against them in domestic struggles. 
Rafsanjani took a different tack with IRGC.  Recognizing his own inability to clip the IRGC's wings 
(Alfoneh 2013, 27, 169), he chose instead to bribe the organization by offering them a stake in Iran's 
economy.  During the Iran-Iraq War, the IRGC had already gained control of the Defense Industries 
Organization, an umbrella of public defense companies that provided the munitions and technologies 
required for Iran's war effort.  At the end of the war, this organization had more than 65,000 employees.  
Instead of winding down its activities, it continued its operations and began to transfer its efforts to the 
production of high-tech items for the civilian market, competing with private industry in Iran.  Rafsanjani 
(Maloney 2015, 205, 244) took this further, harnessing the IRGC's resources for the purposes of 
reconstruction, and it formed a conglomerate which later developed the acronym, GHORB.  Not only did 
it control much of the infrastructure development within Iran, but it also dabbled in agriculture, mining, 
exports, and education.  Additionally, Rafsanjani's privatization campaign afforded preferential 
treatment to veterans in selling shares of state enterprises, giving the network of past and present IRGC 
members a clear advantage.  As with the clerics who subsumed their own share of the economy, the 
economic elites within the security establishment had little interest in opening Iran's economy to the 
West, benefitting both from isolation and the ability to muscle out competition.  The IRGC's entrance 
into the economy demonstrated layering, as well as drift.   
Economic interests notwithstanding, protecting and exporting the revolution were still the 
bread and butter for the IRGC and clerical security forces.  This included the assassination of dissidents 
overseas.  Iranian agents (probably associated with the MOIS) (O'Balance 1997, xix, 155-156) 
assassinated a Kurdish leader and two companions in Vienna in July 1989.  In August 1991 they killed 
former Prime Minister Shapour Bakhtiar in Paris, and in September 1992, they killed three Iranian 
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Kurdish leaders along with a translator in Berlin.  Takeyh (2009, 140-141) pointed out that France was 
one of the Western countries most likely to partner with Iran economically.  However, a string of 
terrorist bombings in 1996 and the Lebanon bombing of French paratroopers in 1983 had already 
strained relations, so the Paris assassination was exactly the kind of press that Rafsanjani did not need. 
Not only did this upset France, but it prompted Switzerland to temporarily close its diplomatic 
mission to Iran, disrupting the indirect consular connection that the U.S. maintained in Iran.  Likewise, 
although the German government was more forgiving, the Berlin assassination stirred domestic 
resentment against Iran in Germany and invited U.S. pressure against the German government to limit 
ties with Iran.  It is difficult to argue that these assassinations provided anything more than symbolic 
value to the regime – a victory for hardliners but a liability to the country.  U.S. officials did not 
distinguish between Iran's political assassinations and terrorism, so these actions added layers to the 
terrorism aspect of the U.S.-Iranian conflict even while Rafsanjani was trying mend relations.   
Iranian opposition to Israel also become an important layer in the relationship during this 
period, as well, and the IRGC spearheaded this process.  Rafsanjani (Maloney 2015, 209-215) began a 
diplomatic offensive as soon as he came into office, attempting to rebuild Iran's influence throughout 
the Middle East, along with its ties to Europe and East Asia.  Further, Iran (Pollack 2004, 253-254) sensed 
new opportunities as the former Soviet republics became independent.  Rafsanjani made little 
substantive headway in these efforts, however, blocked primarily by the U.S. and its Gulf Arab partners.  
When U.S. pressure started to energize the peace process between the Israelis and the Palestinians, it 
threatened the relationship with Iran's one key external ally (Syria) and its last bastion of regional 
influence, and all this while excluding Iran from international discussions.   
Iran’s support for Hezbollah declined in the late 1980’s, but for the IRGC, its foothold in Lebanon 
and the struggle against Israel constituted its most active and promising front for the export of the 
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revolution.  Takeyh (2009, 165) commented about a remarkable consistency in Iran's opposition to Israel 
throughout the early years of the Islamic Republic.  This was not entirely correct.  Iran may have been 
consistent in its rhetorical denunciation of Israel, but as the previous chapter highlighted, this translated 
into very little action during the 1980's.  Now the story would be different.  Iranian leaders gained a 
discernable interest in disrupting Arab-Israeli peace, and the IRGC was again coming into its glory.  In 
March 1992 (Axworthy 2013, 316) ("Death Toll…" 1992), a group associated with Hezbollah detonated a 
truck bomb outside the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, killing over thirty people and injuring hundreds 
more.  While not directly an attack on the U.S., the Bush administration had invested a great deal of 
political capital in the peace process, so attacks against Israel were increasingly seen as attacks against 
U.S. interests.  The Buenos Aires bombing occurred within approximately one month of the Bush 
administration's decision that "there will be no goodwill" (Crist 2012, 388).  Not only did the the IRGC 
increase its support for Hezbollah, it also reached out to Palestinian rejectionist groups and other 
terrorist actors across the Sunni-Shia divide.  Iranian opposition to Israel was now intrinsically linked to 
the U.S.-Iranian conflict.  In short, even while Rafsanjani was attempting to rebuild relations with the 
West, both the clerical establishment and the IRGC steadily undermined this effort and jumped at every 
excuse to increase Iran’s international isolation. 
Institutional processes were working just as hard on U.S. sided of the equation, as well, and 
CENTCOM came into its own as a prominent constituent to the conflict.  As the Bush administration 
entered office (Crist 2012, 371-372), CENTCOM was still conducting escort operations for Kuwaiti 
tankers, which it would continue until April 1980.  CENTCOM's new commander, General Norman 
Schwarzkopf, garnered the support of the President Bush and successfully resisted pressure to draw 
down U.S. forces in the region, arguing this would unsettle Gulf State partners.  He eventually cut the 
number of combatant warships assigned to the Gulf to five, but this was still five more than the U.S. 
operated in the Gulf before 1987.  Upon taking command in 1988 (Hines 2000, 45-46), Schwarzkopf 
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engaged on yet another round of organization building within CENTCOM and external diplomatic 
engagement with Middle Eastern states.  Schwarzkopf helped the command shed the last vestiges of its 
Cold War strategic orientation, and very presciently, he prepared for the possibility of a war with Iraq.  
In his visits with regional partners, though, Schwarzkopf found that, perhaps surprisingly, most leaders 
were more worried about the Iranian threat than any from Iraq, and this shaped CENTCOM’s operating 
environment.  Oddly, his own concerns were vindicated when Iraq's invasion of Kuwait occurred during 
a CENTCOM exercise that was designed to consider the very scenario.   
The Gulf War, named Operation Desert Storm by the U.S.-led coalition that executed it, was a 
historic display of U.S. military and diplomatic power.  President Bush found himself in a position of 
undisputed leadership within the region, and CENTCOM was his primary instrument for exercising this 
leadership.  For the U.S. military (Dawson 2010, 8-10), Desert Storm was also the first major test of the 
Goldwater-Nichols reorganization of the Department of Defense.  CENTCOM ran the war, utilizing its 
integral service components to manage various aspects of the campaign instead of relying on input from 
the military service chiefs in the Pentagon.  While this model would be tweaked over time, CENTCOM 
effectively clawed out a new level of organizational autonomy.  Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
U.S. European and Pacific commands had vied with each other for position as the vanguards of U.S. 
military power.  As the Soviet threat receded, CENTCOM was becoming the center of attention.  Of 
course, because President Bush chose not to invade Iraq, Saddam Hussein continued to pose a threat, 
first and foremost to his own people.  CENTCOM established a joint task forces to enforce no-fly zones in 
both southern and northern Iraq (the northern mission (Thompson 2011) was eventually ceded to 
European Command out of a base in Incirlik Turkey, but it received little press attention), and these 
missions continued until 2003.  CENTCOM also developed a role in enforcing sanctions against Iraq.   
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For all of Bush's promises that American forces would not remain after it restored Kuwaiti 
sovereignty, CENTCOM had established a new footprint in the Middle East, and the administration was 
not about to squander its position of strength.  Once reticent about allowing any U.S. personnel into 
their country, Kuwait now welcomed CENTCOM with open arms (Katzman 2006, 3-5), signing an 
extensive defense pact (still classified) which reportedly covered basing and facilities, joint military 
exercises, training of Kuwaiti forces and arms sales.  By 1993, Kuwait contracted for over $3 billion in 
advanced U.S. weapons purchases.  For the remainder of the decade (CRS 2019, 9-10), the U.S. based 
approximately 4,000 ground troops and 1,000 air personnel in country, along with aircraft and enough 
armor to outfit two combat brigades.  Additionally, the Kuwaitis (Globalsecurity.org 2020) funded the 
construction of state-of-the-art training facilities, and the U.S. began (Jehl and Grace 1992) a frequent 
rotation of thousands of additional troops that would conduct short training deployments into country. 
The story was similar in the rest of the region.  Saudi Arabia (Hedges 2003) continued to host 
approximately 4,000 airmen, allowing the U.S. to patrol Iraqi airspace from its soil.  The U.S. (Blanchard 
2008, 9-10) also signed a classified defense cooperation agreement with Qatar in 1992.  Qatar was not a 
major customer of advanced U.S. weapon systems during the 1990's (although this would change two 
decades later), but it invested $1 billion in the development the Al Udeid Air Base facility throughout the 
decade.  Qatar essentially rented itself out as a premier command and logistical hub for U.S. forces in 
the region.  For the 1990's (CRS 2017, 7), U.S. arms deliveries to the Middle East were higher than at any 
other period prior except for a spike in the 1970's at the height of the Shah's military buildup.  In a 
classic example of displacement and conversion, the U.S. fully supplanted the position previously 
occupied by the Soviet Union as the arms supplier for the Middle East.   
How then, did Iran figure into this equation?  The CENTCOM staff commissioned a study by 
Pelletiere and Johnson (1992, v-16) assessing the U.S. geostrategic position in the Persian Gulf region.  
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The study was not authoritative and did not speak for the command, but in hindsight, it is readily 
apparent that the authors' assumptions and recommendations were well in-tune with the policymakers 
of the day.  The study argued that a unipolar world favorable to the U.S. depended on energy security in 
the Middle East, but relying on balance of power politics would no longer suffice to protect the Gulf 
States (particularly Saudi Arabia) from their "recalcitrant enemies," Iraq and Iran.  The U.S. should 
therefore act as the regional balancer and embrace the role of "policeman" of the Gulf.  In a full-page, 
large-letter graphic, the paper explained that you cannot have "large scale military action without 
consensus." You cannot have "consensus without threat." In essence, the U.S. could not assume this 
leading role in Gulf Security until it was able to rally the Gulf Arab states around a common picture of 
the threats emanating from Iraq and Iran.  Before the Gulf War, Arab states were trying to convince 
CENTCOM to worry about Iran.  Now, CENTCOM would become a cheerleader for the consensus view.  
The U.S. already had a containment apparatus for Iraq in place.  Naturally, it would need one for Iran. 
CENTCOM was a rising constituent to the institutional conflict between the U.S. and Iran, but 
this was still subtle during the Bush years.  The command necessarily fixated on Iraq for most of the 
period.  It is unlikely that anybody from CENTCOM ever called White House and asked the Bush 
administration not to reciprocate "goodwill" to the Iranians for their help in freeing the hostages or 
cooperating with the coalition during the Gulf War.  Instead, CENTCOM simply took the U.S. down a 
path (begun in the 1980's) that was mutually exclusive to rebuilding a constructive relationship with 
Iran.  CENTCOM’s prominence offered the Bush administration the opportunity to make America the 
hegemon of the Persian Gulf, at little apparent cost to U.S. taxpayers, and this was too good to pass up.  
The price was isolating Iran (which had been inviting isolation for over a decade) and Iraq (which had 
made itself odious to the international community in one fell swoop).  This arrangement was 
advantageous to CENTCOM, so there was a strong incentive to use these two foes as a replacement 
(displacement and conversion) for the Soviets.  CENTCOM, along with the broader U.S. national security 
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establishment (Axworthy 2013, 318-319), began to view Iran through a very similar lens of vilification 
and distrust that it had applied to the Soviet Union.  This assumption that Iran had to be "up to no good" 
would color the assessments they provided to policymakers from this time forward and help to fuel the 
cycle of conflict. 
The time period of the George H. W. Bush administration also saw the emergence of another 
constituent to the conflict between the U.S. and Iran.  As previously explained, Iran’s opposition to Israel 
was now being layered into the U.S.-Iranian conflict, but the Israeli government became a constituent in 
its own rite.  The groundwork had long been laid for Israel to turn against Iran, with the exhaustion of 
their “periphery doctrine.”  When this occurred after the June 1992 election of Yitzhak Rabin's Labor 
government, it happened very quickly.  In a matter of a few short months, Israeli leaders who had 
previously been silent about Iran were pressing the U.S. government to tighten the screws on the Islamic 
Republic.  Trita Parsi (2007) provided what is arguably the most comprehensive and widely cited 
description and explanation for this change.  His work is worth considering on its own because his book 
tells an institutional story, in other terms. 
For the first four decades of its existence (Parsi 2007, 140-151), the Israeli security 
establishment primarily concerned itself with existential threats arising externally from hostile 
neighbors.  However, by the late 1980's internal Palestinian unrest was wearing on the Israeli 
population, and this came to a head in the early 1990's.  During this same period, Iraq's invasion of 
Kuwait prompted changes in Israel's geostrategic position.  The U.S. took the lead in defanging one of 
Israel's most potent adversaries, but in doing so, it cozied up to the region’s Arab states and pressed 
Israel to sit on the sidelines, even in the face of missile attacks against its territory.  Israeli relations with 
these Arab states had already been thawing, and the impending collapse of the Soviet Union was 
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prompting the Gulf States to abandon pan-Arabism and move closer to the U.S.  The strategic threat 
against Israel was now at a historic low. 
On the other hand, peace created its own problems.  From Israel’s perspective (Parsi 2007, 140-
151), the U.S. was now realizing a vision for regional order which placed the Persian Gulf as the center 
and not itself.  Perhaps most worryingly, the Bush administration was now determined to broker peace 
talks between the Israelis and the Palestinians, and Bush's increasing opposition to Israeli settlements in 
the West Bank suggested that the U.S. was less willing than ever to favor the Israeli position.  It was not 
that Yitzhak Shamir's hardline Likud government did not want an agreement with the Palestinians, but 
they had little faith in the talks, and they certainly did not want to negotiate from a position of weakness 
and risk being forced to compromise.  Without external threats to blame, Israel could find little excuse 
to avoid being dragged to the Madrid talks, which began in the Fall of 1991.  Israel's special relationship 
with the U.S., along with its own aspirations as a regional hegemon, appeared to be in jeopardy.   
This difficult state of affairs (Parsi 2007, 158-171), along with domestic pressure to address the 
Palestinian issue, prompted a change in Israeli politics and swept Rabin's government to power in 1992.  
Rabin recognized that the PLO was growing weaker and was in danger of being displaced by hardline 
rivals, especially the Islamist Hamas, and he sensed an opportunity.  Rabin's supporters also represented 
the camp that had long been questioning the logic of the periphery doctrine, increasingly since the mid-
1980's.  Iran had exhausted any utility as an ally to Israel, but now that Israel's more immediate threats 
had been addressed, it could be very useful as an adversary.  By presenting Iran as an existential threat, 
Israel could garner U.S. sympathy and support, while also gaining space in the peace process by 
deflecting pressure to compromise.  Further, by painting Iran as the bogeyman of the Middle East, Israel 
could help draw Arab countries toward its orbit and pull the regional center of gravity away from the 
Persian Gulf.   
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Constructing this narrative was easy to do.  Israeli leaders (Parsi 2007, 158-171) simply pointed 
to Iran's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, and instead of downplaying anti-Israeli rhetoric, they 
took it at face value, using the fiery proclamations of Iran's clerical leaders as proof that the Islamic 
Republic was irreconcilably opposed to Israel and the West.  Importantly, this shift was not based on any 
actual change of conditions with regard to Iran.  The Iranian threat was strictly about future potential.  
Instead of having to demonstrate some new development, they could argue that it had always been 
there, lurking under the surface.  This is the message that Rabin's supporters began to deliver to 
Washington, D.C. in the waning months of the Bush administration.   
Israel's shift toward animosity with Iran was a strong example of displacement and conversion.  
As with most institutional change, it was years in the making, but once the underlying conditions 
aligned, it came together very quickly.  Parsi (2007, 167) highlighted the common assertion that, "Israel 
needs an existential threat," pointing to institutional (although he did not use this word) aspects of 
Israel's founding and history.  Even if the broad application of this statement to the state of Israel is an 
over-generalization, there were certainly institutions within 1990’s Israel (notably the defense 
establishment) of which this was almost necessarily true.  If nothing else, Israel had built its relationship 
with the U.S. on the premise that it was an embattled bastion of liberal democracy in a hostile 
neighborhood.   
Assuming there is at least some merit to Israel's need for an existential threat, then when the 
Iraqi and larger Arab threat to Israel suddenly diminished, a replacement was all but inevitable.  The 
periphery doctrine was relatively easy to invert, in theoretical terms, and Iran's own actions and rhetoric 
fed perfectly into this narrative.  This displacement and conversion process also worked to the benefit of 
Israel's chief lobbying apparatus in the U.S., AIPAC.  From its inception (Parsi, 2007, 183), AIPAC had 
focused on rallying U.S. support for Israel against its Arab foes.  With Israel now making peace with the 
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Arab states, the organization was adrift.  The pivot to Iran provided a new impetus and fresh life for 
AIPAC, which renewed its lobbying activities vigorously in support of Rabin.   
Again, there was no smoking gun that pointed to the influence of constituencies in ensuring 
U.S.-Iranian hostility carried through the George H. W. Bush presidency, but these constituencies were 
clearly taking hold of the environment in which foreign policy operated for both the U.S. and Iran.  Both 
the U.S. and Iran could have benefitted from a reduction in hostilities, and their leaders inclined in this 
direction.  However, their freedom of movement was limited by the actions of domestic constituencies 
as home, as well as foreign constituencies abroad, who both soured the waters to pursue their own 
interest.  The next section will demonstrate how this state of affairs expanded during the first term of 
the Clinton administration. 
 
Dual Containment 
For all the reasons previously described, the Bush administration's tokens of goodwill fell far 
short of what the Iranians, and particularly Rafsanjani, were expecting.  Likewise, assistance with the 
hostages notwithstanding, the Iranians remained recalcitrant in their anti-American rhetoric and refusal 
to cooperate with U.S. designs for the Middle East.  In spite of this stalemate, the door for potential 
cooperation was hardly closed.  Rafsanjani was still early in his national reconstruction campaign, and 
the election of William J. Clinton to the U.S. presidency in 1992 was a surprise victory for the Democratic 
party, portending yet another opening for positive changes in the relationship between the U.S. and 
Iran.  Again, the benefits of cooperation showed promise for both sides, but instead, each side hardened 




Bill Clinton (Clinton Presidential Center 2020) campaigned for the presidency in 1992 on a 
platform based almost entirely on economic and social issues.  His predecessor, George H. W. Bush, had 
approval ratings close to 90 percent the year before, bolstered primarily by foreign policy successes that 
included the liberation of Kuwait and his administration's handling of the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union.  Clinton deftly avoided challenging Bush on his strengths, bypassing foreign policy issues where 
he could.  Clinton's election created yet another possibility for improved relations between the U.S. and 
Iran, and his administration (Litwak 2002, 185) conducted its own review with few preconceived notions 
regarding hostility toward Iran.  Parsi (2007, 163-164) pointed out that Clinton was actually surprised 
when Israeli leaders made their case for the Iranian threat; he had been expecting to hear about Iraq. 
Inexorably tied to Israeli discomfort, however, were U.S. concerns over nuclear proliferation.  
The fall of the Soviet Union suggested a safer world in which nuclear weapons would no longer play a 
key role in international politics.  North Korea, in particular, defied this prospect, and Iran (Mann 1991) 
had restarted its own nuclear program by 1991, if not earlier.  A 1992 National Intelligence Estimate 
(Sciolino 1992) published after Clinton's election warned that Iran could have an atomic weapon by the 
year 2000.  Nuclear proliferation was incompatible with the vision of globalization that the Clinton 
administration openly championed, and Iran's nuclear ambitions would add a new enduring layer to the 
conflict.  Regardless, Clinton (Indyk 2009, 32, 216) preferred the idea of engagement with countries like 
Iran and North Korea, and he offered direct talks to Iran in 1993, although he was not willing to make 
concessions to bring them to the table.  For Clinton, Iran would have to alter its behavior to see 
progress, and Iran expressed little interest in negotiating on these terms.   
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Senior State Department official Martin Indyk (who later served two terms as Ambassador to 
Israel) was the first to articulate a policy that the Clinton administration would fully adopt with regard to 
Iran.  In a May 1993 address to a pro-Israeli think tank (Indyk 1993), he laid out a post-Cold War vision 
for the Middle East similar to that already under consideration by CENTCOM.  In the wake of the Cold 
War, attempting to balance powers within the region was no longer advantageous.  The U.S. could no 
longer afford to compartmentalize issues like nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and Islamic extremism for 
the sake of maintaining the status quo.  Instead the U.S. would take a leading role in developing a 
regional order conducive to security and progress for all.  This meant using U.S. power to establish 
regional security and implement the "dual containment" of both Iraq and Iran, as the specific opponents 
of this order.  Indyk's phrase, dual containment, was quickly adopted by the administration as official 
policy.   
Another key label which entered the lexicon of U.S. policy early in the Clinton administration 
was the concept of "rogue states." U.S. national security advisor Anthony Lake (1994) advanced this idea 
in a Foreign Affairs article which envisioned a global "family of nations now committed to the pursuit of 
democratic institutions, the expansion of free markets, the peaceful settlement of conflict and the 
promotion of collective security." In contrast, he identified five nations, including Iraq and Iran, which he 
dubbed "backlash states" for choosing to stay outside this family and oppose its values.  He noted that 
these states shared a common "siege mentality," which they used to justify the pursuit of weapons of 
mass destruction. Ultimately, Lake called upon the international community to assist the U.S. in isolating 
and deterring this group of states.  Edwards (2014, 90) described how the term transitioned seamlessly 
into "rogue states," bifurcating the world into insiders and outsiders with regard to the American-led 
global order.    
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In terms of policy, however, dual containment was problematic, and Brzezinski, et al. (1997, 20) 
described this approach as "more a slogan than a strategy."  Professor Gregory Gause (1994) was an 
early critic of dual containment, arguing (among other things) that what the policy offered in terms of 
clarity and simplicity was fully negated by its practical flaws.  The U.S. would be tying itself to a fixed 
strategy in dynamic region, and it would be virtually impossible to unilaterally contain either actor, let 
alone both.  Litwak (2002, 178-180) pointed out some additional pernicious effects, first of which was 
that the category of rogue states had no objective basis other than U.S. pronouncements, nor any 
standing in international law.  This created friction with U.S. allies that chose to deal differently with 
these states on a limited or case-by-case basis.  It also reduced flexibility because, "Once a state was 
relegated to this demonized category, it became very difficult politically to pursue any strategy other 
than comprehensive containment and isolation."  
Further, the U.S. was largely alone in its efforts to contain Iran (Edwards 2014, 65), and unlike 
the case with Iraq, there were no U.N. Security Council Resolutions against the country.  Complicating 
the issue (Indyk 2009, 167-170), the U.S. had now become Iran's largest customer for oil sales by 1994, 
which did not go unnoticed, especially when Clinton attempted to enlist European partners to pressure 
Iran.  By Clinton's second term, the administration replaced dual containment in all but name with a 
policy that Brzezinski, et al. (1997, 20) described as "differentiated containment," or developing tailored 
solutions specifically for the containment of individual actors.   
Unsurprisingly, Iran did not take well to the news that had been lumped together with Iraq and 
needed to be contained under any particular policy label.  A Tehran news service (FBIS 1993, Jul 5) 
commented directly on the policy of dual containment, describing it as part of a U.S. campaign to "rule 
the world" by coercing other powerful countries into line with its wishes (It also reminded readers up 
front about the U.S. downing of Iran Air 655).  Iranian leaders and press (FBIS 1994, June 7) began to 
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refer to U.S. containment efforts rhetorically as a "hostile" and "defeated" policy.  Rafsanjani's primary 
strategy for defeating containment aligned naturally with his approach to reconstruction, a concerted 
push to rebuild economic ties with Europe and Asia.  In pursuit of this goal, Iranian leaders (FBIS 1994, 
Jun 4) painted every successful diplomatic or economic transaction with a foreign country as a victory 
over U.S. policy.  Indyk (2009, 167-170) described Iran as deliberately attempting to drive a wedge 
between the U.S. and its European allies, and Iran was successful by 1994 (FBIS 1994, Apr 18) at 
garnering multi-billion dollar credit deals with Germany and Japan, along with smaller ones from 
Switzerland, Austria, and Italy.   
Iran had also embedded itself indirectly in the U.S. economy Indyk (2009, 167-170) by selling 24 
percent of its oil exports to U.S. oil companies, who then resold it for profit on the international market.  
This was difficult for the Clinton administration to counter because U.S. business interests benefitted 
from the arrangement and argued that if the U.S. stepped out, another buyer would immediately reap 
the benefit at their expense.  However, as Maloney (2015, 229-245) described, Iran's economic situation 
was plagued by a myriad of interconnected problems that were not easily fixed.  For reasons beyond the 
scope of this work, Iran was poorly poised to either attract or benefit from foreign exchange or 
investment.  A failed 1993 attempt at exchange rate unification erased any gains that average Iranians 
felt from the country's initial post-war recovery, exposing Iran's underlying problems, and Rafsanjani's 
reconstruction program began losing steam as the economy languished.  U.S. pressure on Iran, exercised 
directly through sanctions and indirectly through influence over foreign partners, contributed to these 
woes, but it would be difficult to argue that the real source of Iran's economic problems was external. 
For the first three years of the Clinton presidency, Iran did not conduct any known terrorist 
attacks directly against the U.S., but this was not the case with regard to Israel.  These attacks were part-
and-parcel with Iran’s opposition to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.  When the Madrid talks failed 
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to produce results (Aburish 1998, 249-258), the Israelis and Palestinians conducted secret talks in Oslo, 
Sweden, which culminated in an agreement between Israel and Palestinians, essentially trading land for 
peace and for the recognition of Israel.  Arafat and Rabin (under mild coercion) famously shook hands 
on the White House lawn in September 1993.  Iranian leaders reacted furiously, and Khamenei (FBIS 
1993, Sep 16) condemned Arafat for treachery against the Palestinian cause.  Sensing a threat to their 
strategic position, Iran went, as Parsi (2007, 175-176) described, from "cold peace to cold war."  
Iran increased its support for both Hezbollah and Palestinian rejectionist groups like Hamas.  It 
also targeted Israeli interests overseas.  In June 1994 (UPI 1994), Thai officials arrested an Iranian agent 
plotting to bomb the Israeli embassy in Bangkok.  In July 1994 (Sterman 2014), Hezbollah operatives 
conducted a second bombing in Argentina, this time killing 85 people and wounding hundreds more at a 
Jewish Center in Buenos Aires.  Israeli intelligence linked the bombing directly to Iran.  The next day (BBC 
2018), in an act that would be later attributed to Iran, terrorists bombed a Panamanian passenger plane, 
killing 21, many of them Jews.  Iran (FBIS 1994, Aug 24) (FBIS 1994, Aug 20) denied its involvement in 
terrorism, blaming the Buenos Aires bombing on a U.S.-Israeli plot to discredit Iran.   
Following the November 1995 assassination of Rabin, Hezbollah and Hamas both stepped up 
their attacks against Israel (Schmemann 1996), prompting Prime Minister Shimon Peres to launch a fresh 
Israeli campaign into Lebanon.  Collateral damage from this operation caused a public relations disaster 
which brought down his government and paved the way for the election of hardliner Benjamin 
Netanyahu in May 1996.  Indyk (2009, 170-181) made the point that, while Iran was not directly 
responsible for all of the terrorist acts against Israel, its support to the groups involved and its influence 
over Syria implicated it in the entire chain of events which undermined negotiations.  For the Clinton 
administration, "the enemies of peace had proved stronger than its proponents," and Iran specifically 
highlighted itself as a prominent enemy.  Even without attacking the U.S. directly, Iran thickened the 
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institutional layer of terrorism that impeded any possibility of reconciliation.  It also justified Israel's 
newfound animosity against it to both U.S. and Israeli audiences, further entangling Israeli interest 
within the U.S.-Iranian relationship.   
In spite of this animosity, U.S. and Iranian interests briefly aligned in an oft-forgotten episode 
during Clinton's first term, the case of Bosnia.  In 1991, the U.S. pushed for a U.N. arms embargo against 
all combatants in the Bosnian civil war, a move aimed primarily at limiting the aggression of the Serbs.  
However, by 1994, it appeared that the best way to achieve a peaceful settlement was by allowing the 
Bosnian Muslims and Croats to build parity first.  At this point, the embargo was rarely enforced, and a 
number of countries, especially from the former Soviet Bloc were actively arming the Muslim side.  Iran 
joined this group as well, sending IRGC advisors (Alfoneh 2013, 230-231).  While they were not the 
primary supplier to the conflict (Cohen 1994), they also provided an estimated 1,500 tons of 
ammunition by the end of 1994.  The Clinton administration (Jehl 1995), unable to lift the embargo it 
had previously imposed, deliberately chose to look the other way and not enforce it, a fact which they 
openly admitted in April 1995.  Clinton did not endorse Iran's shipments to Bosnia, but he referred to 
them as, "understandable." This drew criticism, especially from Congress, because of fears that Iran 
would gain a foothold in Bosnia.   
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (1996) conducted an inquiry into the matter, 
essentially accusing the administration of conducting covert action without notifying Congress.  Finding 
little hard evidence to fuel a scandal, the issue passed quickly from the headlines, but this episode 
illustrated a point.  There was almost no public outcry in the U.S. over allowing the Russians or Polish to 
funnel arms into the conflict, but the Iranians were a lightning rod.  Questions posed by the Senate 
Committee recalled the investigation into the Iran Contra Affair, almost a decade prior.  If Clinton's 
officials had taken any more active a role than they did in allowing Iran's actions, they would likely have 
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found themselves in hot water.  In short, cooperation with Iran was now next to impossible, even when 
interests aligned.  The Iranians, for their part, were in no mood to collaborate, either.  Iranian leaders 
(FBIS 1994, Feb 23) (FBIS 1995, Mar 9) harshly criticized U.S. policy in both the Balkans and elsewhere, 
including the Sudan, and they attempted to supplant the U.S.-led peace effort in Bosnia by creating their 
own channel for the resolution of the conflict. 
In the midst of heightening tensions between the U.S. and Iran, Rafsanjani attempted an end 
run at engagement between the two countries.  In March 1995 (Salpukas 1995), Iran awarded a major 
oil development project (the first of its kind to a foreign company) to the U.S. company, Conoco.  This 
offer, which Slavin (2007, 183) dubbed an "exquisitely ill-timed move," drew immediate criticism from 
across the political spectrum in Washington, D.C.  Clinton (Edwards 2013, 66-67), partly in an attempt to 
avoid ceding the political initiative to Congress with regard to Iran, responded by signing two executive 
orders (Clinton 1995a) (Clinton 1995b) which sealed existing loopholes with regard to U.S.-Iranian trade, 
effectively enacting an embargo.  The first order opened with the finding that, "the actions and policies 
of the Government of Iran constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, 
foreign policy, and economy of the United States."  
This language may have been useful in justifying the "national emergency" required to enact 
such an order, but such a hyperbolic statement clearly did not reflect the actual nature of any threat 
that Iran posed to the U.S. in 1995.  The war of rhetoric had taken another step forward.  Maloney 
(2015, 236) examined the dynamics of this move on the Iranian side.  Getting the Iranian parliament to 
agree to such an unprecedented deal with the "Great Satan" cost Rafsanjani considerable political 
capital.  His motivation could have been just as nefarious as his Washington accusers claimed; a ploy to 
unravel the U.S. pressure campaign from the inside out.  It could also have been a practical move, as Iran 
clearly needed this foreign direct investment.  It could even have been a genuine attempt to reset 
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relations with Washington by using economics to drive politics.  Regardless of the motive, Rafsanjani's 
gambit backfired.  The sanctions layer of the U.S.-Iranian conflict thickened into an embargo, and 
Rafsanjani lost ground against his domestic rivals who took Clinton's response as proof of U.S. treachery 
and hostility. 
Congress was not finished ratcheting up the pressure on Iran.  Speaker of the House Newt 
Gingrich (Weiner 1996) Gingrich campaigned very publicly at the end of 1995 to earmark $18 million for 
of the intelligence budget for covert action against Iran, holding up the passage of the entire document 
over this issue.  The money was intended for a campaign to "change the nature of the Government of 
Iran," an obvious affront to the 1981 Algiers Accord which pledged non-interference in Iran's internal 
affairs.  The Clinton administration (Edwards 2013, 68) successfully changed the target of the campaign 
to Iran's policies as opposed to its actual government, but the insult had been deployed.  Not to be 
outdone, the Iranian government (Weiner 1996) allocated $20 million to "counter the Great Satan." 
Congress then went on to pass the Iran Libya Sanctions Act (U.S. Congress 1996) which became law in 
August 1996 and created a mechanism for imposing U.S. sanctions on foreign companies that did 
business with Iran.  This act was extremely controversial (Ibrahim 1996) with America's European 
partners, who considered them a violation of international law, however, Pollack (2004, 288) argued 
that this act was remarkably effective in frightening away international investment from Iran over the 
next several years.  In effect, the U.S. had now unilaterally imposed international sanctions against Iran, 
constraining its options and further thickening this layer of institutional conflict.   
In the midst of this controversy, terrorism again reared its head within the institutional 
development of the U.S.-Iranian conflict.  On June 25, 1996 (Downing 1996, viii), a truck bomb 
detonated outside the Khobar Towers barracks facility in Dharhan, Saudi Arabia, which housed U.S. 
forces deployed in support of U.S. air operations over Iraq.  The bomb killed 19 U.S. personnel and 
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wounded an estimated 500 more.  The U.S. conducted an extensive investigation (Crist 2012, 405), led 
by the FBI, but it took several years of wrestling with the Saudi government to gain access to necessary 
evidence.  Communications intercepts allegedly confirmed the involvement of high-level Iranian leaders 
and the approval of the Supreme Leader, but this was not publicly disclosed.  The FBI investigation led to 
the indictment (in abstentia) (Grand Jury… 2001) of a Saudi Arabian Hezbollah cell, led by Ahmed al-
Mughassil.  This group (Riedel 2016) had trained with Lebanese Hezbollah under the tutelage of the 
IRGC, and al-Mughassil ran operations throughout the 1990's from an Iranian-controlled mosque in 
Damascus.   
Intelligence officials later apprehended al-Mughassil in Beirut in August 2015 after travelling 
under alias on an Iranian passport from Tehran, where he had apparently been sheltered.  It is possible 
(Soufan 2015) that Iran gave up al-Mughassil as some part of the nuclear negotiations with Washington, 
but they utility of hiding this fugitive may also have simply expired.  In some ways, Iran's culpability in 
this attack became even more entrenched in the U.S.-Iranian conflict than it otherwise might because of 
the drawn-out way in which the case unfolded.  Instead of an initial flurry of headlines, discussions and 
revelations continued for years. 
One of effects of this convoluted process was the development of a dissenting view that Iran 
was not responsible for the attacks, and Saudi Arabia framed Iran in order to draw attention away from 
Al-Qaeda, whom it was unwilling to confront.  Journalist Garreth Porter (2009a-e) has been one of the 
chief proponents of this theory, detailing a laundry list of irregularities with regard to the way the 
investigation was handled.  Porter's work relied only on publicly available information and circumstantial 
evidence, though, and while some authors still question Iran's involvement, the official results of the 
investigation have yet to be disproven.  A detailed analysis of this controversy is beyond the scope of 
this work, but what Porter's contributions strongly suggest is that the decision to conduct this attack 
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took place within the darkest recesses of factional politics of Iran.  Rafsanjani himself may not have been 
privy to the bombing plans or may have dissented.  What is completely clear is that operatives 
sponsored by the IRGC conducted extensive and detailed target surveillance of U.S. facilities including 
Khobar Towers prior to the incident.  Even if Iranian leaders did not order the attack, so they certainly 
implicated themselves.  A perverse effect of the extended controversy was that the Khobar Towers 
bombing would be rehashed for decades instead of sliding out of memory.  Regardless of who ordered 
the attack, Iran would bear the blame every time the subject came up. 
At face value, this time period reads like a laundry list of escalating grievances on both sides, but 
tit-for-tat explanations do not explain the cycle of hostility.  Why did a Clinton administration initially 
bent on improving relations so quickly fall into a policy of deliberately isolating Iran?  No particular event 
(or any development not already apparent at the end of the Bush administration) prompted this change, 
and while the U.S. made concessions to North Korea to curb its nuclear ambitions, it did no such thing 
for Iran.  Why was cooperation with Iran over Bosnia such a non-starter, despite converging interest?  
How come, even though the U.S. was Iran’s best customer for oil, a proposed investment deal for a U.S. 
corporation became a political lightening rod that led the President and Congress into a competition to 
see who could be tougher on Iran?  On the Iranian side, why did clerical leaders fight Rafsanjani’s 
economic engagement efforts at every turn and excoriate him for making the attempts?  Why did the 
Iranians so viciously oppose the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians, furthering their own 
isolation for dubious returns?  Finally, why would Iranian leaders support the bombing of Khobar Towers 
but then forego any attempt to exploit the attack for strategic gain, almost as if it were an accident 
instead of a calculated move?  These questions and inconsistencies only begin to make sense when one 
considers that another game was operating under the surface.  Institutional forces were building 
constituencies with an increasing interest in perpetuating the conflict. 
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The institutional development of constituencies  
As the decade progressed, relations between the U.S. and Iran continued to sour, driven 
increasingly by the actions of constituencies.  Both Clinton and Rafsanjani openly preferred improved 
relations, but they found themselves constrained by powerful actors bent on shaping the environment 
toward continued hostility.  In Iran, the clerical establishment, and especially the IRGC and clerical 
security forces, took a more active role in undermining the relationship.  On the U.S. side, CENTCOM and 
the state of Israel continued the activities started under the Bush administration.  Finally, this period 
saw the emergence of a powerful new constituency, the U.S. Congress. 
Rafsanjani's overtures to the West, and especially the U.S., failed for a number of reasons, but 
resistance from the clerical establishment was chief among them.  Radical leaders (Maloney 2015, 223-
227) opposed Rafsanjani for ideological reasons, arguing that liberalism was selling out Iran and the 
principles of the revolution, opening Iran to predation by the West.  These voices were largely muted by 
1992, but they were by no means eliminated, and opponents were happy to see Rafsanjani's initiatives 
fail.  Other clerics, as previously pointed out, had developed a financial stake in Iran's economy, and they 
preferred to leave barriers in place that shielded their own position, even at the expense of general 
prosperity.  The constitution of the Islamic Republic (Economist Intelligence Unit 2006) enshrined 
prohibitions that prevented foreign ownership of Iranian assets, rules that greatly complicated foreign 
direct investment because the Iranian government could not offer terms to foreign companies that were 
favorable enough to offset the perceived risks of investing in Iran.  The Iranians felt this most acutely in 
their oil industry (Stern 2007), as domestic companies lacked the capacity to develop Iran's oil 
infrastructure and maximize the country's earning potential.   
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Indyk (2009, 168-170) described the conservative-controlled Iranian parliament as an "unlikely 
ally" to Clinton administration attempts to isolate Iran.  Even before the U.S. began implementing truly 
effective sanctions, the parliament stymied Rafsanjani's overtures to foreign investors.  The Conoco deal 
was a notable exception and a temporary victory for Rafsanjani.  The broad-based backlash from the 
U.S. government discredited Rafsanjani's already flagging attempts to use external engagement to 
support internal reconstruction.  Much as U.S. democrats would blame Iran for the political demise of 
Jimmy Carter, Iranian leaders could point to the U.S. as the downfall of Rafsanjani and make the point 
that engagement was a recipe for failure.  Iran's domestic politics again became more deeply layered 
into the U.S.-Iranian relationship, and the clerical establishment was stronger as a constituent than ever.   
The IRGC and clerical security forces also did their part to help ensure that rapprochement 
between the U.S. and Iran was a non-starter.  To begin with, they restarted Iran’s nuclear program, and 
while Iranian leaders had declared that they had no intention of building nuclear weapons, the U.S. 
assessed that Iran was only a few short years from this capability.  Parsi (2017, 17-18) argued that Iran 
actually started this effort toward the end of the Iran-Iraq War because it feared a renewed conflict with 
Iraq.  Iranian leaders believed that their country would be unable to sustain another conventional war 
and would need weapons of mass destruction in order to prevail.  However, the 1991 Gulf War 
effectively neutered Iraq's offensive capabilities and left Saddam Hussein internationally isolated.  Iran's 
motivation (Pollack 2004, 259) for continuing the program after this point can only have been to 
increase its leverage against the U.S., and possibly Israel.   
Additionally, the IRGC (Crist 2012, 396-397) began a conventional military buildup that 
approximately doubled its arms expenditures between 1990 and 1993.  This included (Sale 2009, 173-
174) Russian MiG-29 fighters, two hundred T-72 tanks, and three Kilo-class submarines.  Most 
worryingly for the U.S., the IRGC expanded Iran’s ballistic missile program, which its leaders viewed as 
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the lynchpin of the country's deterrence strategy against all external threats.  Although Iran's nuclear 
program (Hunter 2010, 64-65) would not become the primary bone of contention between the U.S. and 
Iran for another decade (it was now a convenient justification for animosity but not yet the driver), Iran 
laid the groundwork for future hostility by adding the nuclear layer to the relationship.  Adding ballistic 
missiles to the mix only exacerbated this effect. 
More immediately damaging to the U.S.-Iranian relationship during this period, the IRGC and 
clerical security forces thickened the terrorism layer.  Iran's worldwide plots against Israel did not incur 
U.S. retribution, but they solidified its association with terrorism.  Iran was not a policy priority for 
Clinton (much like Bush before him), but the Israeli-Palestinian peace process was a symbol of American 
global leadership.  By openly inserting itself as a spoiler in the process, Iran solidified its position as a 
"rogue state" in that emerging unipolar order, and the IRGC led the way in this effort.  Crist (2012, 402-
403) also pointed out that, while Iran's agents often kept a lower profile during this period, they were 
quite active behind the scenes.  They concocted plots in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, and they conducted 
detailed target surveillance of U.S. personnel and facilities in the region.  Indyk (2009, 171) pointed out 
that they even initiated plans to surveil American officials within the continental U.S., although this 
apparently never came to fruition.  Aside from the training and support that the IRGC provided to 
Bosnian Muslims (Risen and McManus 1996), they also made significant inroads into Sudan (Kempster 
1993).  Sudan became a crossroads for radical Islamic groups of all stripes (National Commission… 2004, 
57), and while Iranian ties to Al-Qaeda have been debated, the IRGC shared close proximity and had 
friends in common with Bin Laden's group.  This nexus was only one example of the murky relationships 
that would later fuel accusations (Stewart 2010) of Iranian support to Al-Qaeda.   
The Khobar Towers bombing was the outlier, in that Iran sponsored a major attack which killed 
and wounded a large number of U.S. personnel.  It was also different, because unlike the Lebanon 
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bombings, for which Iran's denials only thinly masked a gloating satisfaction, Iranian officials were more 
muted in their response.  Porter (2009a-e) quoted Iranian officials who coolly explained that Iran had no 
motivation for such an act.  Given the ongoing controversy over the sanctions imposed in 1995 and 
1996, this may not have been entirely accurate.  However, aside from a vindictive act of retribution, it is 
hard to imagine any calculated gain that Iranian leaders expected to achieve.  Assuming that Iranians 
were responsible, this suggest that the right hand was operating independently of the left - a clear case 
of factionalism at work.  This assessment fully supports the assertion of this dissertation that 
constituencies to a conflict will utilize any available opportunity to continue hostilities, even to the 
detriment of the states and societies from which they derive.  By some accounts (Pollack 2004, 289), 
Khobar Towers drove the Clinton administration to the brink of military strikes against Iran by 1997, and 
it certainly hampered later efforts to engage with President Khatami. 
The key Israeli role in pressing the U.S. government during the Clinton administration has 
already been explained.  AIPAC carried the banner for Rabin, working both sides of the political aisle to 
beat the drum against Iran during the 1990's.  Curiously, however, Parsi (2007, 188, 193-206) explained 
that Benjamin Netanyahu, who came to power in the Spring of 1996, ratcheted down Israeli hostility 
toward Iran.  Based upon a complicated short-term interest calculation, Netanyahu decided that conflict 
with Iran was counterproductive to his domestic goals, which included dismantling the Oslo agreement 
with the Palestinians.  With a permanent solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict off the table, Iran was 
happy to oblige Netanyahu and lower its own rhetoric and hostility.  For the U.S.-Iranian relationship, 
however, the train had left the station.  AIPAC still campaigned hard for the ILSA, which did not become 
law until two months after Netanyahu took office.  In light of Khobar Towers, American leaders were 
little interested in the nuances of the dance between Israel and Iran, and neither Hezbollah nor Hamas 
stood down because Iranian and Israeli leaders took a breather.  Netanyahu's decision was a tactical 
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choice, but it did not alter the underlying structural conditions for the U.S., Israel or Iran, and the Israeli 
layer of the U.S.-Iranian relationship only thickened during this period. 
CENTCOM's role in building institutional animosity during this period was again subtle, but it 
was significant, nonetheless.  Cordesman (1997, 47-55) explained that the "peace dividend" from the 
end of the Cold War, along with Clinton's promises to focus on the domestic economy, led to significant 
reductions in military spending during the early 1990's.  Faced with cuts in overall military end-strength, 
CENTCOM looked for ways to improve the efficiency of its crisis response capabilities.  This resulted in a 
new strategy focused on early intervention which would apply the full spectrum of U.S. combat 
superiority to a conflict during the initial stages and require a less extensive buildup than the earlier Gulf 
War to conduct major campaigns.  Paradoxically, the reduction in U.S. military power led to a bolstering 
of CENTCOM's forward presence instead of a draw-down.  Troop levels on-land remained approximately 
constant, but these forces moved from a caretaker orientation to a combat mission, with improved 
equipment and longer logistical tails, including a small army of contractors.  CENTCOM increased its 
offshore naval presence and air capabilities.  In spite of Bush's promises during the buildup to the Gulf 
War that the U.S. had no intention of staying in the region, CENTCOM had established itself as a 
permanent fixture in Iran's neighborhood.   
This increased presence did not go entirely unchallenged.  Sunni militants, primarily under the 
direction of Al-Qaeda, conducted a series of attacks in the greater Middle East region throughout the 
decade, but Khobar Towers was the deadliest attack against U.S. forces.  While the FBI was working with 
the Saudi government to determine responsibility for the attacks, the military and Congress conducted 
their own high-profile inquiries into the incident (Downing 1996) (House National Security Committee 
1996), focused instead on the ability to defend against terrorist threats.  Tellingly, these reports never 
questioned the underlying wisdom of a U.S. forward-deployed presence in the Persian Gulf.  The focus 
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was on holding commanders responsible at all levels and pressing host nations to take a more active 
role in protecting U.S. forces.  The combined result was to turn U.S. facilities across the region into 
virtual fortresses, a trend that would continue for decades to come.  Not only had the U.S. moved into 
Iran's neighborhood, but it was establishing fortified garrisons. 
Crist (2012, 396-400) highlighted an often-overlooked episode in the conflict between the U.S. 
and Iran.  Stemming from a 1994 CENTCOM assessment which noted Iran's increasing conventional and 
missile capabilities in the Gulf, the command began an aggressive series of large-scale amphibious 
exercises throughout the region, lasting into 1995.  Instead of having a deterring effect on Iran, the IRGC 
prepared for war by reinforcing their Persian Gulf islands with forward-deployed troops and both anti-
ship and anti-aircraft missiles.  CENTCOM also noted that unlike previous occasions, the Iranians readied 
their missiles for firing by putting them on their launchers.  Not wanting further escalation, Clinton 
downplayed the situation publicly, but Secretary of Defense William Perry quietly directed the command 
to develop plans for a war with Iran.  Iran had displaced both the Soviet Union and Iraq as America's 
most likely adversary in a future war, and CENTCOM owed its place of prominence within the national 
security establishment to the Islamic Republic.   
One of the highest-profile constituencies to the U.S.-Iranian conflict also emerged during this 
period, as well, the U.S. Congress.  One could argue that the Israeli lobby bore responsibility for turning 
Congress against Iran during the Clinton administration, as AIPAC shifted focus.  However, Congress 
introduced the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 (U.S. Congress 1992 - enacted with the 
Defense Authorization Act), aimed primarily at limiting Iran, before Rabin's election, and it was 
enshrined in law before Israel's pivot against Iran took effect.  In fact, after the developments of the 
1980's, Iran had no friends on either side of the political aisle, and U.S. lawmakers needed little prodding 
to pressure Iran.   
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Edwards (2014, 109-113) explained that a key shift took place in 1994, when Republicans won 
control of both houses of Congress for the first time since the Fall of the Shah.  Foreign policy, especially 
Iran, was in no way central to the Republican victory or their "contract with America." However, the up-
and-coming generation of Republicans leaned against multilateralism and preferred assertions of U.S. 
strength and sovereignty on the world stage, and they favored hardline policies against "rogue states," 
in general.  Relishing a newfound position of strength, congressional leaders such as House Speaker 
Newt Gingrich were keen on pressuring the Clinton administration at any convenient point of leverage.  
Iran proved to be an ideal bludgeon for the Republican Congress.  The Islamic Republic had been so 
demonized in popular opinion that being "hard on Iran" carried no political downside, especially for 
Senators and Congressmen who were not directly responsible for American foreign policy, like the 
President.  Being "soft on Iran" was a political liability, especially in light of AIPAC's efforts, so even for 
democrats, this was not the hill they were willing to die on.   
Rafsanjani's bid to bring Conoco into the Iranian oil industry unfolded only weeks after the 
inauguration of this key power shift in Congress, and Edwards (2014, 65-69) argued that the ensuing 
series of actions against Iran were as much about domestic politics as they were about Iran's actions.  By 
beating the drum against Iran, Gingrich was able to challenge Clinton for the initiative in foreign policy.  
The bills that Republicans proposed during this time would have limited Clinton's flexibility in dealing 
with a broad range of issues, beyond simply Iran, and they would have tread on the traditional 
prerogatives of the executive.  Gingrich, on the other hand, had little to lose by pushing Iran too far, as 
Clinton would be left holding the bag.  The Clinton administration's executive orders were an attempt to 
head this off and demonstrate that Congressional action was not required to address Iran.  In a manner 
slightly reminiscent of Khomeini's competition with his leftist rivals in 1979 and 1980, both sides 
competed to be more radical in their stance toward Iran.  Although Clinton clearly preferred a more 
measured and pragmatic approach, the Islamic Republic was not a policy priority worth squandering 
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political capital over.  Just as in Iran, factional interests made productive engagement impossible, and 
constituencies to the conflict carried the day.   
 The conflict between the U.S. and Iran now had five living and active constituencies.  All five 
developed clearly defined interests in continuing hostility between the U.S. and Iran and preventing any 
form of rapprochement.  They all played a role, often taking turns for the lead, in crafting an 
environment unsuitable for peace.  However, while constituencies may shape conditions, they do not 
necessarily control events.  A surprise electoral outcome in Iran would provide a new opening to 
challenge the power of the constituencies to dictate outcomes.   
 
Khatami - A New Hope? 
If Clinton's 1992 victory was a welcome surprise to proponents of rapprochement between the 
U.S. and Iran, (Seyyed) Mohammad Khatami's election to the Iranian presidency in 1997 promised to be 
a game changer.  A champion of democracy and freedom of the press, Khatami's rhetoric suggested that 
perhaps Iran's revolution had finally reached its long-awaited "Thermidorian phase" (Axworthy 2013, 
306).  While not conciliatory toward the U.S., per se, Khatami (Gheissari and Nasr 2006, 128-134) 
advocated what he called a "dialogue of civilizations," in which Iran and the Western nations could work 
out their differences on the basis of reason and mutual respect.  Most importantly, Khatami's victory 
awakened U.S. audiences to the fact that Iran's population, especially an up-and-coming generation of 
youth, did not necessarily share the radical vision of their hardline leaders.  This development came at a 
time when the conflict with Iran was beginning to cost the U.S. financially and diplomatically, drawing 
domestic criticism (Litwak 2002, 186-187), and Iran’s isolation was beginning to threaten the credibility 
of its own leaders with a restive populace.  Yet for all this promise, the relationship between the U.S. 
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and Iran hardly improved, and constituencies to the conflict continued to block potential openings for 
reconciliation and complicate the relationship through various forms of layering.   
 
What happened? 
The 1997 Presidential election in Iran occurred a time of demographic transition.  More than 
half of Iranians (Abdo and Lyons 2003, 82) were born after 1979 or were too young to remember the fall 
of the Shah.  For many, the Iran-Iraq War and even Khomeini, himself, were only childhood memories.  
Iranian society had become far more educated and cosmopolitan since the revolution, and women 
began to slightly outnumber men in Iranian universities.  Meanwhile (Gheissari and Nasr 2006, 128-133), 
Rafsanjani's administration presided over a flagging economy and rising corruption that limited 
opportunities for most young Iranians, along with increased international isolation.  By defeating his 
leftist rivals in the early 1990's (Abdo and Lyons 2003, 84), Rafsanjani made himself a captive to the 
conservative clerics that came to dominate the government, paving the way for domestic repression 
that caused popular resentment.  Up to this point, politics in Iran had been a game that played out 
among the revolutionary elites who stage managed elections for predictable outcomes – “democracy” 
without popular representation.  Przeworski (2003, 15) argued that (unbridled) democracy is a tool that 
provides a society (both citizens and leaders) with crucial information about itself - where values and 
preferences lie.  Autocratic regimes lack this information, and by haltering Iran's democratic process for 
so long, the country's clerical leadership had left itself blind to the groundswell of discontent that swept 
Khatami to the presidency over conservative favorite Nateq-Nouri.   
Khatami himself was an often-misinterpreted figure.  Dubbed "Ayatollah Gorbachev" (Maloney 
2015, 258) by supporters and opponents alike, both sides pinned their hopes and fears upon Iran's new 
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president.  The country's budding reform movement (Hoveyda 2002, 208-209), still heavily suppressed 
by the state, adopted Khatami as their symbolic leader, hoping to reverse the autocratic nature of the 
regime in favor of genuine liberalism.  Iran's hardliners quickly sensed a danger that Khatami could 
undermine the foundations of their own power.  However, as pointed out by Abdo and Lyons (2003, 83-
87), Khatami and his immediate supporters hailed from the same camp of leftist clerics that Rafsanjani 
and Khatami had sidelined in 1992.  They were not anti-regime dissidents, but products of the revolution 
and supporters of both Khomeini and valayat-e-faqih.  What Khatami advocated was a more moderate 
vision of the Islamic Republic; a change of behavior versus a change of nature.  Although Khatami did 
push a liberal agenda (Majd 2008, 53), he invariably chose the path of reforming the Islamic Republic 
from within.  As authors such as Hoveyda (2002, 207-210) argued, this made Khatami a disappointing 
champion for Iran's reformers.  Regardless, the optimism surrounding Khatami in 1997 extended to 
foreign policy, and many observers expected a significant thaw in relations between the U.S. and Iran. 
For the U.S., relations with Iran had reached their lowest point since the end of the Iran-Iraq 
War.  The Clinton administration and Congress were competing to isolate Iran, and revelations from the 
Khobar Towers investigation pointed increasingly toward Iranian culpability.  In one narrative, Pollack 
(2004, 289-292) described the U.S. as having come to the brink of war with Iran, also mentioning a U.S. 
intelligence operation which deliberately "outed" Iranian agents worldwide in retaliation for Iranian 
surveillance.  Interestingly, Litwak (2002, 186-187) challenged this narrative for the exact same time 
period, noting that there were a lot of commentators outside the U.S. government questioning Clinton's 
hardline approach against Iran, especially because sanctions had failed to generate international 
support.  This disconnect lends support to the assertion that constituencies on the U.S. side had inflated 
the importance of the confronting Iran, but either way, Khatami's election reset the game.   
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Clinton (Mitchell 1997) openly welcomed Khatami's election describing the situation as 
"hopeful," but he was also cautious (Pollack 2004, 314), stipulating that any talks would have to be 
openly acknowledged. Sale (2009, 237-238) explained that, behind closed doors, both the Clinton 
administration and Saudi Arabia deliberately tamped down the investigation into Khobar Towers, the 
Saudis by ending their communication with the investigators and Clinton by personally ordering the 
National Security Documents related to the incident sealed.  Indyk (2009, 217) pointed out that, if 
Khatami was truly keen on changing the behavior of the Iranian state, then Clinton was inclined to 
support those efforts at a "deliberate pace." 
Khatami started his administration with a flurry of positive signals.  The New York Times (1997) 
covered a press conference during the first week after his election and noted that the rhetoric he used 
was fairly standard for an Iranian leader, blaming the U.S. for the conflict between the two nations.  
However, Pollack (2004, 314-315) pointed out subtle differences that spoke volumes to his Iranian 
audience, such as denouncing terrorism and openly addressing the U.S. as the "great American people." 
In January 1998, Khatami gave an unprecedented interview to CNN journalist Christiane Amanpour (CNN 
1998), where he offered a respectful and somewhat conciliatory message to the American people.  He 
denounced all forms of violence and explained his concept for a "dialogue of civilizations," which should 
start outside of government channels through multi-layer interactions at the societal level.  In the 
coming months (Pollack 2004, 317), he would back this up by blessing the travel of a number of 
academics and other non-official delegates to the U.S., where they began feeling out the U.S. position 
with regard to Iran.   
Khamenei (Indyk 2009, 220-221) was not openly supportive, and he denounced any suggestion 
of talks with the U.S. a week after Khatami's interview, but he apparently acceded to the new change of 
direction.  Iran started interdicting the Iraqi oil smuggling operations that it had previously allowed to 
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pass through its waters.  Khatami's change in tone extended to Israel, as well.  That same month, Yasser 
Arafat (Albright, et al. 2003, 320) showed U.S. officials a letter from Khatami that supported Palestinian 
participation in the peace process and recognized Israel's right to exist.  In February 1998 (Pollack 2004, 
318), one of Khatami's vice presidents gave the first interview by an official of the Islamic Republic to an 
Israeli news outlet, Yediot Aharanot.   
The Clinton administration, in accordance with its measured approach, began a series of small 
but meaningful gestures to Iran.  Clinton (Pollack 2004, 319-320) sent a message to Iran's leaders 
through the Swiss delegation, calling for an open dialogue with no preconditions.  When Khatami did not 
respond, the administration assumed that hardliners must have interfered.  Clinton then attempted to 
open a line of communication directly with Khatami, first through Saudi Arabia and later through Oman, 
hoping to bypass Iran's clerical establishment.  Meanwhile, in October 1997 (Indyk 2009, 220, 222), the 
State Department took the symbolic step of adding the MEK to its list of foreign terrorist groups.  In 
January 1998, responding to Khatami's interview, Clinton sent an Id al-Fitr message to the Iranian 
people.  He also eased travel restrictions for Iranians, which facilitated Khatami's informal delegates.  In 
February (Slavin 2007, 185), an American wrestling team competed in Iran.  In May, the Clinton 
administration declined to impose secondary sanctions on French oil company Total for investing in 
Iran's oil industry, and further negotiations led to waivers for other European companies to do business 
with Iran.   
In June (Albright, et al. 2003, 320), Secretary of State Madeleine Albright gave a speech in which 
she called for a path to normalization between the U.S. and Iran and acknowledged that Iran had 
legitimate grievances.  Iran's foreign minister (Sciolino 1998) directly rejected this offer, stating that the 
U.S. needed to end its "punitive" policies against Iran before any engagement could proceed.  In 
September, Albright participated in a regional working group on Afghanistan, in which Iranians were also 
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a part.  However, Iran deliberately avoided sending senior officials, and those in attendance avoided 
contact with the U.S.  In December (Pollack 2004, 322), the State Department removed Iran from its list 
of major states involved in the production and trafficking of narcotics.  While Clinton remained hopeful, 
U.S. overtures gained little positive traction in 1998. 
Clinton's next push with regard to improving U.S.-Iranian relations (Indyk 2009, 224) came as 
Khatami faced mounting domestic pressure from hardline opponents.  Hoping to bolster reformists, 
Clinton gave a speech in April 1999 that again acknowledged the legitimacy of historic Iranian grievances 
against the U.S., a quasi-apology for the Mossadegh coup.  He also relaxed sanctions on a number of 
food, medical and humanitarian items.  Shortly after this attempt, however, the specter of Khobar 
Towers again cast a shadow on the relationship (Pollack 2004, 324-325, 338).  Saudi Arabia handed U.S. 
officials their completed case, including all of the evidence that decisively implicated Iran.  Clinton was 
forced to address this issue but did not want to allow it to derail any progress in the rapprochement 
process.  Clinton asked Omani officials to deliver a letter directly to Khatami, requesting that Iran take 
responsibility for the incident and prosecute those responsible.  It is unlikely that this letter went 
straight to Khatami without additional clerical scrutiny.  Iranian officials flatly denied the incident and 
responded by reminding the U.S. of Iran Air 655 and the money that Congress had recently appropriated 
for covert action against the Islamic Republic.  The Summer of 1999 saw a major demonstration by the 
reform movement forcefully suppressed by hardliners in Iran, and Clinton's olive branch produced little.  
Iran stopped interdicting Iraqi oil smuggling, they continued support for Hezbollah (Albright, et al. 2003, 
323), and their clandestine nuclear program remained a concern.   
Clinton's last major effort toward rapprochement (Pollack 2004, 338-340) occurred in March 
2000.  Sensing an opening after the reformist victory in the February parliament elections, Albright gave 
a pivotal speech at the Iranian American Council in which she apologized for the 1953 coup, announced 
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the lifting of import bans on foodstuffs and carpets, and openly welcomed engagement.  The speech fell 
flat, possibly in part because of its caveats which included a reference to "unelected hands," a poorly 
veiled dig at the power of the Supreme Leader.  Ten days later, Khamanei lashed out at Albright and 
rejected the offer.  That Fall, Clinton and Albright (Albright, et al. 2003, 325) made one more gesture to 
Iran, sitting through Khatami's speech at the U.N.  The speech offered no new openings, and Iranian 
officials avoided engagement with the Americans.  While Rafsanjani had suffered from a poor sense of 
timing in his attempt to push the Conoco deal in 1995, Clinton's officials had failed to read Iranian 
domestic politics.  The zenith of Khatami's potential for affecting change in Iran had passed by the time 
Clinton made his full-court press.   
Khatami's election put the Iranian clerical establishment off guard, giving him some room for 
maneuver at the beginning of his administration.  He scored some initial gains (Pollack 2004, 313-314), 
securing key cabinet appointments and confronting the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) 
(which technically fell under his purview as president) over its controversial and repressive activities.  He 
replaced its hardline leader, and while Khatami did not control the IRGC, he convinced Khamenei to 
replace its long-time commander, Mohsen Rezai.  Khatami's primary focus (Hunter 2014, 162), though, 
was on opening the space for cultural and political expression.  Iranians' newfound freedom led to a 
proliferation of new press and media outlets across the country, and the previously suppressed reform 
movement began to articulate alternate visions for the Islamic Republic.   
It did not take long, however, for Iran's clerical establishment to recognize this threat to their 
grip on power.  By late 1997 (Pollack 2004, 327-331), hardline factions started sending vigilantes to 
intimidate outspoken reformers, and by the Fall of 1998, the judiciary started arresting and prosecuting 
people associated with reform publications.  In late 1998 and early 1999, vigilantes performed a series 
of "serial killings" against reformist leaders.  In perhaps one of the greatest victories of the reform 
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movement, Khatami ordered investigations that linked the murders directly to the MOIS and to fatwas 
issued by leading clerics.  The ensuing scandal led to a purge of the MOIS which cleared out 80 percent 
of personnel and put a halt on its nefarious activities (the IRGC would quickly fill this void).  
Unfortunately, the clerical establishment was not giving any ground. 
In July 1999 (Maloney 2015, 285), the parliament passed a bill that clawed back Iranians' newly 
won press freedoms and shut down a popular newspaper.  Reformers began a large-scale 
demonstration at Tehran University which sparked others across 18 cities.  Iran's activists clearly hoped 
that Khatami would support their efforts, but they were bitterly disappointed.  Abdo and Lyons (2003, 
201-207) stressed that this sort of confrontation was never consistent with Khatami's approach to 
reform.  He distanced himself from the demonstrations and stood by as Iran's security forces and their 
vigilante partners violently suppressed the uprising, killing and wounding an unknown number and 
arresting approximately 1,400 individuals.  This marked a decisive turning point, both for the reform 
movement and for Khatami's presidency.  Activism would continue, but it would operate within tightly 
constricted and ill-defined boundaries, that the hardliners would move periodically to exert their 
dominance.  The February 2000 (Sachs 2000) election swept reformers to victory in parliament, but the 
Guardian Council (controlled by the Supreme leader) was more than prepared to block any attempt at 
meaningful change.   
The U.S.-Iranian relationship played against the backdrop of this unprecedented power struggle 
in Iran, and the Clinton administration was well aware of these developments (Indyk 2014, 222-224), if 
not fully cognizant of the forces behind them.  Clinton and Khatami both apparently desired some form 
of rapprochement, but this was not the priority for either administration.  Albright (et al. 2003, 319-327) 
devoted nine pages of her memoir, which totaled over 500 pages, to this episode - more than James 
Baker from the Bush administration, but little more than an anecdote overall.  A host of other domestic 
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and international issues consumed Clinton's attention throughout his second term, not the least of 
which were his own impeachment (Henneberger 1998) and a major bombing campaign against Iraq.  On 
the other side, Khatami found himself in a political knife fight as soon as he was elected, and unlike 
Rafsanjani before him, he did not relish the contest.  The battles he chose clearly reflected domestic 
priorities.  The results of this apparently historic opportunity to rebuild relations were negligible.   
Clinton and Khatami arguably tried harder during this period to reconcile than any other U.S. or 
Iranian leader at any other point in the 40-year history of the conflict.  Both sides recognized the 
benefits of reduced hostilities and made historically significant conciliatory gestures.  Instead of 
changing the dynamic between the U.S. and Iran, however, the events of the period further entrenched 
hostility.  The conflict’s constituencies had made the environment inhospitable for peace, and this only 
grew through the end of Clinton’s presidency.   
 
The institutional development of constituencies  
It would be convenient for the argument of this dissertation if each of the five identified 
constituencies to the U.S.-Iranian conflict had specifically and deliberately torpedoed rapprochement 
during this time period.  Instead, it appears that the hopes suggested by Khatami's election largely 
became collateral damage from domestic constituencies fighting for their interests on both sides.  This 
indirect manner of operation is often characteristic of institutional processes working behind the scenes.  
Each constituency was active during this period, and the decisions and events that occurred throughout 
this episode had enduring consequences for the future path dependency of the conflict.  The process of 
layering continued unabated throughout. 
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Of the constituencies to the conflict between the U.S. and Iran, Iran's clerical establishment was 
the most open and active in undermining any positive momentum.  Recognizing that the tides of public 
opinion had changed, and assuming that Khatami was loyal to Khomeini's vision for Iran, Khamenei 
initially gave Khatami some room to run.  This did not mean that he endorsed Khatami's "dialogue of 
civilizations.”  The only changes to Khamenei's rhetoric against the U.S. were variations in frequency.  
Abdo and Lyons (2003, 265) cited an especially pointed editorial from a hardline newspaper in 1999 
stating that, in their translation, "to give up the struggle against America was to give up everything." 
Accordingly, Khamenei and his supporters denounced every overture that the Clinton administration 
made, except the ones they ignored.  Iranian officials were clearly prohibited from engaging with U.S. 
counterparts.  Iran's foreign minister explained in 1998 (Sciolino 1998) that his country would not hold 
talks with the U.S. until America dropped all of its "punitive" measures against Iran.  In fact, by the time 
Clinton issued his March 2000 apology, the U.S. had relaxed most of its sanctions, in practice if not in 
principle.  The U.S. was out of the Iranian oil market, but Iran had other investors available.  It is difficult 
to imagine how much more the Clinton administration could reasonably have done or how much it 
would have taken to pique Khamenei's interest.  Aside from temporarily interdicting the flow of 
smuggled Iraqi oil, the Iranians simply made no effort.   
A likely explanation for Iran's turn from open hostility to passive aggressiveness was that the 
clerical establishment's attention was focused on the domestic struggle.  As media outlets blossomed 
(Gheissari and Nasr 2006, 135-140), it quickly became apparent that the very foundations of Khomeini's 
vision were being called into question – a clear threat to the power and privilege this class had attained.  
Violence and repression were the first ports of call, but the clerics could not solve their legitimacy 
problem this way, especially as the population had developed a newfound taste for public 
accountability.  The next best option was to discredit Khatami at every turn.  In one particular area, the 
economy, Khatami made himself vulnerable.  His lack of focus and expertise in this area meant that the 
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economic doldrums of the Rafsanjani era would haunt his administration, as well.  Just as importantly, 
though, undermining Khatami's "dialogue of civilizations" was a cornerstone of their strategy.  It was less 
important to hardliners whether the U.S. and Iran ever sat down and talked than it was to ensure that 
Khatami could not take credit for it.  Eventually, the hardline camp would develop an alternative political 
vision to actively compete with the reform movement (leading to the rise of Ahmadinejad), but until 
that time, Khatami could not be allowed any gains.  The U.S.-Iranian relationship had become a captive 
of internal Iranian politics, and this added a layer to the domestic political layers already in place.   
The IRGC were less visible in the U.S.-Iranian conflict during this period, but institutional forces 
were still at work.  First, the IRGC continued Iran's nuclear program (Albright, et al. 2003), along with 
ballistic missile research and development.  With Iraq held at bay by the U.S., these could only be 
explained at this juncture by fear and animosity directed toward America and possibly Israel (though the 
conflict with Israel had ebbed slightly during this period).  Second, the Basij element (Alfoneh 2015) of 
the IRGC developed a role in domestic repression.  This did not directly concern the U.S., but as 
American interest in Iran's human rights record increased, the Basijis' role as thugs of the regime 
became more disturbing.  Third, as many as 70 percent of the IRGC (Gheissari and Nasr 2006, 131, 136-
137) had voted for Khatami, which greatly disturbed the Supreme Leader.  Khamenei began to insulate 
the IRGC from reformist influence by installing like-minded leadership, increasing its funding and 
support, and giving its leaders and veterans influential government positions.  He also intensified 
(Bajoghli 2020) (Golkar 2010, 2) the ideological indoctrination within the ranks.  This ideology was based 
on Khomeini's vehement anti-Americanism, so this had the effect of further radicalizing the IRGC.  
Khamenei especially focused on indoctrinating the Basij, which because of their large numbers and 
penetration of Iranian society was positioned to produce an up-and-coming generation of regime 
loyalists.  The IRGC also developed the media infrastructure to project its ideology into society, as well.  
Also worth noting, the IRGC benefitted from the 1999 purge (Pollack 2004, 331) of the MOIS and largely 
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usurped its internal security role, further increasing IRGC influence.  Essentially, while the IRGC may 
have been less confrontational toward the U.S. during this period, it also gained in increased stake in 
ensuring that the U.S. and Iran never became friends.   
The U.S. Congress continued its animosity toward Iran throughout the period, but the real focus 
of Congressional Republicans in both houses was on scoring points at the expense of the Democratic 
President, Bill Clinton.  After Clinton's reelection in 1996 (Edwards 2014, 73), he was no longer as 
vulnerable to public accusations of being "soft on Iran." However, just as the fight of ILSA had been a 
fight for control of foreign policy prerogatives within the U.S. government, the Republican-controlled 
Congress continued to press its power struggle.  In 1998 , Congress passed the Iran Missile Proliferation 
Act (IMPA) (U.S. Congress 1998) which would have mandated U.S. sanctions against foreign companies 
deemed to have contributed to Iran's ballistic missile program, also requiring regular reports from the 
Executive Branch back to the Legislature on compliance with this issue.  Clinton vetoed the bill, arguing 
that it tied his hands in foreign policy (Schmitt 1998), but in order to protect against a Congressional 
override (New York Times 1998), he sanctioned nine Russian companies who had been accused of 
complicity in this program.  While Republicans provided the primary impetus for the IMPA, Clinton's 
veto would not have been in danger of an override if Democrats in both houses had not been keen on 
pressuring Iran, as well.   
Even as Clinton pressed his rapprochement efforts, though, Congress kept attempting to tighten 
the screws on Iran.  This pressure is most likely why Clinton felt compelled to address the Khobar Towers 
incident at such an inopportune time in 1999.  There were certainly Iran hawks in his own 
administration, such as F.B.I. Director Luis Freeh (Walsh 2001), but their power to twist his arm came 
indirectly through links to Congress.  The legislative wrangling eventually led to the Iran Non-
Proliferation Act of 2000 (Edwards 2014, 71-72) which Clinton signed only because it left the President 
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the power to choose if and when it would be enforced.  It is also entirely possible that pressure from 
Congress regarding Iran would have been event greater during this period, except that the impeachment 
proceedings (Henneberger 1998) from late 1998 into early 1999 consumed a great deal of lawmakers' 
focus.  The Republicans temporarily found a more effective bludgeon than Iran, and their impeachment 
effort expended a large amount of political capital.  Just as domestic politics in Iran bled into the U.S.-
Iranian relationship, so did U.S. internal politics.  This steady drumbeat of sanctions and the threat of 
more sanctions developed a habitual pattern of action for Congress, and it thickened the sanctions layer 
of the U.S.-Iranian conflict. 
Like the IRGC on the Iranian side, CENTCOM's role in stoking the U.S.-Iran conflict was muted, 
but animosity continued to build.  Prior to Khatami's election (Crist 2012, 407-409), the U.S. was 
ramping up toward military strikes in retaliation for Khobar Towers.  Newly appointed CENTCOM 
commander General Anthony Zinni began developing yet another new war plan for Iran in 1997 with the 
end goal of regime change.  The plan took two years to complete, so its drafting occurred 
simultaneously with Clinton's attempts to engage Iran.  CENTCOM's most important kinetic action (Hines 
2000, 48) during this period targeted Iraq, not Iran.  The late 1998 air campaign, Desert Fox, retaliated 
for Saddam Hussein's non-compliance with the inspections regime.  Again, however, U.S. aircraft were 
conducting military strikes on targets within driving distance of Iran's border, an indirect but 
unmistakable threat.  Additionally, in 1999, CENTCOM assumed responsibility for five of the former 
Soviet Republics in Central Asia.  Even as Iran was attempting to make diplomatic and economic inroads 
with its Asian neighbors, America's most forward-leaning and diplomatically engaged combatant 
command was also extending its reach and competing for the same ground.   
Morrissey (2017, 10, 31, 36-39) describes how, especially during the 1990's, CENTCOM leaders 
began articulating their vision for a U.S. regional strategy in terms of neoliberal tropes, using the 
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expansionist language of globalism and capitalism.  CENTCOM envisioned itself as a global force for 
protecting and expanding both democratic values and free markets, offering regional stability as an 
underpinning for global prosperity (a thin veil for securing the oil markets).  The U.S. was indispensable 
in this role, first because of its ability to intervene on behalf of these objectives, but also because the 
U.S. alone could mediate among a host of countries that had difficulty cooperating amongst themselves.  
In proffering this vision, CENTCOM was aligning itself almost perfectly with the neoliberal ambitions that 
would largely characterize the next presidential administration in the U.S.  The Iranians may not have 
realized it yet, but neoliberalism was a new layer that was being added to the conflict between the U.S. 
and Iran.  
Israel's role in the U.S.-Iran conflict was more subtle during this period, as well, but it still 
exerted influence.  Israel's détente with Iran lasted for about a year.  Per Parsi (2007, 199, 202-210, 216), 
Netanyahu felt that, during his initial months in office, confrontation with Iran was counterproductive.  
He was also concerned that the U.S. might begin a direct dialogue with Iran, as Clinton was inclined to 
do.  If Israel was hostile to Iran when this happened, then it would be cut out of the process and its 
influence with Washington reduced.  However, this temporary thaw with Iran produced few returns for 
Israel.  By the time Khatami came into office and U.S. hopes for a relationship with Iran increased, Israel 
was already leaning back toward hostility.  Khatami's new rhetorical stance may have slowed the 
process, but Iran's actual behavior changed little, and Israeli leaders fixated increasingly on Iran's 
nuclear and ballistic missile programs.  The concerns they shared with U.S. leaders reflected directly in 
the legislation crafted by Congress (the IMPA and the Iran Non-Proliferation Act of 2000) (Smith 2000, 
127-128) and Clinton's sanctions against Russian companies for sharing missile technology.   
Ultimately (Parsi 2007, 216-219), Israeli leaders became cynical about Iran's true capacity for 
rapprochement with the U.S. and stopped worrying as much about the possibility of U.S.-Iranian 
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engagement.  Incoming Prime Minister Ehud Barak hedged his bets in 1999 by shifting Israel's rhetoric 
regarding Iran slightly, reducing them from an "enemy" to merely a "threat," but isolating Iran remained 
in Israel's strategic interest.  Two other points are worth considering in examining Israel as a constituent.  
First, Israeli actions (Parsi 2007, 210) were not always consistent in pursuit of this isolation.  Even while 
AIPAC called for stronger sanctions, some Israeli companies continued to do business with Iranian 
counterparts in the same industries.  Second, AIPAC (Mearsheimer and Walt 2007) demonstrated 
institutional qualities of its own, remaining very consistent throughout this period in lobbying against 
Iran regardless of shifts in Israeli policy. 
In addition to the evolution of constituencies, Khatami's presidency added another completely 
different layer to the conflict between the U.S. and Iran, the issue of human rights.  Prior to his election, 
U.S. audiences had generally viewed Iranians monolithically as ideological fanatics.  Now they began to 
see a pro-Western, democratically inclined population pushing back against an oppressive and 
reactionary government.  This fit the ready-made lens already in place by the Clinton administration as it 
championed globalism, political and economic liberalism, and human rights.  As with any lens, it 
oversimplified the complex political situation in Iran, and in this case, it bifurcated good and evil 
according U.S. standards.   
Albright (et al. 2003 324) explained in her memoirs that Iran was a challenging policy case 
because, "both the totalitarians and the democrats were present at the same time." It was tricky to 
reach out to one while holding the other at bay.  Clinton further exemplified this view (Slavin 2007, 190) 
by attempting to dialogue with Khatami directly (through the Omanis) and bypass the clerical 
establishment.  The underlying assumption was that Khatami was a U.S. ally, trapped by the forces of 
repression.  Much like Ronald Reagan in the previous decade who chased in vain after Iran's elusive pro-
Western "moderates," Clinton viewed Iran's population and their besieged president as allies against an 
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odious regime.  The conceptual problems with viewing Iran in this way warrant a dissertation of their 
own, but for the purposes of this work, there were some very practical consequences for the 
entrenchment of conflict.   
The chief consequence of introducing a human rights layer to the U.S.-Iranian conflict was that it 
encouraged U.S. leaders, along with a host of Western organizations and interests, to attempt to meddle 
in Iranian politics.  Most of this meddling would be primarily rhetorical in nature, challenging the 
legitimacy of Iran's rulers, or as Clinton attempted to do, bolstering the position of reform leaders in 
Iran.  As with Clinton's failed attempts, the U.S. would never be successful in manipulating outcomes in 
Iranian politics.  Unfortunately, by viewing Iran through the Manichean lens of "democrats" versus 
"totalitarians," U.S. leaders constructed a picture of the clerical regime as inherently brittle.  Khamenei's 
reactionary base was clinging to power through repression against a population ready for liberal change 
- a doomed fight against Francis Fukuyama's "end of history." This idea that the Iran's hardline regime 
was waiting to collapse under its own weight would tempt future policymakers to try and expedite the 
process, usually by increasing pressure on Iran.  Another logical consequence of adding this layer to the 
conflict was that the menu of grievances for Iran hawks within the U.S. increased.  If Iran's nuclear 
program or its support for terrorism did not seem bad enough to justify hostility at a given moment, 
constituents to the conflict could cite all manners of domestic repression and paint themselves as 
champions of an oppressed people.  This would play out over the next two decades. 
What this period highlighted most in institutional terms was that fully formed constituencies do 
not even need to consciously try in order to undermine rapprochement.  Once a conflict becomes 
interwoven into the habitus of a social group, domestic struggles that should have nothing to do with 
the international conflict will inevitably drag on the conflict in question.  This drag serves as an anchor 




This period of time, roughly coinciding with the 1990's, demonstrated a tremendous amount of 
entrenchment of the conflict between the U.S. and Iran.  The 1980's laid a foundation for enduring 
conflict, and the events of the decade layered a myriad of issues into the relationship that constrained 
leader action on both sides and generated path dependency.  This formed the foundations for a set of 
constituencies to the conflict that emerged in full form on both sides in the 1990’s.  Whereas during the 
1980’s, it was events and issues shaping constituencies, in the 1990’s the constituencies began to 
actively shape the decision space in which national leaders would have to choose their paths.  On the 
Iranian side, the clerical establishment and the IRGC doubled down on Khomeini’s radical vision as the 
basis for their own legitimacy.  They discovered economic benefits to Iran’s isolation from the world, 
and they began to envision successful foreign policy in negative terms, as anything which spoiled U.S. 
plans for the region.  On the U.S. side, CENTCOM emerged as the flagship of the U.S. national security 
establishment, based first and foremost on the premise of an Iranian threat that filled a vacuum after 
the fall of the Soviet Union.  The U.S. Congress discovered that opposing Iran was a popular and low-cost 
platform for both sides of the aisle, and it could also be an effective partisan bludgeon against the 
Executive Branch.  Finally, Israel joined the fray by decisively opposing Iran, and they began actively 
influencing U.S. politics in this direction, setting patterns of action that would endure for decades. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, institutions are formed by identifiable mechanisms, and when these 
mechanisms can be readily detected, they serve as indicators of institutional forces at work.  
Displacement and conversion worked at one time or another in building all five of the constituencies, 
taking a ready-made community of interest focused on one issue and repurposing the group for another 
issue.  In the first decade, the U.S. replaced Britain and the Shah as an adversary for Iran.  In the second 
decade, Iran replaced the Soviet Union as a key geopolitical adversary for the U.S.  For Israel, hostility 
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toward Iran replaced hostility toward its Arab neighbors.  The impact of layering has already been 
discussed, and the laundry list of issues that became attached to the U.S.-Iranian relationship was 
becoming extensive.  Terrorism, sanctions, grievances over injuries (real or perceived), human rights, 
and domestic politics were only a few of important layers impacting the conflict.  In general, the 
proliferation of layers complicates attempts at peace and creates new avenues by which constituencies 
can undermine these efforts – a problem which played out in the 1990’s.  Finally, the 1990’s saw the 
beginnings of drift, as leadership changed hands in both countries.  This was not as strong a factor as it 
would become, though, because so much continuity remained in key personalities. 
Ultimately, these institutional processes manifested themselves in the five constituencies to the 
conflict.  The role of constituencies in perpetuating conflict is not always direct, but once a conflict 
penetrates the core of a group’s interest calculations, even decisions that have nothing to do with the 
international opponent will affect the relationship.  This means that long-term patterns are often more 
important in identifying the operation of constituencies than a focus on individual events.  When 
powerful constituencies exist on both sides of the conflict, they form a system in which the component 
parts feed off of each other and become greater than the whole.  This system creates a poisonous 
environment that undermines possibilities for peace. 
 Chapter 5 will explain how the 1990’s, which opened and closed with such promise, could lead 
into a decade of intense stalemate and new forms of violence.  Constituencies will take an even more 




CHAPTER 5 - THE THIRD DECADE, 2001-2008 
The third decade of the conflict between the U.S. and Iran marked a generational shift in the 
conflict between the U.S. and Iran.  Over the course of the decade, a significant portion of both 
populations came of age with no living memory of the foundational events of the institution of 
animosity between the two adversaries.  Leaders emerged within the constituencies who remembered 
the events of the 1980's from their youth, but were shaped and molded to a greater degree by things 
that came afterward, while the dwindling members of the old guard struggled to maintain their own 
relevance in a shifting world.  The 2000's added a set of new issues and events onto which the 
institutional layers of previous two decades were superimposed, shaping the way both sides would deal 
with each other in light of a changing environment.  The U.S. began a war on terror, a concept that 
almost inevitably put it at odds with Iran.  Iran's nuclear program went from an aspirational project to a 
viable enterprise that the Western world viewed as an imminent threat.  Wars in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan created opportunities for both cooperation and conflict.   
From the standpoint of realpolitik, there were few pressing reasons why the U.S-Iranian 
relationship had to remain antagonistic.  With the exception of the Khobar Towers bombing, direct 
conflict between the U.S. and Iran had been mostly rhetorical for a number of years.  The benefits of 
rapprochement may not have seemed obvious in advance, but in hindsight, they appear quite stark.  
Iran could have blossomed economically through better relations with the West.  The U.S. could have 
collaborated with Iran in rebuilding both Iraq and Afghanistan.  Instead, Iran increased its political and 
economic isolation from the world, stifling its potential and disappointing its population over a nuclear 
program that provided no tangible benefits whatsoever.  The U.S. conducted a war on terror and 
invaded two of Iran's neighbors in spite of Iran, instead of with its help.  For the Iraq War, in particular, 
Iranian resistance cost hundreds of U.S. lives, billions of dollars, and most likely prolonged the war by 
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several years.  As the official U.S. Army history of the war concluded (Rayburn, et al. 2019b, 639), Iran 
was the only winner in that war, despite U.S. attempts to exclude them entirely.  In Afghanistan, U.S. 
inability to garner reliable regional partners left the Afghan people no closer to long-term stability at the 
end of the decade than they were in the aftermath of the invasion.  In short, the U.S. and Iran carried a 
mutually damaging stalemate into a new generation and came out more mired in the conflict than 
before.   
This chapter will trace the story of missed opportunities for positive change from an institutional 
lens, focused on two key time periods.  The first period will roughly cover the initial term of George W. 
Bush's presidency and discuss how both sides squandered the opportunity to pursue a "grand bargain." 
The second period will approximate the first term of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's presidency in Iran, where 
negotiations over Iran's nuclear program could have changed the direction of the U.S.-Iranian 
relationship, and Iran's proxy war in Iraq helped ensure that they did not.  As before, it will follow the 
five constituencies that consistently undermined rapprochement and stoked hostility:  Iran's clerical 
establishment, the IRGC and clerical security forces, CENTCOM, Israel, and the U.S. Congress.  Along the 
way, it will deal with potential counterarguments against the pivotal role of these constituencies in 
perpetuating the conflict.  
 
'Axis of Evil' and the 'Grand Bargain' 
The first term of the George W. Bush administration was one of the most storied periods in the 
history of the U.S.-Iranian conflict.  The previous decade had witnessed at least three potential openings 
where either the U.S. or Iran made significant gestures toward the other.  Each generated some hopes, 
but in none of these cases did either side extend themselves to the point where they made the policy or 
behavior changes the other side was interested in seeing.  Perhaps predictably, each attempt failed.  
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After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Iran offered the U.S. an unprecedented level of 
cooperation.  This apparent change of heart culminated in the 2003 proposal for a "grand bargain" 
between the U.S. and Iran, in which Iranian leaders explicitly offered to negotiate over every key point 
of contention concerning U.S. officials and begin the process of normalizing relations.  As this section 
will explain, U.S. officials barely even considered the offer.  On one hand, this section will argue that 
these historical events provide perhaps the strongest evidence so far that institutional forces were 
driving the conflict between the U.S. and Iran.  On the other hand, the behavior of the constituents this 
dissertation has been following was not entirely predictable, and additional forces intervened.  This 
section will examine why this was the case and discuss the implications for an institutional lens to the 
study of conflict. 
 
What happened? 
The November 2000 presidential election in the U.S. was a memorable event.  After a close 
contest (Mann 2001) involving lengthy recounts, a controversy over "hanging chads," and intervention 
by the Supreme Court, George W. Bush emerged the victor.  Like his predecessor (Crist 2012, 423) 
(Freedman 2008, 376-377), Bush came to office focused on domestic issues; foreign affairs were not an 
immediate priority, and Iran barely registered.  During the Bush campaign, his soon-to-be National 
Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice (2000, 46-47) authored an article that would come to define the 
initial foreign policy stance of the administration.  Rice argued for a disciplined approach to foreign 
policy that returned the "national interest" to the forefront of decision making instead of the 
"humanitarian interest" that had prompted the Clinton administration to get involved in complicated 
nation-building exercises.  Such an approach would "deal decisively with the threat of rogue regimes," 
and it would confront the proliferation of WMD.  It would strengthen alliances with key partners but 
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would avoid allowing international institutions to bind America's hands or cause it to act against the 
national interest.  The article painted Iran specifically as a power that was attempting to replace the 
American-led global order with one based upon Islamic fundamentalism.  Bush's views appeared entirely 
in-line with this approach as he entered office, and with regard to terrorism especially (Woodward 2002, 
38-39), he believed that Clinton's response to attacks had been so limp as to be provocative of future 
terrorism.   
Unlike Clinton and George H. W. Bush before him, Bush extended no hand to the Iranian regime 
upon coming to office.  Senior State Department official Richard Haas (Slavin 2007, 196-197) authored 
one conciliatory gesture, a three-year shortening of the mandatory period during which ILSA sanctions 
would be enacted.  Bush supported this plan, but the Republican-controlled Congress turned it down.  
The single forum in which U.S. and Iranian officials continued to maintain contact in continuity between 
the Clinton and Bush administrations was a U.N.-brokered group known as the Geneva Initiative (Rashid 
2008, 55, 66) (Slavin 2007, 198), which brought the U.S., Iran, Germany, and Italy together to discuss the 
challenge of Afghanistan.  This was a natural evolution of the 6+2 talks which Albright had once 
previously attended herself, but it was restricted to low-level officials and it avoided any appearance of 
bilateral communication between the U.S. and Iran.   
As the previous chapter described, Iran had been surprisingly unreceptive to the Clinton 
administration's overtures even to the very end, but the winds of change were blowing in Iran, as well as 
the U.S.  Reformist candidates (Daniszewsky 2000) captured the nation's first set of municipal elections 
in 1999, and then in February 2000, they gained a commanding majority in the parliament.  In 
opposition to this trend, official and unofficial repression limited the progress of the reform agenda at 
almost every turn, and many Iranians became disillusioned with Khatami's inability or unwillingness to 
stand up to the clerical establishment.  More disturbingly, the reform movement (Ansari 2004, 277) 
struggled to articulate a clear strategic vision.  For the time being, though, it still presented the only 
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alternative to the stale status quo defended by hardliners, and Iranians (Slackman 2001) handed 
Khatami a second term as president in June 2001 with approximately 75 percent of the vote, even 
higher than his previous victory in 1997.  What this power struggle between reformists and 
conservatives largely masked was that values and priorities were shifting within the Iranian populace.  A 
poll (Maloney 2015, 296-297) of Tehran residents conducted in 2002 showed that economic matters 
were the top priority for Iranian voters, dwarfing concerns over the lack of political freedom.  
Intrinsically linked to their economic concerns, Iranians desired greater engagement with the outside 
world, including America.  Another poll in 2002 (Rieffer-Flanagan 2013, 154) showed that 74 percent of 
Iranians living in Tehran favored opening a dialogue with the U.S.   
In fact, even while conservative factions fought to deny Khatami the credit, Iran's economy was 
on the upswing, along with its external relations.  Some of this had little to do with Khatami at all.  A 
number of development projects (Abrahamian 2004, 134-136) across the country that had been delayed 
by the Iran-Iraq War and its aftermath were finally bearing fruit by the late 1990's, including some of 
Rafsanjani's initiatives.  On the other hand, Khatami's diplomatic outreach (Maloney 2015, 273-276, 293-
298) had also borne fruit.  In spite of U.S. pressure, most European nations had normalized relations 
with Iran by 2000, and several signed significant trade deals.  Additionally, Iran made inroads with its 
regional neighbors, reestablishing cordial relations with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in particular.  Khatami's 
administration also initiated some of its own economic programs, including a revamp of foreign 
exchange rate practices.  The result was an economic resurgence that could be felt by the time of the 
2001 election, with inflation down to 11.3 percent from its 1995 high of 50 percent.  Boosted by high oil 
prices (Abrahamian 2004, 132-134), Iran's GNP jumped between 5 and 7 percent year-over-year 
between 2000 and 2003.  On a more symbolic front, Iran garnered two World Bank loans for 
development projects, over U.S. objections that this would legitimize Tehran's regime.   
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These gains (Maloney 2015, 300-306) were followed through the second half of Khatami's 
presidency by significant trade expansion with Russia and East Asia (especially China), major reforms to 
Iran's rules for allowing foreign investment, and a continued push for domestic privatization of the 
economy.  In effect, Iran's international isolation at the beginning of the Bush administration was largely 
nominal.  This does not mean that Iran's economy was healthy, but people were seeing a difference.  
Instead of producing contentment, though, in a manner consistent with relative deprivation theory (see 
Gurr 2010), a little improvement fostered a taste for more.  The Iranian population agitated for tangible 
progress, and the conditions for engagement with the U.S. were once again ripe on the Iranian side.   
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 which destroyed the World Trade Center in New 
York and a portion of the Pentagon, near Washington, D.C., changed the landscape (Freedman 2008, 
385-396) of American foreign policy immediately.  An examination of this tragedy is beyond the scope of 
this work, but the Bush administration quickly began its planning for an invasion of Afghanistan and the 
overthrow of the Taliban regime, which harbored Osama Bin Laden and the leadership of the al-Qaeda 
terrorist group.  Bush's vision extended far wider than Afghanistan from the start, and addressing a joint 
session of congress on September 20, he stated (Tenet and Harlow 2008, 179), "Our war on terror 
begins with al-Qa'ida [sic], but it does not end there.  It will not end until every terrorist group of global 
reach has been found, stopped, and defeated." This statement portended badly for the U.S.-Iranian 
relationship, which had been layered repeatedly with terrorist-related incidents, accusations, and 
rhetoric. 
Unlike certain Arab countries, where public reactions were mixed and government repudiation 
of the attackers lukewarm, Khatami (Sick 2004, 235-236) immediately condemned the attacks, along 
with all forms of terrorism.  Iranians held candlelight vigils in Tehran for the victims.  Khatami (Crist 
2012, 432) travelled to U.N. General Assembly in New York, and he requested to visit "ground zero," also 
offering counterterrorism collaboration from senior Iranian experts on al-Qaeda.  The Bush 
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administration turned these down.  The Geneva Initiative group (Rashid 2008, 66), however, met on 
September 20, leading to a secret bilateral meeting (Freidman 2004, 155-160) on September 25.  Senior 
IRGC officials attended and met with U.S. officials, including representatives of the CIA.  Geneva 
Initiative talks continued until 2003, but when direct talks were not preferred, British Foreign Secretary 
Jack Straw served as a go-between to facilitate communication.  The Iranians (Crist 2012, 432) offered to 
allow the U.S. to use their airbases.  The Bush administration declined this request but accepted 
emergency landing rights for stricken aircraft.  The Iranians also closed their border at the U.S. request 
and continued to support some 2 million Afghan refugees.   
On the ground in Afghanistan (Friedman 2004, 197-198), Iran offered cooperation by facilitating 
contacts with Northern Alliance members, although it does not appear that U.S. officials made extensive 
use of this.  Where the Iranians were more reserved was in regard to the al-Qaeda fugitives that had fled 
into its territory.  U.S. officials asked repeatedly (Slavin 2007, 198-201) for full details on all of these 
individuals, along with deportations that would facilitate their transfer to U.S. custody.  Iran turned over 
at least one high-value al-Qaeda leader, and provided information on scores of refugees they had 
deported, but they chose to hang onto hundreds more, placing them under house (or hotel) arrest.  Crist 
(2012, 437) explained that the Iranians viewed these individuals as valuable bargaining chips with the 
U.S. and leverage against future al-Qaeda plots.  
Slavin (2007, 197) pointed out that the Iranians chose to offer their support with no 
preconditions, sensing a golden opportunity to take down the Taliban and make inroads with the U.S. at 
the same time.  However, Friedman (2004, 155-160) also mentioned that the Iranians also had a 
geopolitical interest in carving out future autonomy for the Shiite areas of Afghanistan, creating a de 
facto buffer zone for Iran.  The U.S. had no interest in Afghan nation building and gave a nod to these 
concerns.  Motives aside, the Iranian delegation played an important role in the Bonn Conference, which 
began in November 1981 to discuss the future leadership of Afghanistan.  Per Rashid (2008, 104), "U.S. 
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and Iranian diplomats met continuously night and day in the hotel." The Iranians were particularly 
instrumental in convincing leading warlords, especially Burhanuddin Rabbani, to stay their own bids for 
power and support an interim government led by Hamid Karzai.  In January 2002 (Sick 2004, 236), Iran 
pledged $560 million for reconstruction of Afghanistan at a conference in Tokyo, the most of any 
country in the developing world. 
In the midst of this positive synergy between the U.S. and Iran, a spoiler soon emerged.  On 
January 3, 2002 (Bennet 2002), Israeli forces intercepted a cargo ship, the Karine A, that was 
transporting a large shipment of weapons to Palestinian militants in Gaza.  Israeli intelligence linked the 
operation directly to senior officials within Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Authority as well as the Iranian 
government.  At other times, such a revelation might have seemed merely a blip on the screen, but in 
this case, it had a powerful impact on the Bush administration, especially Bush himself.  In his memoir, 
Bush (2011, 400-401) expressed his sense of betrayal by Arafat, stating that he would never trust him 
again.  Bush had already been concerned about terrorist attacks against Israel, brought home by the 
June 1, 2001 attack on a Tel Aviv nightclub.  He was appalled at the loss of life on both sides.  As usual, 
Iran denied the incident and blamed it on an Israeli plot.  Sick (2004, 236) opined that if the Israelis had 
planned the incident themselves, it could not have worked more perfectly.  The IRGC was playing was 
playing the same games it had always played, and terrorism layer of the U.S.-Iranian conflict returned to 
the forefront.   
Bush's January 29, 2002 State of the Union Address went down in history as one of the pivotal 
moments in the perpetuation of animosity between the U.S. and Iran.  With the Taliban defeated and al-
Qaeda on the run, the Bush administration began to look beyond Afghanistan to a wider war on terror, 
and set its sights on Iraq.  Bush tasked his policy team (Baker 2012, 186-187) (Woodward 2004, 85-95) to 
craft language that would convey this vision to the American people, and his speechwriters did not 
disappoint.  In order avoid tipping their hand too early with regard to Iraq, Bush's team lumped it 
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together with North Korea and Iran in an "axis of evil," laying the foundation for a narrative that linked 
the dangers of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.  While never meant to imply collaboration 
among the three actors, this statement effectively bifurcated the world, and it irrevocably placed Iran in 
the opposite camp.  Some of Bush's own advisors questioned Iran's inclusion prior to the speech, but 
Bush himself chose to keep it in (Baker 2012, 186), stating, "I want to turn up the pressure on Iran."  
Bush (2011, 233) later acknowledged that people had people had missed the point of the "axis 
of evil," which had been primarily intended to convey that he was, "serious about dealing with Iraq." 
Regarding Iran, Bush paradoxically believed that applying this label would spur the efforts of Iran's 
reformers against the hardline clerical establishment.  He said afterward (Woodward 2004, 88), "I doubt 
the students and the reformers and the liberators inside Iran were displeased with that.  I made the 
calculation that they would be pleased.  Up here the president speaks so clearly about the nature of the 
regime and the harshness and the repression they have to live under.  Now, I'm confident the leaders 
didn't like it." Based upon these statements, it appears that Bush essentially provided a sop to the 
constituencies arrayed on the U.S. side in support of the conflict with Iran in order to garner support for 
his war against Iraq.  Throwing the U.S.-Iranian relationship under the bus for short-term political gain 
was a pattern well established on both sides of the conflict, and the next section will discuss Bush’s 
relationship with the constituencies in greater detail. 
Meanwhile, Abrahamian (2004, 95) described that, "For the average Iranian, the 'axis of evil' 
speech came as a bolt out of the blue sky." Iranians thought their relationship with the U.S. was 
improving.  Citizens and government alike had condemned the Taliban and terrorism, and they hugely 
resented being categorized with their rival state, Iraq.  The Iranian government (Crist 2012, 441-442) 
issued protests, their officials skipped the next Geneva Initiative meeting, and Iran became less 
cooperative in Afghanistan.  They released the troublemaking Taliban commander Gulbuddin Hekmatyar 
to start fomenting an insurgency and starting anti-American propaganda efforts on the ground.  Yet 
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even though this was a symbolic turning point in the relationship, Iran still returned to Geneva and 
continued overtures of cooperation.  As they did, U.S. priorities were already shifting from Afghanistan, 
and the rest of 2002 and the first four months of 2003 were shaped and dominated almost entirely by 
the impending invasion of Iraq.   
The U.S.-Iranian relationship between the "axis of evil" speech and the successful invasion of 
Iraq moved forward simultaneously along three key strands.  First, Iranian officials continued to offer 
collaboration with the U.S.  The overthrow of Saddam Hussein was generally within Iran's strategic 
interest, and sensing Bush's resolve, the Iranians attempted to shape U.S. efforts instead of bucking 
against them.  Mohammad Javad Zarif (Crist 2012, 455-459) (Slavin 2007, 201-203), then Iran's 
ambassador to the U.N., began an effort in September 2002 to extend engagement beyond the bounds 
of the Geneva Initiative, quietly meeting with a number of past and present U.S. officials.  Zarif offered 
to partner with the U.S. in toppling the Iraqi regime, a similar offer to the one for Afghanistan, and he 
suggested the possibility of normalizing relations.  What Iran expressly wanted in return was guarantees 
regarding the status of Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) members found in Iraq.  Aside from emergency landing 
rights for U.S. pilots, the Bush administration wanted little to do with Iranian assistance, but they 
assured their counterparts that the U.S. considered the MEK a terrorist group and would treat it 
accordingly.  The perception of broken promises was already and established layer of the U.S.-Iranian 
relationship, and this assurance created the opportunity to thicken the layer. 
The second strand, which worked in a negative direction, was the advancement of Iran's nuclear 
program.  Cable News Network (Ensor 2002) broke the story in December 2002 that an Iranian dissident 
group, which turned out to be the MEK, had provided intelligence regarding two previously undeclared 
nuclear sites in Iran.  They also highlighted the fact that Iran was pursuing heavy water nuclear reactors 
that could be used to manufacture weapons-grade fissile material.  This was probably no surprise to the 
U.S. intelligence community, and in the runup to the invasion of Iraq, it did not generate immediate 
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policy action.  What it did was publicly highlight the issue and tee it up for future action, ensuring that 
the nuclear layer could not be disentangled from any U.S. dealings with Iran, and this issue would 
eventually define the relationship for almost two decades afterward.   
The third strand was the link between Iran and terrorism.  For tactical reasons, Iran had 
originally demurred on cooperating with the U.S. in regard to most of the al-Qaeda fugitives that had 
entered its territory, but the longer it held them, the more culpable Iran became in al-Qaeda's activities.  
Leverett and Leverett (2013, 120-121) pointed out that because counterterrorism was the highest U.S. 
priority, any cooperation necessarily hinged on Iran's turning them over.  Much like the Lebanon 
hostages before, Iranian officials likely viewed al-Qaeda members as bargaining chips.  For U.S. officials, 
they were living evidence of Iran's continued support for terrorism.  Crist (2012, 438) relayed that U.S. 
intelligence traced the al-Qaeda operative Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (who would later lead the Sunni 
insurgency in Iraq) to Iran in 2002.  Bush toyed with authorizing a strike inside Iranian territory to kill 
Zarqawi, even before invading Iraq, but the risks were too high.  Between late 2002 and early 2003, the 
CIA (Tenet and Harlow 2008, 244, 272-275) monitored a steady stream of communications that showed 
al-Qaeda operatives within Iran were actively seeking access to Russian nuclear devices and 
collaborating in upcoming terrorist attacks.   
These strands collided in May of 2003.  If the "axis of evil" speech was a symbolic pivot point, 
Iran's "grand bargain" was a more substantial critical juncture.  Shortly after the U.S. victory in Iraq, as 
the culmination of Zarif's diplomatic efforts, Iranian officials passed a proposal (Mousavian 2012, 63-65) 
through the Swiss delegation that offered to formally discuss every major sticking point between the 
U.S. and Iran in pursuit of normalized relations.  In return for a respectful recognition of its legitimate 
interests, Iran was willing to discuss its nuclear program, rebuilding Iraq, its support for Palestinian 
militant groups, and even recognition of Israel, among other issues - all with the apparent blessing of 
Khamenei himself.  Zarif (2003) followed this up with an Op Ed in the New York Times suggesting that 
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the U.S. and Iran should collaborate on rebuilding Iraq and developing a comprehensive Middle East 
security plan. 
At virtually the same time, however, a U.S. newspaper (Slavin 2007, 203-204) broke the story 
about the secret meetings of the Geneva Initiative.  Vice President Dick Cheney and a number of key 
Bush officials had vehemently opposed engagement with Iran from the beginning, so to avoid 
embarrassment, the administration chose to downplay the effort and cancelled future meetings.  
Additionally, al-Qaeda (Crist 2012, 480-481) conducted a series of coordinated attacks against U.S. 
interests in Saudi Arabia on May 12, 2003, and a phone intercept linked the attack to an al-Qaeda 
operative residing in Iran.  Leverett and Leverett (2013, 121) pointed out that Iranian complicity was 
never corroborated, but the resulting suspicions clearly aggravated the terrorism layer of the 
relationship.  Regardless of the impact of the press disclosure and the terrorist attack, the Bush 
administration was in no mood to consider a "grand bargain" with Iran.  State Department official 
Richard Haas (Slavin 2007, 208) stated afterward that he would have liked to explore the option, but he 
could not trust Iran's factional politics, and he was tired of fighting losing battles within the Bush 
administration.  The offer may not have even reached Condoleezza Rice, who stated (Slavin 2007, 205), 
"I honestly don't remember seeing it." The proposal itself was not signed, so it was deemed a "non-
paper." The U.S. issued no response, and Iran would never again extend such an offer.  As the next 
section will discuss, it was no coincidence that the conditions for such a windfall of diplomacy were so 
unfavorable.  Constituencies on both sides made the U.S. unable to accept such a proposal and Iran 
incapable of following through, regardless of the best intentions of the deal’s proponents. 
From this peak of apparent potential, the U.S.-Iranian relationship quickly soured.  The U.S. 
(Slavin 2007, 206) reneged on its promises regarding the MEK in Iraq.  Sensing their value in any future 
conflict with Iran, military officials gave them protected person status.  Even when Iran offered to trade 
them for al-Qaeda suspects, the U.S. declined.  Iran wasted no time in proliferating its influence and its 
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intelligence capabilities in Iraq (Friedman 2004, 316-319), using preexisting Shiite militia networks as a 
tool.  U.S. officials recognized this threat almost immediately, but because they needed the support of 
the Shiite groups to quell the Sunni insurgency (led by loyalists to the former regime), they took little 
action.  With the capture of Saddam Hussein and improvements in the tactical situation, the U.S. 
reconsidered its bargain with the Shiite factions (and their Iranian backers by extension) to give them a 
controlling interest in the new government.  In another forgotten historical episode, an earthquake 
largely destroyed the Iranian city of Bam in late December 2003.  The U.S. offered shipments of 
humanitarian relief, which Iran graciously accepted, but when the Bush administration wanted to send 
official envoys and further capitalize on this gesture of goodwill, Iran turned them down.  Friedman 
(2004, 318) argued that the Iranians were well aware that the U.S. was preparing to trample their 
interests in Iraq, and Iran's hardliners were no longer interested in rapprochement.  By early 2004, a full-
scale Shiite insurgency was brewing, and Iran was poised to impose a terrible cost on U.S. forces.   
As this section has shown, U.S. and Iranian leaders exercised considerable agency throughout 
this period, in some cases making overtures, while fomenting hostility in others.  It is easy to focus on 
Bush, Khamenei, and perhaps Khatami as the main characters in this story, as most historical accounts 
have already been wont to do.  Before making this leap, however, it is important to understand the role 
that constituencies played behind the scenes.  Whether they influenced events directly (which they did 
in some cases) or indirectly, institutional forces on both sides of the conflict had spent over 20 years 
making the ground infertile for cooperation between the U.S. and Iran.  The next section will argue that 
continued hostility was by far the most likely outcome for this period, regardless of actors or intentions, 




The institutional development of constituencies  
The events of this time period present the first real challenge to the pattern this dissertation has 
identified so far.  On one hand, this episode offers what was arguably the clearest example of a 
convergence of interests between the U.S. and Iran that occurred throughout the four decades under 
study.  In hindsight, both sides could have saved a fortune in blood and treasure by collaborating instead 
of perpetuating the conflict.  But like every other opportunity before it, this one fell flat, perpetuating 
the conflict instead of resolving it.  Additionally, even a cursory reading of the history suggests that 
institutional layers such as terrorism and the nuclear issue, along with the grudges and mistrust 
ingrained by two decades of hostility played a significant part.   
On the other hand, this drama played out differently than previous examples.  For a brief 
moment, it appeared that Iran's clerical establishment, already identified as a constituent to the conflict, 
reversed its course and supported rapprochement.  Even the IRGC and clerical security forces appeared 
to behave nicely, although this will be discussed further.  Constituencies on the U.S. side operated 
differently, as well.  None of the U.S. Congress, CENTCOM, or the Israeli lobby supported reconciliation 
with Iran, but neither were any of them the key player in undermining cooperation.  Instead, a 
headstrong U.S. President, bolstered by a neoconservative ideology that pervaded his administration 
(especially embodied in Vice President Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld), took the 
lead in ensuring that that U.S. and Iran were not going to become friends.  This section will deal first 
with the Iranian constituents to the conflict.  It will then look at neoconservatism and evaluate where 
this factor fits into the institutional story of the conflict.  Finally, it will turn to the constituents on the 
U.S. side.   
The first puzzle is why the clerical establishment seemed to acquiesce to Khatami's attempts to 
normalize Iran's relations with the U.S.  Should they not have undermined these efforts, as they had 
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every time before?  There are several plausible reasons, consistent with institutional factors, that may 
explain why they did not.  With regard to Afghanistan, both the Taliban and al-Qaeda were immediate 
regional threats to Iran.  After the Taliban executed nine Iranian diplomats in 1998 (Jehl 1998), Iran 
mobilized for war against Afghanistan, nearly initiating military action.  Khamenei (Friedman 2004, 155-
160) wanted the Taliban out of power, a new government that would be friendly to Iran, and Shiite 
buffer zone against the Sunni Pashtun tribes and their Pakistani supporters.  Not only was a U.S. invasion 
of Afghanistan expedient for Iran, but one could argue that displacement and conversion operated 
naturally, as well.  U.S. anger at Afghanistan's rulers drew its attention away from Iran, so Iran's leaders 
were more comfortable focusing on their own threat next door, a temporary displacement to be sure, 
but significant, nonetheless.  The same logic applied to Iraq.  The U.S. was willing and eager to expend its 
own efforts to topple Iran's bitter rival, Saddam Hussein.  Moreover, Iran (Crist 2012, 468-469) already 
had networks in place to start building its influence among the Shiites of Iraq and shaping the country.  
Displacement occurs when a new threat or opportunity overshadows the previous one for a particular 
constituency, and it need not be permanent.  This was an opportunity for Iran's clerical leaders.   
The expediency of allowing the U.S. to defeat its adversaries could explain Iran's cooperative 
stance before the U.S. military actions, but it still cannot explain why Iran offered a "grand bargain" after 
Saddam Hussein's defeat.  One common explanation (Slavin 2007, 204-205) is that Iranian leaders were 
surprised by the speed and efficiency of U.S. military successes and feared that Iran might be next.  The 
instinct for self-preservation can operate as a form of displacement, again on a temporary basis.  A 
soldier might consider surrender on the battlefield in the face of overwhelming odds, but when the 
threat passes, his enemies are no less enemies.  As the U.S. became bogged down in Iraq and appeared 
less threatening, the Iranians became more aggressive.  But some felt that Iran’s "grand bargain" was 
not intended as a form of capitulation.  Leverett and Leverett (2013, 123) in sympathy to Iran, argued 
that their proposal was not made from a position of weakness but was a genuine expression of 
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frustration with U.S. attempts to isolate Iran in its own neighborhood.  Perhaps an even more 
compelling argument could be made by examining the domestic political situation.   
By the time of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Khamenei and the clerical 
establishment were both more and less secure in their own position than they had been previously.  On 
one hand, they had largely weathered the storm of the reform movement (Nasr and Gheissari 2006, 
138-145).  Repression proved generally effective in tamping down unrest, Khatami had shown himself 
unwilling to challenge the system directly, and Khamenei's control over the Council of Guardians and the 
Expediency Council ensured that no legislation that directly threatened his position could be passed.  On 
the other hand, conservatives understood that they were unpopular, and their long-term viability 
depended upon rebranding their image.  Conservative factions were already beginning to reinvent 
themselves in ways that would bear fruit in 2004 and 2005.  In the meantime, bandwagoning on a 
popular issue like rapprochement with the West was likely in their immediate interest, if only for a brief 
moment.  If the attempt did not work out, Khamenei could back away and leave the reformers holding 
the bag.   
One more possibility to consider was that, as Bush administration officials apparently suspected, 
this offer was disingenuous on the part of the Supreme Leader to begin with.  As Iranian leaders had 
shown with the Lebanon hostages and would again demonstrate later in the 2000's with the nuclear 
negotiations, they were inclined to use diplomacy to buy time and manipulate conditions toward their 
advantage.  Clausewitz referred to war as "politics by other means." In a similar fashion, the clerical 
establishment may have viewed diplomacy as "war by other means," a new front against the U.S. that 
undermined American military advantages.  If any or all of these possibilities obtained to some degree, 
then clerical support to Khatami's overtures no longer appears inconsistent with the institution of 
animosity between the U.S. and Iran.  Regardless of the rationale employed by specific leaders, the 
worldview of Iran’s clerical leaders never changed with regard to confronting the U.S.  Short-term 
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exigencies could alter their approach, but these would always be mediated through an incentive 
structure that ensured that hostility would always be renewed.   
Where Khamenei certainly hedged his bets against the U.S. all along was in regard to the IRGC.  
The IRGC may have kept a lower profile, but they were clearly not supporters of rapprochement.  First, 
at least until Iran was confronted by the international community in 2003, the IRGC (Ensor 2002) was 
moving as quickly and quietly as possible to develop a dual-use nuclear capability.  This included 
constructing heavy water reactors, an old technology difficult to justify for civilian electrical 
consumption, along with the capacity to enrich fissile material.  Second, as previously discussed, the 
IRGC and clerical security forces implicated themselves with terrorism by harboring al-Qaeda fugitives 
who were actively planning and coordinating operations.  Third, while the Karine A incident (Crist 2012, 
436) did not appear to be a calculated attempt to sabotage relations with the U.S., their pattern of 
continued supporting to Palestinian militants and attempts to undermine the Israeli-Palestinian peace 
process were completely inconsistent with reconciliation.  Fourth, IRGC commanders were chomping at 
the bit for action against the U.S. in Iraq.   
Per Crist (2012, 461-467) both the IRGC commander, Major General Yahya Safavi and Qods 
Force Commander Major General Qassim Soleimani advocated military action against the U.S. in Iraq 
from the very beginning of the war.  Khamenei initially restrained the guards from conducting attacks, 
but they still harassed and threatened U.S. forces along the border with Iran, especially in the Shatt-al-
Arab waterways.  MOIS and IRGC officers laid the groundwork in Iraq for heavy Iranian influence, and as 
the relationship between the coalition and the Shiite factions deteriorated, Khamenei allowed the IRGC 
to begin a proxy war against U.S. forces.  As a constituent to the conflict, the IRGC and clerical security 
forces successfully aggravated the layers of terrorism, nuclear weapons, Israel, and they started a new 
layer - insurgency in Iraq.  There was no “grand bargain” from the IRGC, and it is highly unlikely that this 
organization would have allowed such a deal to gain positive momentum even if the U.S. had played 
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ball.  Any form of rapprochement would necessarily have diminished the prominence of the IRGC in 
steering Iranian politics.   
The next issue to examine in the institutional analysis of this episode of the conflict was the 
impact of neoconservatism as a driving ideology for the Bush administration, possibly superseding the 
influence of the constituencies that had previously driven the U.S. side of the conflict.  A detailed 
examination of the history and development of neoconservatism is beyond the scope of this work, but 
this concept has been widely blamed for the animosity between the U.S. and Iran (Leverett and Leverett 
2013, 285-327) (Abrahamian 2004, 96-102), and it must be considered.  Neoconservatism is problematic 
to begin with because it is not a unified theory with an agreed upon definition or scope.  Broadly 
speaking, neoconservatives believe that the spread of democracy, even by force, is the most effective 
way to secure U.S. global interests in the long-term.  Most neoconservatives of the period did not self-
identify, and individuals were generally labelled "neo-cons" by their critics, not their peers, making the 
label almost entirely subjective.  Freedman (2008, 375-376) described neoconservatism as a philosophy 
which combines activism over causes traditionally associated with the left, such as promoting 
democracy and human rights, with methods traditionally associated with the right - especially the 
unilateral application of military force.  Walt (2018, 69) linked the concept to liberal hegemony, noting 
that neoconservative ideology actually derived from roots on both sides of the political aisle, but it took 
a more militant and less cooperative form on the Republican side.  Neoconservatism has been most 
strongly associated with the decision to invade Iraq, which was also its most damning failure.     
Where did neoconservatism intersect with the U.S.-Iran conflict?  Authors have traced 
neoconservatism beck to the 1970's even prior to the Reagan administration (Takeyh 2006, 126), and 
the Islamic Revolution of 1979 energized the movement.  Identifying it as a layer to the U.S.-Iranian 
relationship in the early days of the Islamic Republic would be difficult, though.  In spite of his tough talk, 
Reagan showed restraint in his approach to Iran.  In fact, later authors associated with the 
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neoconservatism like Kenneth Pollack (2004, 204, 214) criticized Reagan for his lack of response to 
Iranian-sponsored terrorism in Lebanon and his ham-handed attempts to negotiate with Iran over the 
hostages.  The 1990's might appear a more promising starting point for a neoliberal constituency, when 
Republicans came to forefront in Congress under the leadership of Newt Gingrich.  However, as shown 
in the previous chapter, Democrats took an interest in punishing Iran, as well, complicating efforts by 
Clinton administration to extend an olive branch.   
When Bush came to office in 2001, foreign policy was not at the forefront of his agenda, and 
Iran took a very low priority.  Bush's cabinet has been described as being bifurcated between two 
camps, the more dovish led by Secretary of State Colin Powell, and the more hawkish by Vice President 
Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.  Rumsfeld and Cheney have sometimes been 
lumped together with the neo-cons, but Freedman (2008, 375-376) described them instead as hard-
power realists, determined to protect and expand U.S. influence.  In Freedman's view, defense official 
Paul Wolfowitz was the leading neo-con in the U.S. government.  With regard to Iraq, the realist hawks 
were looking for an opportunity to deal decisively with Saddam Hussein, and for a moment, 
neoconservative ideology provided a convenient narrative around which to rally support.  This same 
narrative had also animated the War on Terror, and it apparently resonated with President Bush, 
especially after 9-11.    
The neoconservatism for which the Bush administration has been so often criticized found its 
moment in the sun between 2001 and 2003.  It was fueled far more by al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein 
than by Iran.  Where it concerned Iran, neoconservatism intersected with historical grudges held by 
long-time Republican stalwarts like Cheney and Rumsfeld, examples more of institutional layering than 
belief in a liberal internationalist ideology.  Neoconservatism appealed to President Bush, but again, his 
"axis of evil" declaration was more about Iraq than Iran.  Further, the human rights layer of the conflict, 
which came into play after Khatami's election, had heavily influenced Bush's perception of the Iranian 
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people.  He believed that average Iranians were poised to overthrow their tyrannical regime and 
wholeheartedly embrace Western values.  In sum, the neoconservative narrative served as an all-too-
convenient packaging device for articulating layers of the conflict between the U.S. and Iran that had 
already been built over the years.  One could make an argument that neoconservatism was in institution 
in itself, but within the context of the U.S.-Iranian relationship, it functioned more like a layer.  As so 
often occurs, it originally derived from outside the relationship, but as it embedded itself, it 
rearticulated and renewed the layers that came before it. 
Was the Bush administration then a whole new constituent to the conflict?  It was certainly an 
actor, but so were the other administrations before it.  There can be no definitive answer, but the more 
pertinent question for a theoretical analysis is whether it is useful to treat the Bush administration, or 
even Bush himself, as a distinct constituent.  This dissertation argues that it is not.  First, in spite of the 
views he occasionally expressed, Bush rarely focused attention on Iran during his first term in office.  His 
extension of humanitarian aid after the Bam earthquake and his poorly conceived but well-intentioned 
attempt to find solidarity with Iran's reformers through the "axis of evil" speech also suggested that he 
was not as deeply invested in animosity against Iran as some of his advisors.  As the next section will 
show, Bush eventually turned around and made overtures of his own toward Iran during his second 
term.  Additionally, as previously discussed, the actions of the Bush administration reflected the 
institutional entrenchment of animosity with Iran from preceding decades more so than any emergent 
ideology.  Perhaps the most important question to ask, however, if whether Bush could have 
successfully pursued rapprochement with Iran if he had wanted to do so.  The previously identified 
constituents (CENTCOM, Israel, and the U.S. Congress) were fully active throughout this period.  If their 
influence would have been enough to strangle cooperation in the cradle, then arguments over the effect 
of neoconservative ideology become less salient.  This dissertation contends that this was exactly the 
case.   
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Finally, one could argue that constituencies were not necessary to stoke the conflict if the U.S. 
president was hostile to Iran.  However, this section has shown that Bush’s stance toward Iran was not 
consistent (and would become less so during his second administration).  Bush’s decisions regarding Iran 
were mediated through the lens of other priorities (his focus on terrorism and Iraq), and more 
importantly, they were actively shaped by each of the constituencies on the U.S. side, CENTCOM, Israel, 
and the U.S. Congress. 
CENTCOM's role in stoking the conflict between the U.S. and Iran was indirect but entirely 
significant.  CENTCOM Commander General Tommy Franks (2004) described in his memoir, the 
command was stretched to its limits in planning and executing two major wars on short notice in rapid 
succession.  Reading through his memoir, one almost gets the sense that Iran did not exist.  None of the 
Iranian overtures discussed in this section made any significant difference to CENTCOM or the U.S. 
military.  On the other hand, Pakistan and the Arab Gulf States that CENTCOM had been cultivating for 
almost two decades were pivotal players throughout.  The point that emerges is that CENTCOM had 
built a regional order in which Iran did not fit.  Commanders saw no need for Iranian support, and if the 
Bush administration had tried to collaborate more actively with Iran, this would probably have 
jeopardized the precarious relationships with previously established partners.   
Instead, the U.S. military simply tried to go around Iran while invading its neighbors.  Iran 
offered to provide tactical support on the ground in Afghanistan, but with no approval from higher 
levels, U.S. troops had no basis from which to collaborate.  They mostly kept a wary eye on Iranian 
activities, which became increasingly ominous over time anyway.  Because Iran was deemed to have no 
place in determining the future of either Iraq or Afghanistan, CENTCOM made a priority (especially in 
Iraq) of seeking ways to limit Iranian influence and prevent "meddling." As a result, not only had U.S. 
troops directly surrounded Iran on two sides, but they were directly challenging Iranian interests in 
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shaping their neighborhood.  Thus, two wars that originally had nothing to do with Iran (at least in the 
U.S. view) became layers on the U.S.-Iranian conflict. 
If CENTCOM's role in fueling the conflict between the U.S. and Iran was indirect, this could not 
be said about Israel.  Parsi (2007, 215-225) again provided the best narrative description available of the 
Israeli strategy during this period.  Parsi explained that Iranian support for Hezbollah increased in the 
late 1990's after Rafsanjani's attempts at reconciliation with the U.S. failed, and many Israeli leaders 
began to consider Hezbollah more dangerous than Palestinian groups, an example of displacement and 
conversion in the Israeli camp.  When Israel withdrew from Lebanon in April 2000, this undercut 
Hezbollah's influence and Iran's foothold in Lebanon.  Iran responded by increasing its rhetoric and 
found itself pressured by its own promises into increasing support for Palestinian militants.  By the time 
Ariel Sharon became Prime Minister in March 2001, Israel was squarely opposed to Iran and determined 
to shape U.S. policy.  Their first key victory under the Bush administration was in lobbying Congress, 
through AIPAC, to renew and extend the ILSA sanctions, over objections from State Department officials 
like Richard Haas.  This insured that the Bush could not start his administration with a symbolic olive 
branch toward Iran.   
Parsi (2007, 227-235) argued that after 9/11, Israeli leaders understood that they had little to 
offer in a war in Afghanistan.  They watched the U.S. build strategic relationships with Muslim countries 
across the region, which potentially undermined their own influence with Washington, and they were 
determined to ensure that this list did not include Iran.  For this reason, the Israeli lobby (AIPAC 
especially) joined forces with prominent neo-conservative officials and think-tank analysts in attempting 
to tie Hezbollah and their Syrian and Iranian supporters into the U.S. target list for the global war on 
terror.  With U.S. attention focused on the war against the Taliban, they made little headway at first, 
although they attempted to undermine the Geneva Initiative in any way they could.  The Karine A 
incident, however, was a public relations coup for Israel, and they exploited it to the full.   Their reaction 
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to the incident effectively reduced the momentum of the Geneva Initiative, convinced the Pentagon that 
Iran was collaborating with al-Qaeda, and brought Iran to President Bush's attention as he considered 
his State of the Union address in January 2002. 
While some commentators have blamed Israeli influence for the U.S. decision to invade Iraq, 
Parsi (2007, 239-252) points out that Israel initially opposed U.S. action against Iraq, arguing through 
both official and unofficial channels that Iran was the greater threat.  Only once the die was cast did 
Sharon give his backing to the invasion, and then he publicly argued (Benn 2002) that Iraq should only 
be the first step on the way to a confrontation with Iran.  When Iranian officials returned to the Geneva 
Initiative talks in the Spring of 2002 (after suspending them over the "axis of evil" speech), Israel again 
grew concerned.  Parsi (2007, 242) described how Israel's supporters engineered a plot to ensure that 
Pentagon officials were noticed by the media in talks with an Iranian opposition group in June 2002.  The 
Pentagon downplayed the meeting as a chance contact, nevertheless, the affair sowed distrust between 
the U.S. and Iran and helped prevent the Geneva Initiative from gaining more traction.  Israel also 
pressured the U.S. government over Iran's nuclear program.   
Solomon (2016, 114-117) explained that the MEK revelation to CNN regarding Iran's secret 
nuclear program was actually based upon Israeli intelligence, but Israel did not want to tip its hand and 
found the MEK a convenient conduit.  Finally, Parsi (2007, 250-252) relayed that Iran offered a "grand 
bargain" to Israel even before its overture to Washington.  While some officials were intrigued, Sharon's 
hardline supporters were not.  Having advance notice of the Iranian offer before the Bush 
administration gave Israeli strategists time to continue undermining the U.S.-Iranian relationship prior to 
Washington's consideration of the "grand bargain." 
Neither was the U.S. Congress any friend of rapprochement with Iran.  Congress (Katzman 2006) 
renewed the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) for 5 years in August 2001, tightening the definitions applied 
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to foreign investment and requiring a follow-up report from the Executive Branch on the effectiveness 
of sanctions - presumably to hold the President accountable for enforcing them.  As previously 
mentioned, AIPAC conducted an all-out blitz to ensure that this bill went through.  As was the case in the 
1990's, however, neither side of the political aisle needed much prodding to oppose Iran.  From 2001-
2003 (U.S. House of Representatives 2020) (U.S. Senate 2020), both houses of Congress were split 
almost evenly between Republicans and Democrats.  There was simply no significant block of American 
voters arguing for better relations with Iran and no political upside for taking the chance.  After 9-11, 
few Americans were excited about compromising with states that had been associated with terrorism.   
Country music singer Alan Jackson summed up the mood nicely with his hit song "Where Were 
You (When the World Stopped Turning)," which carried the prominent line, "I'm not sure I can tell you 
the difference in Iraq and Iran." The point of the line was not that Americans were ignorant, but that 
Iran (like Iraq) was on the wrong side of public opinion.  House Speaker Newt Gingrich summarized the 
opinion of many lawmakers when he said (Crist 2012, 433), "We confuse Americans, our allies, and our 
enemies when we speak of Iran joining the coalition against terrorism." In some cases, being tough on 
Iran carried a considerable upside.  Senator Sam Brownback (Mearsheimer and Walt 2007, 294) 
appealed to evangelical Christians, Israel, and neoconservatives when he deliberately antagonized Iran 
by introducing an amendment in April 2004 that would have earmarked $50 million for support to 
Iranian opposition groups.  Parsi (2007, 253-255) pointed out that the legislation only fell short because 
the groups in question did not appear credible. 
In summary, the first term of the Bush presidency was an important period for the direction of 
the U.S.-Iranian relationship, and it fully supported the contention that conflict is perpetuated through 
institutional mechanisms.  The hawkish stance taken by the Bush administration and neoconservative 
ideologues may have muddied the waters and challenged the notion that constituencies can be 
discretely or definitively identified over time, but constituencies are not always discrete to begin with.  
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They certainly do not have to be obvious to be effective.  The five constituencies to the conflict all 
behaved in a manner consistent with institutional predictions.  While three on the U.S. side were 
apparently overshadowed by the agency of the "decider," President Bush, it is unlikely that the Bush 
administration had much political latitude to pursue rapprochement with Iran, anyway.  Bush’s decision 
space had already been shaped by constituencies to the conflict, and his ability to pursue policy 
priorities unrelated to Iran depended upon his willingness to play ball with these groups. 
Ultimately, this period also thickened some layers of the conflict.  These included betrayal 
(especially as the U.S. reneged on commitments concerning the MEK), squelching overtures that were 
politically costly to extend (the U.S. and Iran had been taking turns at this for decades now), sanctions, 
human rights, terrorism, threats against Israel, Iran's nuclear program.  Neoconservatism and the wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan added new layers, as well. 
 
Ahmadinejad - An Odd Sort of Opportunity 
At first glance, one might consider it odd to examine the election and early presidency of 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as a case in potential rapprochement between the U.S. and Iran.  Ahmadinejad 
quickly became known for his incendiary rhetoric against Israel and the West, and he developed a 
reputation even among Iranians for outlandish public proclamations and behavior.  It is worth 
considering, though, that in spite of his confrontational style, Ahmadinejad was arguably just as eager to 
engage with the U.S. as either of his predecessors.  Moreover, the Bush administration, which had 
previously quashed attempts at dialogue between the U.S. and Iran, reversed course and attempted to 
take Tehran up on its previous offers.  By the end of the Bush administration, prominent public officials 
(Schweid 2008) from both sides of the U.S. political aisle were openly advocating direct talks with Iran, 
an unprecedented state of affairs.   
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Yet for all this promise, the period between 2005 and the end of 2009 was the most contentious 
episode of the relationship since U.S. and Iranian forces exchanged direct fire in the Tanker War in 1987-
1988.  In fact, U.S. forces battled Iranian proxies daily during operations in Iraq, and the possibility of 
U.S. strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities (Kaplan 2006) dominated public discussion.  As with every 
other period so far, the U.S.-Iranian relationship involved a complex web of interconnected issues, and 
analysts have offered numerous explanations by taking strands in isolation.  Only by examining the 
totality, however, do the institutional aspects emerge that tie this period to each one preceding it.  
Ahmadinejad's sensationalism may have gripped the headlines, but it was previous layers of conflict, 
fostered and developed by constituencies, that actually prevented cooperation.  Constituencies took a 
more decisive role in this process than during the first half of the decade.   
 
What happened? 
In Iran, the hope represented by Khatami's reform movement steadily faded during the first half 
of the 2000's.  With reformers in control of both the presidency and parliament, Iranians held them 
responsible for fulfilling popular expectations, especially with regard to the economy.  Conservatives 
exploited this situation (Hunter 2014, 186-191), shifting blame and attempting to discredit their rivals, 
all while blocking any proposal that promised meaningful change.  Reformers exacerbated their own 
woes by failing to develop a coherent strategy or vision, and they developed a reputation for focusing on 
philosophical issues instead of practical concerns.  Meanwhile, a new generation of conservative leaders 
was developing their own platform and preparing for a grab at power.   
The old guard of Iran's clerical establishment traced their fortunes to the revolution, and often 
to personal association with Khomeini.  For the up-and-coming generation (Mousavian 2015, 201, 207-
208) (Ansari 2009, 13), who dubbed themselves broadly as "principlists," the Iran-Iraq War was their 
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formative event, and many of these emerging leaders were veterans, especially of the IRGC.  These 
principlists, far from being mere proteges of Khamenei, resented the grip that leaders like Rafsanjani 
had developed on power and wealth in Iran.  In expressing their desires, they tapped into some of the 
same roots of popular resentment that had previously animated the reform movement, but with a 
stronger focus on bread and butter issues.  In 2004 (Kazemzadeh 2008, 189), the Guardian Council 
heavily skewed the parliamentary election by disqualifying thousands of reformist candidates.  
Conservatives took approximately 200 of the 290 seats, with declared reform candidates only retaining 
40.  It is doubtful that such overt meddling was necessary for a conservative victory, but much as 
Rafsanjani decisively outmaneuvered the leftist clerics in 1992, Iran's hardliners now effectively 
sidelined the influence of reform politicians. 
Ahmadinejad's victory in the June 2005 presidential election was as much a surprise to Iran's 
conservatives as its reformers.  Ahmadinejad (Naji 2008, 3, 7-8, 32-40, 50-56, 81-86) was an engineer by 
training, not a cleric, and he hailed from humble beginnings, the son of a blacksmith (which he proudly 
leveraged in his campaign).  A self-starter, he secured several administrative positions during the early 
days of the Islamic Republic and the Iran-Iraq War, and he served in the IRGC for two years, although 
possibly not in combat.  After completing his PhD and serving as an engineering professor, he reentered 
the political arena and rose to become the Mayor of Tehran.  During this time, he established his 
credentials as a populist, lavishing public money on popular projects, and he built his political base by 
appealing to the IRGC and especially Iran's large and influential Basij network.  In the 2005 presidential 
election, Rafsanjani had positioned himself as the heir apparent of the presidency with the backing of 
Khamenei.  Ahmadinejad's campaign harnessed popular resentment by painting Rafsanjani as the image 
of elite corruption, juxtaposed against a humble man of the people.  With the backing of the IRGC and 
Basij, Ahmadinejad caught popular attention, and even Khamenei apparently endorsed his victory by the 
end.   
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In much the same manner that George W. Bush was not himself a neoconservative but came to 
embody the movement, Mousavian (2015, 210) argued that Ahmadinejad was not originally a principlist 
but a political opportunist who captured a wave of popular sentiment and made it his own.  Also, like 
Bush, Ahmadinejad surrounded himself (Fathi 2005) with an administration dominated by ideologues, 
some with dubious credentials.  This convergence led to a prevailing foreign policy (Mousavian 2015, 
207-208) based upon the premise that Iran's previous failures in rebuilding its relationship with the West 
were the result of negotiating from a position of weakness.  Iran needed a more confrontational 
approach that could inspire support from the Muslim world, and it needed a nuclear program to display 
its strength.   
In coming to office, Ahmadinejad encountered a Bush administration that had lost some of the 
bluster of its early years.  Contrary to early declarations of victory, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were 
both intensifying and consuming greater resources, and words like "quagmire" and "fiasco" were 
beginning to emerge in the popular press.  Bush's approval ratings were declining in almost linear 
fashion over the course of his presidency (Gallup 2020) from a historic high, shortly after 9/11.  On the 
other hand, Iran's economy was buoyed by higher oil prices, and America's struggles in Iraq and 
Afghanistan increased its leaders’ sense of security, belying any neoconservative fantasies about 
toppling the Iranian regime after Saddam Hussein.  With regard to Iran, the Bush administration was 
split by late 2005.  On one hand, Bush (Crist 2012, 490, 496-502) signed an Iran action plan in 2005 that 
openly directed a public diplomacy campaign to promote democracy in Iran and undermine the 
hardliners.  On the other hand, he dropped U.S. objections to Iran's membership in the World Trade 
Organization, and the NSC had a meeting in December 2005 which considered the possibility of opening 
a consulate in Tehran.   
In this environment, and perhaps suffering from an inflated sense of self-importance, 
Ahmadinejad (Slackman and Fathi 2006) embarked on a spree of controversial public statements that 
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included threats to Israel, holocaust denial, and apocalyptic references to Shiite messianic prophecies, 
inciting concern not only outside Iran but also from the clerical establishment itself.  Yet in spite of his 
rhetoric, Ahmadinejad also deliberately reached out to the U.S. in his own fashion.  In May 2006, 
Ahmadinejad sent an 18-page letter (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2006) to President Bush, outlining 
Iranian grievances against the U.S., but also seemingly suggesting future cooperation.  Mousavian (2015, 
211, 215-216) pointed out that, even from an Iranian perspective, the letter was "naïve" and "insulting," 
but this was also the first time a sitting Iranian president had written an official letter to his U.S. 
counterpart suggesting a future relationship.  Bush declined to respond, commenting afterward that 
Ahmadinejad was "a very strange man."  This would not be the only overture offered by either side, 
though.  Over the next two-and-a-half years three separate dramas would play out simultaneously that 
would directly affect the relationship between the U.S. and Iran. 
The first strand of this engagement story was the shortest and least impactful, but it still made a 
significant difference in shaping the episode as a whole.  Since the 2000 Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon 
(Harel and Isacharoff 2008), tensions between Israel and Hezbollah (controlling much of southern 
Lebanon to Israel's north) had increased.  In February 2005, Syria arguably overplayed its hand in 
Lebanon by sponsoring the assassination of the Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafiq Hariri.  This started a 
chain of events that forced a complete withdrawal of Syrian forces, and it threatened the influence of 
both Hezbollah and their Iranian sponsors within the country.  Hezbollah, seeking to protect its 
reputation as a resistance force, increased its threats against Israel, and in July 2006, they kidnapped 
two Israeli soldiers.  This sparked an extreme reaction from Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's government in 
Israel, which believed that they could use the event as a pretext for military force that would break the 
back of the Hezbollah threat for good.  Israel started with a heavy air campaign and limited ground 
incursions.  They graduated to a larger invasion in specific areas.  Hezbollah was caught off guard by the 
severity of the Israeli attack, but this type of warfare played to their strengths.  Far from being quickly 
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vanquished, they struck back with Iranian-made missiles and used guerilla tactics to produce casualties 
among Israeli troops.  Instead of the quick, decisive campaign envisioned by Israeli leaders, the Israeli 
Defense Forces (IDF) payed a high price for its gains and produced an embarrassing amount of collateral 
damage, drawing the ire of the international community.  
The U.S. initially blessed Israel's military action (Harel and Isacharoff 2008), adding only the 
reservations that it must limit damage to Lebanon's infrastructure and avoid undermining the delicate 
political situation in Beirut.  Israel garnered support from the G-8 nations, hoping the operation would 
undermine Syria and Iran.  As casualties mounted, however, the international community turned against 
Israel, and the U.S. began pressuring for a cease-fire agreement, which even Hezbollah at first claimed it 
would support.  The problem for Israel is that its efforts had produced so few gains, Olmert felt he could 
not end the operation.  The longer it continued, thought, the more Israel's bargaining position eroded.  
By the end of the 34-day war, any Israeli claim to victory was pyrrhic at best.  The public relations fallout 
nearly toppled Olmert's government, sending his approval ratings to historic lows.  Hezbollah, though 
bruised, claimed victory as well, as did both Syria and Iran.  Harel and Isacharoff (2008, 251-258) argued 
that, in reality, Hezbollah lost considerable influence in the region, being painted as a proxy for Iran 
instead of an Arab resistance force.  Iran, for its part, never planned for a war to take place when it did, 
and its leaders would likely have preferred to play Hezbollah's card at a more opportune moment.  For 
the U.S., however, Hezbollah's Iranian missiles and munitions looked like proof positive that Iran was 
serious about Ahmadinejad's recent threats to (Slackman and Fathi 2006), "wipe Israel off the map." 
Israeli leaders did not fail to capitalize on this perception, and the Israeli layer of the U.S.-Iranian conflict 
thickened, as did fears over Iran's missile program. 
The second strand was the controversy over Iran's nuclear program, an ever-growing layer of 
the conflict.  In a likely attempt to head off referral to the U.N. Security Council at the height of U.S. 
power in 2003, Iran negotiated a work plan (Mazzucelli 2007, 5-6) with the EU3 (France, Britain, 
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Germany) to temporarily cease its enrichment activities and pursue a negotiated settlement.  It also 
agreed to adopt the Additional Protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), although the 
Parliament did not ratify this move.  Preoccupied with Iraq, the U.S. acquiesced to this solution, but 
Iranian cooperation (El Baradei 2011, 127-129) with the EU3 and the IAEA was sporadic, and Iran clearly 
intended to exacerbate splits between the U.S. and Europe, which only fueled suspicion within the U.S. 
intelligence community.  In November 2004 (Fathi 2004), Iran signed the Paris Agreement, which further 
codified their temporary agreement to enrich uranium, but even this was surrounded by controversy on 
all sides.  El Baradei (2011, 141-146) argued that Iran's cooperation was intended to produce the elusive 
"grand bargain" with the West, but the U.S. prevented the EU3 from offering any meaningful incentives, 
and Iran grew frustrated.  This may have been the position proffered by Iran’s negotiators, but El 
Baradei clearly discounted the influence that constituencies were wielding in Iran. 
One of Ahmadinejad's first acts (Fathi and Fuller 2005) upon assuming office in August 2005 was 
to announce Iran's decision to break the IAEA seals on their nuclear facilities and resume enrichment.  
His actual level of control over Iran's nuclear portfolio was debatable (El Baradei 2011, 254-256), as his 
onetime rival Ali Larijani became the public face of negotiations for the Supreme Leader, representing 
an opaque network of behind-the-scenes interests, but Ahmadinejad clearly intended to drive the train.  
Ahmadinejad (Barzegar 2009, 21) was primarily responsible for bringing the nuclear program out from 
behind the closed doors of Iranian internal politics and popularizing it with the Iranian people.  With up 
to 90 percent support from the populace at times, it quickly became difficult for any Iranian leader to 
give ground on the issue.  Just as being "soft on Iran" had become a liability in U.S. politics, Iranian 
politicians could no longer afford to compromise away their nuclear program.   
For President Bush, preventing Iran from developing a nuclear capability was a high priority.  
Bush (2011, 416) later stated, "I thought about the problem in terms of two ticking clocks.  One 
measured Iran's progress toward the bomb; the other tracked the ability of reformers to instigate 
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change.  My objective was to slow the first clock and speed the second." In May 2006 (El Baradei 2011, 
194-195), Iran delivered a message to the U.S. through IAEA Chief Mohamad El Baradei that they were 
interested in direct talks over the nuclear issue as well as Iraq, Afghanistan, Hezbollah and Hamas.  In 
response (Crist 2012, 505-507), Condoleezza Rice engineered a proposal presented through the U.N. 
Security Council that if Iran halted enrichment and invited transparency, the U.S. would open direct talks 
that would allow a peaceful nuclear program and pave the way toward normal relations.  This was by far 
the best deal that the U.S. had offered Iran, to date, and perhaps better than they had even hoped for in 
their 2003 "grand bargain" proposal.  However, Iran refused to unilaterally halt its enrichment a second 
time, and the deal fell flat.  Just as constituencies to the conflict had poisoned the well for Iran’s original 
offer, they were now making concessions impossible on the Iranian side and limiting options for the U.S. 
This set into motion a chain of events where the U.S. and Iran alternated between threats and 
negotiations on both sides.  The P-5+1 (the U.N. Security Council plus Germany) superseded the EU3, 
and from this platform, the U.S. (Cordesman, et al. 2014, 37, 41-45) succeeded in passing three rounds 
of U.N. sanctions between December 2006 and March 2008.  The U.S. Congress also passed two acts in 
2006 directed at sanctioning Iran, ensuring that they remained relevant actors in this drama.  The U.S. 
Treasury Department (Solomon 2016, 143-151) joined the fight against Iran as well, finding innovative 
ways to enforce existing sanctions and using new laws related to terrorist financing to pressure banks 
and businesses worldwide to stop doing business with Iran.   
To further press Iran, Bush kept the possibility of military strikes on the table throughout his 
administration, but this was complicated (Treverton 2013, v-vi) in November 2007 by a National 
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that stated with high confidence that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons 
program in 2003.  The NIE did not rule out the possibility that Iran may have restarted it, but in the 
politically charged environment surrounding the nuclear negotiations, this statement became a lightning 
rod for critics of the Bush administration's Iran policy.  Bush (2011, 418-419) himself expressed 
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frustration in his memoirs that the controversy lowered the resolve of P-5+1 partners and reduced his 
administration's ability to maintain pressure on Iran.  Ahmadinejad declared the NIE "a great victory" for 
Iran, although later intelligence reports (Solomon 2016, 128-132) would suggest that Iran had never 
entirely halted its weapons program at all.   
The NIE controversy was followed in February 2008 by a favorable report (El Baradei 2011, 280-
282) from the IAEA with regard to Iran's cooperation, which drew criticism for the IAEA from both the 
U.S. and Israel.  Iran spun the report in its own favor, and then Ahmadinejad (Mousavian 2012, 301) 
fueled the conflict further in April by announcing a completely unrealistic plan to massively expand 
enrichment at Natanz to 6,000 centrifuges, a clear sop to his own domestic base.  In a final effort make 
progress on the issue before the end of his administration (Crist 2012, 509), Bush offered Iran a "freeze 
for freeze" incentive package through the P-5+1 in July 2008.  This would have suspended sanctions 
against Iran merely for a promise to halt further expansion of Iran's program, an opportunity to talk.  
Iran turned this offer down, as well.  The nuclear layer of the U.S.-Iranian relationship could hardly have 
thickened more in this space of time. 
The third strand that operated concurrently during the second half of the Bush administration 
was Iran's proxy war against U.S. forces in Iraq, a new layer to the existing conflict.  Iran had been 
developing Shiite resistance (Rayburn, et al. 2019a, 187-188, 269-270) networks in Iraq for many years 
prior to the U.S. decision to invade.  When the U.S. invaded, they had already started activating those 
networks to undermine Saddam Hussein and build Iranian influence.  After the fall of the Baathist 
government, Iranian agents of various stripes went on a buying spree in Baghdad and southern Iraq, 
reportedly purchasing (O'Hern 2008, 103) as many as 5,000 homes and businesses, so many that it 
produced a bubble in the real estate market.  Through this network, the IRGC and the MOIS began 
arming and directing Shiite militias, first to assassinate former Baathists, but then to defend Shiite 
interests in Iraq.  They also began infiltrating the fledgling police and military forces, along with every 
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echelon of the new Iraqi government.  Shiite militias bided their time at first, expecting democracy to 
work in their interest as the largest confessional group in Iraq.   
One group in particular was not content to wait, though.  The Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) (Rayburn, et 
al. 2019a, 391-392), led by Moqtada al-Sadr, incited major uprisings across southern Iraq throughout 
2004, especially in Karbala and Najaf.  The JAM initially held Iran at arms' length and refused their 
direction and support, but open battles with coalition forces depleted their combat power.  By the end 
of the year, Sadr and his militia changed course and began looking to Tehran, especially as sectarian 
violence between the Sunni's and Shiites ramped up.  JAM started becoming one of Iran's most valuable 
clients.  
Between 2003 and 2005, Iran kept its proxy war against the U.S. at a low boil (Crist 2012, 518-
519), not overtly rocking the boat.  However, by the time of Ahmadinejad's election, Iranian leaders had 
already decided to turn up the heat.  Coalition forces (O'Hern 2008, 86-89) began taking increased 
casualties, especially from a new and more effective style of Improvised Explosive Device (IED), the 
Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP).  U.S. intelligence and special operations soldiers started tracing 
EFP’s back to Iran as early as mid-2005 and uncovering evidence of a full-scale proxy war by the end of 
the year.  This started an uphill battle for tactical commanders concerned about the Iranian threat.  First, 
coalition commanders (Crist 2012, 513, 524) were concerned about undermining Nuri al-Maliki, Iraq's 
Shiite Prime Minister, who generally vetoed operations against Shiite targets.  Just as importantly, 
though, the Pentagon's initial strategy had been to draw down forces in Iraq as quickly as possible, but 
with sectarian violence on the rise, the country appeared to be coming apart at the seams.   
The Bush administration (Rayburn, et al. 2019a, 572-575) spent much of 2006 examining various 
assessments of a way forward.  Iran's increasing bellicosity was troubling, but few senior commanders or 
policymakers (O'Hern 2008, 90-93) were prepared to escalate with Iran while trying to develop an exit 
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strategy.  Iranian agents (Solomon 2016, 70-71) built their networks with relative impunity under the 
personal direction of Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Qassim Soleimani, who established 
mechanisms of control similar to a mafia throughout Iraq.  Intelligence would later confirm reports 
(Ware 2005) that Iran also developed a sophisticated ratline that moved militia recruits from Iraq, 
through Iran and Syria, to Lebanon for training in Lebanese Hezbollah camps.   
Only in September 2006 did the U.S. get serious about countering Iran's proxy warfare in Iraq.  
The coalition (Crist 2012, 525-527) developed a new Special Operations task force with a specific 
mandate to target Shiite militias and their Iranian sponsors.  They started conducting a series of 
aggressive raids (Rayburn, et al. 2019b, 73-74) at the end of 2006, and a January raid in Erbil captured 
five IRGC officers.  The Iranians reacted furiously, claiming that they were diplomats, but the U.S. 
interrogated them and held them prisoner until the withdrawal of coalition forces.  In retaliation, the 
Iranians directly sponsored a sophisticated militia raid on a coalition compound later that month in 
Karbala, killing five American soldiers.  Coalition forces then hunted and killed the perpetrators.   
In February 2007, Bush (Crist 2012, 530-532) publicly put the Iranian government on notice 
about its operations in Iraq, threatening to "deal with" any Iranian agents found in the country.  In 
October 2007, Bush also issued an Executive Order that designated the Quds force a supporter of 
terrorism and the IRGC as a proliferator of WMD.  This allowed the Treasury Department to apply 
sanctions.  Further, Bush's late 2006 decision to "surge" in Iraq, along with his appointment of General 
David Petraeus as the coalition commander changed the command posture with regard to Iran.  In July 
2007 (Rayburn, et al. 2019b, 225-226) Petraeus began a series of press releases that for the first time 
publicly articulated the U.S. case against Iran in a comprehensive manner.  Confronting his rival, 
Petraeus (Solomon 2016, 79-81) and exchanged messages directly with Soleimani on several occasions 
in 2007 and 2008.  In one exchange, Petraeus gave Soleimani an ultimatum not to use a particular 
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weapon, referred to as an IRAM, and Iran refrained from doing so, apparently respecting Petraeus's 
resolve. 
While the nuclear issue had yet to produce a bilateral meeting between the U.S. and Iran, the 
war in Iraq did.  In late 2006 (Rayburn, et al. 2019b, 226-227) (Crist 2012, 533-535), perhaps in response 
to increased U.S. pressure, Iran offered to talk with the U.S. in Iraq.  Ambassador Ryan Crocker met an 
Iranian counterpart in Baghdad in May and July 2007, but the discussions made no headway.  Both sides 
simply accused each other, and it was not apparent that the Iranian representative was empowered to 
offer any significant concessions.  In August 2007, Soleimani asserted his authority by sending a message 
directly to Petraeus, claiming that he was the sole decision-maker for Iran's activities in Iraq, an 
apparent attempt to undermine the authority of the Baghdad talks.  The official U.S. Army history of the 
Iraq War (Rayburn, et al. 2019b, 227) speculated that the December 2007 NIE on Iran's nuclear program 
was nail in the coffin for any future talks.  An emboldened Iran saw no need to return to the table.   
Crist (2012, 536) argued that Soleimani overplayed his hand, as Iranian sponsored groups 
battled each other in Basra that winter, prompting Maliki to finally initiate military action to retake the 
city.  Tellingly, the battle of Basra (O'Hern 2008, 109-110) was ultimately decided, not in Iraq, but by 
Soleimani's mediation among the warring parties at a meeting in Iran.  Overall, Iran's proxy war against 
the U.S. in Iraq added a new and potent layer to the conflict between the U.S. and Iran.  The Pentagon 
(Rempfer 2019) eventually attributed 603 U.S. combat deaths to Iran throughout the war.  A generation 
too young to remember the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, and in some cases even Khobar 
Towers, could loudly proclaim that Iran had U.S. blood on its hands.   
Again, while the relationship between the U.S. and Iran became more contentious throughout 
this period, it was also characterized by abortive attempts on both sides to better relations.  
Frustratingly, concessions by both sides always appeared to come in a disjointed fashion – too little, too 
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late.  As the next section will elaborate, thought, this was not simply another tragic spate of bad luck for 
the U.S. and Iran.  Constituencies were shaping events, ensuring that any peaceful overture would 
always be a non-starter, regardless of how promising it may have seemed. 
 
 
The institutional development of constituencies  
The overlapping period of the presidencies of George W. Bush in the U.S. and Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad in Iran was relatively rich in factors that helped to institutionalize the conflict between the 
U.S. and Iran.  As with other periods under study, both sides made at least some effort to bridge the gap.  
Unlike the early Bush years, where Iran was the primary supplicant, or the late Clinton years, where the 
U.S. took a more active role in seeking rapprochement, this episode was more evenly matched.  The U.S. 
and Iran both seemed to understand the value of direct talks, along with the costs of continuing conflict, 
but neither side proved willing to make significant concessions.  Meanwhile, constituencies to the 
conflict continued to make it unlikely that either side would change course.  Each of the constituencies 
demonstrated layering and drift which added considerable depth to the conflict and helped translate it 
to a new generation. 
Iran's clerical establishment, as a conservative structure of power, was going through significant 
changes that impacted relations with the U.S. and demonstrated the institutional process of drift.  To 
begin with, it was becoming less clerical.  Khomeini's inner circle, which formed the initial core of 
leadership under the Islamic republic, consisted primarily of clerics or individuals with close ties to 
clerics.  However, Khomeini (Khalaji 2010) did not speak for Shiite Islam as a whole.  Khomeini had 
steamrolled or sidelined a significant portion of the clerical hierarchy that disagreed with his views, and 
he essentially banished them to Qom.  Khamenei did not succeed Khomeini because there were no 
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other ayatollahs available.  The leaders of the Islamic Republic represented a splinter from the 
mainstream, which continued to operate quietly in the background but could not be trusted to carry on 
valayat-e faqih.  This problem became worse over time for Khamenei.  Khomeini's system developed 
proteges, but it did not produce a generation of viable successors that had both the popular support and 
religious clout to develop legitimacy.  This meant that the upcoming generation was even more 
beholden to the pillars established by their forebears, especially the U.S.-Iran conflict.  Without this 
perennial sense of external threat, a revolution that occurred before most citizens of the country were 
born offered a thin mandate for rule by this class.   
Khamenei (Vatanka 2019) also found himself increasingly reliant on the IRGC and clerical 
security forces as his base of power.  A network of senior commanders and veterans, forged by the Iran-
Iraq War instead of the Islamic Revolution, was claiming its place in Iranian political and economic life.  
The good news for Khamenei was that these up-and-comers, including Ahmadinejad's principlist 
supporters, relied on the framework of the Islamic Republic and valayat-e faqih for their own power and 
legitimacy, so they had a stake in the system.  The IRGC continued to be one of Iran’s few vehicles for 
social mobility, but the status it offered was inherently linked to the power of the organization and its 
networks.  With their own stake in the confrontation between the U.S. and Iran and leverage over 
Khamenei, he now had to balance and account for their views.  By the middle of the decade, the effects 
of this long-term change became visible and salient.  A new cast of characters had taken the U.S.-Iranian 
conflict and made it their own, making it harder for the old guard to reverse course if they wanted to. 
Iran's clerical establishment also demonstrated the process of layering in two distinct but 
related areas.  The first was a new domestic political situation in Iran.  By sidelining the reformers in 
2004 and 2005 (Hunter 2014, 208), the hardliners could declare victory, but with no rival, the divisions 
within the clerical establishment now became starker as insiders competed for influence.  This had a 
perverse influence on the U.S.-Iranian relationship because rapprochement with the West, especially 
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involving the nuclear program, was popular with the Iranian population, and it was considered a political 
prize.  El Baradei (2011, 198-199) brought out that in the summer of 2006, when the EU-3 had offered 
Iran a generous compromise for ceasing its uranium enrichment, it was the pragmatist conservative 
Hassan Rouhani (who had previously served as Iran's nuclear negotiator under Khatami and would later 
become president) who led the way in obstructing Iran's acceptance of the deal.  Rouhani and his 
supporters did not object to the terms at all, but they did not want to allow Ahmadinejad to be able to 
take credit for the deal and become a "national hero."  
While Iran dithered, the U.S. referred it to the U.N. Security Council.  As they probably planned 
all along, Ahmadinejad's rivals publicly blamed him (Staff Writer 2007) (Khalaji 2007) for mishandling the 
nuclear issue (among other key grievances) when the Security Council approved sanctions in the coming 
months.  Khamenei (Esfandiari 2007) rebuked Ahmadinejad and advised him to be quiet on the nuclear 
issue and leave it to those responsible, an open attempt to wrest political initiative from the bombastic 
president.  This domestic squabble allowed the already contentious nuclear negotiations to enter years 
of stalemate and sanctions, making the nuclear layer of the U.S.-Iranian conflict thicker at every turn.  
Iranian politics directly scuttled a deal that would have reduced hostility and provided the country a 
significant win on the international stage, and a constituency led this effort.  In institutional terms, this 
episode also helped to refresh and renew the clerical establishment as a constituency to the conflict, 
maximizing the participation of Iran’s power brokers. 
The second and related aspect of layering was a change in the way the nuclear issue was treated 
in Iran.  Before the 2002 revelations brought international attention to Iran's nuclear program, this was 
a matter that for the most part was handled quietly by regime insiders.  After 2002, regime hardliners 
marketed the program to average Iranians as a matter of national pride.  As previously mentioned, it 
was Ahmadinejad who really made the nuclear program popular with the Iranian people, tying it into a 
platform of populism and social justice.  This fundamentally transformed the value of the program to 
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Iran's clerical establishment.  Whereas before it was a bargaining chip they could use to achieve other 
goals, over time it became (El Baradei 2011, 135) the "jewel in Tehran's crown." This evolution added a 
new layer of depth to the already potent nuclear layer of the U.S.-Iranian relationship, making 
compromise harder on both sides and increasing path dependency.  By the time the Bush administration 
offered meaningful concessions in 2006, it was the constituencies in Iran that had taken the reigns 
regarding this issue set.   
The IRGC and clerical security forces were probably the most instrumental constituency to the 
U.S.-Iranian conflict during this period, demonstrating drift, displacement and conversion, and layering.  
In terms of drift, the IRGC matured considerably since the Iran-Iraq War.  Not only had it grown to 
dominate Iran's national security establishment (Takeyh 2016), but its tentacles extended throughout 
the economic and political realms, as well.  While its leadership had their roots in the Iran-Iraq War and 
the struggles of the 1980’s, by Ahmadinejad’s presidency most of its rank-in-file had little or no memory 
of either the war or the formation of Hezbollah.  The Quds Force Commander, Qassim Soleimani (Filkins 
2013), a hero of the Iran-Iraq War, came to embody the image of a modern, seasoned, and aggressive 
force.  Soleimani has been described as a man who was not particularly religious but was intensely 
driven by Iranian nationalism.  His motivation for confronting the U.S. was not the protection of a 
clerical regime or even the export of a revolution, but an Iranian sense of manifest destiny within the 
Middle East.  Soleimani's influence within Iranian foreign policy began a stark upward trajectory as soon 
as the U.S. became engaged in Iraq, and he dragged subordinates in his wake.  By the time Petraeus 
took command of the coalition in Iraq, Soleimani was openly asserting his dominance as Iran's chief 
player in the conflict.  In 2007 (Rayburn, et al. 2019b, 226-227), he deliberately undermined the only 
face-to-face talks that the U.S. conducted with Iran during this period, the Baghdad talks that apparently 
failed to meet with his approval.  Rapprochement between the U.S. and Iran had a new set of enemies 
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from within the same organization, each clambering to make a name for themselves in the circles of 
Iran’s elite. 
The IRGC also demonstrated displacement and conversion after the 2006 war between Israel 
and Hezbollah.  The IRGC had been supporting Hezbollah for years, and while the showdown did not 
erupt in the manner of Iran's choosing, their proxy force demonstrated that it could damage Israel.  The 
problem for Iran, however, was that Hezbollah spent itself tactically and politically in the effort.  The 
Iranians maintained their foothold in Lebanon, but this was no longer the center of gravity in efforts to 
export the revolution.  As Lebanon cooled down, Iraq became the place to be for aggressive Quds Force 
operatives looking to make their mark (Afghanistan was another possibility, but Shiites were a minority, 
and the insurgency was driven by the Sunni Taliban, which Iran was loathe to partner with).  Iraq was 
fertile ground for the advancement of IRGC interests on multiple fronts, and there was no way for this 
not to exacerbate the conflict between the U.S. and Iran. 
In terms of adding layers to the conflict, the IRGC and clerical security forces were also busy at 
work.  They were directly responsible for the proxy war in Iraq.  They fostered and developed business 
interests of their own in Iraq, necessitating political influence over the country.  Their support to 
Hezbollah thickened the Israeli layer of the conflict.  The IRGC also advanced Iran's nuclear program.  
Regardless of Khamenei's proclamations that these devices were un-Islamic, the IRGC had a clear 
interest in developing a nuclear weapon and little oversight to prevent it.  Even if Iran's negotiators truly 
believed that their country would never develop a nuclear weapon, there was always a shadow of doubt 
that the IRGC might be doing something without their knowledge.  Indeed, intelligence reports 
(Solomon 2016, 128-132) suggested that this was likely the case, at least to some degree.  Indeed, IRGC 
officers were frequently rewarded for taking initiative (Lyall, et al. 2007) that exceeded their brief.  One 
example was the March 2007 capture of 15 British sailors in the disputed border region of the Shat al-
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Arab.  The commander acted without orders, causing an international incident with Britain, but 
Ahmadinejad made a propaganda exercise out of it and rewarded him for his efforts. 
Unlike the IRGC, CENTCOM might be described as a reluctant constituency in this episode of the 
drama, but their moves in reaction to Iranian threats also thickened layer of the conflict and invested 
the command in hostility against Iran.  Some U.S. commanders, fixated on the growing challenges of 
unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, preferred not to antagonize Iran.  CENTCOM Commander from 
2003 to 2007 General John Abizaid (Crist 2012, 532) consistently argued against escalatory measures, 
although he favored a containment approach.  His replacement, Admiral William "Fox" Fallon was even 
more ambivalent about Iran.  These preferences, however, mattered little on the ground in Iraq, where 
U.S. soldiers were dying at the hands of Iranian proxies.  Before the summer of 2006, U.S. commanders 
in Iraq willfully downplayed Iran's escalating proxy war, not because they did not prefer to fight back, 
but because a new front with Iran did not fit the strategic constraints under which they operated.  This is 
an important point in itself because U.S. inaction likely encouraged Soleimani to increase his own 
efforts, and his untrammeled success in turn gave him wider latitude with Tehran to shape Iraq as he 
saw fit.  This was not the first time that a U.S. failure to retaliate fostered greater aggression by the 
Iranians (Reagan's restraint in Lebanon being another prime example).  This also demonstrates that 
constituencies to a conflict can feed directly off each other's actions (or inaction) whether they are 
intentional or not and thicken layers of the conflict.  The final chapter of this dissertation will discuss the 
institutional implications of this dynamic in greater depth.   
This state of affairs was not going to last forever.  To his credit, Bush personally decided on a 
bold new strategy for Iraq and appointed a bold commander to execute it for him (not to denigrate any 
who came before him, but General Petraeus had a unique sense of vision with regard to executing the 
"surge").  Even before the "surge," the creation of a Special Operations Task Force specifically focused 
on Iran was highly significant.  This may have been a temporary solution at first, but success is rarely 
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wasted, and one could argue that this was the beginning of a new institution.  The Special Operations 
units led by Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal (see McChrystal 2013, 33-36, 250-253) 
fundamentally changed the way U.S. forces fought against all manner of asymmetric warfare threats, 
and Iran’s role in spurring this evolution would not be forgotten in the coming years..  This combined 
with Petraeus's hardline approach toward the Iranian threat on the conventional side.  The tactic with 
the greatest long-term significance was simply calling out Iran publicly (Byman 2007) on what they were 
doing.  Iran could (and did) deny everything, but under Petraeus, the U.S. made a solid, evidence-based 
case to the U.S. public and the world that Iran was fueling the insurgency in Iraq.  The Iraq layer of the 
U.S.-Iranian conflict was no longer a matter of speculation or a hidden grudge match between 
combatants on a battlefield; it became a matter for public consumption and debate in the U.S. and Iran 
and fuel for new narratives on both sides. 
Unlike CENTCOM, Israel displayed no reluctance in furthering their constituency to the U.S.-
Iranian conflict and thickening both the Israeli and nuclear weapons layers.  In May 2006 (Erlanger 2006) 
Ehud Olmert addressed a joint session of the U.S. Congress, only the third Israeli Prime Minister to do 
so, and his message was primarily an admonishment to help defend Israel from the Iranian threat.  Less 
than two months afterward, Israel conducted its 34-day war with Hezbollah in Lebanon.  If the Iraq War 
was a "fiasco" (reference to Ricks 2006) for the U.S., the Lebanon war was a much shorter version of the 
same for Israel, even though it claimed victory.  While the war was originally about Hezbollah and not 
Iran, per se, Ram (2009, 82-86) argued that the Israeli leadership had to double down on selling the 
Iranian threat in order to justify the operation, which had hurt them domestically and strained relations 
with the U.S.  They did this primarily through AIPAC (Mearsheimer and Walt 2007, 298, 301), which 
spent 2007 pushing unsuccessfully for stronger sanctions legislation from Congress and very successfully 
campaigning to prevent the inclusion of a prohibition in the defense appropriations bill that would have 
required Bush to seek Congressional approval before any military strike on Iran.  Israel did not want the 
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U.S. to take the military option off the table, and they also pressured the Bush administration by 
continually implying that they might strike Iran on their own if the U.S. did not - a course of action that 
could have destabilized the entire region.   
After Mearsheimer and Walt's (2007) book went to the publisher, Israel proved this assessment 
again in September 2007 (Holmes 2018) by destroying a Syrian nuclear facility partly sponsored by Iran.  
Olmert personally asked Bush for the U.S. to conduct the strike themselves, but Bush declined.  
However, Bush's (2010, 421-422) memoirs expressed no surprise that Israel conducted the strike, and he 
stated that intelligence gathered after the fact pointed to the likelihood of use for a weapons program.  
Bush stated that the strike, "made up for the confidence I had lost in the Israelis during the Lebanon 
war," potentially suggesting that he had conveyed tacit approval all along.  Ultimately, the Israeli 
government needed Iran’s hostility to support its own political narrative, and there was no diplomatic 
solution between the U.S. and Iran that Israel was willing support during this episode. 
The only less active constituency of this period was the U.S. Congress.  Their constituency 
remained fully intact, but Congress was distracted by domestic issues that temporarily reduced their 
focus on Iran.  To begin with, Congress had less of a role to play during this period.  By 2006 
(Cordesman, et al. 2014, 37, 41-45) (Mearsheimer and Walt 2007, 298) they had already tightened 
unilateral sanctions to the point where further measures would have put the U.S. in direct conflict with 
its allies.  The most obvious room for maneuver against Iran now lay with the Bush administration 
(especially the Treasury Department) and the U.N. Security Council.   
Just as importantly, though, Bush's approval ratings (Gallup 2020) continued their steady 
descent throughout the second half of his presidency, due largely to the unpopularity of the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.  After years of scathing criticism from political opponents over the decision process for 
invading Iraq, the term "preemption" had become a virtual swear word in many circles (the reason that 
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Congress considered reining in Bush's power to authorize strikes on Iran's nuclear program).  It was not 
that the U.S. public was warming up to Iran or failed to appreciate a potential threat, but the tide of 
popular opinion was looking for a different approach to foreign policy, and both sides of the aisle were 
sensitive to this as the 2008 elections approached.  Most of the Democratic candidates for President and 
almost half of the Republicans were hailing from seats in Congress prior to the election.   
Tellingly, the major presidential candidates all promised to protect Israel and believed that Iran 
could not be allowed to develop nuclear weapons (Mearsheimer and Walt 2007, 295), but this is where 
they started to diverge from the increasingly unpopular incumbent.  John McCain (Sturm 2008) 
represented the hardline Republican view most aligned with Bush, that the U.S. should isolate Iran, 
keeping the threat of military force in play, although he avoided escalatory rhetoric.  Democrat Hillary 
Clinton suggested that the U.S. should engage with Iran directly, but she hedged her bets by taking a 
hard line (Morgan 2008) and threatening to "obliterate" Iran if it attacked Israel with a nuclear weapon. 
Democrat Barrack Obama (Sturm 2008) successfully juxtaposed himself against the Bush 
administration by arguing for a renewed campaign of diplomacy and engagement, and this tied into his 
overall narrative of "hope" which carried into his presidential campaign.  His running mate, Senator Joe 
Biden (El Baradei 2011, 264) (Memoli 2019) was one of few lawmakers with a long history of supporting 
engagement, and Biden's views found their moment.  The point of this section is not to provide an 
analysis of the 2008 presidential election, but to show that the U.S. Congress viewed Iran almost entirely 
through the prism of the domestic political struggle during the later years of the Bush administration.  
However, the same motivations which temporarily haltered Congressional animosity against Iran also 
laid the groundwork for it to return with a vengeance after Obama’s victory in 2009.  Iran would still be 
the weapon of choice in future domestic battles, and the institution of animosity against Iran weathered 




In their own ways, both the U.S. and Iran tried harder at rapprochement during the 2000's than 
they did during the 1990's.  A negotiating pattern that began to emerge a decade before was becoming 
a prominent fixture.  The opponent who saw themself in the weaker position made an offer or a gesture 
that should have appealed to the other opponent.  The stronger opponent, instead of accepting victory, 
held out for more and perpetuated the conflict.  Then both sides switched roles.  Game theory might 
offer additional insights into such behavior, but institutional theory suggests a straightforward 
explanation.  Neither side really wanted the conflict to end.  Concessions were short-term tactical moves 
allowed by constituencies on one side when their interests were temporarily distracted from the 
opposing side.  Rejection was an outward demonstration that constituencies on the other side still saw 
their long-term interest tied to the conflict, and no reasonable concession was actually going to be 
enough to change this fact.  As the concluding chapter will discuss, this phenomenon provides another 
compelling explanation why "interest mapping" has rarely, if ever, held the keys to conflict resolution.  
There are a potentially infinite number of drivers for institutional change, but without altering the 
institutional dynamics of a conflict, the puzzle will never be solved.  
The 2000's started with two decades worth of accumulated institutional baggage and then 
added its own.  Iran took the terrorism layer and added support for Hamas, harboring al-Qaeda 
fugitives, support for Hezbollah that included a small war against Israel, and a proxy war in Iraq.  It 
transformed the nuclear layer from relatively minor bone of contention to an impasse with most of the 
free world.  The U.S. surrounded Israel militarily on two sides and offered them little to no stake in the 
future of their neighbors.  Just as George H. W. Bush broke his promise to Iran with regard to "goodwill," 
his son broke his promise with regard to the MEK.  The U.S. used human rights arguments to undermine 
Iran's leadership, supported by a neoconservative ideology every bit as questionable as valayat-e faqih.  
The layers of domestic politics that undermined rapprochement in the 1990's transformed into new 
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layers that continued the same pattern a decade later.  Some of the constituencies exhibited 
displacement and conversion in their development over time, but usually in a manner that served to 
perpetuate the conflict.  All of the constituencies exhibited drift as key personalities changed over time 
but investment in the conflict remained.   
Yet for all this entrenchment, each decade of the conflict promised a new beginning.  The 
Iranians clung to their hope in the possibility of a "grand bargain." The U.S., worn down from years of 
overseas adventurism, elected a new president who promised to reorient American foreign policy.  The 






CHAPTER 6 - THE FOURTH DECADE, 2009-2018 
  The third decade of the conflict between the U.S. and Iran saw the torch of animosity passed 
from one generation to the next, and stoked by hardline conservative governments in both countries, 
that torch burned as brightly as ever by the end of the Bush administration.  However, both the U.S. and 
Iran had compelling national interests in coming to terms with each other.  Iran remained internationally 
isolated; its economy buoyed by oil sales but vulnerable to market fluctuations.  Its nuclear program 
offered a key bargaining chip, but unless Iranian leaders came to the negotiating table, it carried no 
value.  In many respects, the program actually increased Iran's insecurity in the face of international 
pressure, and the cost of holding this chip rose over time.  The U.S., on the other hand, had largely 
squandered its "unipolar moment" as the sole world superpower, becoming bogged down in two very 
costly wars with little end in sight.  Hawkish politicians spoke rashly about possible military action 
against Iran, but in reality, the U.S. public had little appetite for a new war in the Middle East.  When 
Barrack Obama was elected president in 2008, the populations on both sides breathed a sigh of relief, 
hoping for a negotiated solution.  Even the brash Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad seemed 
ready to make a deal.  Such was the mood as the Islamic Republic turned 30.   
As with any good story, this narrative could take multiple approaches.  For the fourth decade of 
the relationship between the U.S. and the Islamic Republic, one could focus on the Obama 
administration, a tragedy perhaps.  This would be a story of great expectations stymied along the way.  
But then, with a combination of great perseverance and political savvy, Obama engineered a historic 
nuclear agreement, paving the way for the end of a decades-long conflict.  Unfortunately, the villains 
come afterward and undo his great achievement, damning the two societies to perpetual enmity.  
Alternatively, one could focus on the Iranian regime and follow the story of Ahmadinejad's bid for 
personal power, interrupting the progress of diplomacy but coming to an ignominious end in 2013.  
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Instead, one could trace the story of Khamenei, struggling to maintain his own power and ensure that 
Khomeini's legacy lived on in an enduring Islamic Republic.  In this context, the nuclear agreement 
implemented in 2016 seems less like a triumph and more like a tactical concession, made in the name of 
expediency.  One might even take Khamenei's own view and explain how the duplicitous United States 
was fundamentally incapable of treating Iran with respect and honoring its own commitments.  The list 
could continue, but none of these narratives provides a complete picture of the conflict. 
Following the pattern of previous decades, this chapter will use an institutional lens to narrate 
the story.  The first episode, covering Obama's first term in office, will show how constituencies to the 
conflict, shaped by the operation of institutional mechanisms over the course of decades, dashed the 
hopes for reconciliation that Obama carried with him into office in 2009.  The second episode, 
corresponding roughly with the beginning of Obama's second term to the full implementation of the 
nuclear agreement in 2016, will be more complicated.  On one hand, the failure of the U.S. and Iran to 
cooperate in the fight against ISIS was entirely consistent with the pattern of three and half decades.  On 
the other, the nuclear agreement was a historic break in the paradigm of the relationship.  This chapter 
will discuss how this development constituted a victory over the power of constituencies, perhaps even 
challenging the concept of institutional animosity.  The victory was short-lived, though, and the third 
episode, which saw the election of President Trump in 2016, will end with the abrogation of the nuclear 
agreement in 2018 and the immediate aftermath of this event, a triumph for the seemingly defeated 
constituencies and a testament to the endurance of institutional forces.  Throughout the story, 
constituencies to the conflict evolved by the processes of displacement and conversion, layering, and 




Obama's 'Open Hand' 
The election of Senator Barrack Obama to the presidency in November 2008 ushered in a new 
era of possibility for the U.S.-Iranian relationship.  Obama campaigned for the presidency on a platform 
in which he portrayed himself as the polar opposite of his predecessor, George W. Bush.  Instead of a 
unilateral, "you are either with us or against us" (CNN 2001) approach, Obama advocated 
multilateralism (Zeleny and Kulish 2008), and he believed that American leadership would only be 
effective in partnership with allies and international bodies like the United Nations.  This appealed to 
large segments of the American population that were disaffected by the seemingly stalemated wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, and who had become allergic to the proposition that the U.S. might start another 
preemptive war with a country like Iran.  With regard to Iran, Obama (Luo 2008) believed that the U.S. 
had yet to make a sincere attempt at engagement, and this was a vital first step toward any resolution 
of the conflict, especially over Iran's nuclear program.   
Obama was not as dovish as his opponents sometimes claimed, and he had actually sponsored a 
bill in the Senate (Maloney 2015, 464-465) in 2007 that became the basis for sanctions he ultimately 
signed into law in 2010.  Although Obama's patience was not unlimited, he believed (Solomon 2016, 
174) that a sincere attempt at diplomacy would help the U.S. unite the international community against 
Iran if additional pressure were required.  His presidential campaign and the early days of his 
administration prompted a spate of optimistic literature advocating varying degrees of engagement with 
Iran (see (Maloney 2008), (Kinzer 2010), (Parasiliti 2010)).  The core of U.S. interests in the Middle East 
during this period centered around the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the containment of 
Islamic extremism, both of which would have been far less difficult and expensive in cooperation with 
Iran than in competition.  On the Iranian side, Ahmadinejad seemed even more eager for negotiations 
with the U.S. than he had been at the beginning of his term, and while three years in office had not 
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dampened his ambitions, they had tempered some of his more controversial impulses.  Iran’s population 
would have welcomed the economic benefits of international engagement, as well as the prestige of 
being recognized by the U.S. and its partners as a legitimate regional power.   
Instead of comprehensive engagement, by 2012, the U.S. and Iran were as far apart as they had 
ever been.  The international community was in the process of imposing one of the most comprehensive 
and innovative sanctions regimes in modern history against Iran, and publics on both sides again braced 
for the possibility of U.S. military action.  For the Iranians, their prized nuclear program produced no 
tangible benefits for the people and left their country economically strained and even more 
internationally isolated than during the Iran-Iraq War.  For the U.S, the short-term costs seemed 
minimal, but Vali Nasr (2013, 122) argued that the U.S. paid a significant strategic price by ceding 
political ground to its up-and-coming great power rivals, China and Russia, in return for their support.  If 
Iran and the U.S. had cooperated, Iran could have kept a significant portion of their civilian nuclear 
program, cost-free, and Obama's "pivot to Asia" (see Shambaugh 2013) might have had a greater impact 
in shaping China's rise.  This section will show that constituencies on both sides helped restrict the room 
for productive diplomacy and perpetuate the conflict, thickening layers of institutional animosity. 
  
What happened? 
The first several months of the Obama administration appeared promising for relations with 
Iran, as Obama established his new foreign policy priorities.  Shortly after his electoral victory in 
November 2008, Ahmadinejad (Erdbrink 2008) sent him a congratulatory letter, suggesting that Iran 
would welcome, "major, fair and real changes, in policies and actions, especially in this region."  While 
not devoid of rhetorical lecturing, Mousavian (2015, 224) made the point that this was the first 
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"complimentary" letter sent directly by a sitting Iranian president to his American counterpart.  Obama 
did not respond to the letter, but he initiated a series of overtures toward Iran upon taking office.  His 
administration (Solomon 2016, 178) rolled back some of the Bush-era democracy promotion initiatives 
that the Iranian government found offensive, arguing that they were of dubious value to begin with.  In 
March 2009 (Clinton 2014, 422), the U.S. indirectly invited Iran to participate at an international 
conference in the Hague on Afghanistan, and they sent a representative.  Several months later (Voice of 
America 2009), the State Department sent invitations to Iranian counterparts at embassies around the 
world, inviting them to take part in U.S. Independence Day celebrations, although it would rescind those 
invitations in the wake of the June 2009 election controversy in Tehran.   
More directly, Obama (2009) recorded a congratulatory video to the Iranian people celebrating 
the Persian New Year (Nowruz) in March 2009.  His message, broadcast by television and the internet, 
avoided most of the inflammatory language typical of previous messaging and offered a "new 
beginning," but it still cautioned Iran against supporting "terror" or attempting to build "arms." As in 
previous cases, Khamenei's response (Mousavian 2015, 225) focused almost entirely on these negative 
aspects of the speech.  He called Obama's approach an "iron hand" in a "velvet glove" and stated that, 
"our nation… hates [the policy of] threat and enticement." Undaunted, Obama (Burns 2019, 348) sent a 
personal letter to Khamenei (bypassing Ahmadinejad) through the Swiss in May 2009, offering direct 
engagement.  Khamenei responded promptly, and while the exchange has not been published, 
Mousavian (2015, 226) described the Supreme Leader's return letter as cordial.  He explained Iran's 
grievances but, aware of the tide of public sentiment in his own country, expressed a willingness to work 
together in and attitude of mutual respect.  Obama (Washington Times 2009) sent a second letter in 
early June, but events interrupted the momentum of this promising exchange.  The human rights layer, 
added to the U.S.-Iranian conflict under Khatami, was about to reemerge in a new and energized form.   
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Iran's June 2009 presidential election became another watershed moment in the history of the 
Islamic Republic.  By June (Abootalebi 2009, 5-8), the race boiled down to two viable candidates.  The 
incumbent, Ahmadinejad, retained a considerable base of support despite his controversial policies.  His 
leading challenger, Mir Hossein Mousavi, led a resurgent strand of Khatami's reformists that would 
brand themselves as the "Green Movement" in the wake of the election.  Significantly, the debates 
(Axworthy 2013, 401-402) leading up to the election were conducted in a Western-style format and 
were unusually candid, revealing regime dirty laundry like corruption far more openly than in any 
previous contest, piquing public interest.  On the day of the election, Mousavi (Rieffer-Flanagan 2013, 
99-101) prematurely declared victory, based on dubious evidence.  The government, possibly spooked 
by this claim, quickly responded by calling the results in favor of Ahmadinejad, with 62.8 percent of the 
vote (more than enough to prevent a runoff election).  This almost immediately led to claims of fraud by 
Mousavi's supporters and sparked a wave of protests across Iran, reportedly reaching as high as 3 
million participants in the following week.  On June 19, Khamenei (Abootalebi 2009, 8-9) (Erdbrink and 
Branigan 2009) openly sided with Ahmadinejad in a speech during Friday prayers, demanding that 
Iranians return to their homes and supporting crackdowns on continued descent.  The Supreme Leader 
accepted that there may have been some fraudulent activity, but he claimed that it was simply 
impossible to fabricate the required 11 million votes under the Islamic Republic.  
The emergent Green Movement (Axworthy 2013, 404-406) continued to sponsor protests 
regularly for the first month, then sporadically through the fall and into early 2010.  In some cases, they 
coopted events that had been officially sponsored by the government, such as a December 2009 
commemoration of the Shiite holiday Ashura.  For the first time in the history of the Islamic Republic, 
chants directed against the Supreme Leader himself became pervasive.  The Iranian government (Hunter 
2014, 213, 217-218) blamed the unrest on Western plots and described it as a U.S. attempt to foment a 
color revolution.  Open support for the Green Movement from expatriate dissident groups like the 
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Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) and son of the former Shah (Majd 2010, 55) only provided grist for these 
conspiracy theories.  While displaying what some have described as surprising restraint, Iranian security 
forces (Rieffer-Flanagan 2013, 99-104, 124) nevertheless employed a considerable amount of 
repression, killing approximately 200 protestors in the first month and imprisoning over 4,000, with 
thousands more to follow in the coming months.  Many of those jailed were reportedly subjected to 
beatings, torture or rape, and hundreds were tried in kangaroo courts on ill-defined charges and 
sentenced to prison terms.  In February 2011, the government placed Mousavi, along with his wife, 
under house arrest.   
A detailed examination of the controversy surrounding the 2009 election is beyond the scope of 
this work.  As Hunter (2014, 214-216) outlined, there were irregularities with the election that 
warranted suspicion, but there was also evidence suggesting that Ahmadinejad was the legitimate 
victor, in spite of any tampering that may have occurred.  In the West, however, and especially in the 
U.S., the verdict was almost unanimous that the election had been blatantly rigged and that the Green 
Movement was a popular uprising against clerical rule in Iran.  Leverett and Leverett (2013, 229-272) 
provided one of the most comprehensive critical views of this position available in Western literature.  
They argued that not only were claims of electoral fraud based on blatantly false information that was 
uncritically accepted by the Western media, but the Green Movement itself drew from a relatively small 
base of support that tapped into the emotion of a very unique moment in Iranian history.  They never 
mounted a viable threat or alternative (see Majd (2010, 54)) to the system in Iran, and it was not 
repression that defeated them.  When public emotion faded, the Green Movement simply collapsed 
under its own weight.   
Significant to this dissertation, Leverett and Leverett (2013, 229-232) argued that the U.S. 
suffered from a "tyranny of expectations" with regard to Iran.  The human rights layer of the conflict had 
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created several popular illusions.  The first was that the regime was brittle and subject to overthrow at 
any time by a popular uprising.  Second, the Ahmadinejad and other conservatives did not have popular 
support in Iran.  Third, U.S. observers painted the Green Movement in their own image, liberal human-
rights advocates seeking to install Western-style democracy and rejoin the world community.  In short, 
the West saw what it wanted to see when it looked at Iran's elections and the Green movement, and 
this blinded it to what was (and was not) really taking place.  For years, U.S. perceptions regarding Iran 
had been shaped and molded by constituencies to the conflict that were intent upon building a popular 
narrative that recalled years of grievances instead of objectively assessing current conditions. 
This activation of the human rights layer placed the Obama administration between a rock and 
hard place.  On one hand, Obama was compelled by popular opinion to support this burgeoning 
democracy movement against the oppression of Iran's clerical regime.  On the other, many worried 
(Clinton 2014, 423) that blatant American support would undermine the Green Movement domestically.  
This dilemma aside, opponents of engagement had new ammunition to advocate for a policy of regime 
change in Iran instead of negotiating with a dictatorial regime that appeared to be on the ropes.  Regime 
change was a favorite mantra of the constituencies to the conflict because it precluded compromise 
with Iran, prevented U.S. leaders from granting any legitimacy to the Islamic Republic, and virtually 
ensured that conflict would continue unabated.  Obama stayed quiet for the most part (a policy for 
which Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (2014, 424) later expressed regret), but when he did speak out 
against the violence two weeks after the election (Slavin 2009), his remarks drew immediate criticism 
from Khamenei, who pointed out that Obama's tone completely contradicted the letters he had 
previously sent.   
Meanwhile, the State Department (Clinton 2014, 424) (Crist 2012, 522, 547) worked with 
technology companies like Twitter to help ensure internet access for Iranian dissidents and promoted 
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technology to help Iranians evade internet filters.  The CIA also developed mobile internet kits which 
they disseminated to some Iranians.  After previously cutting democracy promotion programs leftover 
from the Bush administration, the Obama administration went on to spend millions of dollars training 
more than 5,000 democracy activists worldwide, some related directly to Iran.  In 2011 (Cordesman, et 
al. 2014, 3), the State Department opened an online "virtual embassy for Iran," which was clearly 
designed to influence Iranian youth, and which Tehran promptly blocked.  Finally, Voice of America's 
Persian News Network (Sanger 2012, 213-219), which was already expanding its outreach to the Iranian 
people with U.S.-sponsored news and commentary, vastly increased its penetration of Iranian audiences 
after the 2009 elections, drawing the ire of Iran's leaders.  The events surrounding the 2009 election 
were relatively short-lived, but it is difficult to exaggerate the extent to which the human rights layer 
impacted every other facet of the relationship moving forward.  Constituencies on both sides had a new 
pool of excuses to argue against trust or cooperation.   
In the midst of these developments, the Obama administration had yet to tackle the issue of 
Iran's nuclear program.  In early 2009 (El Baradei 2011, 295, 298), the U.S. intelligence community 
identified a previously undeclared nuclear installation at Ferdowsi, near Qom, which experts believed 
was intended for military purposes.  Anticipating imminent disclosure in September, the Iranians 
informed the IAEA.  At the same time, the newly reelected Ahmadinejad passed a message for Obama 
through IAEA chief El Baradei that Iran was "ready to engage in bilateral negotiations, without 
conditions on the basis of mutual respect," also offering potential cooperation on Afghanistan and 
elsewhere.  Unconvinced with regard to this offer for engagement, Obama (Clinton 2014, 424-425) 
seized the initiative by briefing the United Nations on the full extent of Iran's duplicity, in an effort to 
increase international pressure on Iran.   
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In spite this confrontational move, senior U.S. officials met face-to-face with Iranian 
counterparts for the first time since the revolution at a P5+1 meeting in Geneva the next month, and 
senior diplomat William Burns (2019, 349-353) engineered a proposal for Iran that built upon a request 
they had made to the IAEA earlier in 2009.  Iran wanted 20 percent enriched uranium for a research 
reactor that manufactured medical isotopes.  Burns offered another freeze-for-freeze.  Along with 
freezing new sanctions in return for a halt on Iranian enrichment, the U.S. or its allies would take Iran's 
existing stock of Low Enriched Uranium (LEU), enrich it to 20 percent, and return it to Iran for their 
reactor.  Ahmadinejad (El Baradei 2011, 308-311) was interested in the proposal, but when Iran's 
negotiators took it back to Tehran, political wrangling ensued and Khamenei intervened to turn it down, 
calling it an "indignity" to Iran.  Burns (2019, 353) summed it up by saying that, "The Iranian president's 
political rivals, some of whom had been involved in nuclear negotiations before and might otherwise 
have taken more supportive positions, didn't want Ahmadinejad to get credit for any breakthrough, 
however modest." For constituencies, the conflict was less about the U.S. and more about the utility 
that animosity provided.  The domestic politics layer of the relationship had reared its head. 
In the wake of this failure, U.S. diplomats began a worldwide effort to garner support for 
international sanctions against Iran, and Ahmadinejad (El Baradei 2011, 312-313) defiantly declared Iran 
a "nuclear state."  In an effort to head off sanctions, though, Iran worked with Turkey and Brazil and 
announced a resurrected version of Burns' original proposal, which they announced in May.  Obama 
(Burns 2019, 353-354) dismissed the proposal as "too little, too late." Critics (Nasr 2013, 122-125) took 
this as proof that Obama was never actually serious about a negotiated solution, but this new proposal 
would have removed only a minority of Iran's LEU stockpile and failed to halt further domestic 
enrichment.  In June 2010, the U.N. Security Council (2010) passed Resolution 1929 which targeted the 
IRGC along with its affiliates and financial interests and imposed a complete arms embargo against Iran. 
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Perhaps even more importantly, this symbolic action paved the way for both U.S. and E.U. 
sanctions (Cordesman, et al. 2014, 3, 37) legislation which went into effect in July 2010, targeting Iran's 
oil industry and applying financial sanctions on companies from any country doing business with Iran's 
energy sector.  Interestingly (Solomon 2016, 195-201) Obama's White House actually opposed the 
sanctions bill that he, himself, had initiated in 2007, fearing it would alienate U.S. allies by sanctioning 
their countries.  With bipartisan support for the bill, however, Obama had little choice but to go all in on 
opposition to Iran.  With sanctions in place, the Departments of State and Treasury created new units to 
identify sanctions violators and began to levy billions of dollars in fines.  Concurrent with sanctions, U.S. 
diplomats were working with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the U.A.E. to coordinate increased production 
that would offset the loss of Iranian oil to world oil markets.   
In the midst of rising tensions, Obama apparently held out some hope for more productive 
engagement with Iran.  In March 2010, he (Obama 2010) sent a second Nowruz message in December 
2010.  This time the tone was less sanguine.  He offered respect to the people of Iran, but in a manner 
more reminiscent of Bush before him, he bifurcated the message between the Iranian government and 
its citizens, stating that, "Faced with an extended hand, Iran's leaders have shown only a clenched fist." 
In December, Clinton (2014, 434) made an aggressive attempt to openly engage Iranian Foreign Minister 
Manouchehr Mottaki at an international conference and present an offer for dialogue.  Mottaki avoided 
contact, shunning the offer. 
Another key development in the U.S.-Iranian relationship that added a new layer to conflict 
came to light in 2010, the Stuxnet virus.  While still officially denied by the U.S. government, Sanger 
(2012, 188-209) provided a detailed account of this U.S. cyber operation against Iran which deployed an 
innovative weapon against the centrifuges in Iran's nuclear program.  The operation originated in 2006, 
when Bush was looking for another options besides military force and sanctions to set back the Iranian 
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nuclear program.  By working with Israel on the project, the U.S. sent a message to the Israeli 
government that airstrikes were not the only way to deal with Iran.  Bush personally handed the 
operation over to Obama, who continued the effort.  It was aggressively deployed in 2010, damaging a 
significant number of Iranian centrifuges, but the computer virus, which became known as Stuxnet also 
leaked out onto the wider internet, where it was discovered and became public knowledge.  Sanger 
(2012, 207) pointed out that, while Stuxnet set Iran back in certain areas, its total output of enriched 
uranium did not decline during this period.  At best, Stuxnet bought additional time for negotiations.  On 
the other hand, Stuxnet added a new layer to the conflict between the U.S. and Iran, which the Iranian 
side would not be remiss in adopting themselves, cyber warfare. 
The terrorism layer was not entirely absent from this period either.  First, Iran plotted terrorist 
attacks (Crist 2012, 552-553) in 2011 against Israeli interests in Georgia, Thailand, and India.  Although 
these were most likely a response to an Israeli campaign of bombings and targeted assassinations inside 
Iran (to be discussed more in the next section), U.S. officials like Clinton (2014, 442) made little 
distinction between when charging Iran with acts of terrorism.  More damaging to U.S.-Iran relations, 
the FBI (Axworthy 2013, 419-421) uncovered an Iranian plot in October 2011 to assassinate the Saudi 
Ambassador in Washington, D.C.  An attack on U.S. soil was uncharacteristic of the Iranian security 
services, and Mousavian (2015, 236-237) made the point that this allegation against Iran did not make 
sense given that Iran was cooperating on a number of fronts with the IAEA in the context of the nuclear 
negotiations.  However, if one buys the argument that constituencies to the conflict were likely trying to 
undermine those negotiations, this otherwise improbable event seems remarkably consistent with 
previous patterns.  Either way, this brought U.S.-Iranian relations to a new low at precisely the time 
when Congress was pressing hardest against Iran. 
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The domestic politics layer featured on the U.S. side as well.  In late 2011 (Solomon 2016, 200-
210), Congress made a bi-partisan push for a new set of sanctions designed to cripple and isolate key 
sectors of Iran's economy, especially its banks.  Obama felt that these measures were counterproductive 
to a negotiated solution and resisted a bipartisan effort, drawing special criticism from Republican 
Senators as he headed into an election year.  Much like Clinton in 1995, Obama attempted to reclaim 
the initiative in foreign policy by introducing two sets of his own unilateral sanctions through the 
Treasury Department (Cordesman, et al. 2014, 3-4) in November 2011.  However, the legislation passed 
at the end of December as part of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act, adding to the other 
sanctions already in place.  The next year would see this noose tighten around Iran as the U.S. and the 
E.U. developed a truly unprecedented sanctions regime building especially into the 2012 U.S. 
presidential election, and military action (Clinton 2014, 438-439) remained on the table, as well.   
While Obama desired a reset in relations with Iran, domestic constituencies to the conflict tied 
hands and made rapprochement a political non-starter.  Constituencies in Iran provided all the 
ammunition that hawks on the U.S. side needed to justify the conflict.  Likewise, Ahmadinejad desired a 
breakthrough in relations with the U.S., but domestic constituencies in Iran were not about to give him a 
political victory in this arena.  Hostile actions by the U.S. stirred the pot, as well.  As the next section will 
show, Khamenei and his supporters had little to gain and much to lose from rapprochement with the 
West, so every measure taken against Iran served as an all-too-convenient vindication for their hardline 





The institutional development of constituencies  
Obama's election and early years in office might be taken as proof of the old maxim, the more 
things change, the more they stay the same.  Obama came into office campaigning as the polar opposite 
of his predecessor, but after four years, observers like Nasr (2013, 114, 128) claimed that Obama's policy 
on Iran was merely a continuation of the one started by Bush before him, only with slightly better 
salesmanship in the press. The "reset" advocated by Kinzer (2010) and many others seemed no closer 
than when he started, and "hope" that rhetorically characterized the Obama campaign had done little 
"change" the relationship.  It has been the contention of this dissertation all along that institutional 
forces explain patterns of path dependency effects, and those forces are most visible and identifiable 
within constituencies to the conflict.  During this period, layering was the most prevalent of the 
mechanisms under study.  Instead of falling by the wayside, baggage from previous decades reappeared 
and took new and more salient forms.  This invisible force operated beneath the headlines to ensure 
that hostility continued. 
Iran's clerical establishment demonstrated a high degree of layering, especially in the manner 
that domestic politics weighed on the U.S.-Iranian relationship.  Opposition to the U.S. was rarely an end 
in itself, but it became a means for achieving a widening array of other objectives.  As discussed in the 
previous chapter, Iran's leaders (mostly for the sake of domestic politics) had made the nuclear program 
popular with their public audience.  In spite of the costs it was imposing on Iran, all of the leading 
candidates (Abootalebi 2009, 6) for the 2009 presidential election openly touted Iran's right to enrich 
uranium, including Mousavi.  When the U.S. engaged Iran directly in Geneva in October 2009, William 
Burns engineered an offer that would have been good for the Iranian side (especially demonstrated by 
the fact they agreed to a very similar offer with Brazil and Turkey in May 2010).  However, the nuclear 
issue was an all-too-convenient political bludgeon.  Ahmadinejad's rivals (El Baradei 2011, 310-311) 
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(including Ali Larijani, who had apparently made sincere attempts at negotiation himself several years 
earlier) chose a short-term political win over Iran's long-term benefit by scuttling the deal and accusing 
him of selling out to the West.   
Ray Takeyh (McManus 2009) opined that the deal failed because Iran's government was too 
gridlocked to make a decision after the 2009 presidential election controversy.  Perhaps this played a 
role, but the outcome followed a now-predictable pattern.  Takeyh (2009) published an amplification of 
his views a month later, stating that after the election, hardline elements strongly associated with IRGC 
formed a new and secretive national security council under the Supreme Leader which opposed any 
compromise over the nuclear issue.  Hardline nuclear ambitions may also have played a role, but Burns' 
proposal would not have ended Iran's nuclear ambitions by any means.  It is more likely that this new 
body was marking its territory vis-a-vis Ahmadinejad in the early stages of its formation.  Almost any 
way the historical information is presented, the domestic politics layer was clearly the primary factor in 
preventing nuclear cooperation, and the constituencies in Iran led the way. 
The 2009 presidential election controversy activated and amplified both the domestic politics 
and human rights layers of the conflict for the clerical establishment.  As pointed out by Axworthy (2013, 
407-408), the fallout from the elections weakened Khamenei politically.  As Supreme Leader, Khamenei 
had tried to follow Khomeini's pattern, keeping himself above the political fray in public view as a 
representative of a higher power.  By siding publicly with Ahmadinejad during such a pivotal moment, 
however, Khamenei sacrificed any remaining moral authority he still retained in the eyes of many 
Iranians.  Protestors cries of "death to the dictator" (referring to Khamenei) could not have been any 
more blatantly reminiscent of the slogan "death to the Shah," which he had personally encouraged 30 
years before.  Khamenei was now more beholden than ever to the IRGC and clerical security forces 
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which proceeded to crush the Green Movement, and he was likewise beholden to hardline clerics and 
clerical allies willing to prop up the institution of valyat-e faqih.   
This coalition of forces perceived a direct threat from the Western human rights agenda, and 
just as during the 1990's, its economic interests flourished in the opacity of Iran's international isolation.  
Khamenei might have been genuinely offended by Obama's criticism after the election, but regardless, 
he was in no position to compromise with the U.S.  Even further, by openly supporting Ahmadinejad, 
Khamenei tied his own reputation to the reelected president.  Ahmadinejad may have preferred a deal 
with the West, but when he was outflanked by his rivals, he became just as intransigent as ever with 
regard to Iran's nuclear program.  Curiously, Ahmadinejad (Maloney 2015, 361-362) overstepped his 
own boundaries in 2011 by openly challenging the Supreme Leader regarding the firing of a particular 
cabinet minister.  Khamenei not only withdrew his support but publicly suggested doing away with the 
position of the presidency altogether.  At this point, though, Ahmadinejad's star was waning, and his 
administration was caught in multiple scandals over corruption and mismanagement.  It was politically 
convenient for the Supreme Leader to disassociate himself, but now he relied even more on hardliners 
hostile to both the U.S. and Western human rights.  Neither Ahmadinejad nor Khamenei could act 
independently of the constituencies to the conflict. 
Another area of layering to discuss with regard to the clerical establishment was the layer of 
sanctions.  The Islamic Republic had been subject to various types of U.S. and international sanctions 
(Cordesman, et al. 2014, 36-37) since the hostage crisis during the Carter administration.  Every 
successive U.S. president added sanctions of their own, and the Obama administration took this to a 
new level.  Sanctions were a hostile act, and they had always been a source of friction between the U.S. 
and Iran.  The sanctions, along with their underlying demands, were insulting to Iranian leaders, 
frequently drawing the ire of leaders like Khamenei who resented American "threat and enticement" 
302 
 
(Mousavian 2015, 225).  But it would be difficult to argue that, at least up until the end of this period, 
sanctions had ever produced a positive change in Iranian behavior.  Iranian leaders were used to being 
sanctioned, and they were practiced at evading them.  Maloney (2015, 354-357) argued that the clerical 
establishment were optimistic that sanctions would fail to garner international support, and their 
effectiveness would be short-lived, as had been the regular pattern for decades.   
Perversely, the economic isolation (Fathollah-Nejad 2014, 54-55) produced by sanctions served 
to bolster the financial positions of many IRGC affiliates and other clerical establishment insiders.  
Perhaps most importantly, sanctions fueled the narrative of the Islamic Revolution.  Khamenei had self-
identified in a 2013 speech as "not a diplomat but a revolutionary" (Mousavian 2015, 226).  In response 
to sanctions, Khamenei reverted to a concept that Iranian leaders had promoted variously since the 
1980's (Maloney 2015, 355), building an "economy of resistance." Maloney (2015, 473-483) pointed out 
that Iran's typical response to sanctions involved conspiracy theories, resistance, and moral 
counterarguments, all of which fed their own worldview.  Ultimately, the sanctions layer of the conflict 
thickened, not just because new sanctions increased the level of hostility, but because they fed a 
pattern of expectation and behavior within the clerical establishment that thrived on conflict with the 
U.S.  This constituency needed to fuel the conflict with the U.S. because it underpinned a status quo that 
kept them in power and concentrated Iran’s wealth in their hands.   
The IRGC and clerical security forces were busy adding a variety of layers to the U.S.-Iranian 
conflict, as well.  This constituency had become the power behind the throne in Iran, and they had no 
interest in normalizing relations with the outside world.  To begin with, they were instrumental in 
putting down the largest and most significant popular challenge to Iran's clerical leadership since the 
revolution, the Green Movement.  Crist (2012, 546) stated that the IRGC leadership advocated a much 
more forceful response to the protests, but clerical leaders feared they would alienate themselves from 
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the people entirely.  Regardless, the IRGC stage-managed the campaign of repression (Pourzand 2010, 
99, 102-103) (Safshekan and Sabet 2010, 556) which was carried out largely by the extensive network of 
Basij forces across Iran.  They aggravated the human rights layer by using mass arrests, beatings, and 
torture to intimidate opponents.  They also began to aggressively target internet freedom (Golkar 2011), 
beginning what would become an extensive system of national control over the cyber realm.  Seizing on 
the example set by Stuxnet, the IRGC additionally began building an offensive cyber capability of its own 
for use against the U.S., adding to the newly created cyber warfare layer emplaced by the U.S. and 
Israel.   
As previously mentioned (Takeyh 2009a), the IRGC also jumped at the opportunity to formalize 
their expanded role as guardians of the regime by installing their personnel in a new and secretive 
security council, which stood between the Supreme Leader and other branches of the government.  This 
increased their political clout, but it came at the expense of existing power brokers, with whom they 
would contend for power, exacerbating the domestic politics layer of the U.S.-Iranian conflict.  Beside 
their security role, the IRGC still controlled and operated Iran's nuclear program.  There expansion of 
uranium enrichment had obvious implications for the nuclear layer of the conflict, but it likewise 
affected the domestic politics layer, because the nuclear program provided a key source of relevance 
which undergirded their political and economic power.  If the nuclear program became less important in 
Iranian politics, so would the IRGC.  This provided a strong incentive to oppose reconciliation with the 
U.S. 
The IRGC thickened the layers related to Persian Gulf security, terrorism, and the Iraq War, as 
well.  While this received little publicity, IRGC naval forces (Crist 2012, 559-560) continued to harass U.S. 
and British patrols in the Gulf.  In 2011, this almost led to a direct-fire incident with a British warship, 
serving as a warning to both the U.S. and Britain alike.  Iranian forces also plotted attacks (though not 
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conducted successfully) against Israeli interests in India, Thailand and Georgia.  These were provoked by 
an Israeli campaign within Iran against IRGC affiliates, especially nuclear scientists, but regardless, the 
actions reinforced Iran's international reputation as a terrorist state.  Further, as previously discussed, 
Iran's almost bizarre plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington, D.C. is best explained as 
the handiwork of IRGC personnel with little interest in seeing the nuclear negotiations succeed or Iran's 
relationship with America improve.  
Finally, Iranian forces (Crist 2012, 537, 558-559) continued to undermine and sponsor attacks 
against U.S. forces for the remainder of their time in Iraq.  As the U.S. consolidated onto bases and 
eventually withdrew combat forces in 2011, Quds Force Commander Soleimani consistently looked for 
opportunities to needle and provoke his favorite adversary.  He also took an active interest in seeing 
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's government firmly entrenched through his reelection in 2010.  The pro-
Iranian Maliki government (Al-Ali 2014) was largely responsible for exacerbating the ethnic divide in Iraq 
and paving the way for the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), which eventually 
captured most of northern and western Iraq in 2014.  As the next section will discuss, Iran's policies in 
both Iraq and Syria contributed directly to the rise of ISIL, which strained the relationship between the 
U.S. and Iran even further. 
With the American war in Iraq drawing to a close, CENTCOM was a full-fledged constituent to 
the U.S.-Iranian conflict during this period.  While this command was often distracted by other short-
term priorities, Iran was its bread and butter in the long-term.  CENTCOM was integral in the nuclear 
layer for several reasons.  First, as Israel and Congress pressured the Obama administration to maintain 
a viable threat of military strikes against Iran, it was CENTCOM that was responsible for planning those 
strikes and ensuring assets were in place for their execution, making Iran a key priority within the 
command's mission set.  Second, in support of the pressure campaign against Iran, CENTCOM (Clinton 
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2014, 438-439) expanded its military presence in the Persian Gulf region through exercises and patrols, 
aggravating tensions and increasing its friction with IRGC naval forces in the Gulf.  Third, CENTCOM (Crist 
2012, 557-558) increased support to its network of Arab and Turkish allies in the region.  It conducted 
exercises, and it worked to develop and deploy a missile shield designed specifically to protect Gulf 
states and eventually Europe against Iranian attacks.  The Gulf states in particular pressed the Obama 
administration (Sanger 2012, 159-161) for pressure against Iran, and this was mediated through the 
security architecture that had largely been established and maintained by CENTCOM, which had played 
a leading role for U.S. policy within the Middle East for decades.  This stood as a testament to layering 
that began in the 1980's, bifurcating the Middle East between friends and enemies.   
With the war in Iraq diminishing, CENTCOM also experienced a degree of displacement and 
conversion which increased its focus on Iran.  According to a 2011 posture statement to the U.S. 
Congress (Committee on Armed Services 2011, 65, 72, 87-89), which was an integral part of CENTCOM's 
budget request for FY2012, the war in Afghanistan, which had always taken second place to the war in 
Iraq became CENTCOM "main effort." Number two was partnership with Pakistan, an effort that 
involved a very high price tag in U.S. military aid.  The third on its list of nine key tasks was "countering 
Iran's destabilizing activities and keeping peace with our partners." By the language expressed in the 
document, Iran had again displaced Iraq as a key source of threats.   
Significantly, these threats and activities justified the funding requested for the command.  With 
Iran apparently increasing in priority, it is worth asking whether they had actually a greater threat to the 
U.S.  Aside from their stockpile of Low Enriched Uranium which brought them closer to a nuclear 
weapon, there is little to suggest that Iran's military capabilities were significantly more threatening.  
This is not to argue that CENTCOM's assessment of Iran was baseless.  This dissertation asserts that an 
organization like CENTCOM is fundamentally built to counter threats.  In the absence of something more 
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pressing, though, Iran has been the default button since formation of the command.  Afghanistan and 
Iraq were only temporary examples of displacement.  As they diminished in priority, CENTCOM found 
itself consistently reverting to its focus on Iran, which had cultivated since the early 1980’s.   
CENTCOM’s top leadership also helped broadcast the command’s constituency to the conflict, 
simultaneously demonstrating the mechanism of drift.  Admiral Fallon, who commanded CENTCOM in 
2008 preferred to focus on Iraq and avoid confrontation with Iran, but his commander in Iraq, General 
Petraeus, was openly confronting Iran within the context of his own campaign.  After a brief interlude, 
General Petraeus became CENTCOM commander, and shaped by his own confrontation with Soleimani, 
advocated a more muscular approach to Iran.  In 2010, after another brief interim period, the reins of 
CENTCOM passed to Marine General James Mattis, who quickly developed a reputation as the most 
hawkish yet of CENTCOM's commanders.  Mattis minced few words in declaring Iran the greatest threat 
to U.S. national security in the Middle East, and observers (Perry 2016) noted that his history of personal 
animosity against Iran traced its roots all the way back to Beirut bombing in 1983.  CENTCOM may have 
been shaped by the personalities of its commanders, but institutional forces directed the course of 
these leaders as much or more.   
As Soleimani's proxy forces rocketed the remaining U.S. troops in Baghdad prior to the final 
withdrawal, Mattis (Jaffe and Entous 2017) advocated aggressively striking targets on Iranian soil in 
retaliation.  It is worth noting that while these attacks produced casualties, their scale was not 
comparable to efforts that Iran had arrayed against coalition forces five years earlier.  The U.S. did not 
attack Iran at that time either.  Mattis apparently considered the Bush-era restraint to have been a 
tremendous mistake.  Again, after the FBI uncovered the late 2011 Iranian plot against the Saudi 
Ambassador in Washington, D.C. (Torrance 2019), Mattis advocated direct retaliation against Iran.  
When Obama demurred, Mattis expressed the opinion that this failure to retaliate against an "act of 
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war" emboldened Iran and made them even more dangerous.  Receiving only aggressive policy options 
from Mattis with regard to Iran, Obama abruptly announced his decision to replace him as CENTCOM 
Commander in December 2012.  Each of these succeeding commanders dealt with Iran in their own 
fashion, based upon a continually expanding base of experiences generated by U.S.-Iranian friction.  
Each added their own imprint along the way, building the conflict over time. 
Israel proved to be arguably the strongest constituent to the U.S.-Iranian conflict throughout 
this period.  As with the succession of CENTCOM commanders, Israel also experienced notable drift in a 
confrontational direction and contributed to layering.  Less than a month after Obama's inauguration 
(Freedman 2020, 138-140), the Israelis elected hardline conservative Benjamin Netanyahu as Prime 
Minister.  The famously abrasive Netanyahu had been known for aggravating relations between Israel 
and the Clinton White House during his first service as Prime Minister in the late 1990's, and his 
relationship with Obama would be even more contentious.  Obama entered office determined to 
energize the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and pursue a diplomatic solution to the nuclear standoff 
with Iran.  In order to do both, he believed that the U.S. needed to be seen as an honest broker within 
the region, distancing itself from open complicity with Israel.  Netanyahu, on the other hand, showed 
little interest in the peace process, and he actively undermined the two-state solution by supporting 
illegal settlements.  Instead, Netanyahu clung to a securitized worldview (David 2020, 200-201) and 
preferred to focus primarily on the existential threat that he believed Iran posed to Israel, setting this 
tone from the outset in his inauguration address.  Israel was not interested compromise, and it was not 
willing to accept any uranium enrichment by Iran that might eventually lead to a nuclear weapon.   
Parsi (2017, 74) described Obama and Netanyahu's first official meeting as heads of state in May 
2009 as "nothing short of a disaster," a clash of two competing worldviews.  From that point forward, 
Israel pursued what Parsi (2017, 75-78, 117, 150) described as a two-prong strategy of imposing 
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impossible demands, like zero-enrichment, while simultaneously undermining the political space for 
diplomacy between the U.S. and Iran.  From the very outset in 2009, Netanyahu attempted to impose 
artificial deadlines on U.S. negotiations with Iran, advising Obama to wait no more than 12 weeks for 
progress.  As negotiations continued, he used continually revised projections of Iran's "breakout" date 
(when it would have enough enriched uranium for a bomb), such as March 2011, to pressure the U.S.  
For its part, the Obama administration resisted these efforts, realizing that this strategy was designed to 
force the U.S. hand and leave no remaining options but military force when Iran inevitably failed to 
comply.   
To the same end, Israel (David 2020, 201) repeatedly threatened (both explicitly and implicitly) 
that it was prepared to unilaterally strike Iran.  According to Parsi (2017, 119, 158-159), Netanyahu went 
as far as to order a mobilization of the Israeli military against Iran in an effort to escalate tensions, not so 
Israel could actually strike Iran, but to draw the U.S. into a military confrontation.  Senior Israeli officials 
disobeyed his orders to prevent this, but these continuing efforts forced CENTCOM to prepare for the 
fallout of a new Middle East war.  The underlying theme of Parsi's work was that Netanyahu's 
preoccupation with Iran was at least as much about domestic politics (including the desire to deflect 
pressure regarding the peace process) as it was really about Iran - the domestic politics layer.  
Confrontation with Iran allowed Israel to continue portraying itself as David, besieged by Goliath, all the 
while directing attention away from its controversial policies vis-à-vis the Palestinians.   
Israel added or thickened several additional layers of the conflict for the U.S.  First, largely 
through AIPAC (Parsi 2017, 101-102, 114-115), Israel pushed Congress to sponsor sanctions that would 
preempt diplomacy with Iran.  The House of Representative passed a sanctions bill in December 2009 
before Iran had even responded to Burns' proposal regarding uranium for medical isotopes.  Obama 
continually had to slow-roll the efforts of Congress to create space for diplomacy and maintain his 
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prerogative for driving foreign policy, a clear aggravation of the domestic politics layer within the U.S.  
Second, Israel sponsored a covert campaign of assassinations and bombings against IRGC affiliates 
within Iran (Sanger 2012, 142-146) (Dehghan 2012), especially a number of nuclear scientists.  The U.S. 
apparently had nothing to do with these activities, but just as American leaders failed to delineate Iran's 
terrorism against regional adversaries from terrorism against itself, Iran failed to delineate Israeli-
sponsored terrorism from U.S. actions.  This added a new dimension to the terrorism layer of the U.S.-
Iranian relationship and invited Iranian retaliation against Israeli targets, fueling the cycle of conflict and 
accusation for all parties and undermining negotiations.  Third, Israel collaborated with the U.S. (Sanger 
2012, 188-209) in developing and deploying the Stuxnet virus which damaged a significant number of 
Iranian centrifuges.  While never official claiming credit, Israeli officials were quick to gloat over their 
activities, not unlike Iranian officials after the Beirut bombings in 1983.  Israel was integral to adding the 
cyber warfare layer to the U.S.-Iranian conflict. 
Finally, Congress was more active than it had been in previous years as a constituent to the U.S.-
Iranian conflict, spurred by the Israeli, domestic politics and human rights layers, but thickening the 
sanctions layer of the conflict with their own actions.  As with their counterparts in Iran, conflict was less 
about any moral imperative and more about the political utility of confrontation.  The influence of AIPAC 
has already been discussed, and this certainly helps to explain why sanctions against Iran garnered 
broad-based support across both parties, but Israel was not the only angle affecting Congress.  
Congressional democrats (Parsi 2017, 86-87), who had toned down opposition to Iran in order to focus 
criticism on the Bush administration, now increased their support for sanctions against Iran in the wake 
of the 2009 election controversy and Iranian crackdown on protestors.  Regardless of the truth about 
the election, U.S. observers had drawn their own conclusions, and there was no political benefit to 
American lawmakers from giving Iran's clerics the benefit of the doubt.  The human rights layer tied 
their hands.  
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For Republicans, seething at Obama's election in favor his rival, Senator John McCain, Iran was a 
ready-made weapon against their political rival.  As always, there was little to lose by being tough on 
Iran.  Sanctions were a costly endeavor, but it was a cost that few American taxpayers would notice on 
an individual basis.  With regard to the negotiations, Congress had little skin in the game, and many 
believed they were destined for failure, anyway.  Causing the administration to flounder in the process 
worked to their political advantage.  With regard to military action, Congress could afford to be 
bellicose.  Few projected a positive outcome from military strikes, and Obama was especially unlikely to 
order them.  This gave Congressional Republicans the advantage of being able to talk tough without 
worrying that they might be starting a war.  Even if Obama did authorize strikes, he would hold the bag, 
not Congress.  All of these issues became even more important as the 2012 U.S. elections approached.  
Iran was not the main issue for any of the candidates, but the conflict had the potential to undermine 
issues they considered far more important, thus shaping the debate.   
In short, constituencies played either a direct or indirect in every development between the U.S. 
and Iran throughout this period.  Leaders in both the U.S. and Iran apparently preferred a reduction in 
hostility, but no leader could resist the combined weight of multiple constituencies dragging on both 
sides of the conflict.  The next episode, however, would provide the greatest test the constituencies had 
faced since their formation. 
 
JPCOA and ISIS 
Regardless of the disappointments of the Obama's first term in office with regard to the U.S.-
Iranian relationship, events were in motion that would provide new opportunities for a positive change.  
The most prominent involved the nuclear negotiations that led to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of 
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Action (JPCOA), signed in July 2015, which offered a definitive solution to the nuclear conflict between 
the U.S. and Iran.  In fact, this agreement was so unprecedented that its success offers the greatest 
challenge in four decades to the concept of institutional animosity.  Constituencies do not always win; 
actors and events get a vote in deciding outcomes.  However, constituencies will always act according to 
their institutional design, and they do not simply disappear because of setbacks.  This section will discuss 
the implications of the JPCOA for the argument advanced by this dissertation.   
Another key event was the Arab Spring, which began in 2011 and sparked a civil war in Iran's 
ally, Syria.  As a result, regional destabilization led to the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS) (see Irshaid 2015 
for a discussion of naming), a descendent of Al Qaeda in Iraq which controlled significant swaths of 
Syrian and Iraqi territory by late 2014.  ISIS provided the U.S. and Iran with a common enemy and 
created the potential for cooperation between the two adversaries.  Instead, the relationship between 
the U.S. and Iran continued on its predictable pattern of mistrust and antagonism regarding regional 
affairs, despite progress on the nuclear front.  This section will examine how the operation of 
constituencies to the conflict allowed one opportunity to produce a surprising success while the other 
fell flat, and it will discuss how institutional dynamics contributed to the process. 
  
What happened? 
Obama's 2012 reelection campaign shifted the focus of his administration away from his goals 
with regard to Iran.  Entering the race with low approval ratings (IPCSR 2020), domestic issues 
(particularly the economic recovery) defined the race.  Where Iran factored into the discussion, 
Republican criticism forced Obama to harden his stance, as exemplified by the late 2011 sanctions 
against Iran which he ultimately signed into law and a shift in is campaign speeches (Freedman 2020, 
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144) toward greater support for Israel.  Iran remained intransigent throughout this period, offering no 
public sign of capitulation as Obama ultimately defeated his Republican challenger, Mitt Romney in 
November 2012.  Obama's victory gave him breathing room to continue pursuing his own agenda, 
including with respect to Iran.  In actuality, a door had already been opened that would lead to a major 
breakthrough as events continued to unfold. 
Sultan Qaboos bin Said al Said of Oman (Kerry 2018, 487-491) proved himself useful as a 
potential conduit between the U.S. and Iran between 2009 and 2011, helping behind the scenes to 
secure the release of three American hikers who had been detained by Iran.  In 2011, the Sultan again 
offered his services as Obama looked for a way to negotiate directly with Iran's Supreme Leader, whose 
buy-in he understood to be crucial for any potential deal over the nuclear issue.  From the outset, the 
keys to success were determined to be secrecy (which precluded the interference of domestic factions 
on either side) and the ability to prove that the negotiators spoke with authority.  Establishing this 
channel was a political risk, and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was skeptical of the effort, so Obama 
asked Senator John Kerry, who chaired the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to visit Muscat and lay 
the groundwork in December 2011.  In July 2012, the U.S. sent a small delegation of senior diplomatic 
officials to Muscat to meet with Iranian counterparts.  The first meeting produced few results as both 
sides talked past each other, but this established a new channel for communication.   
According to Parsi (2017, 174-182), the Obama administration began to reconsider its approach 
to negotiations with Iran by the end of 2012.  Western allies supported the U.S. position of "zero-
enrichment," but this was becoming increasingly unpopular as the rest of the world grew nervous about 
a military confrontation between the U.S. and Iran.  More importantly, the realization was dawning that 
Iran's enrichment would likely yield enough fissile material for weaponization in a matter of months, 
whereas the pressure campaign was certain to take longer, if it worked at all.  Obama changed tack and 
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decided to offer Iran the concession that it said it wanted, the right to enrich its own uranium on a 
limited basis.  The U.S. and Iran tried again in Muscat (Burns 2019, 359-367) in March 2013.  Obama sent 
senior diplomat William Burns with the offer that the U.S. was willing to accept a very limited and 
controlled enrichment program.  Burns established ground rules that this channel was complimentary to 
the P5+1 negotiations, not a replacement, and the discussion would be limited to the nuclear program, 
although the Iranians still at times leaned toward wanting a "grand bargain" that would solve all their 
issues at once.  While the results were more encouraging, Burns (2019, 366-367) stated that there was 
still, "powerful cognitive dissonance at the heart of our discussions at this stage…" What changed the 
dynamic of the negotiations was the election of Hasan Rouhani as Iranian president in June 2013. 
Perhaps even more than the election of Ahmadinejad before him, Rouhani's election was a 
surprise to both the clerical establishment and the population alike.  Wanting to expunge the influence 
of the increasingly reviled Ahmadinejad, the Khamenei's Guardian Council (Hunter 2014, 243-258) 
disqualified the chosen successor from his camp.  In a move that still provokes discussion, the council 
also disqualified former president Rafsanjani, who had rebranded himself in the cloak of the reform 
movement.  Hasan Rouhani, who had led Iran's nuclear negotiations under the Khatami administration 
before the 2005 election, was allowed to run because he was believed to have been so thoroughly 
discredited that he posed no challenge to the conservative favorite, Saeed Jalili.  In the final weeks 
before the election, though, reformers of all stripes coalesced around Rouhani.  Since the suppression of 
the Green Movement after the 2009 election, Iran's population had been left out of the conversation 
regarding their country's nuclear program and defiance of the international community.  Through the 
speeches and debates generated by the campaign, it suddenly became clear that the Iranian people 
overwhelmingly favored improved relations with the West and were becoming disenchanted with the 
revolutionary themes of resistance and the deprivations wrought by international sanctions.  This bore 
out on election day, when Rouhani captured just over 50 percent of the vote and avoided a runoff 
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election.  The fact that the clerical establishment allowed this close result to stand without interference 
may have been a testament to Khamenei's fears of another popular uprising. 
Rouhani's election changed the tenor of the U.S.-Iranian relationship almost immediately.  
Obama sent a congratulatory letter (Burns 2019, 368-369) to Rouhani, who responded promptly in a 
positive manner.  In September 2013, John Kerry (2018, 486-487) (Sherman 2018, 30-31), now Secretary 
of State, had a historic face-to-face conversation with Iran's new Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad 
Zarif, on the margins of the U.N. General Assembly meeting.  This was followed soon after by another 
first for the relationship when Obama and Rouhani spoke directly by phone.  For the next month-and-a-
half, a succession of secret back-channel meetings ran in parallel with the P5+1 negotiations.  While the 
meetings moved forward, both Burns (2019, 375 to 376) and Sherman (2018, 40-41) recounted how 
differences in culture and worldview made every step of the negotiations difficult and exhausting, 
probably for both sides.   
By November, the Obama administration was ready to merge the tracks, and Ambassador 
Wendy Sherman (2018, 59-63, 66-70) received the unenviable task of informing the P5+1 partners that 
the U.S. and Iran were close to making a deal behind their backs.  This led to some friction, which was 
soon worked out, but more significantly, the extent of the U.S.-Iranian negotiations was now subject to 
public scrutiny and to the attacks of the deal's opponents.  From this point forward (Kerry 2018, 499-
501) (Burns 2019, 376-381), the U.S. Congress and Israel worked tirelessly to undermine the negotiation 
process.  Regardless, the parties signed an interim deal, known as the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) in 
November, which went into effect in January 2014.  The Iranians halted the bulk of their enrichment 
activities, and the U.S. began releasing installments of a group of $4.2 billion in frozen Iranian assets.  
Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu called it the "deal of the century" for Iran.   
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2014 was a year of diplomatic wrangling (Kerry 2018, 501-503) between the U.S. and Iran.  
Khamenei undermined the P5+1 talks in July in speech saying that Iran would not cut its enrichment but 
increase it tenfold.  Talks in November stalemated, as well, but both sides understood that pressure was 
mounting to conclude a deal.  The Obama administration kept the U.S. Congress and the Israeli 
government informed on the progress of the talks, but the lack of momentum was feeding the narrative 
that Iran was simply playing for time.  As the new deadline of March 31, 2015 approached (Calamur 
2015), Congressional Republicans arranged (without consulting the White House) for Netanyahu to 
address a joint session of Congress and campaign against the "very bad deal." Republican Senator Tom 
Cotton (2015) authored a letter to Khamenei, signed by his Republican Senate colleagues, which strongly 
implied that Congress would disapprove or abrogate any deal the Obama administration made with Iran.  
Even still, by April 2, the P5+1 concluded its framework for the final deal.   
Meanwhile, Congress pushed a bill (U.S. Congress 2015) originally introduced by Republican 
Senator Bob Corker, that would give the Senate the right of final refusal on any deal made with Iran.  
The Obama administration fought the effort (Parsi 2017, 290-297), but eventually conceded in May 
2015.  In June and July (Kerry 2018, 513-517, 523), with a full measure of diplomatic drama, the U.S. and 
Iran concluded their deal.  In spite of a monumental effort by AIPAC and the Israeli government, the 
Obama administration found 42 Senate votes, enough to prevent any formal rejection by the Senate.  
The final agreement (The White House 2016), known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JPCOA) 
bound Iran to the NPT, along with 10 years under the additional protocol.  It would keep their stockpile 
of enriched uranium below the level needed for a bomb for 15 years and subject Iranian enrichment to 
international monitoring and limitations. It also relieved Iran of international sanctions and suspended 
(pending periodic recertification) some (but not all) of the U.S. sanctions.    
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January 2016 was an eventful month for the U.S.-Iranian relationship.  Iran fast-tracked its 
certification of compliance with the JPCOA, and implemented the agreement ahead of schedule by the 
middle of the month.  Only days before implementation, however, a disabled U.S. Navy patrol (DeYoung 
2016) strayed into Iranian waters.  The IRGC intercepted the patrol and took 10 U.S. sailors captive at 
gunpoint, interrogating them and quickly transferring them to custody in Tehran.  Not only was this a 
tremendous embarrassment to the U.S. Navy and CENTCOM, as the sailors had clearly made numerous 
mistakes, but Iran hawks like Republican Senator John McCain called Iran's actions an "act of war." 
Understanding the precarious nature of the fledgling JPCOA, Kerry and Zarif (Parsi 2017, 1-8) worked 
quickly through their newly formed diplomatic channels to defuse the situation, and Iran returned the 
sailors a day later, unharmed.  Iran's hardliners (Castillo 2016) did not miss an opportunity to exploit the 
situation for propaganda purposes, though, and Khamenei publicly awarded medals to the officers 
responsible. 
In another interesting twist, the U.S. and Iran conducted a prisoner swap (Toosi 2016), with Iran 
releasing five dual national Iranian-American political prisoners and the U.S. releasing eight Iranian 
citizens sentenced for crimes related to evading sanctions (although none of the Iranians chose to return 
to Iran).  Almost simultaneously, the U.S. made a $400 million dollar payment to Iran.  Kerry (2018, 518-
521) explained that the prisoner swap had been negotiated separately from the JPCOA and just 
happened to coincide.  Further, the money was the first installment of a $1.7 billion settlement that the 
U.S. had separately agreed to pay to Iran to avoid a lawsuit at the Hague over a larger amount.  The 
timing allowed critics to accuse the Obama administration of paying ransom for the political prisoners, 
which Kerry vehemently denied.  However, the State Department (Solomon and Lee 2016) admitted 
months later that the U.S. deliberately used this first installment as leverage to ensure that prisoners 




The nuclear deal between the U.S. and Iran was only part of the picture, though.  In fact, in 
order to get a viable deal with Iran, the Obama administration deliberately muted its reaction to Iran's 
other efforts at increasing its own influence withing the Middle East.  When the 2011 Arab Spring 
movement prompted unrest in major cities throughout the Middle East and North Africa, Iran embraced 
the movement (Parchami 2012), claiming that it was an extension and a vindication of Iran's own Islamic 
Revolution.  In terms of sponsorship, Iran's reach proved shorter than its rhetoric, but it promoted 
dissent among Shiite populations across the region.  Kuwait (Friedman 2012, 80-84), in particular broke 
up eight Iranian spy networks (two of them armed) working among the Shiites, and Bahrain complained 
about similar Iranian infiltration.  Iran had already been sponsoring the Shiite Houthi rebels in Yemen 
(Terrill 2014), but it increased its support, enabling this group to destabilize the country throughout the 
2010's.  Where Iran was not promoting the banner of the Arab Spring, aside from within its own country 
as it cracked down on the Green Movement, was in its ally, Syria.   
Iran cast its lot decisively with the Assad regime (Solomon 2016, 218-226) from the outset of the 
Syrian civil war, and it heavily leveraged both its IRGC forces and Lebanese Hezbollah to counter the 
uprising.  Quds Force Commander Soleimani increased his own public profile and personal influence 
throughout the episode, and the Iranians (along with Russian air support) were integral in helping 
prevent the fall of Assad.  For the Obama administration, Iran's actions in Syria presented a challenge.  
Obama deliberately chose not to directly involve the U.S. in the Syrian civil war, but he also staked a 
position that Assad needed to be removed for the good of Syria.  Therefore, to a large degree, the U.S. 
could only watch from the sidelines as Iran helped produce exactly the opposite of Obama’s desired 
outcome.  This became even more convoluted with the rise of ISIS. 
If the Syrian civil war did not directly threaten U.S. interests in the region, ISIS certainly did.  The 
Syrian civil war (Glenn, et al. 2019) allowed them to expand from an underground terrorist organization 
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to a powerful militia, sponsoring and inspiring terrorist attacks worldwide from a quasi-state that they 
established in Syrian and Iraqi territory.  ISIS was a threat to Iran, as well, and Esfandiary and Tabatabai 
(2015, 2-6) argued that the degree of this threat has been underappreciated in the West.  Real or 
imagined, many Iranians believed that ISIS was an existential threat capable of invading Iranian territory 
at any time, and they demanded action from their government, which of course boosted Soleimani's 
(Filkins 2013) celebrity status even further.   
Because the U.S. had withdrawn its combat forces from Iraq and chosen not to engage in Syria, 
it was late to the game in fighting ISIS.  CENTCOM (Schmitt 2015) attempted a fraught mission to build 
its own Syrian militia, to little avail, and ultimately it worked primarily through Kurdish militias (Vitalone 
2019) in Syria and badly unprepared Iraqi Army forces (Broder 2015) in Iraq.  It took several years for the 
U.S. to build its anti-ISIS coalition and deploy significant firepower support of its own.  Meanwhile, Iran 
had Hezbollah and Syrian regular forces at its disposal in Syria, and when Soleimani shifted focus to Iraq, 
he had a pre-existing network of Shiite militias at his disposal.  As a result, the U.S. and Iran (Hussain 
2019) fought the same enemy in the same territory with little more than rudimentary tactical 
deconfliction, instead of partnership. 
Should the U.S. and Iran have collaborated against ISIS?  Esfandiary and Tabatabai (2015, 2-6, 
10-11) argued that this was an important opportunity for both sides.  Iran was making important 
contributions to the ISIS fight and had influence that the U.S. could not replicate.  Further, Iran's 
hardliners were preoccupied with painting red lines for the nuclear program, not ISIS, so this might have 
been even more successful than the nuclear deal.  Nader (2015) argued that the U.S. and Iran had 
divergent long-term goals, but that tactical cooperation in the short-term might be worthwhile, if 
carefully managed.  Friedman (2018), on the other hand, summarized the argument against 
cooperation, believing that Iran remained a dangerous adversary that should be contained instead of 
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appeased.  Cooperation would only implicate the U.S. in Iran's nefarious activities and complicate long-
term strategic aims.  As the nuclear negotiations were proceeding in 2014, both the U.S. and Iran sent 
mixed signals (Esfandiary and Tabatabai 2015, 2) with regard to their willingness to cooperate against 
ISIS, but neither side officially pursued the effort.   
The U.S. excluded Iran from its anti-ISIS coalition, a move reminiscent of the Madrid Conference 
in 1991, Afghanistan in 2001, and Iraq in 2003 (Iran recused itself from the 1991 Gulf War).  In the fight 
against ISIS, CENTCOM reverted to the regional order that it had been building since the 1980's for 
support and assistance (which had also become a thick layer in the U.S.-Iranian conflict).  It is doubtful 
that any of the Gulf Arab States, in particular, would have been supportive of U.S. collaboration with 
Iran, and Israel was most certainly not.  It is likely that the benefits of collaborating with Iran in this area 
were simply not worth fighting the institutional pressures that had insulated the two sides from a 
productive relationship.  As the next section will show, the influence of constituencies made 
cooperation a moot point.  The constituencies may have missed a beat in preventing the JPCOA, but 
they would never have allowed this kind of constructive collaboration to bear fruit. 
  
The institutional development of constituencies  
If animosity between two states builds over time in an institutional fashion, and constituencies 
to the conflict act as proponents for this institutional animosity, then the successful implementation of 
the JPCOA stands in need of explanation.  Trita Parsi (2017, 346-351) made some key insights into why 
the JPCOA succeeded from a U.S. perspective.  This dissertation will borrow elements from his analysis 
and argue that Parsi was actually making an institutional argument that applied to both the U.S. and 
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Iran.   This section will then look beyond the JPCOA and examine how constituencies continued to 
develop and advance the conflict in an institutional fashion throughout this period.   
To begin with, it is worthwhile to consider the non-institutional explanations for the JPCOA.  On 
the U.S. side (Cassidy 2015) (Maloney 2014), proponents and critics of diplomacy alike credited the 
Obama administration's pressure campaign for bringing Iran to the table.  Crippling sanctions left Iran 
with no other choice.  Critics (Cornwell 2015) simply argued that the U.S. should have held out longer 
and forced a stricter deal on Iran.  On the Iranian side (Parsi 2017, 362), leaders painted the JPCOA as a 
triumph of their enrichment strategy.  Iran made its enrichment program a fait accompli, and the U.S. 
was forced to either accept Iran's right to enrich uranium or stand by helplessly as Iran stockpiled 
enough fissile material for a nuclear weapons program.  The fact that both sides could claim victory from 
the same deal was probably a key factor in making the JPCOA ultimately viable.  The problem is that, 
while both sides viewed the other as under pressure, neither side viewed themselves this way, and 
constituencies on both sides still opposed the negotiations.  Parsi (2017, 362) argued that, in actuality, it 
was the newfound willingness to compromise by both sides that paved the way for a deal.  These 
compromises generated the positive momentum that had been lacking for decades.  This was 
undoubtedly important to finalizing the JPCOA, but it does not explain how the U.S. and Iran were able 
to come to the table in first place, in spite of clear opposition from constituencies on both sides. 
This dissertation argues that the primary reason Obama and Rouhani succeeded in negotiating 
and implementing the JPCOA was because constituencies on both sides simultaneously failed in their 
efforts to perpetuate the conflict.  They failed for two related reasons.  First, they overplayed their hand.  
Second, they had become stultified by patterns repeated throughout decades of conflict and were 
unable to adapt to a unique moment in history.  Both of these patterns played out earlier on the Iranian 
side than the U.S. side.  After the 2009 election, the clerical establishment reasserted its dominance 
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over the people of Iran, relying on the security services to crush dissent and clamping down on social 
media and public freedoms.  Khamenei rallied around Iran's nuclear program as a symbol of 
revolutionary resistance to the Western world, a familiar trope, and he called on Iranians to defiantly 
endure the effects of sanctions.  In doing so, the clerical establishment lost touch with the pulse of the 
Iranian people (see Przeworski 2003, 15), and they were caught off guard by the results of the 2013 
election.  Parsi (2017, 204) relayed that, as it became apparent that Rouhani would win the election, a 
unit of IRGC soldiers surrounded Rouhani and his wife, waiting for orders but unclear as to whether their 
purpose was to protect the new president or arrest him.  
Whereas before the election, Khamenei had based his strategy for political survival on his 
alliance with the IRGC, he now saw that he needed a broader base to avoid further alienating himself 
from the people.  Protecting his domestic power base in the short term became more important than 
his stand over the nuclear program.  Likewise, the IRGC had all but taken over as the power behind the 
throne in Iran.  Now it found its wings clipped, and more moderate voices were directing Iranian policy.  
For its own sake, the IRGC had to avoid overt acts of extremism that might antagonize the population or 
further degrade its influence within Iran's circles of power.  To this end, both the clerical establishment 
and the IRGC attempted to drag out and undermine the negotiations in typical fashion, but neither were 
willing to put themselves in a position to shoulder public responsibility if the talks failed.  They were out 
of new ideas.   
A similar process of overreach happened later on the U.S. side, most importantly by the U.S. 
Congress and Israel.  By 2013, Obama already had an established backchannel to Iran, and taking 
advantage of a historic change in Iranian leadership, his administration gained the initiative by reaching 
a preliminary agreement outside the watchful eye of his critics.  The November 2013 announcement of 
the back-channel’s progress put Congress and Israel off guard.  Their rhetorical line had been that 
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diplomacy with Iran was a fool's errand because Iran would never actually make a deal.  Now that a deal 
was on the table, they could no longer disparage the diplomatic effort.  The next fallback was to demand 
that Obama pursue an unrealistic outcome, zero enrichment.  However, by taking such an extreme 
position, Parsi (2017, 346-351) pointed out that the opponents of diplomacy left no other realistic 
option except for military action.  Obama understood, perhaps better than his critics, that the U.S. 
population was not prepared to go to war with Iran over its nuclear program.  Much to their frustration 
(Cornwell 2015) (Jett 2018, 39-40), he turned his opponents' argument around and framed the debate 
for the American people as a choice between war and peace, which ultimately garnered the support he 
required, even from Congress.   
Parsi (2017, 346) also explained that opponents of the JPCOA failed because they offered no 
viable alternative, but instead chose to "saturate the debate with a deluge of second-rate arguments, 
none of which held up to scrutiny or even addressed the central aspects of the deal.  It was a strategy 
that smacked of defeatism…" Mark Dubowitz (2015, 2) from the Foundation for the Defense of 
Democracies provided an excellent example in his July 2015 Congressional testimony arguing against the 
JPCOA.  Dubowitz argued that the U.S. should never accept Iranian enrichment because there were still 
"viable alternatives" for "coercive diplomacy."  The alternatives he listed consisted of more sanctions 
(notwithstanding the fact that previous sanctions had not stopped Iran's enrichment) and two barely 
distinguishable prescriptions for direct military force against Iran - hardly a form of diplomacy (see Jett 
2018, 39 for a list of justifications for preventing the deal).  In a similar fashion, Netanyahu seemed to 
believe that beating his drum louder was a winning strategy, castigating the JPCOA at every opportunity 
without providing any alternatives.  He also took for granted the level of influence that Israel had 
traditionally held in U.S. politics, and he apparently believed that he could successfully undermine the 
uncooperative U.S. president by appealing directly to Congress and the American people.  With a 
stronger case, this might have worked, but as Parsi (2017, 350) described, the opponents of the JPCOA 
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were "disoriented." Opposing rapprochement with Iran had never before required a great deal of 
strategic thought or effort.  The constituencies on both sides of the conflict had grown comfortable with 
their repertoires of action and lost ground, but this does not mean that they were down for the count.   
It is also important to note that institutional stories rarely unfold over short time durations.  The 
JPCOA was a victory for advocates of rapprochement between the U.S. and Iran, but as the next section 
will show, the agreement turned out to be short-lived, and it failed to deliver significant improvements 
in the relationship.  The success of the JPCOA was limited precisely because it failed to alter the 
institutional dynamics of the conflict between the two parties.  No conflict is permanent, but when it is 
constructed by institutional processes, it must be deconstructed by institutional processes as well.  One 
could make the argument that the JPCOA was a significant step in this deconstruction process, but it was 
only one of many that would likely be required to alter the trajectory of the relationship.  Of course, 
even as the nuclear negotiations were proceeding, the constituencies continued to operate and 
develop. 
The clerical establishment, and Khamenei in particular, most likely allowed the JPCOA to 
proceed because of a short-term interest in pacifying its restive population and seeing sanctions lifted.  
Throughout the process (Khalaji 2015, 64-75), Iranian hardliners thickened the rhetorical layer of the 
conflict through anti-American statements, questioning the sincerity of the Obama administration and 
casting doubt on whether Iran would actually comply with a future deal.  Once an agreement was 
reached, however, Khamenei (Milani and McFaul 2015) refrained from taking a position on it.  This 
allowed the debate to take place in parliament, relatively openly.  Supporters of the deal included all 
stripes of moderates and reformers within the Iranian government, along with most the Iranian people.  
Conservatives almost uniformly opposed the bill, citing security and sovereignty issues as their foremost 
concerns.  However, Milani and McFaul (2015) suggested that justifications only thinly veiled the 
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political and economic interests that would be disrupted by increased engagement with the West.  
Institutional priorities had not changed, and even though Khamenei apparently acquiesced to the deal, 
his modus operandi remained remarkably consistent under the surface.   
In October 2015 (Erdbrink 2015), the Iranian Parliament ratified the deal by a wide margin, and 
Khamenei denied the request of hardliners to modify the agreement.  Within the domestic politics layer 
of the conflict, this was a deft maneuver by Khamenei, who essentially washed his hands of the JPCOA 
and placed responsibility for the deal and its outcome squarely on Rouhani and his moderate 
supporters.  In a pattern similar to the way he had approached Khatami's presidency before, the 
Supreme leader allowed Rouhani some initial latitude in order to satisfy public opinion, but he was 
already tightening his grip on power behind the scenes.  Khamenei had set Rouhani up to take the blame 
for failed policies, many of which he bore little responsibility for, and the conservatives used these 
failures to discredit the reform movement.  Likewise, Rouhani now held the bag for both the success of 
the JPCOA and all the unrealistic hopes that Iranians had associated with it.  Hardliners could now 
undermine the JPCOA with little consequence, and when it failed, Khamenei could say I told you so! 
The IRGC and clerical security forces were hard at work building layers of the conflict, even as 
Iran negotiated with the P5+1.  First, while the JPCOA (at least in theory) put the nuclear issue to rest, it 
did nothing to constrain Iran's ballistic missile program.  When this constituency lost some ground in one 
issue, it simply shifted focus to other tracks in order to continue stoking the conflict.  The IRGC had been 
developing its ballistic missile arsenal for many years, and they continued throughout the nuclear 
negotiations.  Only a month after signing the JPCOA (Charbonneau 2015), Iran tested a medium-range 
missile capable of delivering a nuclear warhead, in violation of the U.N. Security Council Ban on ballistic 
missile tests.  Ballistic missiles were not a new layer to the relationship, but this layer was becoming 
more contentious as Iran increased its capability.   
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Second, largely in response to Stuxnet, the IRGC developed its own indigenous cyber warfare 
program, thickening the relatively new cyber layer of the relationship.  Starting in 2011 (Eisenstadt 2016, 
4), Iran began cyber espionage operations against at least 16 Western countries, penetrating businesses, 
infrastructure, and military facilities, and it conducted a number of cyber-attacks.  In 2012 and 2013, 
Iranian agents targeted the New York Stock Exchange and U.S. Banks in successive waves of attacks, and 
a hacking penetration of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps networks took four months to completely 
rectify.  In 2014, the Iran attacked the Sands Corporation, most likely in retaliation for its owner's 
advocacy of military action against Iran, and this took place during the JPCOA negotiations.  The 
Congressional Research Service (2013) listed Iran in the company, of China, Russia, North Korea and the 
Islamic State as a key cyber threat to U.S. interests and infrastructure.  Third, the IRGC's naval forces 
continued their aggressive posture in the Persian Gulf.  The capture of the 10 U.S. sailors apparently 
took place without any specific direction from Tehran, but the IRGC jumped at the opportunity to 
embarrass the U.S.  This episode might have thwarted the JPCOA just days from its implementation, but 
as usual, Khamenei rewarded the IRGC for its initiative.   
Fourth, the IRGC and clerical security forces, led prominently by Qassim Soleimani, were actively 
driving to expand Iran's regional influence, an extension of several layers of the conflict.  This section has 
already discussed Iran's activities in Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Yemen.  The IRGC actively fought 
ISIS, which legitimately threatened the security of its homeland, and this might have provided fertile 
ground for cooperation with the U.S.  However, Iran conducted all of its campaigns in a manner that 
furthered its strategic goals, and the ISIS fight never detracted from Iran's support to the Assad regime.  
Ostovar (2015) offered an alternative explanation why the IRGC acquiesced to the JPCOA.  While IRGC 
affiliates may have still profited under the sanctions regime, there is no doubt that IRGC enterprises 
were among the most heavily affected by the sanctions, and they stood the most to gain from their 
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removal.   Also, with U.S. and international isolation decreased, many felt it would give the IRGC a free 
hand to continue building Iranian influence across the region. 
CENTCOM continued its role in the conflict as well.  Obama replaced the hawkish General Mattis 
with General Lloyd Austin, but the new commander faced no fewer challenges within the region.  The 
2013 CENTCOM Posture Statement (Armed Services Committee 2013, 5-6) before Congress (one of 
Mattis's last acts as commander) listed "Malign Iranian Influence" as the first of CENTCOM's "most 
serious strategic risks to U.S. national security." Aside from the threats posed by Iran's nuclear, ballistic 
missile and cyber programs, it listed Iran's maritime threat in the Persian Gulf.  More ominously, it 
described the "Iranian Threat Network" which served as an umbrella term for the amalgam of "illicit 
weapons, financial aid, trained personnel and training" that Iran and its proxies operated in at least 
seven countries throughout the region.  CENTCOM charged the Assad regime with destabilizing Syria's 
neighbors and castigated Iran for propping up Assad.  The 2014 Posture Statement (Armed Services 
Committee 2014) toned down language used to paint Iran as the key U.S. adversary (possibly pressured 
by the White House during the nuclear negotiations), but its description of Iran's capabilities and "threat 
network" was no less daunting.   
To this effect, CENTCOM's regional footprint was just as threatening to Iran as it had been in 
previous episodes.  The U.S. withdrew combat forces from Iraq in 2011, but it kept a significant training 
and advisory element, along with an extensive basing infrastructure.  With the rise of ISIS, the U.S. 
returned some previously withdrawn ground troops (especially Special Operations Forces), spread over 
Iraq, Syria and Turkey, and it kept a large number of air assets within easy striking distance of Iran.  In its 
own contribution to the ballistic missile layer, CENTCOM (Armed Services Committee 2014, 18-19, 35-
36) also continued to build its anti-ballistic missile capabilities in the Gulf region, in defense of both U.S. 
forces and partner nations.   
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The most important layer for the U.S.-Iranian relationship remained CENTCOM's network of 
allied partners throughout the region.  CENTCOM (Austin 2014, 19-34) conducted 52 bilateral and 
multilateral exercises in the Middle East Region between 2013 and early 2014, some of which were 
directly focused on countering threats from Iran, and it engaged in "security cooperation" (military 
equipment sales and training of forces) with states across the region.  When the U.S. formed its counter-
ISIS coalition (McInnis 2016), it drew support from 66 countries by 2016, including most of Iran's 
neighbors, but it specifically excluded Iran.  As previously mentioned, the U.S. choice of allies made it all 
but impossible to include Iran, a move that would have been very divisive, especially with the Gulf Arab 
States.  Lastly, the growing cyber conflict between the U.S. and Iran was fueling the development of the 
U.S. Cyber Command (U.S. Cyber Command 2020), which had been established in 2009 under U.S. 
Strategic Command but would become its own combatant command in 2018.  While Cyber Command 
was never subordinate to CENTCOM, its focus on the Iranian threat required continual coordination and 
collaboration between the commands, helping weave the cyber warfare layer further into the fabric of 
the conflict.   
Israel's role as a constituent requires little elaboration.  Netanyahu led the way, rarely missing 
an opportunity to thicken the Israeli layer of the conflict and campaign for tougher action against Iran.  
Israel's covert war against Iran died down after 2012, but Netanyahu still repeatedly threatened military 
action against Iran's nuclear sites.  Israel also conducted a number of airstrikes (Sly and Haidamous 
2013) (Sly and Haidamous 2014) (Chandler 2015) in Syria throughout the duration of the Syrian civil war, 
primarily attacking targets associated with Hezbollah, which Iran was directly sponsoring.  The domestic 
politics layer came into play in Israel, as well.  In March 2015, after addressing the U.S. Congress 
regarding Iran, Netanyahu's Likud Party won a resounding victory (Staff and AP 2015) in the Israeli 
election.  Netanyahu had based his campaign on security issues including Iran, and his open feud with 
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Obama apparently helped him instead of hindering him in the Israeli polls.  For Netanyahu and his 
supporters in the U.S., conflict with Iran was eminently useful.   
As with previous periods, both sides of the political aisle in Congress largely aligned with Israel, 
and AIPAC had strong Democratic support.  Even still it was Republican loathing of President Obama that 
truly animated the Congressional effort against Iran, bringing out the domestic politics layer of the U.S-
Iranian relationship.  Inviting the Israeli Prime Minister to address Congress without properly informing 
the White House, all in a deliberate attempt to undermine a foreign policy negotiation, was more than 
just a dirty trick in the game of politics.  Approximately 60 Democrats (Everett and Kim 2015) refused to 
show up in protest, and even some who attended made scathing statements afterward.  Senator 
Cotton's letter to the Khamenei was outrageous by any standard of political behavior.  It seemed there 
were few depths to which Republicans were not willing to sink in order to undermine the Obama 
administration.  However, as Parsi (2017, 276, 290-297) described, the Republicans within this 
constituency also overplayed their hand.  By attacking Obama so brazenly over the nuclear program, 
they actually united many Democrats in support of the President - even those who otherwise might 
have been supportive of Israel or hawkish on Iran.  This came to bear in the final vote mandated by the 
Corker Bill, and Senate opponents of the JPCOA were not able to vote it down.     
  The JPCOA was a clear setback for the constituencies interested in perpetuating the U.S.-Iranian 
conflict.  In summary, Obama’s secret negotiations created space which allowed the process to gain 
traction before constituencies could sabotage it.  Once these negotiations became public, the 
convergence of two popular leaders, Obama in the U.S. and Rouhani in Iran, gave the negotiations 
momentum.  Meanwhile, the constituencies on both sides had fallen out of synch with popular opinion, 
and these leaders capitalized on public sentiment.  Finally, by limiting the negotiations to one issue, it 
removed some of layering that would have complicated a more comprehensive agreement.  However, 
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the limited nature of this agreement also produced as many questions as answers, and this diplomatic 
success story only temporarily supplanted the morass of institutional forces that continued to work 
behind the scenes to ensure that this would not result in lasting peace.  The constituencies adapted to 
the new conditions and continued to consolidate their positions behind the scenes on both sides, and as 
the next section will show, they proved more than sufficient to the task of reversing this positive 
momentum. 
 
Trump Abrogates the JPCOA 
The triumph of the JPCOA was relatively short-lived.  While Donald Trump did not immediately 
abrogate the agreement upon taking office as President, the writing was on all after his election, and it 
took little more than a year for him to come to this decision.  As with Obama's choice to pursue 
negotiation in a deliberate and serious manner, Trump's personal agency certainly affected the direction 
of the U.S.-Iranian relationship in a prominent manner.  However, this section will argue that the 
institutional undercurrents of the relationship changed little between administrations; all five 
constituencies on both sides still benefited from animosity.  Even if Obama had somehow been granted 
a third term of presidency, he would have found that the problems between the U.S. and Iran were far 
from solved.   
Yet the U.S. still maintained a strong interest in Middle East stability, combatting terrorism, and 
preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.  The American public was little more prepared to take 
military action against Iran, so cooperation was preferable to conflict.  Iran, for its part, desperately 
needed an economic boost, and a slew of international partners were waiting in the wings to begin 
investing in Iran.  Its leaders had only to avoid antagonizing the Trump administration, and the weight of 
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world opinion might have conferred a level of legitimacy unseen since the revolution.  Instead, both 
sides reignited the fires that had characterized the relationship from the beginning.  This section will 
explain the demise of the JPCOA and discuss yet another episode in the institutional development of 
constituencies to the conflict. 
  
What happened? 
The 2016 Presidential election was nearly as surprising for the U.S. as Rouhani's 2013 election 
had been for Iran.  Democrat Hillary Clinton, the former Senator and Secretary of State, was widely 
assumed to be the frontrunner (Cohn 2016) and led the polls even up to election day.  With regard to 
Iran, Clinton was more hawkish than Obama, and she was better at currying favor with the Israeli lobby.  
Clinton defended the JPCOA (Galston 2015), but she did not believe it would fundamentally alter the 
relationship between the U.S. and Iran.  She believed that the U.S. still needed a comprehensive plan to 
contain Iranian influence, and regarding Iran's nuclear program, she coined the phrase "distrust but 
verify."  
On the Republican side (Martin and Healy 2016), real estate tycoon-cum-television celebrity 
Donald J. Trump edged out a historically large field of politically experienced but otherwise uninspiring 
competitors with a combination of anti-establishment star power and populist appeal.  The signing of 
the JPCOA coincided with the beginning of the campaign season, so Republican candidates across the 
board competed to criticize the agreement, a clear expression of the domestic politics layer of the 
conflict.   Trump (Stokols and Gass 2015) led the way in this effort, calling the JPCOA "catastrophic" and 
"the single greatest security threat facing America." However, when it came to his intentions as 
President regarding the JPCOA, candidate Trump (Torbati 2016) gave mixed signals.  He said early in his 
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campaign that he would not "rip up" the agreement but would “police that contract so tough they don’t 
have a chance,” but he later told an AIPAC audience that he would "dismantle the disastrous deal with 
Iran." Trump's surprise election in November 2016 immediately put the nuclear agreement into 
question. 
In Iran (Bengali and Mostaghim 2016, Nov 18) (Nov 4), Rouhani suggested that Trump's election 
would not change the Iranian stance toward the JPCOA and that a change of Presidents would have "no 
impact on the will of Iran." Hardliners, on the other hand, seized upon Trump's rhetoric to fuel their 
narrative of U.S. duplicity and malice, a move they had prepared in advance to make.  Khamenei 
accused the U.S. of reneging on the JPCOA as soon as Trump's victory was announced, even before any 
policy action was even possible.  He also said, "Over the past 37 years, any major U.S. party that came to 
power brought us no good…  Their evil was always directed toward the Iranian nation."  Hardliners had 
already started blaming Iran's economic woes on the JPCOA and arguing that newfound openness was 
exposing Iran’s domestic industries to international exploitation.  Rouhani lamented (New York Times 
2016) with regard to Trump, "Our hard-liners will pressure him, they are very happy now."  However, in 
spite of mounting conservative opposition to his moderate administration, Rouhani (Erdbrink 2017) still 
won a landslide victory in his May 2017 reelection bid.  He secured 57 percent of the vote with a turnout 
of more than 70 percent.   
Rhetoric aside, Iran was not Trump's first policy priority upon taking office.  In addition to 
struggles in building his cabinet and a scandal that led to the prompt removal of his first National 
Security Advisor (Haberman 2017), Trump embarked on an aggressive 100-day plan (NPR 2017) to fulfill 
many of his campaign promises.  This laundry list of largely controversial measures included restrictions 
on immigration from certain countries (popularized as the "Muslim ban"), a U.S. exit from the Trans-
Pacific Partnership agreement (which had not been ratified by Congress yet), and the removal of 
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restrictions regarding fossil fuels, just to name a few.  However, Iran continued its pattern of testing 
ballistic missiles (Iran Primer 2017a) during this period, a layer of the conflict which the Trump 
administration could not ignore.  The administration's initial reaction (Iran Primer 2017b) consisted of 
applying two rounds of unilateral sanctions against a list of specific entities and individuals associated 
with Iran's missile program.  These lists grew almost monthly throughout 2017, and while the sanctions 
layer had never been fully removed from the relationship, it began thickening again.   
When the recertification of Iran's compliance with the JPCOA was due to Congress in April, 
Trump’s administration was not yet prepared to deny it.  With some blustery criticism (Harris 2017) and 
another round of targeted sanctions, they certified the deal.  By July of 2017 (Baker 2017), though, 
Trump's patience with Iran was wearing thin.  After a lengthy debate, his national security team 
convinced him to recertify again, but he demanded an aggressive new strategy for dealing with Iran, also 
unilaterally announcing (Calamur 2017) new sanctions.  In October, Trump (Landler and Sanger 2017) 
chose not to certify Iran to Congress, stating that he would not restore certification until a new 
agreement was reached that permanently prevented Iran from gaining either a nuclear weapon or an 
intercontinental ballistic missile (an issue not covered by the JPCOA).  This did not formally end the 
agreement, but it put the onus on Congress to decide whether or not to reimpose the original sanctions 
regime.  Amidst the swirling international controversy over Trump's decision, Congress did not act on 
the move.   
Two months later, events unfolded in Iran which further aggravated the human rights layer of 
the conflict, in addition to the JPCOA.  In late December 2017 (Dehghan and Graham-Harrison 2017), 
protests erupted across at approximately 72 Iranian cities.  While smaller than the 2009 protests and 
lacking in central coordination, the breadth of the unrest was unprecedented.  Some analysts (Asadzade 
2018) (Fathollah-Nejad 2020) claimed that hardliners had orchestrated the original protests to 
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undermine the Rouhani administration, but these quickly took on a life of their own and became a 
vehicle for channeling pent up frustrations across the country.  Focused primarily on economic issues 
and quality of life, the protestors widely chanted slogans directed against Khamenei himself.   
Iranian security forces (Karimi and Gambrell 2018) (Bayet 2018) cracked down violently on the 
protests, killing at least 25 people and arresting approximately 3,700, many of whom would face severe 
convictions.  Quick to stir the pot, Trump (Diaz and Merica 2018) sent a series of tweets accusing the 
Iranian government of oppressing its people and arguing that it was "time for change" in Iran.  This only 
fueled Khamenei's (Karimi and Gambrell 2018) narrative that the protests were entirely the product of 
foreign plots attempting to undermine the regime.  It is unclear if this period of unrest emboldened 
Trump's final decision with regard to the JPCOA, but it fueled speculation that the Iranian regime was 
vulnerable and made Iran a tempting target for hawks within the administration.   
Meanwhile, Trump's own proclivities were turning more hawkish.  In December 2017 (Holland 
and Lubell 2017), Trump gifted Netanyahu by reversing decades of U.S. policy and formally recognizing 
Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.  While unrelated to Iran, it was an unmistakable signal that the U.S. 
was aligning its foreign policy in favor of the Israeli Likud government.  In March 2018, Trump (Landler 
and Haberman 2018) replaced his National Security Advisor, H.R. McMaster, and his Secretary of State, 
Rex Tillerson.  Both had consistently advocated restraint in dealing with Iran and favored remaining in 
the JPCOA.  Their replacements, John Bolton as National Security Advisor and Mike Pompeo as Secretary 
of State, both advocated a hard line against Iran, apparently believing that Iran's clerical leaders were 
vulnerable to pressure.   
In May 2018 (Landler 2018), after months of angst and speculation, Trump formally announced 
that the U.S. was abandoning the JPCOA.  His administration acknowledged that Iran was in compliance 
with the agreement, but stated that JPCOA itself was "fatally flawed." Trump also cited his campaign 
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promises in abrogating the deal.  Predictably, the move drew criticism from around the globe, but 
especially from the European signatories to the bill, who vowed to remain within the agreement.  The 
ensuing rift between the U.S. and Europe (Norman 2020) led to months of wrangling as the U.S. 
unilaterally imposed secondary sanctions, making it difficult for the European businesses to continue 
dealing with Iran, and Europe even set up a financial vehicle for circumventing those sanctions.  Its 
success remains to be seen as of this writing. 
In Iran, the reaction to Trump's formal abrogation of the JPCOA was bifurcated between the 
subdued tone of President Rouhani (Landler 2018), who vowed to stay in the deal, and hardliners who 
increased their threats and rhetoric against the U.S.  In a dramatic display (Cunningham and Sabbagh 
2018) typical of the rhetorical layer of the conflict, Iranian lawmakers set fire to the U.S. flag and a copy 
of the JPCOA in Parliament.  Hardliners also demanded Rouhani's resignation.  The day after Trump's 
announcement (Kershner and Halbfinger 2018), Iranian forces in Syria launched 20 rockets at targets in 
Israel.  Israel retaliated with their largest and most overt campaign of airstrikes yet into Syrian territory.  
However, perhaps in a bid to continue currying favor with Europe, Iran (Dehganpisheh 2019) waited an 
entire year to announce the restart of its nuclear program, and even then, it did not pull completely out 
of the JPCOA.  By the end of 2019 (Wolgolenter and Sanger, 2019), Iran moved even further from the 
deal and resumed a significant portion of its enrichment activities.  After four decades, the U.S. and Iran 
were still adversaries, with little end in sight. 
  
The institutional development of constituencies  
One of the drawbacks of electoral politics is that political leaders are often time-constrained and 
forced to build their legacies on short-term gains.  The JPCOA was a significant accomplishment for 
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Obama and Rouhani, but it did not fundamentally alter the nature of the relationship between the U.S. 
and Iran, nor did it rebuild the incentive structure for the constituents to the conflict.  It established the 
precedent that diplomacy between the U.S. and Iran was possible, but the agreement itself had shallow 
roots based in the shifting sands of political expediency.  The layers of conflict continued to grow even 
as the JPCOA was negotiated, and they did not stop iteratively shaping the conflict afterward. 
The clerical establishment, led by Khamenei, apparently hedged its bets all along on the failure 
of the JPCOA, energizing the domestic politics layer of the conflict in Iran.  After successfully foisting 
responsibility for the deal on Rouhani and his supporters, the hardliners were free to criticize their 
opponents at every juncture while simultaneously undermining the agreement.  Western analysts 
(Barnato 2015) correctly predicted that the JPCOA would not immediately solve most of Iran's economic 
problems, but they were not entirely correct in their assumption that this would stir the Iranian people 
to hold their government accountable for the country's underlying problems.  Instead, the clerical 
establishment turned the argument around and blamed the JPCOA, along with Rouhani's administration.  
This did not work as well as they might have hoped.  Whether or not conservatives literally sparked the 
2017 unrest themselves, they did actively promote protests against the president, and the backlash they 
unleashed targeted Khamenei, himself.  Alas, since 2009, the clerical establishment had honed its 
repressive apparatus, and it proved more than adequately prepared to stifle active dissent.  There was 
no need to change strategies, as Rouhani's reputation and influence was on the decline anyway, much 
like Khatami's had in the early 2000's, when hardliners regained the initiative the first time.  The Trump 
administration provided Khamenei with all the ammunition it needed to scapegoat the U.S. for Iran's 
problems and perpetuate a 40-year pattern of action.   
The IRGC and clerical security forces played an especially sinister role as a constituent during this 
period, probably in conjunction with the most hardline elements of the clerical establishment.  First, 
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knowing that the JPCOA provided no effective limitations with regard to ballistic missiles, the IRGC (BBC 
News 2016) (Iran Primer 2017a) (Staff 2018) brazenly and aggressively tested and expanded its missile 
arsenal.  The IRGC reacted defiantly to each new iteration of stepwise sanctions, making a point of 
escalating the conflict with each new test, deliberately thickening the ballistic missile layer of the 
conflict.  Second, absent an active nuclear program, the IRGC (Jones 2016) (Eisenstadt 2016) placed an 
increasing priority on its cyber warfare capabilities, another key layer.  After the conclusion of the 
nuclear deal, they stepped up their hacking program aimed at monitoring the activities of U.S. and other 
Western officials, journalists, and dissidents.  They engaged in a brief 2016 cyber battle with Saudi 
Arabia.  More disturbing than their known operations, though, Iranian hackers became more 
sophisticated and harder to track at all.  Iran was reportedly spending $1 billion per year by 2016 on its 
cyber program, half as much as the United Kingdom.  Cyber experts increasingly placed Iran in the same 
league as China and Russia, citing complex multi-year penetrations of various systems worldwide, based 
on indigenously produced codes.  Third, the IRGC continued to increase its regional influence, especially 
in supporting for the Assad Regime in Syria and the Houthi rebels in Yemen, along with its high-profile 
role in fighting ISIS. 
Fourth, Iran's security forces targeted dual-national citizens with a campaign of arbitrary arrests 
and detention, bringing to mind the hostage-taking layer of the U.S.-Iranian relationship.  Iran does not 
recognize dual nationality, and since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, travelling back to Iran has always 
carried some degree of risk and uncertainty for expatriates.  The controversial detention of the five 
American prisoners, including journalist Jason Rezaian (Morello, et al. 2016) released in 2016 testified to 
this fact.  However, after the prisoner swap, at the height of expectations for improved relations, the 
security services started taking a new batch of dual-national political prisoners.  Between 2015 and 2017 
(Nada, et al. 2020), the IRGC arrested at least 30 dual nationals, 19 of whom had European citizenship.  
This included at least four U.S. citizens.  In 2018, Iran arrested two more U.S. Citizens.  In a September 
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2017 interview with CNN, Rouhani hinted that he disagreed with these detentions, however, he stated 
that Iran had an independent judiciary, and he had no power over them.  The same month, Donald 
Trump raised the issue of political prisoners in Iran at the U.N. General Assembly.  Former captive Jason 
Rezaian (2019) described this systematic practice of arrests as a "hostage factory." Iranians learned the 
value of hostage-taking in the 1980's, and they have not forgotten.  This practice brings back painful 
memories for the U.S. and works as an extremely corrosive layer of the conflict. 
In 2016, General Joseph Votel replaced General Austin as the Commander of CENTCOM, 
demonstrating a new iteration of drift in the conflict between the U.S. and Iran.  Unlike Mattis, two 
iterations before, who had a reputation as hawkish on Iran, Votel was known as an even-handed 
intellectual.  However, Votel (2017) stated in his 2017 annual posture statement before Congress, "Iran 
poses the most significant threat to the Central Region and to our national interests and the interests of 
our partners and allies."  He also categorized them as the, "greatest long-term threat," and he stated 
that Iran's behavior had become more provocative since the signing of the JPCOA. This language was 
even less equivocal than any his predecessors had employed.  It also likely reflected a change, not only 
in Iran's behavior but the strategic picture as the U.S. saw it.  The fight against ISIS, which to some 
degree had displaced Iran as the primary threat within the region, was CENTCOM's priority as a shooting 
war.  However, the anti-ISIS coalition was ascendant, and victory was within sight.  Over the course of 
2017 (Glenn, et al. 2019), the coalition ejected ISIS from Iraq, and the next year ISIS was all but defeated 
in Syria.   
As for CENTCOM's other remaining shooting war in Afghanistan, the newly elected President 
Trump (Pramuk 2017) had vowed to bring the troops home, and remaining troops were largely 
relegated to supporting indigenous Afghan forces.  As displacement and conversion operated on 
CENTCOM's outlook within the region, Iran was poised to return to the U.S. cross hairs from an 
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institutional perspective as well as a strategic choice.  Additionally, with the regional drawdown of U.S. 
forces on the near horizon, CENTCOM was more dependent on its regional partners to protect U.S. 
national interests.  As Votel (2017) stated, "Stronger, more capable partners, able and willing to assume 
a greater role in countering Iran, will serve to further enhance deterrence and improve stability in the 
region." These regional partners were all aligned against and increasingly threatened by Iran, so the 
layer presented by this security architecture inevitably thickened.  Every aspect of CENTCOM’s chosen 
mission and strategy relied on animosity against Iran.  There was simply no room for a cooperative 
approach. 
As with the previous period, Israel's constituency to the conflict requires little elaboration.  
Netanyahu continued as Prime Minister, bolstered by his 2015 reelection, and defined Israeli external 
interests largely by opposition to a nuclear Iran.  AIPAC (2018) continued to campaign against the 
JPCOA, arguing that it would facilitate a nuclear-armed Iran.  After almost completely alienating the 
Obama administration (Freedman 2020, 147-152) through support for unauthorized settlements in 
Palestinian territory and opposition to the JPCOA, Trump's election was a welcome gift to Netanyahu.  
The two leaders quickly hit things off when Trump invited him to the White House, shortly after his 
inauguration.  Trump cautioned Netanyahu against enflaming the conflict with the Palestinians through 
further settlements, but he also backed away from previous U.S. insistence on a "two-state solution." 
Ultimately, Trump's decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and his abrogation of the 
JPCOA played almost perfectly into Netanyahu's policies.  The Israel layer was as thick as ever in the 
U.S.-Iranian conflict.  Also, while Israel can hardly be blamed for its massive retaliatory strikes against 
Iranian forces in Syria in May 2018, this indirectly served to aggravate tensions between the U.S. and 
Iran, as well. 
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Congress's role as a constituent to the conflict highlighted the domestic politics layer of the U.S.-
Iranian relationship.  After losing the fight to prevent the JPCOA from being implemented, even 
Republicans were divided on whether Trump should abandon the treaty.  Senators like Jeff Flake (Carney 
2018) argued that abandoning the treaty would alienate key U.S. allies.  While the Trump administration 
imposed new Executive Branch sanctions after decertifying Iran and abrogating the treaty, Congress did 
not follow suit.  However, Congress did impose sanctions on Iran prior to these decisions during Trump's 
first year as President.  In July 2017, the U.S. Congress (2017) passed a bill that sanctioned a number of 
actors related to Iran, North Korea, and Russia.  It specifically targeted Iran's ballistic missile program, 
and attacked the IRGC more broadly.  The bill passed the House (Iran Primer 2017b) with a vote of 419-3 
and the Senate with a vote of 98-2.   
What this bipartisan support concealed was an effort by Congressional Democrats to overtly 
punish Russia for its meddling in the 2016 U.S. election and concurrently embarrass Trump by forcing 
him to publicly walk back his own support for Russian President Vladimir Putin.  A bill focused exclusively 
on Russia would likely have faced partisan controversy and a potential veto.  Packaging Russia with Iran 
and North Korea was a similar strategy to George W. Bush's packaging Iraq with the same two partners 
in the Axis of Evil speech in 2002.  Voting against the bill would have been perceived as a vote for 
America's worst adversaries.  On the other hand, there is no indication that Congress would have 
bothered to pass a bill exclusive to Iran, had not Russia generated a politically useful scandal.  Conflict 
between the U.S. and Iran again became a convenient weapon in the domestic political fight, as it had so 
many times before.   
As with George W. Bush, Trump played his own hand in the conflict between the U.S. and Iran.  
However, as this dissertation has shown, path dependency dealt the cards, based upon years of layering.  
Trump was able to capitalize on hostility against Iran because the constituencies had provided a political 
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base to which he could appeal.  Without this foundation, there would have been little incentive for him 
to antagonize Iran.  Likewise, in Iran, the clerical establishment and IRGC leaders found new and more 
exciting ways to play same game that had been bolstering their position since 1979.  Conflict with the 
U.S. was useful, while peace was expensive and potentially destabilizing.   
 
Conclusion 
Had the story of this fourth decade ended with the implementation of the JPCOA, the concept of 
institutional animosity might have been called into question.  However, the fundamental assumption of 
the institutional lens is that, like tectonic plates, the forces that direct history take time and pressure to 
make themselves understood.  Agreements like the JPCOA are possible when the right factors, usually 
great statesmen (the women and men of history), align with favorable conditions.  However, until the 
corresponding plates that underlie the conflict shift their position, changes in trajectory are short-lived.  
With four decades of troubled history, it hardly required a new theory to predict that the animosity 
between the U.S. and Iran would not simply evaporate because of a controversial agreement signed by 
diplomats in Europe.  The utility of this theoretical exercise has been to articulate and explain what 
others sensed by intuition and experience.   
An institution of animosity is not simply produced by a convergence of conditions.  Conflict can 
result (and often does) from unfortunate and unpredictable combinations of events, but this does not 
create an institution, nor does it make the conflict intractable.  When bad luck continues for decades, it 
requires a new explanation.  The five constituencies to the U.S.-Iranian conflict were not just five actors 
who happened to follow their interest at given points in time to the detriment of their own societies.  
These constituencies developed reproducible values that translated past experience into future patterns 
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of action, and they interacted with each other in a dynamic manner to form a system which perpetuated 
bad luck, regardless of the conditions that arose.  Transient actors like Obama and Rouhani found 
themselves fighting against forces that could not only outlast them, but could subtly and consistently 
undermine their best efforts at transformational change.   
On the other hand, one should not discount the transformational power of an agreement like 
the JPCOA.  If institutions endure through a constant process of renewal and change, this cannot help 
but to have had some effect.  The JPCOA may not have altered the relationship in a visible sense, but it 
introduced new pressures on the tectonic plates.  Just as conflict can find its way to the center of the 
habitus carried social groups, it can also find its way out as new patterns and interests slowly supplant 
the old.  Kupchan (2010) explained that diplomacy often fails its way to success, with each new 
breakthrough changing the precedent that guides future attempts.  No conflict lasts forever, so 
intractability is an inherently temporary condition.  The ultimate success or failure of the JPCOA may not 
be apparent for years or even decades, and Obama's (or Rouhani's) "legacy" could have less to do with 







CHAPTER 7 – ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS  
The preceding chapters have traced the institutional development of the conflict between the 
U.S. and Iran over the space of four decades.  Certain aspects of this sordid tale are unique, or at least 
extraordinary in comparison with other conflicts.  Every conflict has distinctive characteristics because 
individual leaders or collective personalities place their own imprints on them.  However, this 
dissertation contends that the U.S.-Iranian relationship provides a wealth of generalizable insights into 
how international conflict becomes intractable.  To mine these insights, it has proposed an institutional 
lens for evaluating conflict, which traces the development of constituencies over time.  These 
constituencies exhibit their own institutional characteristics and subordinate themselves on both sides 
of the conflict to a larger institution of animosity, serving to perpetuate hostility even against the 
interests of the larger societies involved.  These processes take long periods of time to play out, and 
even when changes appear suddenly, they are usually enabled by an incremental evolution operating 
under the surface, prior to the event.  This dissertation has conducted a multi-generational evaluation of 
the U.S.-Iranian relationship, focusing on periods in which cooperation or rapprochement were possible, 
and found that history generally supports these claims. 
This chapter will discuss the findings produced by applying the institutional lens to the U.S.-
Iranian conflict.  It will begin with a theoretical review of the relationship between institutions and 
conflict intractability.  It will recap the case study of the U.S.-Iranian relationship as a story told in 
institutional terms.  The chapter will then explore some of the key observations that became apparent 
throughout the study and consider their implications for intractable conflict.  Next, it will evaluate the 
performance and efficiency of the model itself.  Finally, it will contemplate avenues for future research 
into the application of institutional theory within the study of conflict.   
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Institutions of Animosity – A Lens for Explaining Intractability 
This dissertation has contended that conflict becomes intractable because it develops 
institutional properties, becoming an institution of animosity.  This happens when constituencies form 
on both sides that have the power to help perpetuate hostility.  That said, intractability is not the 
product of some conspiracy, nor is it the result of collusion on the part of the actors involved.  Human 
plans and intentions rarely produce such durability, even in the best of cases.  Instead, the conflict 
ingrains itself into the very fabric of social order.   
Social groups develop around a shared habitus, Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of a collective 
consciousness which encodes experience from the past and carries it into the future, propagating values 
and interests which endure in the face of change.  The secret to longevity, paradoxically, derives from 
the ability of the habitus to incorporate new inputs and evolve constantly.  In doing so, it serves as a 
buffer between social groups and events, slowing the pace of change and shaping the environment in its 
own image whenever possible.  This construct is the root of all human institutions.  New ideas and 
realities find their way into the habitus of a social group slowly, but once rooted, they can be very 
difficult to change.   
Interstate conflict is just one of the many changing situations that can alter the habitus of a 
social group.  Most disputes are resolved relatively quickly (in a matter of a few years or less), and they 
never have the opportunity to shape the habitus of the societies involved before they are supplanted by 
new priorities and distractions.  However, just as time and pressure create new geologic realities by 
moving the tectonic plates under the surface of the earth, hostility acts as the pressure which can alter a 
habitus over time.  Groups exposed to a conflict can begin to reorder their values and define their 
interests in opposition to a particular foe, with lasting effect.  This usually starts with tactical decisions 
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made for short-term gain, where a group finds particular utility in stoking the fires of conflict.  When 
these behaviors succeed, they develop into habitual pattern of actions.  Thus, the conflict develops 
constituencies. 
Constituencies are institutions, but they do not individually constitute an institution of 
animosity.  As the saying goes, it takes two to tango.  The modern international system provides enough 
accountability that, in many cases, if one side displays little interest in confrontation, there are 
mechanisms that will facilitate de-escalation.  For a conflict to assume institutional properties, it must 
develop constituencies on both sides that have the power to influence events.  Once this takes place, 
the conflict penetrates the habitus of conflicting groups in a similar fashion, creating a commonality 
among foes.  It also generates synergy because the actions of each group feed off of the other, ensuring 
that cycle of hostility continues and undermining efforts at reconciliation.  Further, with more 
constituencies present, they can pick up for each other should one fail or its members become 
distracted by other issues.   
Constituencies to a conflict are sub-divisions of a larger society.  The question of whether a 
dispute aligns with the broader interests of a particular society is often academic, but it is undeniable 
that conflict is costly from a variety of standpoints.  For most conflicts that are widely recognized as 
intractable, there is a prominent argument that protracted hostility deviates from the interests of 
society, and it is perpetuated primarily by the few, namely constituencies.  Constituencies, of course, 
take the lead in countering this view, arguing that their view alone truly represents the masses.  A 
conflict does not necessarily have to run perpendicular to societal interest in order to become 




Finally, institutional theory provides insights into how this process plays out.  Historical 
Institutionalism explains how the habitus of a social group is manipulated and describes mechanisms by 
which constituencies are formed.  Institutionalization is an intangible concept that is difficult to measure 
or assess.  These mechanisms, therefore, provide markers that can be identified and traced, offering a 
lens into a concept that is often invoked but less often explored.  This dissertation has utilized these 
mechanisms to examine the development of constituencies to the U.S.-Iranian conflict, and it has 
demonstrated that synergy has increased as the five key constituencies have internalized the conflict in 
institutional fashion, making the conflict intractable by almost any definition of the term.   
 
The U.S.-Iranian Relationship – An Institutional Story 
This dissertation has argued that the U.S.-Iranian relationship from 1979-2018 provided an ideal 
test case for the argument that intractable conflict is caused by institutional forces.  Chapter 1 examined 
the costs that the conflict has imposed on each of the two societies, costs that may not have been 
apparent in the moment, but which compounded considerably over the course of time.  The analysis 
also stepped back from ideological and tit-for-tat grievances, showing that the most common arguments 
for continued animosity provide little utility in terms in serving greater national interests on either side.  
Each decade of the conflict then showed that societal leaders in both the U.S. and Iran repeatedly 
attempted to reduce hostility between the parties, only to be stymied by forces seemingly beyond their 
control. 
At the start of the conflict, in 1979 and the early 1980’s, Iran’s new leaders apparently never 
envisioned a permanent rift with the U.S.  Hostility was convenient in the moment and became an 
entrenched pattern.  The Reagan administration, focused on the Cold War, envisioned rapprochement 
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with post-Khomeini Iran until the Iran-Contra scandal soured these hopes.  In 1989 and the early 1990’s, 
presidents George H. W. Bush and Hashemi Rafsanjani both courted each other until new priorities 
intervened.  Bill Clinton attempted to pick up where Bush had left off in bringing Iran back to the fold, 
then after the election of Mohammad Khatami in 1997, he redoubled his efforts.  Khatami initiated a 
new level of engagement with the West, but again fell short in garnering meaningful change.   
George W. Bush started out ambivalent toward Iran in 2001 but begrudgingly accepted Iranian 
help in the aftermath of the 9-11 attacks.  In the coming years, even Supreme Leader Khamenei 
demonstrated an apparent change of heart, proffering the suggestion of a “grand bargain,” only to be 
rebuffed.  During Bush’s second term, the tables were turned, and the U.S. offered Iran significant 
concessions for a halt in its nuclear program, to little avail.  Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made overtures 
(however misguided) toward the West during both terms in office, despite his rhetoric.  Obama’s 
outreach to Iran, while troubled at first, resulted in the only significant diplomatic breakthrough 
between the opponents in 40 years.  Hassan Rouhani was a major factor in securing this victory.  Even 
Donald Trump, who abrogated the historic agreement, claimed to do so in order to bring Iran back to 
the table for a better agreement.  In summary, there was never a period between 1979 and 2018 when 
key leaders on one or both sides of the U.S.-Iranian relationship did not recognize an interest in reducing 
hostility.  Hostility continued, nevertheless.   
Understanding why this tragic pattern unfolded requires an understanding of the constituencies 
that ultimately perpetuated the conflict.  Constituencies on the Iranian side manifested earlier, as Iran 
initiated the conflict.  In spite of his rhetoric, confrontation with the U.S. did not appear to be an early 
priority for Khomeini until it became useful in vanquishing his domestic rivals.  The sudden fall of the 
Shah placed the clerics at risk of becoming victims of their own success, and they needed a bogeyman to 
rally against.  The clerical establishment seized upon confrontation with the U.S. and used radicalism as 
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a form of currency, first against their opponents, then in competition with each other.  This was never 
intended to place Iran in a permanent state of international isolation, but the train had left the station.  
Clerical radicalism layered against a host of issues and events over the coming decades, creating path 
dependency.  Many leaders recognized an Iranian interest in reducing hostility, but it was rarely in the 
best interest of an individual cleric to be the one to break ranks and push for change.  There were 
almost always political or economic gains to be had by stirring the fire.  Rafsanjani came arguably the 
closest to breaking the cycle, wielding power in a time of transition, but his own clerical establishment 
fought his efforts. 
The IRGC and clerical security forces were born of the clerical establishment – young foot 
soldiers who supported Khomeini but had little else going for them in Iranian society.  They built a 
complete military force (with land, air, naval, special operations, and intelligence) from the ground up in 
competition with Iran’s regular forces (which still persist to this day).  This force seized upon Khomeini’s 
most radical doctrines and used confrontation with the U.S. as its raison d'etre.  The Iran-Iraq War 
provided the impetus to build the force, but they required a larger cause to justify the continued 
expansion of their power and influence.  In 40 years, they rarely missed an opportunity to jab the U.S., 
either directly or indirectly (often through proxies or attacks on Israel).  In the pattern of the clerical 
establishment, they frequently rewarded bold, radical initiative and rarely punished misguided action.  
The IRGC added numerous layers to the conflict, most importantly involving terrorism, threats against 
Israel, and the country’s nuclear program.  Far from feeling the negative consequences of their actions, 
the IRGC finished its first 40 years as the rarely disputed power behind the regime in Tehran.   
Constituencies took longer to develop on the U.S. side, as America struggled to come to terms 
with its loss of a key ally in the Middle East.  As traumatic as the hostage crisis was for the U.S. 
population, Cold War exigencies ruled the day, and some held out hope that the fall of the Shah would 
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only be a bump in the road the U.S. relationship with Tehran.  U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) was 
the first constituency on the U.S. side.  It owed its formation largely to the U.S. inability to react militarily 
to the hostage crisis and to the perceived Soviet threat against Iran.  CENTCOM’s top priority changed 
multiple times over the years, but Iran remained a constant, never failing to occupy a prominent 
position on the command’s radar.  The fall of the Soviet Union and the 1991 Gulf War positioned 
CENTCOM as America’s premier combatant command, and the Iranian threat helped to bolster this 
position in the face of shifting policy priorities and geopolitical changes in the Middle East.  Even as the 
U.S. military downsized, CENTCOM found itself on the winning end of the competition for resources.  
Perhaps most importantly, CENTCOM became the vanguard of U.S. foreign policy in this part of the 
world.  Beginning in the early 1980’s, the U.S. constructed a network of partnerships and alliances across 
the greater Middle East.  The lynchpin of this regional order was opposition to Iran, and any possible 
rapprochement with Iran risked the stability of the entire enterprise.     
The state of Israel began this story as ally of Iran.  Clinging to their periphery doctrine, which 
advocated building alliances with countries outside the immediate ring of adversarial neighbors, its 
leaders believed that a semi-covert relationship with Iran remained feasible after the fall of the Shah.  
Israel supported Iran in its war with Iraq, and it even helped facilitate the transactions that led to the 
Iran-Contra Affair.  Iran, however, provided little in return except for measured hostility.  As Israel’s chief 
patron, the U.S., turned more overtly against Iran, the periphery doctrine finally lost salience.  With the 
end of the Cold War and the U.S. defeat of Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War, Israel found itself in a new position 
of strength vis-à-vis its neighbors.  However, it now faced an international community, led by the U.S., 
which expected it to come to terms with the Palestinians.  It also risked becoming less important as the 
U.S. build ties with the Persian Gulf States.  Iran became useful again, this time as an adversary.  From 
that point forward, Israeli leaders touted Iran as an existential threat and did everything in their power 
to focus U.S. attention on opposition to the Islamic Republic.  Within the U.S., the American Israeli 
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Political Action Committee (AIPAC) drew new energy from this conflict and became Israel’s best weapon 
against Iran, influencing U.S. politicians at all levels.  There have been few, if any openings for peace 
between the U.S. and Iran that Israeli leaders have not actively undermined.   
The U.S. Congress took longer to develop as a constituency, but the seeds of bipartisan 
opposition to Iran were sown at an early stage.  Democrats blamed Iran for the downfall of the Carter 
administration.  While they often opposed Reagan’s foreign policy in the Middle East (mainly on partisan 
grounds), once the Iran-Contra scandal developed, they seized upon the Iranian angle as a political 
weapon.  This public censure helped to harden Reagan’s position against Iran, leading to the Tanker War 
in 1997 and 1998, which neither Republicans nor Democrats did much to oppose.  By the end of the first 
decade, Iran had staunch opponents on both sides of the political aisle, reducing the freedom of 
maneuver for both Bush and Clinton in the next decade.  The U.S. Congress arguably reached a point of 
no return when Republicans took control of both houses in the 1994 mid-term election.  Taking a page 
from their democratic colleagues during the Iran-Contra Affair, Republican leaders relentlessly attacked 
the Clinton administration over Iran.  Congressional Democrats well understood the danger of appearing 
soft on Iran, and they followed suit, removing any space for compromise with Iran.  From that point 
forward, congressional leaders on both sides of the aisle began competing with the White House to 
criticize and sanction Iran at every possible turn.   
With the transformation of Congress into an active constituency circa 1995, the conflict 
between the U.S. and Iran took its final form as an institution of animosity.  Influenced heavily by the 
Israeli lobby and the model of world order that CENTCOM was increasingly propagating and 
exemplifying, Congress brought a new level of power to the U.S. side of the constituency ledger.  Dating 
the inception of an institution is always a tricky prospect, but constituencies provide a semi-tangible 
marker that is easier to trace.  Through the 1980’s and early 1990’s it was still possible that a different 
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combination of decisions or events might have changed the direction of the U.S.-Iranian relationship.  
However, by 1995, the conflict had powerful constituencies on both sides, and intractability became 
inevitable.   
In telling the institutional story of these constituencies, it is important to reemphasize the point 
that hostility was not the product of some back-room conspiracy with a long-term strategic plan to 
perpetuate conflict between the U.S. and Iran.  CENTCOM’s commanders, for instance, probably never 
viewed themselves as agents of a plot to sow hostility with Iran.  As far as they were concerned, they 
acted in the best interest of U.S. national security, but their perception was also filtered through an 
organization whose very roots derived from confrontation with Iran.  From these roots, successive 
commanders constructed a modern reality by building a regional order antithetical to peace with Iran.  
This construct produced a worldview that could not allow for anything but conflict, and CENTCOM’s 
actions directly challenged Iran’s view of its own sovereignty and national security.   
Being more bellicose in their rhetoric, it might be easier to blame Iranian leaders for deliberately 
provoking conflict with the U.S.  Perhaps this is warranted to some extent, but did U.S. policy in the 
Middle East directly threaten Iran?  Of course it did.  Various facets of U.S. foreign policy threatened Iran 
during almost every period of the 40 years under question.  IRGC leaders could therefore claim to be 
acting in Iran’s national interest by doing exactly what their organization was programmed to do – 
oppose the U.S.  So could leaders within the clerical establishment.  Turning back to the U.S. side, 
Congressional leaders claimed they were protecting U.S. interests by opposing Iran, and the Israelis 
painted the very existence of the Islamic Republic as a threat to their own security.   
In summary, every constituency acted in the national interest of its own side according to a 
particular worldview.  Within this construct, actors could fully rationalize the pursuit of their own 
interests as well.  Yet each constituency was actively perpetuating a conflict that increasingly diverged 
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from the interest of the societies from which they hailed.  This is an example of the synergy generated 
by an institution of animosity.  Each constituency did exactly what it was influenced by its habitus to do, 
and the resulting actions fed a continuous cycle of provocation that fueled intractable conflict. 
Sometimes constituencies directly undermined opportunities for rapprochement, but more 
often they acted indirectly by poisoning the waters in other aspects of the relationship.  When viewed in 
isolation from each other, outcomes often appeared to be cases of bad timing or bad luck regarding the 
surrounding events5, but these breakdowns did not happen arbitrarily.  Considering the conflict over 
four decades, it is difficult to assign consistent outcomes to the vagaries of fortune.  Constituencies to 
the conflict ensured that it was virtually impossible for leaders on either side to make an overture 
toward the other without some member of either camp (often their own) throwing more kindling on the 
fire. 
  
What Did the Model Reveal About Intractable Conflict? 
The advantage of covering a 40-year time period for a single case is that this birds-eye view 
reveals patterns that get lost in the details of a shorter study.  This section will start with observations 
most closely related to the argument of this dissertation.  It will then consider observations that relate 
this work to rational choice approaches.  It will revisit the insights of Jack Snyder (1991), first discussed 
in Chapter 1.  Finally, it will discuss the role of individual leaders in the process of institutional 
development. 
 




The application of this institutional model to the U.S.-Iranian conflict suggests a number of key 
points with regard to intractable conflict.  Starting with some general observations, it shows that a 
conflict can become intractable while nobody is looking.  The U.S.-Iranian conflict reached its 
institutional form during one of the least contentious periods in four decades.  Institutional forces are 
always at work.  They are not always making a conflict intractable, but they do not have to be obvious in 
order to do so.  Another general observation is that constituencies to a conflict need not be self-aware, 
and many are not.  There was no conspiracy to perpetuate the conflict between the U.S. and Iran.  If one 
were to interview a member of a constituency, they might very tell you that they desire a peaceful 
resolution as quickly as possible.  In fact, even the most hawkish leaders of constituencies to the U.S.-
Iran conflict have expressed a preference for peace and cooperation, and when speaking in abstract 
terms, there is no reason to doubt their sincerity.  Some are more self-aware than others, and Iran's 
leaders have occasionally acknowledged the value of fostering an external enemy, but there was no 
collusion in this effort by the U.S. side.  Even internally, Iran's constituencies have been too fractious to 
sow hostility in a centralized fashion.  It is the nature of the institution that constituencies act as though 
they form a concerted effort, even when they clearly do not.   
The next observation is one that leads to the supposition of a general rule: the more broadly the 
institutional process of layering operates upon a conflict, the more likely it is to become intractable.  The 
preceding chapters showed layering to be the most common institutional process at work, and this 
should be expected.  Institutions are sticky by nature, so displacement and conversion are unusual 
events.  Drift may happen continuously, but it requires long periods of time to recognize the shifting 
baselines.  Exhaustion happens rarely, and it leads to the death or dismemberment of an institution.  
Layering, on the other hand, happens all the time by simple virtue of the fact that institutions are not 
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discrete.  Constituencies are made of people who overlap with other institutions.  Further, institutions 
operate in an external environment and react to events they do not control, causing them to internalize 
new issues.  While layering may be inevitable, though, the scope of the issues it connects is not always 
broad.   
In the U.S.-Iranian conflict, the breadth of the issues drawn into the same basket was extreme.  
Domestic power struggles in every corner, nuclear weapons, terrorism, hostages, human rights, 
sanctions, opposition to Israel, and a mistakenly shot-down airliner were just a sample of the many 
issues that became bundled together in a single international conflict.  Proponents of the "grand 
bargain" approach to conflict resolution acknowledge this challenge, not incorrectly believing that a 
multiplicity of issues complicates the development of a resolution that will satisfy all parties.  In the U.S.-
Iranian relationship it did more than this, though.  Layering is more than just multiplying variables in an 
equation, and constituencies are not really interested in solving the equation, anyway.  Returning to the 
physics analogy of Chapter 2, layering increases the gravitational pull of the conflict in attracting and 
binding constituencies.  Not only were a broader range of parties interested in the U.S.-Iranian conflict, 
but their menu of grievances expanded.  If one issue lost salience, another would take its place in an 
endless cycle of excuses for continued hostility.  A general rule that a wider breadth of layering increases 
the degree of conflict intractability might be debatable, but it is also testable.  Future work could test 
this rule as a hypothesis by comparing the breadth of layering as it operated across multiple conflicts.   
 
A warped incentive structure 
This dissertation contends that the institutional lens for examining intractable conflict is not a 
replacement for all other lenses but acts in a complimentary manner with some of them.  The most 
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prominent of these is rational choice, and the examination of four decades revealed that constituencies 
to the U.S.-Iranian conflict operated rationally within the confines of the worldviews they developed and 
propagated.  Considering the concept of rational choice in light of this study reveals an important 
observation, though, which does not become apparent when considering shorter periods in isolation.  
Over the course of the conflict, the cost of joining a constituency (and ultimately the institution of 
animosity) was consistently low, and the cost of leaving was high.  Constituencies also based their 
decisions almost invariably on short-term interest calculations, usually rooted in domestic struggles, at 
the expense of the bigger picture.  This fostered a warped incentive structure that favored hostility in 
most cases.  How did this incentive structure come into being, and why were constituencies able to get 
away with this for so long? 
As discussed in the first chapter, both the U.S. and Iran have paid a high price for their mutual 
hostility, but their societies have borne the cost, not the constituencies.  Many of these costs have been 
diffuse, and both societies became conditioned to them over time, starting early in the conflict.  The 
populations of the U.S. and Iran, therefore, have put remarkably little pressure on their political leaders 
to change the course of the relationship.  One might counter that oppression has silenced the voices of 
ordinary Iranians, who hold little sway over their government, as compared to U.S. citizens.  However, 
Iranians have a long history of courageous dissent (usually over domestic political or economic issues), 
even under the Islamic Republic, and the government has not been entirely unresponsive to domestic 
pressure.  The bottom line is that constituencies have operated in the U.S.-Iranian relationship with 
relative impunity.  There have been few incentives to take the political risks required to better relations, 
and the short-term rewards for stoking hostility have often been appealing.   
Perhaps the strongest explanation for this warped incentive structure is the simple point that 
neither the U.S. nor Iran have presented an existential threat to the other.  Operation Eagle Claw, the 
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failed rescue attempt of the U.S. hostages in 1980 helped to illustrate just how difficult it really is to 
project force into Iranian territory.  Few argue that the U.S. ever lacked the capability to invade and 
conquer Iran if it were required, but the costs would always have been enormous.  U.S. leaders never 
seriously contemplated such a move except in the Cold War context of a potential World War III with 
the Soviet Union.  Even during the most heated moment between the adversaries, when naval forces 
engaged in open combat during the Tanker War (1987-1988), Reagan deliberately stopped short of 
authorizing attacks inland of the Iranian shoreline.  One could point out that some hawkish 
neoconservatives called for a follow-on invasion of Iran as the U.S. prepared for its 2003 invasion of Iraq, 
but this amounted to little more than loose talk, quickly squelched by the realities of an actual war.  
Lastly, the U.S. would never have used nuclear weapons against Iran except in response to a nuclear 
attack, and Iran did not develop this capability.  The Iranians, for their part, had little means to 
significantly threaten the U.S. homeland, and as Chapter 1 explained, even their threat to Israel was far 
short of existential.  Iran's nuclear program was troubling, but it amounted to a "tomorrow problem," 
not one that was ever realized during the 40 years under study. 
Some might go as far as to describe the conflict between the U.S. and Iran as a "phony war." U.S. 
responses to Iranian provocations were consistently strong on rhetoric but tepid, at best, in action.  
Aside from sanctions, the U.S. never actually retaliated for the hostage crisis of 1979-1981.  Reagan did 
nothing against Iran in retaliation for the attacks in Lebanon.  He responded to the taking of hostages by 
negotiating with Iran to buy them back.  It is true that the U.S. inflicted some casualties during the 
Tanker War, but these paled in comparison to the losses that Iran was simultaneously absorbing on land 
at the hands of Saddam Hussein, only a few short miles to the north.  A decade later, Clinton chose not 
to retaliate for Iran's role in the Khobar Towers bombing, instead obscuring the evidence of their 
responsibility.  George W. Bush was tough on Iran, yet the U.S. military largely failed to retaliate for 
Iran's proxy war in Iraq.  When it did, it confined its reaction to the proxies and Iranian agents physically 
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located on Iraqi soil.  Obama all but invited Iran into Syria and Yemen through waffling policies that 
failed to address the problems growing in those countries.  Across these decades, the U.S. employed all 
manner of sanctions and international pressure, but the constituencies in Iran largely flourished under 
this type of siege.   
Iran's war against the U.S. has been, in some ways, just as phony.  Its attacks in Lebanon were 
arguably its greatest blow against the "Great Satan," but they did not really constitute retaliation for 
anything.  They were opportunistic moves by a radical section of a nascent constituency looking to build 
their own power and prestige by embarrassing the U.S.  The mining of the USS Bridgeton and the 
subsequent Tanker War fell into the same category, but with less actual effect.  Iranian actions in the 
naval campaign were largely pyrrhic show of defiance, intended to glorify the IRGC more than really hurt 
America.  Iran offered no retaliation for the downing of Iran Air 655, although they have never forgotten 
this incident.  Iranian terrorist attacks in the 1990's, mostly directed at Israel but including the Khobar 
Towers attack, were poorly linked to any identifiable goals of statecraft and appeared largely intended 
to stir the pot and perpetuate conflict.  Iran's proxy war in Iraq was by far its most calculated and 
deliberate campaign of aggression against the U.S.  However, for all the damage that Iraqi militias 
inflicted on U.S. forces, Iran eschewed direct involvement and maintained a degree of plausible 
deniability.  They avoided taking any concrete action that might prompt significant escalation by U.S. 
forces against Iran, and its leaders lacked a strategy to truly capitalize on their success.  Finally, in spite 
of years of support to Hezbollah and other proxy groups, Iran has confined its attacks against the U.S. 
almost entirely to the Middle East6.  With a few notable exceptions, most Iranian action against the U.S. 
over 40 years has amounted to threats and rhetoric.   
 
6 The first exception to this rule was the bizarre assassination attempt against the Saudi Ambassador in Washington D.C. in 
2011.  The other exception has been cyberwarfare.  However, the rules of cyberwarfare have yet to be worked out, and most of 
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Throughout the conflict, both sides established predictable patterns of action and inaction.  
Iranian leaders understood that as long as they kept their opposition from provoking a full-scale war, 
they could expect the normal package of reactions that included harsh rhetoric, sanctions, and efforts to 
isolate Iran internationally.  The sanctions became unusually effective between the third and fourth 
decades with the application of innovative banking tools, but even this happened in a gradual fashion, 
and Iranians became accustomed to the effects.  On the other hand, it was not for a lack of capability 
that Iranian leaders avoided authorizing terrorist attacks on U.S. soil.  They understood this was a red 
line that could push the relationship into uncharted territory.  U.S. leaders understood that military 
action against Iran would upset regional stability and world oil markets, and Iranian retaliation would 
place U.S. forces in the Middle East at risk.  However, Iran could do little about sanctions, and this gave 
them an avenue to demonstrate toughness against Iran without alarming the U.S. population.   
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the U.S. and Iran would have been more circumspect 
in their mutual antagonism if they had been more afraid of each other.  The "phony wars" previously 
described established a rhythm.  It mattered less whether the U.S. and Iran had good information about 
how the other would react than that both sides believed that they did.  As the U.S. and Iranian 
populations became conditioned to absorb certain forms of deprivation related to the conflict, this 
further reduced the sense of uncertainty.  Thus, the cycle of escalation and de-escalation typical of 
intractable conflicts in general became a sort of a dance.  Is this observation generalizable to other 
intractable conflicts, though? 
Considering the conflict between Pakistan and India, both sides have always represented an 
existential threat to the other.  With large armies and nuclear weapons, each side could inflict massive 
 
Iran’s cyber-attacks during the 2010’s were relatively cost-free, in terms of retaliation.  This appears to be changing as the U.S. 
develops its cyber policies and capabilities.   
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damage on the other.  But would they?  Even before the introduction of nuclear weapons fostered a 
condition of mutually assured destruction, the conflict was developing patterns.  The open warfare 
between the sides occurred mostly in Kashmir (after Pakistan lost Bangladesh) and in points along the 
border.  Border skirmishes, insurgencies and the sponsorship of terrorist actions developed a rhythm as 
both sides explored what they could get away with.  The India-Pakistan conflict has never been subject 
to the label of "phony war," like the conflict between the U.S. and Iran.  However, it has developed its 
own dance.  Actors on both sides have consistently perceived that they can afford to escalate tensions 
for domestic political gain without incurring a cost their societies are unwilling to underwrite.  This is the 
space that allows a conflict to develop institutional qualities. 
The conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians is another example.  This is no "phony 
war," either.  A low level of violence has pervaded across the decades, punctuated by occasional flare-
ups.  The Israelis have the military capability to annihilate the Palestinians altogether if they chose, but 
both sides know that they will not do that.  In fact, even the most limited military incursions into 
Palestinian territory inflict a high domestic and international costs on the Israeli government.  For the 
Palestinians, many of them perceive that they have little to lose by antagonizing Israel.  There is no 
shortage of young men willing to risk death or prison.  The population is conditioned to the collateral 
damage that accompanies Israeli military retaliation.  Likewise, political actors on the Israeli side can also 
score points by being uncompromising on the Palestinian issue.  Both sides have established their dance.  
Like the conflict between India and Pakistan, hostility between the Israelis and the Palestinians is 
overdetermined.  Unlike the U.S.-Iranian conflict, there are obvious reasons for hostility that stand up to 
scrutiny.  However, this does not mean that institutional forces are not at work.  This dissertation argues 
that even in overdetermined cases of conflict, institutional forces drive the state of intractability.   
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What does institutional theory offer to this analysis?  First, rational choice can identify a warped 
incentive structure, but it cannot explain how one comes into existence.  Incentive structures are 
simultaneously the drivers and the products of constituency evolution, in iterative fashion.  The 
mechanisms of institutional development, which this dissertation has explored in depth, mediate 
between the two functions as constituencies both react to and redefine their world.  They entrench 
patterns in a path-dependent fashion.  These patterns cannot predict future events, but they can help 
describe the manner in which different possibilities are most likely to play out.  They can also help to 
avoid plans based upon wishful thinking that is incompatible with the realities of institutional dynamics. 
Second, analysis based upon this approach offers a stark warning to scholars and statesman 
(and women) alike.  When brinksmanship can be carried out for political gain at low cost, the risk is not 
simply that miscalculation could lead to war.  If leaders are successful in this type of behavior, both sides 
are likely to adopt destructive patterns and see them entrenched over time.  Short-term victories on the 
domestic front can lead to costly and protracted conflict on the international stage.  On the other hand, 
when a state’s interests are attacked, rhetoric is a poor substitute for a proportional response.  How 
might the U.S.-Iranian relationship have turned out differently if Carter had blockaded Iranian ports in 
reaction to the seizure of hostages?  Or what if Reagan had authorized the planned air strikes on 
Hezbollah training camps after the Marine barracks was destroyed?  The point is that what seems like 
prudent restraint in the moment could be a step on the road toward intractable conflict.  In essence, this 
is little more than the wisdom that grade-schoolers learn on the playground, and game theory has 
explored similar questions, but institutional analysis helps to illuminate when and how these dynamics 





Based upon observations from the U.S.-Iranian relationship, this dissertation also posits that 
cartelized politics promotes constituency formation and increases the likelihood that conflict will 
become intractable.  This is less of function of the plurality of views and opinions and more a function of 
the degree to which those views coalesce into competing groups.  It is relatively intuitive that political 
factions are ready-made institutions, waiting to be drawn into the orbit of other institutions, including 
one of centered around a conflict.  While domestic politics was only one of the layers of the U.S.-Iranian 
conflict, it was the most pervasive.  This layer operated in every period under study.  Further, American 
observers have often been quick to point out the degree to which factional infighting shapes Iranian 
politics.  This is like the pot calling the kettle black, as political polarization in the U.S. has steadily 
increased throughout the decades of conflict.   
Politics is fundamentally a competition for power, and some degree of factionalism exists in all 
political systems.  Higher levels open the door for linking otherwise unrelated issues to the domestic 
competition.  Jack Snyder (1991) explained how this dynamic operates when he tied cartelized politics to 
a powerful state's tendencies to engage in imperialism.  Drawing on Hobson (original 1902), Snyder built 
the case that imperialism was a futile enterprise that inevitably strained the resources of a state to line 
the pockets of the few.  He then asked why major historical powers were seduced by this behavior.  
Snyder's answer was that when domestic politics in a state becomes cartelized, factions engage in 
"logrolling" to build coalitions and maintain power.  Logrolling means that, in order to find common 
ground, they support each other's expansionist goals.  Each faction realizes that imperialism is bad for 
the state, but this is a diffuse problem with consequences they can put off to the future.  The result is an 
expansionist outcome more extreme than any of the factions would have individually advocated.  These 
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political leaders then cover their tracks with the population by spreading propaganda and weaving 
ideological narratives that support the overall policy direction. 
Snyder's (1991) work does not translate directly to conflict, but his observations are apt.  For the 
imperial powers in Snyder's study, expansion was a low-risk enterprise that was easy to sell to the 
population, and the bill would not come due until some point in the distant future.  The rational choice 
for politicians was to capitalize on easy gains by supporting imperial policies.  For leaders on both sides 
of the U.S.-Iranian conflict, hostility toward each other has been a relatively low-risk enterprise.  With 
populations conditioned by ideological narratives and used to absorbing the costs, logrolling was evident 
on both sides.  Beyond logrolling, though, both sides engaged in races to the bottom, or competitions of 
radicalism.  The U.S. and Iran had demonized each other in popular narratives, so politicians could 
periodically score points against each other by appearing tougher.  As with Snyder's description of 
imperialism, this led to more radical policies than either would have chosen individually.  The costs 
would be tomorrow's problem.  The U.S.-Iranian conflict suggests that both logrolling and races to the 
bottom are facilitated by cartelized politics, especially when the conflict is routinized to the point that 
leaders become comfortable with the risks involved.  What Snyder failed to emphasize was that 
imperialism is an institution, and these practices are especially conducive toward shaping a habitus. 
As the reader will recall, this dissertation mentioned Snyder (1991) in reference to the theories 
that fail to adequately explain the U.S.-Iranian conflict.  This was because Snyder's work did not account 
for mutual construction.  His work deftly described a process that occurs within a state, but it was not 
designed to illustrate the interaction between two states.  Institutional theory bridges this gap and helps 
to emphasize the synergistic nature of a conflict.  Competing radicalism on one side is bound to stir a 
similar process on the other, not immediately, but eventually.  Anything that increases the gravitational 
pull of the conflict increases the likelihood that powerful constituencies will form on both sides and lead 
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to intractability.  In the case of the U.S.-Iran conflict, cartelization was already present on both sides, 
paving the way for the process. 
 
The role of individual leaders in the institutionalization of conflict 
Returning to the endless debate between structure and agency in Political Science, these 
findings also cast light on the role of individual leaders in causing intractable conflicts.  If there was one 
prominent leader most obviously culpable in fostering this condition between the U.S. and Iran, it was 
Ayatollah Khomeini.  Journalist Kim Ghattas (2020, 7-50) expressed one popular view by painting 
Khomeini as a master manipulator who hijacked a popular revolution and utilized both violence and deft 
political maneuvering to secure his rise to power.  As this dissertation has shown, part of his effort 
included deliberately making enemies with the U.S.  Most of what Ghattas's work and other leading 
historical accounts have said about Khomeini is undoubtedly true, and he was certainly responsible for 
the violence and oppression over which he presided, but from an institutional perspective, one must 
argue that they give Khomeini entirely too much credit.  Khomeini's genius (if one might call it that) lay 
in his ability to perceive and harness the institutional forces that were already working in Iran.   
Pierre Bourdieu's (1984) concept of the "field" was very similar to this dissertation's working 
definition of institutions, a rule-based social structure that incorporates habitus and in which individuals 
interact with their world.  Cornut (2017) explained that within Bourdieu's field construct, actors exercise 
agency according to their habitus in improvisational fashion.  Success or failure is based largely upon the 
degree to which their habitus is "attuned" to the field.  "Virtuosos" are rare individuals who find 
themselves so synchronized with the field that their reflexive actions meet with an unusual degree of 
success most of the time.  By this logic, Khomeini might be seen as a virtuoso of his day in Iranian 
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politics.  The degree to which Khomeini manipulated institutional forces or was simply carried by them is 
debatable, but also irrelevant.  Either way, Khomeini represented (and perhaps embodied) forces far 
greater than himself.  The same might be said of any societal leader who seizes upon a particular 
moment in time and achieves prominence.  One could also argue that Barrack Obama succeeded in 
outwitting the constituencies to garner the JPCOA agreement through his own demonstration of 
virtuoso, tapping into latent institutional forces that pressed against the conflict.  The point for this 
dissertation, is that understanding why conflicts become intractable requires looking past the 
personalities or agency of leaders and examining the forces that allow them to succeed.   
  
What Were the Strengths and Weaknesses of the Institutional Lens? 
This dissertation has presented a new lens with which to evaluate intractable conflicts.  
Moreover, one could use this lens to consider any conflict and assess the likelihood that it will develop 
an intractable nature.  It provides an answer to the question of what makes conflict intractable by 
explaining constituencies to the conflict.  It offers an answer to the question of when the conflict will 
become intractable - when powerful constituencies take shape on both sides of the conflict.  It gives 
tools for tracing the development and evolution of constituencies and it shows how institutional 
dynamics shape and are in-turn shaped by the conflict.  This method reconciles a wide range of both 
rational choice and socio-culturally based approaches, all of which contribute to conflict analysis, but 
none of which fully explain intractability.   
This model falls short of completely decoding the mysteries of intractable conflict, though.  First, 
constituencies are abstractions, and as such, they are subjective.  As previously mentioned, 
constituencies are usually not self-aware.  Somebody has to identify them.  This dissertation accounts 
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for the fact that there are different ways to parse out constituencies, but this may not reconcile all 
subjective concerns.  Further, constituencies are easier to identify in hindsight with long periods of time 
to study, which brings up the next point.  Second, institutional analysis requires long periods of time to 
study.  For historical work, this is not really a problem.  Conflicts are not identified as intractable until 
they have demonstrated some persistence.  However, evaluating current conflicts that could become 
intractable is far trickier.  This brings up point number three.  Institutions are everywhere, and they are 
always working.  They are a part and parcel with the social nature of humanity.  How then, does one 
choose the right institutions to focus on in relation to a conflict or potential conflict?  There is no hard 
and fast answer to this question, but this dissertation contends that the continued practice of 
institutional analysis will reveal helpful guidelines. 
Another potential challenge to utilizing this model is definitional in nature.  This dissertation 
described intractable conflict as a protracted struggle between two states (or aspiring states) lasting 
more than a generation which for both parties has become divorced from the greater interest of the 
societies they represent.  First, after examining the U.S.-Iranian case, continuity between generations 
appears more a telltale symptom of intractability than a hard and fast rule.  The U.S. and Iran developed 
a recognizable institution of animosity in approximately fifteen years, suggesting that the criteria for 
intractability should be reconsidered.    Second, the assessment of a society’s greater good will always 
require a subjective evaluation.  Conceptions of national interest are inherently contested, and 
candidates for inclusion in this category necessarily align with the parochial interest of the parties that 
put them forward.  As the first chapter showed, the U.S.-Iranian conflict was an ideal test case for the 
institutional model because it involved such a low degree of broader societal interest on both sides, but 
even this is debatable.  Unfortunately, most conflicts are more complicated because core national 
interests are more apparent.  This does not mean that peace would not benefit both societies.  It does 
not mean that constituencies are not the primary roadblock to resolution of the conflict.  What it does 
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mean is that the definition of intractability will have to be reconsidered in order to study many of the 
conflicts that the modern world considers intractable through this approach. 
Lastly, the answer to the fundamental question of this dissertation is not entirely complete.  
Conflicts become intractable when they develop into institutions of animosity.  The model cannot 
predict exactly when this will happen, though.  This dissertation has offered some insights into what 
makes it more likely, but it cannot definitively answer the question, especially not in a generalizable 
fashion.  In fact, intractability (by any definition) may be difficult to detect until it is firmly entrenched.  
On the other hand, anything is easier to detect once you start looking for it, and this model provides 
tools to do just that. 
  
What Are the Next Steps in Developing a Broader Institutional Theory of Conflict? 
This dissertation has thoroughly examined the institutional approach in the case of the U.S.-
Iranian conflict, but is this approach truly generalizable to other intractable cases?  The next important 
step in the application of institutional theory to the study conflict would be to test this out.  The most 
basic methodology for doing this would be a comparative case study of multiple conflicts that examines 
the degree to which institutionalization correlates with the prolongation of a conflict.  Such an endeavor 
would face a number of challenges, the first being case selection.   
As the previous section explained, a subjective definition of intractability could make it difficult 
to find cases to compare, even when a general consensus exists that certain conflicts are intractable.  
The researcher would be better off in this case simply picking conflicts that have endured for a set 
number of years.  Another aspect of case selection to consider would be the time periods to study.  
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Historical conflicts provide the easiest cases for research purposes, but no conflict lasts forever.  
Knowing the final outcome, the question becomes, when were they intractable?  This brings up another 
possibility.  One could treat different time periods as separate cases.  If the claims of this dissertation 
are generalizable, then one would expect to see a different set of institutional conditions during the 
period of intractability than during the period in which a resolution was reached.  One must also 
consider cases where a resolution was reached, but it did not endure.  If this is not accounted for, the 
researcher might draw misleading conclusions from the study. 
The next challenge would be choosing an appropriate measure to examine institutionalization.  
Unfortunately, this concept does not lend itself well to quantification.  On the other end of the 
spectrum, a researcher might simply establish criteria and use a binary approach - either the criteria is 
met or it is not.  This dissertation argues that institutionalization of conflict requires powerful 
constituencies to the conflict, and that they exist on both sides.  Both could be answered with a yes or 
no.  The problem with a binary approach is that institutionalization (and intractability) are matters of 
degree.  Therefore, the challenge to the researcher would be to develop an ordinal ranking system that 
allows for meaningful comparison between different structures of constituency. 
Returning to the problems inherent in defining intractability, there is a limit to what such a 
comparative study can show.  Even assuming that one conducted a "large-n" study with dozens or even 
hundreds of cases over a period of multiple centuries, and they established a strong correlation 
between constituency formation and intractability, this does not prove causation.  There could be 
confounding variables yet to be considered.  For example, one might argue that the conflict between the 
Israelis and the Palestinians is rooted in the fundamental problem that both groups have built their 
identities around a piece of ground they cannot both occupy.  Perhaps constituency formation is a 
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symptom of the deeper problems causing intractability, not the cause.  This brings up one of the most 
fundamental challenges in the field of Political Science. 
However, proving causation is a bar that has never been decisively met, and it is not necessary 
in this case.  As this dissertation has shown, constituencies cannot be meaningfully identified without a 
historical examination that involves in-depth temporal analysis.  The practice of process tracing helps to 
illuminate the actors and the course of events that help to build a conflict.  It is especially helpful at 
debunking broad generalizations.  Returning to the Israeli-Palestinian example, it shows that certain 
actions had little (if anything) to do with a fight over land and everything to do with power struggles 
over a broad range of unrelated interests that may not have even existed when the newfound state of 
Israel occupied the soil.  Therefore, any meaningful comparative case study must incorporate in-depth 
analysis of every conflict.  This means that the "large-n" approach will probably never be practical. 
The payoff for wrestling with these challenges is that one could more decisively pinpoint the 
role of institutional forces in human conflict.  A general institutional theory might be useful, not only to 
intractable interstate conflict, but any manner of societal hostility.  As with any theory, it would not 
answer every question, but it could provide an extremely useful lens for examining the topic and help to 
recast existing theories in a more productive manner.   
  
Conclusion 
Are the U.S. and Iran doomed to conflict?  A 40-year track record is not easily overcome.  Yet 
institutional forces are always at work, and they are not always apparent until after the fact.  These 
foundational shifts can leave an institution vulnerable to unexpected events, which might shift the 
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entire course of the conflict.  Further, even apparently failed attempts at cooperation and 
rapprochement, such as the JPCOA, can have long-term effects in a positive direction.  Kupchan (2010) 
pointed out that rapprochement between adversaries is often built upon a series of failed attempts that 
finally gain traction.  A detailed analysis of the state of institutional forces between the U.S. and Iran 
since 2018 is beyond the scope of this work, but there is certainly hope.  The key lesson of this 
dissertation, though, is that constituencies will not fail to act like constituencies.  It would be unrealistic 
to expect a major change in the relationship unless the institutional processes of displacement and 
conversion, layering, drift, or exhaustion divert the interests of constituencies on both sides of the 
conflict.  Unfortunately, the implication of this rule is that intractable conflict often ends only when a 
new conflict or crisis takes its place.  One might have hoped that the 2020 global pandemic caused by 
COVID-19 might have carried such a silver lining, but this has not proven to be the case, so far.  One can 
only hope that the situation (or combination of situations) that cures the U.S.-Iranian conflict will not be 
worse than the disease. 
In the meantime, understanding the institutional aspects and dynamics of conflict could provide 
an important lens for explaining a number of hard cases.  Appreciating the forces that lead to 
intractability is an important step toward preventing them.  In the perpetuation of conflict, 
constituencies operate unconsciously, but people do not.  It is not inconceivable that statesmen (and 
women) of our age, armed with an understanding of how institutions relate to conflict, could develop 





APPENDIX A – A MEDIA REVOLUTION AND THE NARRATIVES OF 
ANIMOSITY 
The Islamic revolution, arguably beginning in 1978, surprised the West and unleashed a wave of 
criticism regarding the way in which the U.S. news media had covered and was continuing to cover Iran.  
It should also be noted that, in many cases, European reporting (British and French, in particular) 
demonstrated higher quality than that of the U.S. (Said 1997, 123-133), but some problems were 
systemic within media outlets across the West.  James Bill (1978, 323-324) was an early voice of dissent, 
describing U.S. press coverage throughout the Shah's reign as "consistently sparse, superficial, and 
distorted," and he accused America's major newspapers of "misrepresenting the nature and depth of 
opposition to the Shah."  U.S. coverage of Iran during the Shah's reign (Dorman, 1986, 432-435) 
generally aligned itself with the ruling regime or with U.S. policymaker assessments.  Criticism of the 
Shah or the U.S. relationship with Iran occurred primarily at the margins and only within an already 
established framework of U.S. policy concerns.  When the revolution brought Iran to the attention of 
most Americans for the first time, it changed the context in which reporting took place, but it did not 
change the methods or the underlying worldview.  Dorman (1986, 426) described how, in 1978 and 
1979, over 300 Western journalists "parachuted" into Iran to get the scoop on the breaking story.  Very 
few of them spoke the langue or had any great familiarity with Iran, and most were dependent on the 
same circle of "safe," Westernized Iranians that U.S. government officials were criticized for favoring.  
While able to cover events, media reporting largely helped to ossify existing biases regarding the forces 
behind them. 
James Rubin (1980, 337-356) took a different view, and he assessed these accusations by 
examining U.S. newspaper coverage of Iran throughout the 1970's and into the hostage crisis.  His work 
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found that the diversity of the news media made accurate generalizations difficult, and there were many 
examples of accurate and insightful reporting that appeared throughout the decade.  By 1975, Iran was 
also the most covered "third-world" country in the U.S. newspapers.  Taken in aggregate, however, 
there were some systemic challenges.  First, the U.S. news media is consumer driven, and international 
news, in general, has usually taken a back seat to domestic issues.  The best reporting on Iran probably 
garnered little readership without a crisis.  Further, Western reporters tend to be generalists as opposed 
to specialists, in order to cover the most exciting topics at any given time.  Second, the U.S. viewed Iran 
through a regional, primarily Cold War lens.  Critical reporting was directed toward hot-button policy 
issues like arms sales or (eventually) human rights that often missed the larger picture.  Third, under the 
Shah, information in Iran was controlled, and even foreign journalists were subject to pressure and 
manipulation by the government, increasingly so as the revolution unfolded.   
Beyond censorship, Dorman's (1986, 427-428) work added the point that even though the U.S. 
press was not restricted domestically, it has always been swayed by widely shared ideologies - conscious 
and subconscious assumptions about America's place in the world.  These ideologies act as a form of 
"internal constraint," both on what is reported and how.  The press retained the appearance of unbiased 
reporting by criticizing policymakers, but in most cases, they simply evaluated tactics without 
questioning underlying assumptions. 
Rubin (1980, 350-364) focused his harshest criticism on U.S. press coverage of the religious 
factions in the revolution, and he described the lack of understanding by reporters as "nothing short of 
appalling." U.S. media covered Iran's clerics, especially Khomeini, with an exotic fetishism, but they still 
managed to completely underestimate their influence.  Further, the "crash-course" approach taken by 
reporters to understand Iran left them unable to effectively translate the perspective of this 
tremendously important element for the U.S. public.   
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When the hostage crisis occurred, it generated unprecedented media coverage in the U.S.  Aside 
from print and radio, television news was already poised to make an evolutionary leap.  The ABC 
network created a nightly news program specifically to cover the crisis, marking the count of every day 
in dramatic fashion.  This evolved into Nightline, a news show which endures to this day.  This style of 
coverage, with soap-opera-like narratives, would eventually pave the way for the emergence of the 24-
hour news cycle a decade later.  Because Americans were so emotionally invested in the crisis, it became 
a prime case study in the interplay between policy and media, arguably the first of its kind (See Larson 
1986).  A New York Times thought piece offered a succinct explanation of why this incident was so 
traumatic for the American public and why this trauma played so deeply into national policy.  
"There seem to have been four factors in the release of the emotional torrent. First, the 
Americans seized were for the most part civilians whose families we grew to know and whose fate 
we worried about because of a natural sense of kinship with identifiable victims. Second, their 
captivity offered the American people an unaccustomed opportunity to unite and play the role of 
aggrieved party in an otherwise ambiguous situation. Third, the national fixation was at least in 
part a product of the actions of President Carter. And fourth, it was a product of the attention of 
the news media. Each of these factors needs to be examined if one is to understand the meaning 
of the American reaction to the events in Iran.” (New York Times 1981) 
  
Because of this interplay, the media had a tremendous role in constructing the narratives which 
the U.S. would carry forward regarding Iran after the crisis.  Said (1997, 81-123) described how Islamic 
extremism became simplified and lumped together with everything else that Americans considered evil 
in the world.  The treatment of Iran and its people by "expert" commentators carried a strong orientalist 
flavor.  Discussions of "who lost Iran?" carried imperialistic overtones suggesting that Iran belonged to 
the U.S.  Iranians were portrayed as irrational, feeding the "Mad Mullah" label.  The very concept of 
change in geopolitics took on a negative connotation, so instead of evaluating agents of change on their 
merits, the American worldview retrenched itself.  Further, because of the expansion of coverage, air-
time had to be filled even in the absence of new developments, leaving ample room for speculation and 
372 
 
hyperbole.  It became politically convenient to denigrate Iran, so commentators frequently did not even 
bother learning to pronounce the names of Iranian people or places correctly.   
Scott (2000) revealed another aspect of the narrative produced by the West in reaction to the 
hostage crisis.  The "captivity narrative" is deeply embedded in the American experience - the idea of 
civilized society pushing against the surrounding savages.  Stories of captivity by the natives invoke not 
only a morbid fascination, but also a sense of comradery and common purpose.  Tales of daring rescue, 
real or imagined, inspire and bind polite society.  The hostage crisis united Americans in solidarity, even 
those who disagreed on how to handle the situation, and it created a powerful vehicle with which to 
"other" Iran. 
Iran's press, on the other hand, underwent a complex transition throughout the revolution that 
far exceeds the scope of this work.  In the space of only a couple of years, the Iranian media went from a 
height of censorship under the Shah, to a brief but chaotic flowering as all restrictions suddenly 
collapsed, to capture and competition by factional interests, to a new state of censorship and 
government control.  While Iranian outlets still mattered to their own people, especially for domestic 
issues, Iranians largely became fixated on U.S. reporting during the hostage crisis.  As Rubin (1980, 340-
341, 356-364) pointed out, Iranians lacked a tradition of free media in their own country, so they made 
little distinction between the U.S. media and its government.  Just as the explosion in television was 
transforming the West, Iranians were gaining unprecedented access to the outside world, and many 
Iranian leaders pored over Western media stories.  Sensational headlines seemed like proof of effect 
that their policies were sending the desired message.  Khomeini's followers (Sreberny and Mohammadi 
1994, 119-135) had become adept at harnessing new forms of media during the revolution, including 
cassette tapes, xerox leaflets, and press releases to foreign journalists.  Khomeini himself had leveraged 
the foreign press during his time in Paris to undermine the Shah.  The radical clerics understood the 
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value of propaganda, and after winning an information war against the Shah, they probably believed 
they could now manipulate the U.S. in similar fashion.   
Additionally, Iranian leaders (Rubin 1980, 356-364) appeared to genuinely believe that if 
Americans were made aware of their grievances, many would rally to the support the Islamic Republic.  
Their sense of frustration grew, however, when this did not appear to be the case.  Iranians were looking 
for stories that highlighted the oppression of the Shah and his international supporters, justifying their 
revolution.  They chafed when they (instead of the Shah) were branded as human rights abusers for 
meting out their version of justice against the former regime.  Iranian leaders increasingly began to view 
Western journalists as spies attempting to undermine the revolution, and hostility against them 
increased.   
Far from being resolved with time, the media-related pathologies born of the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution and the succeeding hostage crisis continued to fester and grow, coloring the U.S.-Iranian 
relationship at every stage of the relationship.  Iranian leaders have persistently overestimated the 
attention that the U.S. population pays to Iran, and their attempts to manipulate Western perceptions 
through by headline-grabbing statements and actions have generally backfired.  Within the U.S., press 
coverage of Iran within the mainstream media has rarely moved beyond shallow tropes which either 
demonize their subjects or mirror-image them in a Western lens.  A thriving discussion regarding Iran 
has grown within academic circles, but even this has often been colored by contentious political agendas 
of varying stripes, so there has not been a unified front from which to challenge the mainstream views.  
The impacts of the media on the institutionalization of the U.S.-Iran conflict cannot be underestimated, 








Abdo, Geneive and Jonathan Lyons. 2003. Answering Only to God: Faith and Freedom in Twenty-First-
Century Iran. New York: Henry Holt. 
Abootalebi, Ali R. 2009. Iran's Tenth Presidential Elections: Candidates, Issues, and Implications. Middle 
East Review of International Affairs (Online) 13 (3): 1-18. 
Abrahamian, Ervand. 1999. Tortured Confessions: Prisons and Public Recantations in Modern Iran. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Abrahamian, Ervand. 2004. Empire Strikes Back: Iran in U.S. Sights. In Inventing the Axis of Evil: The Truth 
about North Korea, Iran, and Syria, edited by Bruce Cumings and Ervand Abrahamian, 213. New 
York: New Press. 
Acemoglu, Darron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2005. Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of 
Long-Run Growth. In Handbook of Economic Growth, edited by Phillipe Aghion and Steven N. 
Durlauf. Vol. 1A, 386-471. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
AIPAC. 2018. The Iran Nuclear Deal: Expiration Dates & Consequences. American Israeli Political Action 
Committee., last modified Mar 1, accessed Apr 17, 2020, https://www.aipac.org/-
/media/publications/policy-and-politics/fact-sheets/other/the-iran-nuclear-deal-expiration-
dates-and-consequences.pdf. 
Akhavi, Shahrougb. 2008. The Thought and Role of Ayatollah Hossein'Ali Montazeri in the Politics of 
Post-1979 Iran. Iranian Studies 41 (5): 645. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ijh&AN=59.8519&site=ehost-
live&scope=site.  
Al-Ali, Zaid. 2014. How Maliki Ruined Iraq. Foreign Policy [Argument]. 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/06/19/how-maliki-ruined-iraq/. 
Albright, Madeleine Korbel and Bill Woodward. 2003. Madam Secretary. New York: Miramax Books. 
Alfoneh, Ali. 2013. Iran Unveiled: How the Revolutionary Guards is Turning Theocracy into Military 
Dictatorship. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute Press. 
Alfoneh, Ali. 2015. The Basij Resistance Force. U.S. Institute of Peace: The Iran Primer. 
https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/basij-resistance-force. 
Alpher, Joseph. 1989. Israel and the Iran-Iraq War. In The Iran-Iraq War: Impact and Implications, 154-
170. New York: St. Martin's Press. 
Alpher. 2015. Periphery: Israel's Search for Middle East Allies. London: Rowman and Littlefield. 
Amanat, Abbas. 2017. Iran: A Modern History. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Amirpur, Katajun. 2012. Iran's policy towards Jewish Iranians and the state of Israel: is the present 
Iranian state Islamofascism? Die Welt Des Islams 52 (3/4): 370.  
Anderson, Jack. 1981. Big business backing saudis on AWACS sale. Washington Post, October 26, 1981. 
Ansari, Ali M. 2009. Iran Under Ahmadinejad. In The Iranian Puzzle Piece: Understanding Iran in the 
Global Context, edited by Amin Tarzi, 11-20. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press. 
375 
 
Apple, R. W. 1983. Shiite Denies Role in Beirut Blasts. New York Times - Late Edition [East Coast], Oct 28, 
A9. 
Armed Services Committee. 2013. Statement of General James N. Mattis, U.S. Marine Corps, 
Commander U.S. Central Command before the House Armed Services Committee on the Posture 
of U.S. Central Command. Mar 6. 
Armed Services Committee. 2014. Statement of General Lloyd J. Austin III Commander U.S. Central 
Command before the House Armed Services Committee on the Posture of U.S. Central Command. 
Mar 5. 
Armstrong, Scott. 1981. Saudis' AWACS just a beginning of new strategy. Washington Post, November 1, 
1981. 
Asadzade, Peyman. 2018. New Data Shed Light on the Dramatic Protests in Iran. Washington Post 
[Monkey Cage - Analysis], Jan 12. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2018/01/12/what-data-show-us-about-irans-protests/. 
Associated Press. 1981. House committee votes approval for sale of F16 jets to pakistan. The 
Washington Post, November 20, 1981. 
Associated Press. 1984. Iran Labelled Terrorist Nation. The Washington Post, Jan 24, A8. 
Associated Press. 1989. U.S. Agrees to Reimburse Iran. New York Times, November 7, A8. 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/427448702?accountid=11752. 
Ausseil, Pierre. 1995. France Convicts Six in Absentia in 1991 Assassination of Bakhtiar. AP News, Jun 16. 
https://apnews.com/0d87d3d31cfb0d8b0c806e155fd29e74. 
Axworthy, Michael. 2007. Empire of the Mind: A History of Iran. London: Hurst. 
http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/fy0804/2008399438.html. 
Axworthy, Michael. 2013. Revolutionary Iran: A History of the Islamic Republic. New York, New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Axworthy, Michael. 2018. "The Shia Rising. (Cover Story)." New Statesman 147 (5407): 22. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=f5h&AN=128217575&site=ehost-
live&scope=site. 
Aziz, T. M. 1993. The Role of Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr in Shii Political Activism in Iraq from 1958 to 
1980. International Journal of Middle East Studies 25 (2): 207-
222. http://www.jstor.org/stable/164663. 
Bacevich, Andrew J. 2016. America's war for the greater middle east: A military history. First ed. New 
York: Random House.  




Bajoghli, Narges. 2019. Iran Reframed: Anxieties of Power in the Islamic Republic. Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press. 
Bajoghli, Narges. 2020.  Comments from a public book talk event at George Washington University on 
Jan 23.  Used with permission.   
376 
 
Baker, James Addison and Thomas M. DeFrank. 1995. The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and 
Peace, 1989-1992. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons. 
Baker, Peter. 2013. Days of Fire: Bush and Cheney in the White House. First ed. New York: Doubleday.  
Baker, Peter. 2017. Reluctantly, Trump Recertifies Iran's Compliance with Nuclear Agreement: [Foreign 
Desk]. New York Times, Jul 18, A7. 
Barfield, Thomas J. 2010. Afghanistan: A cultural and political history. Princeton studies in Muslim 
politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Barnato, Katy. 2015. Some Iranians Gain from Sanctions: Economist. CNBC News, Jan 6. 
https://www.cnbc.com/2015/01/06/some-iranians-gain-from-sanctions-economist.html. 
Barnett, Michael N., and Martha Finnemore. 1999. The politics, power, and pathologies of international 
organizations. International Organization 53 (4) (10/15): 699.  
Barzegar, Kayhan. 2009. The Paradox of Iran's Nuclear Consensus. World Policy Journal 26 (3): 21-30. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40468653. 
Barzegr, Kayhan, and Abdolrasool Divsallar. 2017. Political rationality in Iranian foreign policy. The 
Washington Quarterly 40 (1): 39-53. 
Bawley, Dan and Eliahu Salpeter. 1984. Fire in Beirut: Israel's War in Lebanon with the PLO. Briarcliff 
Manor, N.Y.: Stein and Day. 
BBC News. 2016. Iran 'Conducts New Ballistic Missile Tests'. BBC News, Mar 8. 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35752974. 
BBC. 2018. Panama Says New Evidence shows 1994 Plane Crash 'Terrorist' Incident. BBC News, May 22. 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-44207991. 
Beeman, William O. 2005. The "great satan" vs. the "mad mullahs": How the united states and iran 
demonize each other. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers. 
Bengali, Shashank and Ramin Mostaghim. 2016. "President-Elect's Tough Talk Sparks Optimism in Iran; 
Moderates, Hard-Liners Like what they See for Different Reasons." Los Angeles Times, Nov 18, 
A1. 
Benn, Aluf. 2002. Where First Strikes are Far from the Last Resort: [FINAL Edition]. Washington Post, Nov 
10, B03. 
Bennet, James. 2002. Seized Arms would have Vastly Extended Arafat Arsenal. New York Times, Jan 12, 
A5. 
Berman, Ilan. 2005. Tehran Rising: Iran's Challenge to the United States. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & 
Littlefield. 
Bill, James A. 1988. The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
Binder, David. 1991. Remains of C.I.A. official are flown to U.S. for rites. New York Times, December 28, 
1991. 




Bliddal, Henrik. 2009. Reforming National Security Organization: U.S. Military Command Arrangements 
for the Persian Gulf, 1977-1981. University of Copenhagen. 
Blight, James G., Janet M. Lang, Husein Banai, Malcom Byrne, and John Tirman. 2012. Becoming 
enemies: U.S.-Iran relations and the Iran-Iraq War, 1979-1988. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers. 
Bolger, Daniel P. 1995. Savage Peace: Americans at War in the 1990s. Novato, CA: Presidio. 
Boring, Warls. 2019. Why no nation would want to fight israel's tiny (nuclear armed) navy. The National 
Interest (February 18). 
Boroujerdi, Mehrzad and Kourosh Rahimkhani. 2018. Postrevolutionary Iran: A Political Handbook. 
Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press. 
Boroumand, Ladan and Roya Boroumand. 2002. Terror, Islam, and Democracy. Journal of Democracy 13 
(2): 5. doi:10.1353/jod.2002.0023. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=asn&AN=6751832&site=ehost-
live&scope=site. 
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1977. Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge Studies in Social Anthropology. Vol. 
16. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Bowden, Mark. 2007. Guests of the Ayatollah: The Iran Hostage Crisis: The First Battle in America's War 
with Militant Islam. New York: Grove Atlantic. 
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/jhu/detail.action?docID=5599908. 
Branigan, William. 1979. Iran cancels arms orders with U.S.: Iran cancels remaining U.S. weapons orders. 
Washington Post, April 10, 1979. 
Broder, Jonathan. 2015. A Bloody Disaster: The Iraqi Army's Fight Against ISIS. Newsweek, Mar 7. 
https://www.newsweek.com/iraqi-army-fight-against-isis-312105. 
Bronson, Rachel. 2006. Thicker than oil: America's uneasy partnership with saudi arabia. New York, N.Y.: 
Oxford University Press. 
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Brent Scowcroft, and Richard Murphy. 1997. Differentiated Containment. Foreign 
Affairs (May/June): 20-30. 
Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce. 1984. Forecasting Policy Decisions: An Expected Utility Approach to Post-
Khomeini Iran. PS 17 (2): 226. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ijh&AN=35.1063&site=ehost-
live&scope=site. 
Burns, William J. 2019. The Back Channel: A Memoir of American Diplomacy and the Case for its 
Renewal. First ed. New York: Random House. 
Bush, George and Brent Scowcroft. 1999. A World Transformed. Vintage books ed. New York: Vintage 
Books. 
Bush, George W. 1989. Inaugural Address of George Bush. The Avalon Project, Yale Law School., 
accessed Feb 14, 2020, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/bush.asp. 
Bush, George W. 2011. Decision Points. First paperback ed. New York: Broadway Books. 
Byman, Daniel. 2007. What Tehran is really Up To. New York Times, Feb 18, B1. 
378 
 
Calamur, Krishnadev. 2015. In Speech to Congress, Netanyahu Blasts 'A very Bad Deal' with Iran. 
National Public Radio [NPR.Org], Mar 3. https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2015/03/03/390250986/netanyahu-to-outline-iran-threats-in-much-anticipated-speech-to-
congress. 
Calamur, Krishnadev. 2017. The Latest U.S. Sanctions Against Iran. The Atlantic, Jul 18. 
https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2017/07/iran-sanctions/534003/. 
Carney, Jordain. 2018. GOP Senator: Withdrawing from Iran Deal Not in 'National Interest'. The Hill, May 
8. https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/386787-gop-senator-withdrawing-from-iran-deal-not-
in-national-interest. 
Carter, Jimmy. 1980. Jimmy Carter State of the Union Address 1980. The Jimmy Carter Presidential 
Library and Museum., 
https://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/assets/documents/speeches/su80jec.phtml. 
Cassidy, John. 2015. The Iran Deal is a Victory for Reason and Economic Sanctions. The New Yorker, Sep 
12. https://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/the-iran-deal-is-a-victory-for-reason-and-
economic-sanctions. 
Castillo, Mariano. 2016. Iran Gives Medals to Generals Who Detained U.S. Sailors. CNN.com, Feb 1. 
https://www.cnn.com/2016/01/31/middleeast/iran-republic-guard-praised-for-naval-
incident/index.html. 
Chandler, Adam. 2015. Report: Israel Strikes Target in Syria ... Again. The Atlantic, Nov 11. 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/11/report-israel-strikes-target-in-
syria/415446/. 
Charbonneau, Louis. 2015. U.S. Confirms Iran Tested Nuclear-Capable Ballistic Missile. Reuters, Oct 16. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-missiles-usa/u-s-confirms-iran-tested-nuclear-capable-
ballistic-missile-idUSKCN0SA20Z20151016. 
Chubin, Shahram. 2014. Is iran a military threat? Survival (00396338) 56 (2) (Apr): 65-88. 
Clinton, Hillary Rodham. 2014. Hard Choices. First Simon & Schuster hardcover ed. New York: Simon & 
Schuster. 
Clinton, William J. 1995a. Executive Order 12957—Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to the 
Development of Iranian Petroleum Resources. Washington, D.C.: The White House. 
Clinton, William J. 1995b. Executive Order 12959—Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to Iran. 
Washington, D.C.: The White House. 
CNN. 1998. Transcript of Interview with Iranian President Mohammad Khatami. CNN.COM., last 
modified Jan 7, accessed Mar 5, 2020, 
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9801/07/iran/interview.html. 
CNN. 2001. 'You are either with Us Or Against Us'. CNN.Com, Nov 6. 
https://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/11/06/gen.attack.on.terror/. 






Cohen, Roger. 1994. Arms Trafficking to Bosnia Goes on Despite Embargo. New York Times, Nov 5, 1:1. 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/429960313?accountid=11752. 
Cohn, Nate. 2016. Another Swing in the Polls perhaps, but Not Necessarily a Shift in the Race: [National 
Desk]. New York Times, Nov 1, A20. 
Committee on Armed Services. 2011. Full Committee Hearing on Budget Requests from the U.S. Central 
Command and U.S. Special Operations Command. Mar 3. 
Congressional Research Service. 2013. "Information Warfare: Issues for Congress." Congressional 
Research Service Report (R45142). 
Congressional Research Service. 2017. Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives 
for U.S. Policy. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service. 
Congressional Research Service. 2019. Kuwait: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy. Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Research Service. 
Cordesman, Anthony H., Bryan Gold, Chloe Coughlin-Schulte, and Center for Strategic and International 
Studies. 2014. Iran: Sanctions, Energy, Arms Control, and Regime Change. Lanham, MD: Rowman 
& Littlefield. http://csis.org/files/publication/140122_Cordesman_IranSanctions_Web.pdf. 
Cordesman, Anthony, H. 1997. U.S. Forces in the Middle East: Resources and Capabilities. Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press. 
Cordesman, Anthony. 1998. USCENTCOM Mission and History. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic 
and International Studies. 
Cordesman, Anthony. 2015. The Conventional Military. The Iran Primer [U.S. Institute for Peace], 
accessed September 12, 2019, http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/conventional-military.  
Cornut, Jérémie. 2017. Diplomacy, agency, and the logic of improvisation and virtuosity in practice. 
European Journal of International Relations.  
Cornwell, Susan. 2015. Obama's Choice on Iran Deal 'Absurd': Senate Leader McConnell. Reuters, Aug 6. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-usa-senate/obamas-choice-on-iran-deal-
absurd-senate-leader-mcconnell-idUSKCN0QB21A20150806. 
Cotton, Tom. 2015. Cotton and 46 Fellow Senators to Send Open Letter to the Leaders of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. Website of Senator Tom Cotton [Press Releases]., last modified Mar 9, accessed 
Apr 12, 2020, https://www.cotton.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=120. 
Crean, Jeffrey. 2015. War on the Line: Telephone Diplomacy in the Making and Maintenance of the 




Crist, David. 2009. Gulf of Conflict: A History of the U.S.-Iranian Confrontation at Sea. The Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy (Policy Focus Number 95). 
Crist, David. 2012. The Twilight War: The Secret History of America's Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran. New 
York, N.Y.: Penguin Press. 
Cunningham, Erin and Bijan Sabbagh. 2018. Iran's Hard-Liners and Moderates Clash Over Whether to 
Honor Nuclear Deal. Washington Post, May 10, A13.  
380 
 
Cushman, John H. 1988. U.S. is Reportedly Weighing Retaliation for Mining of Gulf. New York Times, Apr 
17, 1. 
Czulda, Robert. 2019. Iran's quest for military modernisation. Military Technology 43 (2) (02): 36-7. 
Daniszewsky, John. 2000. Iranians Try to Get a Handle on Reformers' Victory. Los Angeles Times, Feb 22, 
A1. 
Davar, Faramarz. 2019. The Islamic Republic is Addicted to Hostage-Taking as a Diplomatic Strategy. 
Iranwire. https://iranwire.com/en/features/6329. 
David, Steven R. 1991. Explaining third world alignment. World Politics 43 (2): 233-56.  
David, Steven R. 1995. Risky Business: Let Us Not Take a Chance on Proliferation: Debate. Security 
Studies 4 (4): 773-778. 
David, Steven R. 2013. With Nothing to Lose, the Limits of a Rational Iran. The American Interest 
(May/June): 36-43. 
David, Steven R. 2020. Coping with an Existential Threat: Israel and Iran Under Netanyahu. In Israel 
Under Netanyahu: Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy, edited by Robert O. Freedman, 197-215. 
New York: Routledge. 
Davis, Paul K. 1982. Observations on the rapid deployment joint task force: Origins, directions, and 
mission. Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation. 
Dawson, David A. 2010. The Evolution of U.S. Central Command from Operational to Strategic 
Headquarters. United States Army War College. 
Death Toll in Israeli Embassy Bombing Rises to 32. 1992. New York Times, Mar 21, A4. 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/428417429?accountid=11752. 
Dehganpisheh, Babak. 2019. Iran to Restart some Nuclear Activity in Response to U.S. Withdrawal from 
Nuclear Deal. Reuters, May 6. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iran-actions/iran-to-
restart-some-nuclear-activity-in-response-to-us-withdrawal-from-nuclear-deal-idUSKCN1SC1FP. 
Dehghan, Saeed Kalali and Emma Graham-Harrison. 2017. Iranians Chant ‘death to Dictator’ in Biggest 
Unrest since Crushing of Protests in 2009. The Guardian, Dec 31. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/30/iran-protests-trump-tweets. 
Dehghan, Saeed Kalali. 2012. Iran Nuclear Scientist Killed in Tehran Motorbike Bomb Attack. The 
Guardian, Jan 11. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/11/iran-nuclear-scientist-
killed. 
DeYoung, Karen. 2016. 10 U.S. Sailors Released by Iran. Washington Post, Jan 14, A-1. 
Diaz, Daniella and Dan Merica. 2017. Trump on Iran: 'Time for Change!'. CNN [Politics]. 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/12/30/politics/donald-trump-iran-protests/index.html. 
Director of Central Intelligence. 1988. Interagency Intelligence Memorandum (IIM) 88-10004C: Impact 
and Implications of Chemical Weapons use in the Iran-Iraq War: Director of Central Intelligence. 
Dorman, William A. 1986. Peripheral Vision: U.S. Journalism and the Third World. World Policy Journal 3 
(3). 
Dowd, Maureen. 1989a. Bush Says 'Clear Signal' from Iran on Hostages could Reopen Ties. New York 
Times, Aug 16, A8. https://search.proquest.com/docview/427327411?accountid=11752. 
381 
 
Dowd, Maureen. 1989b. Iran is reported ready for a deal to recover assets. New York Times, August 9, 
1989. 
Downing, Wayne A. 1996. Report of the Assessment of the Khobar Towers Bombing. Washington, D.C.: 
Department of Defense. 
Draper, Theodore. 1991. A very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affairs. New York: Hill and Wang. 
Dubowitz, Mark. 2015. Congressional Testimony: Implications of a Nuclear Agreement with Iran - 
Hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, July 23, 2015. Washington, D.C.: 
Foundation for Defense of Democracies. 
Eaton, William J. 1980. Carter Pledges Neutrality in Border Crisis. Los Angeles Times, Sep 23, 1.  
https://search.proquest.com/docview/162925856?. 
Economist Intelligence Unit. 2006. Iran: Competition and Price Regulations. Economist Intelligence Unit 
ViewsWire, Apr 4. https://country.eiu.com/iran. 
Edelman, Eric and Ray Takeyh. 2018. Revolution Ever After? Hoover Institution Press. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=asn&AN=133155024&site=ehost-
live&scope=site. 
Editorial Board. 2020. Our ‘maximum Pressure’ on Iran Failed — Unless the Goal was to Help 
China. Washington Post, Jul 20,. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-
opinions/our-maximum-pressure-on-iran-failed--unless-the-goal-was-to-help-
china/2020/07/20/484ae90a-c847-11ea-b037-f9711f89ee46_story.html. 
Edwards, Alex. 2014. “Dual Containment" Policy in the Persian Gulf: The USA, Iran, and Iraq, 1991-2000. 
First ed. New York, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.  
https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/jhu/reader.action?docID=1987360&ppg=65 
Ehteshami, Anoushiravan. 1991. After Khomeini: The Structure of Power in the Iranian Second Republic. 
Vol. 39 Sage Publications Inc. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.1991.tb00586.x. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=asn&AN=21483011&site=ehost-
live&scope=site. 
Eisenstadt, Michael. 2016. Iran's Lengthening Cyber Shadow. Washington Institute for Near East Policy 
Research Note (34). 
El Azhary, M. S. 1984. "The Attitudes of the Superpowers Toward the Gulf War." In The Iran-Iraq War: 
An Historical, Economic, and Political Analysis, edited by M. S. El Azhary, 88-105. New York: St. 
Martin's Press. 
El Baradei, Mohamed. 2011. The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times. New York: 
Metropolitan Books. 
Ensor, David. 2002. U.S. has Photos of Secret Iran Nuclear Sites. CNN.Com/World, Dec 13. 
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/12/12/iran.nuclear/. 
Erdbrink, Thomas and William Branigan. 2009. "Iran's Top Leader Endorses Election; Opposition is 
Warned it Will be Held Liable for Bloodshed from Protests." Washington Post, Jun 20, A1. 
Erdbrink, Thomas. 2008. Ahmadinejad Congratulates Obama, Urges 'Real' Change. Washington Post, 
Nov 7, A12. 
Erdbrink, Thomas. 2015. Iran's Parliament Approves Details of Nuclear Accord: [Foreign Desk]. New York 
Times, Oct 14, A11. 
382 
 
Erdbrink, Thomas. 2017. Rouhani Secures Resounding Victory in Iran's Presidential Election: [Foreign 
Desk]. New York Times, May 21, A13. 
Erdbrink, Thomas. 2019. Iran suicide bombing kills 27 revolutionary guards. New York Times, February 
13, 2019.  
Erlanger, Steven. 2006. 2 Cheers for Olmert in Washington: [News Analysis]. New York Times, May 25, 
A10. 
Erlich, Reese. 2019. Trump is driving Iran into Russia’s arms. Foreign Policy (May 29). 
Esfandiari, Golnaz. 2007. Iran: President Ahmadinejad Comes Under Fire. Radio Free Europe / Radio 
Liberty, Jan 19. http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/1/016F98EE-5E4A-4192-992B-
69053AFD12D7.html. 
Esfandiary, Dina and Ariane Tabatabai. 2015. "Iran's ISIS Policy." International Affairs 91 (1): 1. 
Ettelaat. 1984a. " بودهاست  سابقهی تا کنون ب  تنمی در سال گذشته از زمان جنگ و کای مرٱ ی نظام ی ها نهی هز ش ی افزا  [U.S. 
Military Spending Increased in the Last Year to Levels Unprecedented since the Vietnam War]." 
 .Ettelaat], Jul 7, 12] اطالعات
Ettelaat. 1984b. " کرد می فارس را تحمل نخواه جی منطقه خل می حر به کای مرٱتجاوز ناوگان   [we Will Not Tolerate 
Encroachment by the U.S. Fleet into the Persian Gulf]." اطالعات [Ettelaat], Jul 10,. 
Ettelaat. 1984c. " یالملل نی ب  سمی تجاوز و ترور یبرا ییسکو انهی در خاورم کای مرٱ ی نظام یگاهای شبکه پا  
[American&nbsp;Military Base Network in the Middle East a Platform for International 
Aggression and Terrorism]." اطالعات [Ettelaat], Jul 9, 12. 
Ettelaat. 1984d. " کای مرٱبه نفع  ک ی مصر و عراق در اتحاد اسراتژ  [Egypt and Iraq in a Strategic Alliance for the 
Benefit of the United States]."  اطالعات [Ettelaat], Jul 7, 12. 
Everett, Burgess and Seung Min Kim. 2015. Dems: Bibi Speech was an 'Insult' to America, Obama. 
Politico, Mar 3. https://www.politico.com/story/2015/03/democrats-react-benjamin-
netanyahu-speech-115705. 
Fairbanks, Stephen C. 1998. Theocracy Versus Democracy: Iran Considers Political Parties. Middle East 
Journal 52 (1): 17-31.  http://www.jstor.org/stable/4329151. 
Fairbanks, Stephen C. 1998. Theocracy Versus Democracy: Iran Considers Political Parties. Middle East 
Journal 52 (1): 17-31.  http://www.jstor.org/stable/4329151. 
Farhang, Mansour. 1989. The Iran-Israel connection. Arab Studies Quarterly 11 (1): 85-98. 
Farhi, Farideh. 2015. The Parliament. The Iran Primer. https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/parliament. 
Farley, Robert. 2019. Israel's air force is one of the best in world for a reason. The National Interest 
(March 22). 
Farrell, William E. 1983. Unanswered Question: Who was Responsible? New York Times - Late Edition 
[East Coast], Oct 25, A16. 
Fathi, Nazila and Thomas Fuller. 2005. Iran Reopens Uranium Processing Plant as U.N. Agency Meets. 
New York Times, Aug 11, A3. 
Fathi, Nazila. 2001. On the Sly, Iran Weighs Closer Ties with U.S. New York Times, November 9, A11. 




Fathi, Nazila. 2005. Iranian Conservatives Criticize Cabinet Nominees. New York Times, Aug 22, A4. 
Fathollah-Nejad, Ali. 2014. Why Sanctions Against Iran are Counterproductive: Conflict Resolution and 
State–society Relations. International Journal 69 (1): 48-65. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/24709341. 
Fathollah-Nejad, Ali. 2020. The Islamic Republic of Iran Four Decades on: The 2017/18 Protests Amid a 
Triple Crisis. Washington, D.C: Brookings Institute. 
FBIS. 1979a. AFP Reports Ambassador Sullivan Released - Paris AFP in English - Feb 14, 1979. FBIS Daily 
Report for Middle East and North Africa 5 (32): R19. 
FBIS. 1979a1. Khomeyni Interview on Hostages - Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, November 18, 
1979. FBIS Daily Report of Middle East and North Africa V (224): r26-r28. 
FBIS. 1979b. Communique on Foreigner's Protection - Tehran Domestic Service in Persian - Feb 13, 1979. 
FBIS Daily Report for Middle East and North Africa 5 (32): R2. 
FBIS. 1979b1. Khomeyni on Occupation - Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, November 5, 1979. FBIS 
Daily Report for Middle East and North Africa V (216): r2-r3. 
FBIS. 1979c. Tehran Cites Report on U.S. Embassy 'Surrender' - Tehran Domestic Service in Persian - Feb 
14, 1979. FBIS Daily Report for Middle East and North Africa 5 (32): R13. 
FBIS. 1980a. Khomeyni on 'U.S. Crimes' - Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, April 26, 1980. FBIS Daily 
Report for South Asia VIII (83): i2-i3. 
FBIS. 1980b. Khomeyni Speech - Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, April 25, 1980. FBIS Daily Report for 
South Asia VIII (83): i1-i2. 
FBIS. 1980c. President Favors Return of Bodies - Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, April 26, 1980. FBIS 
Daily Report for South Asia VIII (83): i4-i5. 
FBIS. 1980c. President Favors Return of Bodies - Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, April 26, 1980. FBIS 
Daily Report for South Asia VIII (83): i4-i5. 
FBIS. 1981a. Nabavi 20 JAN Interview Imminent: Hostage Release - Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 
January 20, 1981. FBIS Daily Report for South Asia VIII (13): i22-i23. 
FBIS. 1981b. Nabavi, Others on Financial Negotiations with the U.S. - Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 
January 20, 1981. FBIS Daily Report for South Asia VIII (13): i23-i28. 
FBIS. 1981c. PARS Recounts Stages of U.S. Campaign Against Iran - Tehran PARS in English, January 20, 
1981. FBIS Daily Report for South Asia VIII (13): i33-i35. 
FBIS. 1981d. Rafsanjani Addresses Majles After Hostage Release - Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 
January 21, 1981. FBIS Daily Report for South Asia VIII (13): i30-i31. 
FBIS. 1981e. Tehran: Carter Trip to Wiesbaden 'Propaganda' - Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 
January 19, 1981. FBIS Daily Report for South Asia VIII (13): i32-i33. 
FBIS. 1981e. Tehran: Carter Trip to Wiesbaden 'Propaganda' - Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 
January 19, 1981. FBIS Daily Report for South Asia VIII (13): i32-i33. 
FBIS. 1983. Iran Cites Denial - Tehran IRNA in English, Oct 24, 1983. Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service Daily Report for South Asia VIII (26): I-1. 
384 
 
FBIS. 1983. War Victories, Defeat of U.S. 'Conspiracies' Viewed - Tehran Domestic Service in Persian - Oct 
25, 1983. Foreign Broadcast Information Service - South Asia Daily Report VIII: I-2. 
FBIS. 1984. Details of U.S. Chemical Arms Supplied to Iraq - Tehran, IRNA in English, July 3, 1984. FBIS 
Daily Report for South Asia VIII (130): I5. 
FBIS. 1984. Hashemi-Rafsanjani Explains Export of the Revolution - Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 
Oct 31 1984. Foreign Broadcast Information Service - Daily Report for South Asia VIII (213): I-1. 
FBIS. 1984. Hashemi-Rafsanjani Explains Export of the Revolution - Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 
Oct 31 1984. Foreign Broadcast Information Service - Daily Report for South Asia VIII (213): I-1. 
FBIS. 1984. Tehran Comments on Iraqi Attacks on Tankers - Tehran International Service in Arabic, Jan 
03, 1984. Foreign Broadcast Information Service - Daily Report for South Asia VIII (003): I1-I2. 
FBIS. 1984a. Details of U.S. Chemical Arms Supplied to Iraq - Tehran, IRNA in English, July 3, 1984. FBIS 
Daily Report for South Asia VIII (130): I5. 
FBIS. 1984b. Khomeyni 'Id Al Fitr Speech on Gulf War - Tehran Domestic Service in Persian - July 01, 
1984. FBIS Daily Report for South Asia VIII (128): I-1. 
FBIS. 1984c. Nicaraguan Foreign Trade Minister Holds Talks. FBIS Daily Report for South Asia VIII (130): 
14-15. 
FBIS. 1986a. Aim of 'Undercover' Visit to Resume Relations - Tehran IRNA in English, Nov 4, 
1986. Foreign Broadcast Information System - Daily Report for South Asia VIII (215). 
FBIS. 1986b. Hashemi Rafsanjani on Alleged McFarlane Visit - Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, Nov 4, 
1986. Foreign Broadcast Information Service - Daily Report for South Asia. 
FBIS. 1986c. Lebanese Paper on Hashemi-McFarlane Issues - AL-SHIRAA in Arabic, Nov 3, 1986. Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service - Daily Report for South Asia VIII (215). 
FBIS. 1986d. Montazeri on 'Second Revolution' - Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, Nov 5, 
1986. Foreign Broadcast Information Service - Daily Report for South Asia VIII (214): I-8. 
FBIS. 1986e. Montazeri Termed 'most Eligible Successor' - Tehran IRNA in English, Nov 2, 1986. Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service - Daily Report for South Asia VIII (212): I-2. 
FBIS. 1987a. Boats 'Savagely Attacked' by US Gunships - Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, Oct 9, 
1987. Foreign Broadcast Information Service - Daily Report for Near East and South Asia (FBIS 
NES 87-196): 29. 
FBIS. 1987b. Guard Corps Navy Commander Comments - Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, Aug 3, 
1987. Foreign Broadcast Information Service - Daily Report for Near East and South Asia V (149): 
I1-I2. 
FBIS. 1987c. Hashemi-Rafsanjani Addresses Majles. Foreign Broadcast Information Service - Daily Report 
for South Asia VIII (097): I-1. 
FBIS. 1987d. Hashemi-Rafsanjani Delivers Friday Prayer Sermon - Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 
June 5, 1987. Foreign Broadcast Information Service - Daily Report for Near East and South 
Asia V (108): S-1. 
FBIS. 1987e. Hashemi-Rafsanjani Delivers Friday Prayer Sermons - Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 




FBIS. 1987f. Hashemi-Rafsanjani on Gulf, United Nations, France - Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, 
Jul 27, 1987. Foreign Broadcast Information Service - Daily Report for Near East and South Asia V 
(144): S3-S6. 
FBIS. 1987g. Musavi Reacts to Attack on U.S. Frigate in Gulf - Tehran IRNA in English, May 18, 
1987. Foreign Broadcast Information Service - Daily Report for South Asia VIII (095): I-1. 
FBIS. 1987h. Musavi: Mine Explosion Damages U.S. Credibility. Foreign Broadcast Information Service - 
Daily Report for Near East and South Asia V (142): S-2. 
FBIS. 1987i. Participants Vow Revenge - Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, Aug 2, 1987. Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service - Daily Report for Near East and South Asia V (149): I-1. 
FBIS. 1987j. Rezai'E Vows Decisive Blow to U.S. - Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, Sep 22, 
1987. Foreign Broadcast Information Service - Daily Report for Near East and South Asia (FBIS 
NES 87-124): 37-38. 
FBIS. 1987k. Tehran Accuses U.S. of Mining Gulf, Hitting Tankers - Tehran IRNA in English, Sep 3, 
1987. Foreign Broadcast Information Service - Daily Report for Near East and South Asia V (172): 
S-4. 
FBIS. 1987l. Threatens to Attack Kuwait - Tehran in English to Europe, July 27 1987. Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service - Daily Report for Near East and South Asia V (144).  
FBIS. 1987m. US Helicopter 'Shot Down' - October 9, 1987. Foreign Broadcast Information Service - Daily 
Report for Near East and South Asia (FBIS-NES-87-196): 29-30. 
FBIS. 1988a. Attacks Increase Determination - Tehran IRNA in English, Apr 19, 1988. Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service - Daily Report for Near East and South Asia (FBIS-NES-88-076): 49-50. 
FBIS. 1988b. Majles Speaker on US 'Lie' Over Mining - Tehran IRNA in English, Apr 18, 1988. Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service - Daily Report for Near East and South Asia (FBIS-NES-88-074): 63. 
FBIS. 1988c. Malekzadegan Comments on Mining Incident. Foreign Broadcast Information Service - Daily 
Report for Near East and South Asia (FBIS-NES-88-074): 63. 
FBIS. 1988d. Malekzadegan Interviewed - Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, Apr 19, 1988. Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service - Daily Report for Near East and South Asia (FBIS-NES-88-075): 64. 
FBIS. 1990. Karrubi Meets Lebanese, Palestinian Leaders: Tehran, IRNA in English, October 25 1991. 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report for Near East and South Asia (FBIS NES 91-
208): 40. 
FBIS. 1993. Khamene'i Addresses IRGC - Tehran IRIB Television First Program Network, September 16, 
1993. Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report for Near East and South Asia (FBIS-
NES-93-179). 
FBIS. 1994. Paper Discusses U.S., Zionist 'Plots' - Tehran KAYHAN in Persian, August 24, 1994. Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service Daily Report for Near East and South Asia (FBIS-NES-94-173). 
Filkins, Dexter. 2013. The Shadow Commander. The New Yorker. 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/09/30/the-shadow-commander. 
Fioretos, Orfeo. 2011. Historical Institutionalism in International Relations. International Organization 65 
(2): 367. 
Fisher, Max. 2013. The forgotten story of iran air flight 655. Washington Post, October 16, 2013. 
386 
 
Foreign Office, (GBR). 1979. Political Relations between Israel and Iran (FCO 93/2074). Foreign Office 
Files for the Middle East, 1979-1981. 
http://www.archivesdirect.amdigital.co.uk/Documents/Details/FCO_93_2074. 
Foreign relations of the united states, 1969–1976. 2006. , eds. Daniel J. Lawler, Erin R. Mahan. Vol. E-4, 
Documents on Iran and Iraq, 1969–1972; 201. Memorandum of Conversation, Tehran, May 31, 
1972, 10:30 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
Franke, Ulrich, and Ulrich Roos. 2010. Actor, structure, process: Transcending the state personhood 
debate by means of a pragmatist ontological model for international relations theory. Review of 
International Studies 36 (4) (10/01): 1057. 
Franks, Tommy with Malcom McConnell. 2004. American Soldier. New York: Harper-Collins. 
Freedman, Lawrence. 2008. A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East. New York: Public 
Affairs. 
Freedman, Robert O. 2020. Israel and the United States: An Uncertain Relationship. In Israel Under 
Netanyahu: Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy, edited by Robert O. Freedmand, 135-160. New 
York: Routledge. 
Friedman, Brandon. 2012. Battle for Bahrain. World Affairs 174 (6): 74-84. 
Friedman, Brandon. 2018. Iran's Hezbollah Model in Iraq and Syria: Fait Accompli? Orbis 62 (3): 438.  
Friedman, George. 2004. America's Secret War: Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle between America 
and its Enemies. New York: Doubleday. 
Friedman, Thomas L. 1983. Counting the Casualties in Beirut and Beyond. New York Times, Late Edition 
(East Coast), Apr 24, A3. 
Friedman, Thomas L. 1990. Bush's Comment on Israel Divides U.S. Jews. New York Times, March 13, A9. 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/427582270?accountid=11752.  
Friedman, Thomas. 2010. Driving drunk in jerusalem: [op-ed]. New York Times, March 14, 2010. 
Frisch, Hillel. 2018. Most iranians Couldn’t care less about the palestinians or israel. Begin-Sadat Center 
for Strategic Studies, 820. 
Gallup. 2020. Presidential Approval Ratings -- George W. Bush. Gallup., accessed Mar 23, 2020, 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/116500/presidential-approval-ratings-george-bush.aspx. 
Galston, William A. 2015. Hillary Clinton on the Iran Nuclear Deal: ‘Distrust and Verify’. Brookings 
Institute [Markaz Blog]. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2015/09/09/hillary-clinton-
on-the-iran-nuclear-deal-distrust-and-verify/. 
Gamlen, Elizabeth and Paul Rogers. 1993. U.S. Reflagging of Kuwaiti Tankers. In The Iran-Iraq War: The 
Politics of Aggression, edited by Farhang Rajaee, 121-151. Gainesville, FL: University Press of 
Florida. 
Gause, III, F.G. 1994. The Illogic of Dual Containment. Foreign Affairs 73 . doi:10.2307/20045919. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=f5h&AN=9404111591&site=ehost-
live&scope=site. 
Gheissari, Ali and Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr. 2006. Democracy in Iran. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Gibson, Bryan R. 2010. Covert relationship: American foreign policy, intelligence, and the iran-iraq war, 
1980-1988. PSI reports. Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger. 
387 
 
Gjoza, Enea. 2019. Counting the Cost of Financial Warfare: Recalibrating Sanctions Policy to Preserve 
U.S. Financial Hegemony. Washington, D.C.: Defense Priorities. 
Glenn, Cameron, John Caves, and Garrett Nada. 2019. Timeline: The Rise, Spread, and Fall of the Islamic 
State. The Wilson Center, Oct 28. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/timeline-the-rise-
spread-and-fall-the-islamic-state. 
Glenn, John and United States. 1987. Persian Gulf. S. Prt. Vol. 100-38. Washington: U.S. G.P.O. 
http://congressional.proquest.com/congcomp/getdoc?CRDC-ID=CMP-1987-SAS-0001. 
Globalsecurity.org. Udairi Training Range. Globalsecurity.org., accessed Feb 21, 2020, 
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/udairi.htm. 
Globalsecurity.org. US Military Facilities in Kuwait - an Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier. Globalsecurity.org., 
accessed Feb 21, 2020, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/kuwait.htm. 
Gold, Dore. 1988. America, the gulf, and israel: CENTCOM (central command) and emerging US regional 
security policies in the mideast. JCSS study. Vol. 11. Jerusalem, Israel: Jerusalem Post; Boulder, 
Colo. 
Golkar, Saeid. 2010. The Ideological-Political Training of Iran’s Basij. Brandeis University Crown Center for 
Middle East Studies, Middle East Brief (44). 
Golkar, Saeid. 2011. Liberation Or Suppression Technologies? the Internet, the Green Movement and 
the Regime in Iran Saeid Golkar. International Journal of Emerging Technologies and Society 9 
(1): 50-70. 
Goshko, John M. 1981. Reagan lobbies 27 senators on sale of AWACS to saudi arabia. Washington Post, 
September 15, 1981. 
Greif, Avner and David. D. Laitin. 2004. A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change.  American Political 
Science Review 98(4): 633-652. 
Gurr, Ted Robert. 2010. Why Men Rebel. 40th Anniversary Ed. ed. London and New York: Routledge. 
Haass, Richard N. 2019. The George H.W. bush administration. in The Iran Primer [U.S. Institute of 
Peace] [database online]. Washington, D.C., [cited September 12, 2019]. Available from 
https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/george-hw-bush-administration. 
Haberman, Maggie, Matthew Rosenberg, Matt Apuzzo, and Glenn Thrush. 2017. "Facing Scrutiny Over 
Russia Call, Flynn Steps Down: [National Desk]." New York Times, Feb 14, A1. 
Hacker, Jacob S. and Paul Pierson. 2010. Winner-Take-all Politics: Public Policy, Political Organization, 
and the Precipitous Rise of Top Incomes in the United States. Politics and Society 38 (2): 152. 
Hall, Peter A., and Rosemary C. R. Taylor. 1996. Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms. 
Political Studies 44 (5): 936. 
Hamzeh, Ahmad Nizar. 2004. In the Path of Hizbullah. Modern Intellectual and Political History of the 
Middle East. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University 
Press. http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0422/2004021012.html. 
Harel, Amos and Avi Isacharoff. 2008. 34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah, and the War in Lebanon. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan.  
Harik, Judith P. 2004. Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism. New in pbk, 2005 ed. London; New 
York: I.B. Tauris. 
388 
 
Harris, Gardiner. 2017. Tillerson Toughens Tone on Iran After U.S. Confirms Nuclear Deal Compliance. 
New York Times, Apr 19. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/19/world/middleeast/trump-
administration-grudgingly-confirms-irans-compliance-with-nuclear-deal.html. 
Harris, Kevan. 2017. A Social Revolution: Politics and the Welfare State in Iran. Oakland, California: 
University of California Press. 
Hedges, Stephen. 2003. Military to Leave Saudi Arabia. Chicago Tribune, Apr 30,. 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2003-04-30-0304300346-story.html. 
Hegghammer, Thomas. 2008. Deconstructing the myth about al-Qa`ida and khobar. CTC Sentinal 1 (3) 
(February 28).  
Henneberger, Melinda. 1998. Republicans Prevail with a Costly Victory. New York Times, Dec 21, A24. 
Herszenhorn, David. 2019. Trump praises saudi crown prince, ignores questions on khashoggi killing. 
Politico, June 29, 2019. 
Hines, Jay E. 2000. From desert one to southern watch: The evolution of U.S. central command. Joint 
Force Quarterly Spring: 42-48. 
Hiro, Dilip. 1992. Desert Shield to Desert Storm: The Second Gulf War. New York: Routledge. 
History. This day in history: Beiruit barracks blown up. in A&E Television Networks [database online]. 
2019 [cited September 9 2019]. Available from https://www.history.com/this-day-in-
history/beirut-barracks-blown-up. 
Hobson, J. A. 1902. Imperialism: A Study of the History, Politics, and Economics of the Colonial Powers in 
Europe and America. 2018 edition. Columbia, SC: Adansonia Press. 
Hoffman, Bruce. 1989. U.S. Policy Options to the Hostage Crisis in Lebanon, P-7585. Santa Monica, CA: 
The Rand Corporation. 
Holland, Steve and Maayan Lubell. 2017. "Trump Recognizes Jerusalem as Israel's Capital, Reversing 
Longtime U.S. Policy.", Dec 6. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-israel/trump-
recognizes-jerusalem-as-israels-capital-reversing-longtime-u-s-policy-idUSKBN1E01PS. 
Holmes, Oliver. 2018. Israel Confirms it Carried Out 2007 Airstrike on Syrian Nuclear Reactor. The 
Guardian, Mar 21. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/21/israel-admits-it-carried-
out-2007-airstrike-on-syrian-nuclear-reactor. 
Houghton, David Patrick. 2001. US Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis. Cambridge Studies in 
International Relations. Vol. 75. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
House National Security Committee. 1996. The Khobar Towers Bombing Incident. Washington D.C.: U.S. 
Congress. 










Hunter, Shireen T. 1989. Post-Khomeini Iran. Vol. 68 Foreign Affairs. doi:10.2307/20044204. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=f5h&AN=9001220804&site=ehost-
live&scope=site. 
Hunter, Shireen. 2010. Iran's Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era. Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger. 
http://JHU.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=554288. 
Hunter, Shireen. 2014. Iran Divided: The Historical Roots of Iranian Debates on Identity, Culture, and 
Governance in the Twenty-First Century. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Huntington, Samuel P. 1993. The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs 72 (3): 22-49. 
Hussain, Murtaza. 2019. Iran's Shadow War on ISIS. The Intercept, Nov 1. 
https://theintercept.com/2019/11/18/iran-isis-iraq-kurds/. 
Ibrahim, Ahmed Bahaa El-Din. 2006. A Study in Multilateral Diplomacy: The Madrid Conference (1991), 
and After. University of Leicester. 
Ibrahim, Youssef M. 1996. Planned U.S. Sanctions Anger Europeans. New York Times, July 25, 14. 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/430625464/fulltext/3C8709F82F284F33PQ/3?accountid=
11752. 
Ikenberry, G. John. 2001. After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After 
Major Wars. Princeton Studies in International History and Politics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press. 
Ikenberry, G. John. 2011. Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American 
World Order. Princeton Studies in International History and Politics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press. 
Indyk, Martin. 1992. Watershed in the Middle East. Foreign Affairs 71 (1): 70. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=f5h&AN=9203301181&site=ehost-
live&scope=site. 
Indyk, Martin. 1993. The Clinton Administration's Approach to the Middle East . The Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-
clinton-administrations-approach-to-the-middle-east. 
Indyk, Martin. 2009. Innocent Abroad: An Intimate Account of American Peace Diplomacy in the Middle 
East. Simon & Schuster hardcover ed. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
IPCSR. 2020. The 2012 Election. IPCSR website [University of Michigan], accessed Apr 11, 2020, 
https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/instructors/setups2012/2012.jsp. 
Iran Primer. 2017a. Iran’s Missile Tests: 201 . U.S. Institute for Peace [the Iran Primer]. 
https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2017/aug/01/iran%E2%80%99s-missile-tests-2017. 
Iran Primer. 2017b. US Sanctions on Iran: 2017. U.S. Institute for Peace [The Iran Primer]. 
https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2017/jul/31/us-sanctions-iran-2017. 
Iran’s Support for Terrorism Worldwide: Testimony Submitted to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs 
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee on the Middle East and 
North Africa, March 4, 2014, 2014, 
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/testimony/LevittTestimony2014030
4.pdf (accessed September 10, 2019). 
390 
 
Iraq Study Group, (U.S.). 2006. Iraq Study Group Report. Washington: U.S. G.P.O. 
http://congressional.proquest.com/congcomp/getdoc?CRDC-ID=CMP-2006-ISG-0001. 
Irshaid, Faisal. 2015. Isis, Isil, IS Or Daesh? One Group, Many Names. BBC News, Dec 2. 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27994277. 
Jaffe, Greg and Adam Entous. 2017. "Mattis Urged Iran Strike Over U.S. Troops' Deaths." Washington 
Post, Jan 9, A1. 
Jehl, Douglas. 1995. U.S. Looks Away as Iran Arms Bosnia. New York Times, Apr 15, 3. 
Jehl, Douglas. 1998. Iran Holds Taliban Responsible for 9 Diplomats' Deaths. New York Times, Sep 11, A3. 
https://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/11/world/iran-holds-taliban-responsible-for-9-diplomats-
deaths.html. 
Jehl, Douglass and Stephanie Grace. 1992. "Bush Will Send Troops to Kuwait : Persian Gulf: About 2,400 
Soldiers are to be Deployed Over Next Three Weeks. White House Says it is Sending a Message 
to Recalcitrant Saddam Hussein." Los Angeles Times, Aug 1,. 
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1992-08-01-mn-4289-story.html. 
Jett, Dennis C. and SpringerLink. 2018. The Iran Nuclear Deal. Cham: Springer International Publishing. 
Johnson, Robert. 2011. The Iran-Iraq War. Twentieth-Century Wars. Houndmills, Basingstoke, 
Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
http://www.netread.com/jcusers/1388/2281150/image/lgcover.9780230577749.jpg. 
Jomhouri F. 1984a. " بکشاند شوبٱفارس, منطقه را به  جی با ناامن کردن خل کندی تالش م یاستکبار جهان   [Global Arrogance 
Seeks to Destabilize the Persian Gulf, Drags the Region into Chaos]."  یاسالم  یجمهور  [Jomhouri 
Eslami], Jul 7, 12. 
Jomhouri Eslami. 1984b. " امام یخی تار امی مجلس و پ  ندگانی نما  [Parliament Ministers and the Imam's Historic 
Message]." یاسالم ی جمهور  [Jomhouri Eslami], Jul 5, 12. 
Jomhouri Eslami. 1984c. " کرد ی واشنگتن به صدام ار بررس یکمکها ش ی به بغداد نحوه افزا کای مرٱ ی اعزام اتی ه  [U.S. 
Delegation Sent to Baghdad to Examine how Aid to Saddam can be Increased]." یاسالم یجمهور  
[Jomhouri Eslami], Jul 7, 3. 
Jones, Sam. 2016. Cyber Warfare: Iran Opens a New Front. Financial Times, Apr 16. 
https://www.ft.com/content/15e1acf0-0a47-11e6-b0f1-61f222853ff3#axzz478cZz3ao. 
Juneau, Thomas. 2014. Iran under rouhani: Still alone in the world. Middle East Policy 21 (4) (12/01): 92. 
Kaplan, Robert. 2006. Use Brinkmanship to Contain Iran: [HOME EDITION]. Los Angeles Times, Sep 29, 
B11. 
Karimi, Nasser and John Gambrell. 2018. Iran Protests: Supreme Leader Blames ‘enemies’ for Meddling. 
AP News, Jan 2. https://apnews.com/0337232e446e41e49211dc71a788e152/Iran-state-TV:-9-
killed-in-nationwide-protests,-unrest. 
Karsh, Efraim. 1990. Geopolitical Determinism: The Origins of the Iran-Iraq War. Middle East Journal 44 
(2): 256-268. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4328101. 
Katzman, Kenneth, Neelesh Nerurkar, Ronald O'Rourke, R. Chuck Mason, and Michael Ratner. 2012. 
Iran's threat to the strait of hormuz. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, R42335. 
Katzman, Kenneth. 1993. The Warriors of Islam: Iran's Revolutionary Guard. Boulder: Westview Press. 
Katzman, Kenneth. 2006. The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA). CRS Report for Congress (RS20871). 
391 
 
Katzman, Kenneth. 2006. Kuwait: Security, Reform, and U.S. Policy. Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Research Service. 
Katzman, Kenneth. 2019. Iran sanctions. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, RS20871. 
Kaye, Dalia Dassa, Alireza Nader, and Parisa Roshan. 2011. Israel and Iran: A Dangerous Rivalry. Rand 
Corporation Monograph Series. Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute. 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg1143osd. 
Kazemzadeh, Masoud. 2008. Intra-Elite Factionalism and the 2004 Majles Elections in Iran. Middle 
Eastern Studies 44 (2): 189-214. doi:10.1080/00263200701874867. 
Keen, David. 2008. Complex emergencies. Malden, MA: Polity Press.  
Keen, David. 2012. Useful wars: When waging wars is more important than winning them. New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press.  
Kemp, John. 2016. Saudi arabia turns oil weapon on iran. Reuters, April 18, 2016. 
Kempster, Norman. 1993. Terrorism Case Puts Focus on Secretive Sudan Suspects: Troubled African 
State has been a Base for Radical Groups, has Ties to Iran. its U.N. Mission Denies Links to 
Arrests in New York.: [Home Edition]. Los Angeles Times, June 26, 16. 
Keohane, Robert O. 1984. After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
Kerr, Paul and Kenneth Katzman. 2018. Iran Nuclear Agreement and U.S. Exit [R43333]. Washington, 
D.C.: Congressional Research Service. 
Kerry, John. 2018. Every Day is Extra. First Simon & Schuster hardcover ed. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Kershner, Isabel and David M. Halbfinger. 2018. Israel Strikes Military Assets of Iran in Syria: [Foreign 
Desk]. New York Times, May 11, A1. 
Kessler, Glenn. 2011. Did ahmadinejad really say israel should be ‘wiped off the map’? Washington Post 
(October 5). 
Khalaji, Mehdi. 2007. Iran Feels the Heat: International Pressure Emboldens Tehran's Domestic Critics. 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy Policy Analysis (Policy #1185). 
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/iran-feels-the-heat-international-
pressure-emboldens-tehrans-domestic-criti. 
Khalaji, Mehdi. 2010. The Iranian Clergy's Silence. Current Trends in Islamist Ideology 10: 42-55. 
https://www.hudson.org/research/9870-the-iranian-clergy-s-silence-. 
Khalaji, Mehdi. 2015. Great Expectations: Iran After the Deal. The Washington Quarterly 38 (3): 61-77. 
Khomeini, Ruhollah al-Musavi. 1989a. Imam Khomeini's Last Will and Testament. Washington, D.C.: 
Interest Section of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Embassy of the Democratic and Popular Republic 
of Algeria. 
Khomeini, Ruhollah al-Musavi. 1989b. Letter Dismissing Montazeri. 
https://irandataportal.syr.edu/letter-dismissing-montazeri. 
Kifner, John. 1979. IRAN, IN A PROTEST, TELLS U.S. TO DELAY SENDING NEW ENVOY: RESPONSE TO 
SENATE ACTION 'Interference' Fiercely Assailed, as is Javits, Sponsor of Measure Denouncing 
Executions. New York Times, May 21, A-1. 
392 
 
Kifner, John. 1984. 23 die, including 2 americans, in terrorist car bomb attack on the u.s. embassy at 
beiruit; blast kills driver. New York Times, September 21, 1984, sec A. 
Kimball, Jeffrey. 2006. The nixon doctrine: A saga of misunderstanding. Presidential Studies Quarterly 36 
(1): 59-74. 
Kinzer, Stephen. 2003. All the shah's men: An american coup and the roots of middle east terror. 
Hoboken, N.J.: J. Wiley & Sons. 
Kinzer, Stephen. 2010. Reset: Iran, Turkey, and America's Future. New York: Times Books. 
Kissinger, Henry. 1979. The Shah's 'Doubts about our Real Intentions'. The Washington Post, Feb 26, 
A21. 
Klare, Michael T. 2006. Oil, iraq, and american foreign policy: The continuing salience of the carter 
doctrine. International Journal 62 (1): 31-42. 
Krasner, Stephen D. 1982. Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening 
Variables. International Organization 36 (2): 185. 
Krasner, Stephen D. 2016. "The Persistence of State Sovereignty”, Ch. 31 (Pp. 521-537) in Eds., 2016. . ." 
In The Oxford Handbook of Historical Institutionalism, edited by Orfeo Fioretos, Tulia G. Falleti 
and Adam Sheingate, 521-537. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kreisher, Otto. 2000. Desert One Disaster. MHQ: Quarterly Journal of Military History 13 (1): 42. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ahl&AN=45847387&site=ehost-
live&scope=site. 
Kupchan, Charles. 2010. How enemies become friends: The sources of stable peace. Princeton studies in 
international history and politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Lake, Anthony. 1994. Confronting Backlash States. Foreign Affairs 73 (2): 45. doi:10.2307/20045918. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=f5h&AN=9404111590&site=ehost-
live&scope=site. 
Landler, Mark and David E. Sanger. 2017. Trump Disavows Accord with Iran on Nuclear Arms: [Foreign 
Desk]. New York Times, Oct 14, A1. 
Landler, Mark and Maggie Haberman. 2018. Trump Chooses Bolton for 3rd Security Adviser as Shake-Up 
Continues. New York Times, Mar 22. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/22/us/politics/hr-
mcmaster-trump-bolton.html. 
Landler, Mark. 2018. Trump Abandons Iran Pact He Long Scorned: [Foreign Desk]. New York Times, May 
9, A1. 
Landler, Mark. 2019. Trump bandies policy of regime change without a blueprint: [news analysis]. New 
York Times (May 19): A.8. 
Larson, James F. 1986. Television and U.S. Foreign Policy: The Case of the Iran Hostage Crisis. Journal of 
Communication 36 (4): 108. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ahl&AN=45956301&site=ehost-
live&scope=site. 
Latham, Niles. 1985. Reagan Declares War on International Terrorism. New York Post, Jul 1, 4. 
Lebow, Richard Ned. 2008. A Cultural Theory of International Relations. Cambridge, UK; New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
393 
 
Leslie, Jonathan, Reza Marashi, and Trita Parsi. 2014. Losing billions: The cost of economic sanctions to 
the U.S. economy. Washington, D.C.: National Iranian American Council. 
Leverett, Flynt Lawrence and Hillary Mann Leverett. 2013. Going to Tehran: Why the United States must 
Come to Terms with the Islamic Republic of Iran. US ed. New York: Metropolitan Books. 
Levitt, Matthew, and Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 2006. Hamas: Politics, charity, and 
terrorism in the service of jihad. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. 1981. Iran Hostage Crisis. S.l: S.N. 
http://congressional.proquest.com/congcomp/getdoc?CRDC-ID=CRS-1981-FND-0052. 
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. 1984. Escalation of the Conflict in the Persian Gulf. 
S.l: S.N. http://congressional.proquest.com/congcomp/getdoc?CRDC-ID=CRS-1984-ENR-0042. 
Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. 1985. Beirut Hostages. S.l: S.N. 
http://congressional.proquest.com/congcomp/getdoc?CRDC-ID=CRS-1985-FND-0063. 
Limbert, John W. 1987. Iran, at War with History. Profiles. Nations of the Contemporary Middle East. 
Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press; London. 
Limbert, John W. 2009. Negotiating With Iran: Wrestling the Ghosts of History. Washington, D.C.: United 
States Institute of Peace. 
Litwak, Robert S. 2002. Iraq and Iran: From Dual to Differentiated Containment. In Eagle Rules?: Foreign 
Policy and American Primacy in the Twenty-First Century, edited by Robert J. Lieber, 173-193. 
Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall. 
Luft, Gal, and Anne Korin. 2013. The myth of U.S. energy dependence. Foreign Affairs. October 15, 2013. 
Luo, Michael. 2008. Obama Talk on Iranians Draws Fire from McCain. New York Times, May 20, A20. 
Lyall, Sarah, Michael Slackman, and Edward Wong. 2007. "Iran Sets Free 15 Britons Seized at Sea in 
March." New York Times, Apr 5, A1. 
Lyke, Austin. 2017. Habitus, Doxa, and Saga: Applications of Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice to 
Organizational History. Management & Organizational History 12 (2): 163-173. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17449359.2017.1329091. 
Mahoney, James and Kathleen Thelen. 2009. A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change. In Explaining 
Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power, edited by James Mahoney and Kathleen 
Thelen, 1-37;. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Majd, Hooman. 2008. The Ayatollah Begs to Differ: The Paradox of Modern Iran. New York: Doubleday. 
Majd, Hooman. 2010. The Ayatollah's Democracy: An Iranian Challenge. New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company. 
Malici, Akan. 2009. Rogue states: Enemies of our own making? Psicología Política 39 (11/01): 39. 
Maloney, Suzanne. 2008. US Policy Toward Iran: Missed Opportunities and Paths Forward. Fletcher 
Forum of World Affairs 32 (2): 25. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ijh&AN=61.1384&site=ehost-
live&scope=site. 




Maloney, Suzanne. 2015. Iran's Political Economy since the Revolution. New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Mann, Jim. 1991. Iran's Nuclear Plans Worry U.S. Officials. Los Angeles Times, Jan 17, A1. 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/421000363?accountid=11752. 
Mann, Thomas. 2001. Reflections on the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election. Brookings [Online Article]. 
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/reflections-on-the-2000-u-s-presidential-election/. 
Martin, Jonathan and Patrick Healy. 2016. Donald Trump all but Clinches Nomination with Indiana Win; 
Cruz Quits: [National Desk]. New York Times, May 4, A1.  
Mattair, Thomas R. 2008. Global Security Watch--Iran: A Reference Handbook. Global Security Watch 
Series. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International. 
Mazzucelli, Colette. 2007. EU3-Iranian Nuclear Diplomacy: Implications for US Policy in the Middle East. 
European Union Miami Analysis 4 (6). http://aei.pitt.edu/8198/1/Mazzucelli-IranEUMA_edi.pdf. 
McChrystal, Stanley A. 2013. My Share of the Task: A Memoir. New York: Portfolio/Penguin. 
McInnis, Kathleen J. 2016. Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State [R44135]. Washington, 
D.C.: Congressional Research Service. 
McManus, Doyle. 2009. Talking with Iran - and Sending a Message. Los Angeles Times, Nov 1. 
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2009-nov-01-oe-mcmanus1-story.html. 
Mearsheimer, John J. 2014. The tragedy of great power politics. The norton series in world politics. 
Updated. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.  
Mearsheimer, John J. 2018. The great delusion: Liberal dreams and international realities. New Haven: 
Yale University Press.  
Mearsheimer, John J. and Stephen M. Walt. 2007. The Israeli Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. New York: 
Farrar, Straus, Giroux. 
Meisler, Stanley. 1991. Bush Rules Out `Uncle Sucker' Mideast Role: [Home Edition]. Los Angeles Times, 
Mar 10, 1. 
Memoli, Mike. 2019. Biden Once Warned a President: War with Iran without Congressional Approval is 
Impeachable. NBC News [Online], June 20. https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2020-
election/biden-once-warned-president-war-iran-without-congressional-approval-impeachable-
n1019041. 
Milani, Abbas and Michael McFaul. 2015. What the Iran-Deal Debate is Like in Iran. The Atlantic, Aug 11. 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/08/iran-deal-politics-rouhani-
khamenei/400985/. 
Milani, Abbas. 2003. Can Iran Become a Democracy? Hoover Digest (2). 
https://www.hoover.org/research/can-iran-become-democracy. 
Milani, Abbas. 2010. The Good Ayatollah.  Foreign Policy. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bsu&AN=48445393&site=ehost-
live&scope=site. 
Milani, Mohsen M. 1992. The Transformation of the Velayat‐e Faqih Institution: From Khomeini to 
Khamenei. The Muslim World 82 (3-4): 175-190. 
395 
 
Milani, Mohsen M. 1994. The Making of Iran's Islamic Revolution: From Monarchy to Islamic Republic. 
Westview Special Studies on the Middle East. 2nd edition ed. Boulder: Westview Press. 
Milani, Mohsen M. 2009. Iran's Policies in Iraq. In The Iranian Puzzle Piece: Understanding Iran in the 
Global Context, edited by Amin Tarzi, 57-70. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press. 
Missile Defense Project. Missiles of israel. in Center for Strategic and International Studies [database 
online]. Washington, D.C., 2018 [cited September 12 2019]. Available from 
https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/israel/. 
Mitchell, Alison. 1997. Clinton Sees Hope in the Election of Moderate as President of Iran. New York 
Times, May 30, A10. 
Mohammadi, Hossein. 2013. The Headaches Caused by Anti-US Chants in Iran. Rooz Online, Oct 4. 
http://www.payvand.com/news/13/oct/1085.html. 
Molotsky, Irvin. 1983. 2 Topics: Grenada and Beirut, Beirut and Grenada. New York Times - Late Edition 
[East Coast], Oct 27, B12. 
Morello, Carol, Karen DeYoung, William Branigin, and Joby Warrick. 2016. Iran Frees Post Reporter Jason 
Rezaian, 4 Other Americans, Officials Say (Posted 2016-01-16 15:21:33): Among those Freed was 
Post Correspondent Jason Rezaian while the U.S. Freed Or Dropped Charges Against Iranians. 
Washington Post, Jan 16. 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/1757508336/B6A41B51AA9D452APQ/2?accountid=1175
2. 
Morgan, David. 2008. Clinton Says U.S. could "Totally Obliterate" Iran. Reuters, Apr 22. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-politics-iran/clinton-says-u-s-could-totally-obliterate-
iran-idUSN2224332720080422. 
Morgenthau, Hans J. 1955. Politics among nations; the struggle for power and peace. 2d , ed. New York: 
Knopf. 
Morley, Jefferson. 2019. The growing obsession with linking iran to terrorism. The New Republic (April 
10).  
Mousavian, Hossein with Shahir Shahidsaless. 2015. Iran and the United States: An Insider's View on the 
Failed Past and the Road to Peace. New York: Bloomsbury Academic. 
Mousavian, Seyyed Hossein. 2012. The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace. 
Mozaffari, Mehdi. 1998. Fatwa: Violence & Discourtesy. Aarhus, Denmark; Oakville, Conn.: Aarhus 
University Press. 
Mufson, Steven, and Damian Paletta. 2018. Boeing, airbus to lose $39 billion in deals with iran as trump 
reimposes sanctions. The Washington Post (May 9): A.13.  
Murray, Michelle. 2018. The Struggle for Recognition in International Relations: Status, Revisionism, and 
Rising Powers. Oxford: Oxford Scholarship Online. 
Murray, Williamson and Kevin M. Woods. 2014. The Iran-Iraq War: A Military and Strategic History. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107449794. 





Nader, Alireza. 2015. Iran's Role in Iraq: Room for U.S.-Iranian Cooperation?. Santa Monica, CA: Rand 
Corporation. 
Nadimi, Farzin. 2019. How sanctions are affecting Iran’s airline industry. Washington, D.C.: The 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policywatch 3108. 
Nadimi, Farzin. 2020. Iran's Evolving Approach to Asymmetric Naval Warfare: Strategy and Capabilities 
in the Persian Gulf. Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy. 
Naji, Kasra. 2008. Ahmadinejad: The Secret History of Iran's Radical Leader. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Najmabadi, Afsaneh. 1987. Iran's turn to islam: From modernism to moral order. Middle East Journal 41 
(2). 
Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza. 2006. The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future. New 
York: Norton. http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0612/2006012361.html. 
Nasr, Vali. 2013. The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat. Brunswick: Scribe 
Publications. 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the U.S. 2004. 9/11 Commission Report. New York: 
W.W. Norton and Company. 
New York Times News Service. 2006."$75 Million Sought to Sell Democracy in Iran. Chicago Tribune, Feb 
16. http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2006-02-16-0602160189-story.html. 
New York Times. 1981. For America, a Painful Reawakening. New York Times (Late Edition, East Coast), 
May 17, a114. 
New York Times. 1997. Iran's Leader Blames U.S. for Poor Ties. New York Times, May 28, A6. 
New York Times. 1998. Clinton to Penalize Russian Companies. New York Times, Jul 16, A1. 
New York Times. 2016. Across the World, Shock and Uncertainty at Trump's Victory: [Foreign Desk]. New 
York Times, Nov 10. 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/1838741186/7B3779946D3F4C6DPQ/1?accountid=11752
. 
Norman, Laurence. 2020. EU Ramps Up Trade System with Iran Despite U.S. Threats. Wall Street Journal, 
Mar 31. https://www.wsj.com/articles/eu-ramps-up-trade-system-with-iran-despite-u-s-threats-
11585661594. 
NPR. 2017. Trump's 100-Day Plan, Annotated: Where His Promises Stand. National Public Radio, April 
24. https://www.npr.org/2017/04/24/520159167/trumps-100-day-action-plan-annotated. 
O'Ballance, Edgar. 1997. Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism, 1979-95: The Iranian Connection. 
Washington Square, N.Y.: New York University Press. 
Obama, Barrack. 2009. Videotaped Remarks by the President in Celebration of Nowruz. The White 
House., last modified Mar 20, accessed Mar 30, 2020, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/videotaped-remarks-president-
celebration-nowruz. 
Obama, Barrack. 2010. Remarks of President Obama Marking Nowruz. The White House., last modified 




Oberdorfer, Don. 1981.  U.S. reports some progress in mending ties to pakistan Washington Post, March 
28, 1981. 
Office of Imam Khomeini. 1989. Mersad Operation Dealt Crushing Blow to MKO 
Terrorists. DEPARTMENT THE INSTITUTE FOR COMPILATION AND PUBLICATION OF IMAM 
KHOMEINI'S WORKS. 
Office of the Historian, U. S. Department of State. The Madrid Conference, 1991. Office of the Historian, 
U.S. Department of State., accessed Feb 15, 2020, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-
1992/madrid-conference. 
O'Hern, Steven K. 2008. The Intelligence Wars: Lessons from Baghdad. Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus 
Books. 
O'hern, Steven. 2012. Iran's Revolutionary Guard: The Threat that Grows while America Sleeps. 
Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books. 
Olson, Mancur. 2000. Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships. New 
York: Basic Books. 
Ostovar, Afshon. 2015. Why Iran’s Revolutionary Guard is Happy. Politico, Jul 15. 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/07/the-new-danger-from-irans-revolutionary-
guard-120158. 
Ostovar, Afshon. 2016. Vanguard of the Imam: Religion, Politics, and Iran's Revolutionary Guards. New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199387892.001.0001. 
Ottaway, David B. 1981a. Saudi, citing fears of israeli attack, urges closer alliance. Washington Post, 
November 18, 1981. 
Ottaway, David B. 1991b. Saudis wary of U.S. military role. Washington Post, December 2, 1991. 
Ottolenghi, Emanuele. 2011. The Pasdaran: Inside Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Washington, 
D.C.: Foundation for the Defense of Democracies Press. 
Painter, David S. 2012. Oil and the american century. Journal of American History 99 (1): 24-39. 
Pamuk, Humerya, and Doina Chiacu. 2019. U.S. removed almost 2.7 million barrels daily of iranian oil 
from market: Pompeo. Reuters, August 20, 2019. 
Pamuk, Humeyra. 2019. Exclusive: U.S. Probe of Saudi Oil Attack shows it Came from North - Report. 
Reuters, Dec 19. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-aramco-attacks-iran-
exclusive/exclusive-u-s-probe-of-saudi-oil-attack-shows-it-came-from-north-report-
idUSKBN1YN299. 
Parasiliti, Andrew. 2010. After Sanctions, Deter and Engage Iran. Survival 52 (5): 13-20. 
Parchami, Ali. 2012. The 'Arab Spring': The View from Tehran [Iran]. Contemporary Politics 18 (1): 35.  
Parsi, Trita. 2007. Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States. New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 
Parsi, Trita. 2012. A Single Roll of the Dice: Obama's Diplomacy with Iran. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 




Paules, Marian. 2003. U. S. Relations with Iran: American Identity, Foreign Policy, and the Politics of 
Representation. Ph.D. Dissertation, Syracuse University.  UMI Microform 3081652. 
Pelletiere, Stepen C., and Douglas V. Johnson II. 1992. Oil and the new world system: CENTCOM rethinks 
its mission. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, ACN 92054.  
Perry, Mark. 2016. James Mattis’ 33-Year Grudge Against Iran. Politico, Dec 4. 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/12/james-mattis-iran-secretary-of-defense-
214500. 
Pierce, Jonathan. 2012. Oil and the house of saud: Analysis of saudi arabian oil policy. Digest of Middle 
East Studies 21 (1) (March): 89. 
Pillar, Paul R. 2016. The role of villain: Iran and U.S. foreign policy. Political Science Quarterly (Wiley-
Blackwell) 131 (2) (06/01): 365. 
Pollack, Kenneth M. 2004. The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict between Iran and America. New York: 
Random House. 
Posen, Barry. 2014. Restraint: A new foundation for U.S. grand strategy. Cornell studies in security 
affairs. Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press.  
Pourzand, Azadeh. 2010. Change they Don't Believe in: The Political Presence of the Basij in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. Harvard Kennedy School Review 10: 99-103. 
Pramuk, Jacob. 2017. "What Trump Said about Afghanistan before He Became President." CNBC News, 
Aug 21,. https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/21/what-trump-said-about-afghanistan-before-he-
became-president.html. 
Przeworski, Adam. 2003. Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense. In The Democracy 
Sourcebook, edited by Robert Dahl, Ian Shapiro and Jose Antonio Cheibub, 12-17. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press. 
Putnam, Robert D. 1988. Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games. International 
Organization 42 (3): 427-60.  
Radio Farda. 2018."Shocking Video Clip from 1989 shows Khamenei Elected Only for One Year as A 
Caretaker. Radio Farda, Jan 09. https://en.radiofarda.com/a/video-showing-khamenei-election-
supreme-leader/28963611.html. 
Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty. 2006. Iran: Text of Ahmadinejad's Letter to Bush. Radio Free Europe / 
Radio Liberty, May 11. https://www.rferl.org/a/1068319.html. 
Rafsanjani, Hashemi. 2007. ۱۳۶۳سرنوشت: کارنامه وخاطرات سال  ی به سو  [Toward Destiny: Memoirs 
and_Recollections from Year 1363]. 3rd ed. Tehran, Iran:  دفتر نشر معارف انقالب [Office of 
Revolutionary Educational Publishing]. 
Ram, Haggai. 2009. Iranophobia: The Logic of an Israeli Obsession. Stanford Studies in Middle Eastern 
and Islamic Societies and Cultures. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 
Ramazani, Rouhollah K. 2013. Independence without freedom: Iran's foreign policy. Charlottesville: 
University of Virginia Press.  




Rashid, Ahmed. 2008. Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in 
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. New York: Viking. 
Rauch, Jonathan. 2005. In Hindsight, the War on Terror Began with Salman Rushdie. Vol. 37 National 
Journal Group LLC. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=f5h&AN=16478188&site=ehost-
live&scope=site. 
Rayburn, Joel, Frank K. Sobchak, and Army War College. 2019a. The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, Volume I 
- Invasion, Insurgency, Civil War 2003-2006. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute. 
Rayburn, Joel, Frank K. Sobchak, and Army War College. 2019b. The U.S. Army in the Iraq War, Volume II 
- Surge and Withdrawal 2007-2011. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute. 
Rayment, Sean. 2008. Iran ‘paid Iraq insurgents to kill UK soldiers’. The Telegraph. May 24. 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/2022631/Iran-paid-Iraq-
insurgents-to-kill-UK-soldiers.html. 
Razavi, Negar. 2019. The systematic problem of "iran expertise" in washington. Jadaliyya (September 4, 
2019), https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/39946/The-Systemic-Problem-of-“Iran-Expertise”-in-
Washington.  
Reagan, Ronald. 1982. National Security Decision Directive Number 64 - Next Steps in Lebanon. The 
White House. 
Record, Jeffrey, and Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. 1983. The rapid deployment force and U.S. 
military intervention in the persian gulf. Special report / institute for foreign policy analysis, inc. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. 
Rempfer, Kyle. 2019. Iran Killed More US Troops in Iraq than Previously Known, Pentagon Says. Military 
Times, Apr 4, https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2019/04/04/iran-killed-more-
us-troops-in-iraq-than-previously-known-pentagon-says/. 
Rezaian, Jason. 2019. Iran's Hostage Factory. Washington Post, Nov 4. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/11/04/irans-hostage-factory/?arc404=true. 




Ricks, Thomas E. 2006. Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq. New York: Penguin Press. 
Rieffer-Flanagan, Barbara Ann J. 2013. Evolving Iran: An Introduction to Politics and Problems in the 
Islamic Republic. Washington, District of Columbia: Georgetown University Press. 
Riker, William H. 1980. Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of 
Institutions. The American Political Science Review 74 (2): 432-446. doi:10.2307/1960638. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1960638. 
Risen, James and Doyle McManus. 1996. U.S. had Options to Let Bosnia Get Arms, Avoid Iran: Balkans: 
Friendlier Countries were Available to Supply Weapons, Officials Say. but Clinton was Left Little 
Choice After such Plans were Shot Down by Key Advisors. Los Angeles Times, July 14, VYA1. 
Rixen, Thomas and Lora Anne Viola. 2016. Towards Explaining Change and Stability in International 
Institutions. In Historical Institutionalism and International Relations: Explaining Institutional 
400 
 
Development in World Politics, edited by Thomas Rixen, Lora Anne Viola and Michael Zurn. First 
ed., 3-34. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Roberts, Paul Craig. 2019. 52nd anniversary of Israel’s attack on the USS liberty. Foreign Policy Journal 
(June 8). 
Rosenberg, Matthew. 2015. Fact check: Has iran really killed or maimed thousands of americans? New 
York Times, March 3, 2015, 2015. 
Rouhi, Mahsa. 2019. How to make a lasting deal with iran. Foreign Policy (September 7). 
Rubin, Barry M. 1980. Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Rubin, Barry M. 1980. Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Rushdie, Salman. 2012. Joseph Anton: A Memoir. New York: Random House. 
Ryan, Paul B. 1985. The Iranian Rescue Mission: Why it Failed. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press. 
Sachs, Susan. 2000. Iranians in Huge Numbers Vote in Parliamentary Election. New York Times, Feb 19. 
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/021900iran-vote.html. 
Safshekan, Roozbeh and Farzan Sabet. 2010. The Ayatollah’s Praetorians: The Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard Corps and the 2009 Election Crisis. Middle East Journal 64 (4): 543-558. 
Sagan, Scott Douglas, and Kenneth Neal Waltz. 2003. The spread of nuclear weapons: A debate renewed: 
With new sections on india and pakistan, terrorism, and missile defense. New York: Norton. 
Said, Edward W. 1997. Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine how we See the Rest 
of the World. Rev, Vintage Books ed. New York: Vintage Books. 
Sale, Richard. 2009. Clinton's Secret Wars: The Evolution of a Commander in Chief. New York: St. Martin's 
Press. 
Salpukas, Agis. 1995. Iran Signs Oil Deal with Conoco; First since 1980 Break with U.S. New York Times, 
Mar 7, A1. 
Samaan, Jean-Loup and ProQuest. 2018. Israel's Foreign Policy Beyond the Arab World: Engaging the 
Periphery. Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics. Vol. 88. London, England; New York, 
New York: Routledge. 
Samaan, Jean-Loup. 2019. The Renaissance of Israel's Periphery Doctrine. In Israel in a Turbulent Region: 
Security and Foreign Policy, edited by Tore T. Petersen. Vol. 94, 273-289. London; New York: 
Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. 
https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/jhu/detail.action?docID=5724706. 
Sanger, David E. 2012. Confront and Conceal: Obama's Secret Wars and Surprising use of American 
Power. New York: Crown Publishers. 
SASC - Committee on Armed Services. Senate., Statement of Gen. George B. Crist, USMC, Commander-
in-Chief, U.S. Central Command, within the Hearing on Department of Defense Authorization for 





Schahgaldian, Nikola, Gina Barkhordarian, United States, and Rand Corporation. 1987. The Iranian 
Military Under the Islamic Republic. Santa Monica, CA: Rand. 
Schmemann, Serge. 1996. Israelis Suffer First Casualties in Lebanon since Truce. New York Times, May 
13, A3. 
Schmitt, Eric. 1998. U.S. Backs Off Sanctions, Seeing Poor Effect Abroad. New York Times, Jul 31, A1. 
Schmitt, Eric. 2015. New Role for General After Failure of Syria Rebel Plan: [Foreign Desk]. New York 
Times, Oct 20, A6. 
Schweid, Barry. 2008. Five Ex-Secretaries of State Urge Talks with Iran. Associated Press, Sep 15. 
https://www.foxnews.com/wires/2008Sep15/0,4670,CandidatesAdvice,00.html. 
Sciolino, Elaine. 1991. THE LAST U.S. HOSTAGE; from Iran to U.S., a Hint of Good Will: [News 
Analysis]. New York Times, Dec 5, 
A1. https://search.proquest.com/docview/428326504?accountid=11752. 
Sciolino, Elaine. 1992. C.I.A. Says Iran Makes Progress on Atom Arms. New York Times, Nov 30, A1. 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/428781839?accountid=11752. 
Sciolino, Elaine. 1998. Iran Rejects Overtures by Albright. New York Times, Jun 26, A5. 
Scott, Catherine V. 2000. Bound for Glory: The Hostage Crisis as Captivity Narrative in Iran. International 
Studies Quarterly 44 (1): 177. doi:10.1111/0020-8833.00153. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bsu&AN=2950662&site=ehost-
live&scope=site. 
Secord, Richard. 1986. Declassified Report to the National Security Council regarding the 25 August 1986 
Meeting with Iranian Delegation in Brussels, BE. 
Select Committee on Intelligence. 1996. Congressional Notification. Https://Search-Proquest-
Com.Proxy1.Library.Jhu.Edu/Docview/1679136006?accountid=11752. Sep 5. 
Shambaugh, David. 2013. Assessing the US “Pivot” to Asia. Strategic Studies Quarterly 7 (2): 10-19. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/26270763. 
Sherman, Wendy R. 2018. Not for the Faint of Heart: Lessons in Courage, Power, and Persistence. New 
York: Hachette Book Group. 
Shlaim, Avi. 2000. The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World. New York: W.W. Norton. 
Sick, Gary. 1986. All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran. New York, N.Y., U.S.A.: Penguin 
Books. 
Sick, Gary. 1991. October Surprise: America's Hostages in Iran and the Election of Ronald Reagan. New 
York: Times Books/Random House. 
Sick, Gary. 2004. Confronting Terrorism. In Reshaping Rogue States: Preemption, Regime Change, and 
U.S. Policy Toward Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, edited by Alexander T. J. Lennon and Camille Eiss, 
371. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Siddiqui, Sabena. 2019. Iran reinforces partnership with china for economic relief. AL-Monitor, 
September 17, 2019. 
Simon, Herbert A. 1979. Rational Decision Making in Business Organization. American Economic Review 





Slackman, Michael and Nazila Fathi. 2006. A New Face in Iran Resurrects an Old Defiance. New York 
Times, Jan 30, A1. 
Slackman, Michael. 2001. Khatami Sweeps Iranian Election. Los Angeles Times, Jun 9,. 
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2001-jun-09-mn-8295-story.html. 
Slavin, Barbara. 2003. Terrorism Accusations Halt U.S.-Iran Dialogue; Tehran Rejects Claim that it's 
Harboring Riyadh Suspects. USA Today, May 22, A10. 
Slavin, Barbara. 2007. Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies: Iran, the U.S., and the Twisted Path to 
Confrontation. New York: St. Martin's Press. 
Slavin, Barbara. 2009. EXCLUSIVE: U.S. Contacted Iran's Ayatollah before Election. Washington Times, 
Jun 24. https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jun/24/us-contacted-irans-ayatollah-
before-election/. 
Sly, Liz and Suzan Haidamous. 2013. Syrian Report: Israel Bombs Outskirts of Damascus for Second Time 
in Recent Days (Posted 2013-05-06 03:07:59): Israel Launches Airstrike in Syria Again. 
Washington Post, May 6. 
Sly, Liz and Suzan Haidamous. 2014. Israel Bombs Syria in Attacks Probably Aimed at Hezbollah (Posted 
2014-12-07 23:21:12): The Strikes were Probably Aimed at Iranian Shipments of Weapons to 
Hezbollah, Analysts Say. The Washington Post, Dec 7. 
Smith, Tony. 2000. Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign 
Policy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Snyder, Jack L. 1991. Myths of empire: Domestic politics and international ambition. Cornell studies in 
security affairs. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 
Sobhani, Sohrab. 1989. The Pragmatic Entente: Israeli-Iranian Relations, 1948-1988. New York: Praeger. 
Solingen, Etel and Wilfred Wan. 2016. Critical Junctures, Developmental Pathways, and Incremental 
Change in Security Institutions. In The Oxford Handbook of Historical Institutionalism, edited by 
Orfeo Fioretos, Tulia G. Falleti and Adam Sheingate, 572-589. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Solomon, Jay and Carol Lee. 2016. U.S. Acknowledges Cash Payment to Iran was ‘Leverage’ in Prisoner 
Release. Wall Street Journal, Aug 18. 
Solomon, Jay. 2016. The Iran Wars: Spy Games, Bank Battles, and the Secret Deals that Reshaped the 
Middle East. First ed. New York: Random House. 
Special Operations Review Group. 1980. Rescue Mission Report, August 1980. Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Defense. 
Sreberny, Annabelle and Ali Mohammadi. 1994. Small Media, Big Revolution: Communication, Culture, 
and the Iranian Revolution. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Staff Writer. 2007. Political Problems Mount for Ahmadinejad. BBC News [Online], Feb 26. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6396873.stm. 





Staff, Toi. 2018. Iran Said to Double Number of Missile Tests, in Possible Violation of Nuke Deal. Times of 
Israel, Dec 9. https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-said-to-double-number-of-missile-tests-in-
possible-violation-of-nuke-deal/. 
Steinberg, Gerald M. 2009. Iran in the Israeli Threat Perception. In The Iranian Puzzle Piece: 
Understanding Iran in the Global Context, edited by Amin Tarzi, 71-82. Quantico, VA: Marine 
Corps University Press. 
Sterman, Avid. 2014. Israel has Killed Perpetrators of 1994 Buenos Aires Bombing, Says Ex-Envoy. Times 
of Israel, Jan 3. https://www.timesofisrael.com/iranian-bombers-in-amia-attack-were-taken-
out-by-israel/. 
Stern, Roger. 2007. The Iranian Petroleum Crisis and United States National Security. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 104 (1): 377-382. 
https://www.pnas.org/content/104/1/377. 
Stewart, Scott. 2010. Iranian Proxies: An Intricate and Active Web. Stratfor Worldview, Feb 3. 
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/iranian-proxies-intricate-and-active-web. 
Stokols, Eli and Nick Gass. 2015. Trump Storms Washington. Politico, Sep 9. 
https://www.politico.com/story/2015/09/donald-trump-iran-deal-washington-rally-213451. 
Streeck, Wolfgang and Kathleen Ann Thelen. 2005. "Introduction: Institutional Change in Advanced 
Political Economies." In Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political 
Economies, edited by Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Ann Thelen, 1-39. Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Sturm, Frankie. 2008. The Candidates on Iran. Foreign Policy in Focus, Apr 4. 
Tabaar, Mohammad Ayatollahi. 2017. Causes of the US Hostage Crisis in Iran: The Untold Account of the 
Communist Threat. Security Studies 26 (4): 665. doi:10.1080/09636412.2017.1336390. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tsh&AN=123985491&site=ehost-
live&scope=site. 
Tait, Robert. 2007. Khomeini 'Sought to Drop Death to America Chant'. The Guardian, Aug 19. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/aug/20/iran.roberttait. 
Takeyh, Ray. 2006. Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic. New York: Times Books. 
Takeyh, Ray. 2009a. Behind Scuttled Nuke Pact, Iran’s Regime in Turmoil. Boston Globe [Op-Ed], Dec 17. 
http://archive.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2009/12/17/behind_sc
uttled_nuke_pact_irans_regime_in_turmoil/. 
Takeyh, Ray. 2009b. Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs. 
Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. 
Takeyh, Ray. 2012. All the Ayatollah's Men. National Interest (121): 51. 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=f5h&AN=79352665&site=ehost-
live&scope=site.  
Takeyh, Ray. 2016. How Powerful is Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps? Council on Foreign Relations 
[Expert Brief]. https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/how-powerful-irans-revolutionary-guard-corps. 
TCA Regional News. 2019. Iran to buy 630 wagons for Tehran subway network. TCA Regional News, 
August 29, 2019. 
404 
 
Tenet, George with Bill Harlow. 2008. At the Center of the Storm: The CIA during America's Time of Crisis. 
Harper Perennial ed. New York: Harper Perennial. 
Terrill, W. A. 2014. Iranian Involvement in Yemen. Orbis 58 (3): 429. 
Thaler, David E., Alireza Nader, Shahram Chubin, Jerrold D. Green, Charlotte Lynch, and Frederic 
Wehrey. 2010. "Formal Structures of the Islamic Republic." In Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads, 21-
36: RAND Corporation. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg878osd.10. 
The White House. 1977. Presidential Directive PD/NSC - 18, Subject: U.S. National Strategy (U)(August 
24, 1977). 
The White House. 1981a. Presidential Directive PD/NSC-62, Subject: Modifications in U.S. National 
Strategy (U) (January 15, 1981). 
The White House. 1981b. Presidential Directive PD/NSC - 63, Subject: Persian Gulf Security Framework 
(U)(January 15, 1981). 
The White House. 1984a. National Security Decision Directive 139: Measures to Improve U.S. Posture 
and Readiness to Respond to Developments in the Iran-Iraq War. Washington, D.C.: The White 
House. 
The White House. 2016. The Historic Deal that Will Prevent Iran from Acquiring a Nuclear Weapon. The 
White House [Website], accessed Apr 13, 2020, 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/issues/foreign-policy/iran-deal. 
The White House. 2019. Statement from the president on the designation of the islamic revolutionary 
guard corps as a foreign terrorist organization, april 8, 2019. The White House. 
Thompson, Bob. 2011. Airpower Shaped by Iraqi no-Fly Zones. U.S. European Command. 
Toosi, Nahal. 2016. Iran Releases 5 Detained Americans, Including Washington Post Reporter. Politico, 
Jan 16. https://www.politico.com/story/2016/01/iran-prisoners-217875. 
Torbati, Yeganeh. 2016. Trump Election Puts Iran Nuclear Deal on Shaky Ground. Reuters, Nov 9. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-trump-iran/trump-election-puts-iran-nuclear-
deal-on-shaky-ground-idUSKBN13427E. 
Torrance, Kelly Jane. 2019. "Act of War': Mattis Says Obama's Inept Response to Cafe Milano Bomb Plot 
'Emboldened' Iran. Washington Examiner, Sep 4. 
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/defense-national-security/act-of-war-mattis-
says-obamas-inept-response-to-cafe-milano-bomb-plot-emboldened-iran. 
Treverton, Gregory F. 2013. Support to Policymakers: The 2007 NIE on Iran's Intentions and Capabilities. 
CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence. https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-
intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/csi-intelligence-and-policy-
monographs/pdfs/support-to-policymakers-2007-nie.pdf. 
U.S. Congress. 1992. H.R.5006 - National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993. 102 sess. (Oct 
23). 
U.S. Congress. 1996. H.R. 3107 - Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996. 104 sess. (Aug 5). 
U.S. Congress. 1998. H.R. 2709 - Iran Missile Proliferation Act. 105 sess. (Jun 24). 
U.S. Congress. 2015. H.R.1191 - Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015. 114 sess. (May 22). 
405 
 
U.S. Congress. 2017. H.R.3364 - Countering America's Adversaries through Sanctions Act. 115 sess. (Aug 
2,). 
U.S. Cyber Command. 2020. U.S. Cyber Command History. U.S. Cyber Command., accessed Apr 9, 2020, 
https://www.cybercom.mil/About/History/. 
U.S. Department of Defense. 1988. Formal Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the 
Downing of Iran Air Flight 655 on 3 July 1988. 
U.S. Department of State. 2018. Press briefing with brian hook, U.S. special representative for 
iran.  special briefing via telephone. november 5, 2018. Washinton, D.C.: U.S. Department of 
State. 
U.S. Energy Information Agency. in U.S. Energy Information Agency [database online]. 2019 [cited 
September 9, 2019]. Available from https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=32&t=6. 
U.S. House of Representatives. 2020. Party Divisions of the House of Representatives, 1789 to Present. 
U.S. House of Representatives: History, Art & 
Archives. https://history.house.gov/Institution/Party-Divisions/Party-Divisions/. 
U.S. Senate. 2020."Party Division. United States Senate. https://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm. 
United Nations Security Council. 2010. Resolution 1929. 
United States National Security Council Staff. 1979. "The Arc of Instability: What is to be done? 
[Attachments Not Included]." . https://search-proquest-
com.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/docview/1679096474?accountid=11752. 
United States. Congress. Senate. Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the 
Nicaraguan Opposition. 1987. Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-
Contra Affair with Supplemental, Minority, and Additional Views. S. Rpt. 100-216. Washington: 
S.N. http://congressional.proquest.com/congcomp/getdoc?SERIAL-SET-ID=13764+S.rp.216. 
United States. President's Special Review Board, John Tower, Edmund S. Muskie, and Brent Scowcroft. 
1987. The Tower Commission Report: The Full Text of the President's Special Review Board 
[Report of the President's Special Review Board]. New York: Bantam Books. 
UPI. 1994. "Iranian Arrested for Thailand Bomb Plot." United Press International [Archives], Jun 3. 
https://www.upi.com/Archives/1994/06/03/Iranian-arrested-for-Thailand-bomb-
plot/7033770616000/. 
Varady, Corrin and SpringerLink. 2017.  US Foreign Policy and the Multinational Force in Lebanon. Cham: 
Springer International Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-53973-7. 
Vatanka, Alex. 2019. Iran’s IRGC has Long Kept Khamenei in Power. Foreign Policy [Argument], Oct 29,. 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/29/iran-irgc-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-kept-
supreme-leader-ayatollah-ali-khamenei-power/. 
Vergun, David. 2020. Iran Poses Greatest Threat to the Region, CENTCOM Commander Says. U.S. 
Department of Defense [DoD News]., last modified June 10, accessed June 23, 2020, 
https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/2215452/iran-poses-greatest-threat-to-
region-centcom-commander-says/. 





Voice of America. 2009. US Rescinds Invitations to Iranian Diplomats. Voice of America News, Jun 24. 
Votel, Joseph L. 2017. Statement of General Joseph L. Votel on the Posture of U.S. Central Command. 
U.S. Central Command., last modified Mar 9, accessed Apr 17, 2020, 
https://www.centcom.mil/ABOUT-US/SASC-POSTURE-STATEMENT-2017/. 
Walsh, Elsa. 2001. Louis Freeh's Last Case. New Yorker (May 14 Issue). 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2001/05/14/louis-freehs-last-case. 
Walsh, Lawrence E. and United States. 1994. Iran-Contra: The Final Report. New York: Times Books. 
Walt, Stephen M. 2018. The Hell of Good Intentions: America's Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. 
Primacy. First ed. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 
Waltz, Kenneth Neal. 1979. Theory of international politics. Addison-Wesley series in political science. 
Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co. 
War Over, Allies Turn Attention to Freeing Hostages in Lebanon. 1991. Los Angeles Times, Mar 10, 9. 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/281380381?accountid=11752. 
Ward, Steven R. and Georgetown University. 2009. Immortal: A Military History of Iran and its Armed 
Forces. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 
Ware, Michael. 2005. Inside Iran's Secret War for Iraq. Time, Aug 22. http://www.mickware.com/2002-
2009/2005/files/1ed99bba67b6c013794d8844a97615ab-11.php. 
Ware, Michael. 2005. Inside Iran's Secret War for Iraq. Time, Aug 22. http://www.mickware.com/2002-
2009/2005/files/1ed99bba67b6c013794d8844a97615ab-11.php. 
Washington Post. 1981a. Arms list for the persian gulf. Washington Post, November 1, 1981. 
Washington Post. 1981b. Pentagon denies AWACS sale tied to bases in saudi arabia. Washington Post, 
November 2, 1981, sec A3. 
Washington Post. 2001. Iran Minister Gives Powell A Handshake: [FINAL Edition]. Washington Post, Nov 
13, A15. 
Washington Times. 2009. Obama Sent Second Letter to Khamenei. Washington Times, Sep 3. 
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/sep/03/obama-sent-second-letter-to-irans-
khamenei/. 
Wedge, Carl A. 2013. Iranian Intelligence Organizations. In Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage 
Outside the Anglosphere, 141-156. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 
Wehrey, Frederic M., United States, and National Defense Research Institute. 2009. The Rise of the 
Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. Rand 
Corporation Monograph Series. Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg821osd. 
Weiner, Tim. 1996. U.S. Plan to Change Iran Leaders is an Open Secret before it Begins. New York Times, 
Jan 26, A1. 
Wezeman, Pieter D., and Alexandrarou Kuimova. 2019. SIPRI fact sheet: Military spending and arms 
imports by iran, saudi arabia, qatar, and the UAE. Solna, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute. 
Wilkie, Christina. 2019. Trump: If iran blocks the strait of hormuz, ‘it’s not going to be closed for long’. 
CNBC, June 14, 2019. 
407 
 
Wilkinson, Tracy. 1991. U.S. Downs 2nd Iraqi Warplane Persian Gulf: Air Force Fighters Attack Jet Flying 
in Defiance of Tentative Cease-Fire Accord. White House Insists it is Not Meddling in Rebellion 
Against Hussein. Lost Angeles Times, March 23, 1. 
William J. Clinton Presidential Center. 2020. The Campaign. Clinton Foundation., accessed Feb 25, 2020, 
https://www.clintonfoundation.org/clinton-presidential-center/exhibits/permanent/campaign. 
Williams, Dan. 2019. Israel says arrow-3 missile shield passes U.S. trials, warns iran. Reuters, July 28, 
2019. 
Williams, Nick B. Jr. 1991. Iran Tells Hussein's Aide it Will Hold Iraqi Fliers, Planes . Los Angeles Times, 
Feb 1, A24. https://search.proquest.com/docview/421010328?accountid=11752. 
Wilson, George C. 1987. USS Stark had Only Seconds to React; Pentagon Chronology Describes Belated 
Radar Warning. The Washington Post, June 4, A03. 
Wilson, George C. and David Hoffman. 1986. U.S. Warplanes Bomb Targets in Libya as 'Self-Defense' 
Against Terrorism: U.S. Bombs Libya in 'Self-Defense' Against Terrorism. The Washington Post, 
April 15, A1. 
Wines, Michael. 1991. AFTER THE WAR; Years Later, no Clear Culprit in Gassing of Kurds. New York Times 
[Late Edition - East Coast], april 28, A13. 
Wise, Harold Lee. 2013. Inside the Danger Zone. New York: Naval Institute Press. 
http://JHU.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=1359573. 
Wolgolenter, Michael and David Sanger. 2019. Iran Steps further from Nuclear Deal with Move on 
Centrifuges. New York Times, Nov 7. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/05/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-uranium-
centrifuges.html. 
Woodward, Bob, and Dan Morgan. 1987. Soviet threat toward iran overstated, casey concluded. The 
Washington Post, January 13, 1987, sec A1. 
Woodward, Bob. 2002. Bush at War. New York: Simon and Schuster. 
Woodward, Bob. 2004. Plan of Attack. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Worth, Robert F. and Rick Gladstone. 2011. "Iranian Protesters Attack British Embassy." New York Times, 
Nov 29. https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/30/world/middleeast/tehran-protesters-storm-
british-embassy.html. 
Wright, Robin B. 2000. The Last Great Revolution: Turmoil and Transformation in Iran. New York: A.A. 
Knopf. 
Wright, Robin. 1984. Terrorists Strike again in Beirut: With US Out of Lebanon, Motive for Attack Unclear 
Beirut Previous Attacks by 'Islamic Jihad' Terrorists. Christian Science Monitor, Sep 21.  
Wright, Robin. 1987. Iran Looks Beyond Khomeini. Vol. 244 Nation Company, L. P.  
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=f5h&AN=14117631&site=ehost-
live&scope=site. 
Wright, Robin. 1989. In the Name of God: The Khomeini Decade. New York: Touchstone. 
Wright, Robin. 1992. Business and Cultural Ties Warm U.S.-Iran Relations. Los Angeles Times, Apr 19, 1. 
408 
 
Wright, Robin. 2017. Rafsanjani, Iran’s Wiliest Revolutionary, Dies. The New 
Yorker. https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/rafsanjani-irans-wiliest-revolutionary-
dies. 
Yetiv, Steve A. 1992. The Outcomes of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm: Some Antecedent 
Causes. Political Science Quarterly 107 (2): 195-212. doi:10.2307/2152655. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2152655. 
Zarif, M. Javad. 2003. A Neighbor's Vision of the New Iraq: [Op-Ed]. New York Times, May 10, A21. 
Zatarain, Lee Allen. 2010. America's First Clash with Iran: The Tanker War, 1987-88. Havertown, Pa.; 
Newbury: Casemate. 
Zeleny, Jeff and Nicholas Kulish. 2008. Obama, in Berlin, Calls for Renewal of Ties with Allies: [National 
Desk]. New York Times, Jul 25, A19. 





BIOGRAPHY AND CURRICULUM VITAE – JOSEPH D. BECKER 
 
Colonel Joseph D. Becker was commissioned in the U.S. Army as an Infantry Officer in 1996 out 
of the Virginia Tech where he earned a Bachelor of Science in Industrial and Systems Engineering.  His 
first assignment was to Camp Casey, Korea, where he served as a Rifle Platoon Leader and the 
Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC) Executive Officer in the 1/503 Air Assault Battalion.  
Following Korea, he served as a Company Executive Officer and an Assistant Battalion Operations Officer 
in the 1/61 Infantry Battalion at Fort Jackson, SC, conducting Initial Entry Training for incoming soldiers.   
As a Captain, Joe assessed into the Army Special Forces Branch, and after training, he served in 
the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) at Fort Campbell, KY.  During this time, he led two Operational 
Detachments Alpha (ODA’s) and served as both a Company Executive Officer and a Battalion Assistant 
Operations Officer.  Joe also conducted multiple tours in the Middle East region in support of the Global 
War on Terror (GWOT) and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF).  As a Major, Joe supported U.S. Central 
Command (CENTCOM) in both Iraq and Afghanistan.  He also assisted with the stand-up of the U.S. 
Africa Command (AFRICOM).  Following these positions, Joe served on the Army Staff in the Pentagon as 
a Strategic Planner, and then as a Branch Chief for strategic issues. 
As a Lieutenant Colonel, Joe was afforded the opportunity to teach and mentor mid-career 
officers and civilians as a graduate faculty instructor for Professional Military Education.  His courses 
focused on global strategic matters and Middle East regional studies.  Following his teaching 
assignment, Joe served as a policy planner at the National Counterterrorism Center, where he was later 
selected as the Executive Officer for the Director for Strategic Operational Planning (DSOP).   
Joe’s civilian education includes a Bachelor of Science in Industrial and Systems Engineering 
from Virginia Tech and a Master of Business Administration (MBA) from Webster University.  Joe is a 
fellow in the Army Strategic Planning and Policy Program (ASP3) and has submitted this dissertation in 
fulfillment of the requirements for a Doctor of Philosophy degree in Political Science from the Krieger 
School of Arts and Sciences at Johns Hopkins University. 
Joe’s military education includes Senior Service College (SSC) equivalency, Intermediate Level 
Education (ILE), the Infantry Captains Career Course, and the Combined Arms Services and Staff School 
(CAS3).  Joe’s awards and decorations include three Bronze Stars, three Defense Meritorious Service 
Medals, the Army’s Meritorious Service Medal, the Ranger Tab, and the Army Staff Badge.   
410 
 




“Strategy in the New Era of Tactical Nuclear Weapons” – published in Strategic Studies Quarterly, 
(Volume 14, Issue 1 – Spring 2020).  Winner of the 2020 General Larry D. Welch Deterrence Writing 
Award (Senior Division) sponsored by U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM). 
“Building Strategic Influence:  The SOF Role in Political Warfare” – published in Special Warfare, 
(Volume 31, Issue 1 – January to March 2018). 
“Why the U.S. Military Should Support Domestic CVE” – published in Perspectives on Terrorism, 
(Volume 11, Issue 3 - June 2017). 
“Intelligence Analysts: Continuing Education for Enduring Strategic Value” – International Association for 
Intelligence Educators (IAFIE) 2015 Essay Contest award winner for best essay in the Professional 
Category, published in the American Intelligence Journal (Volume 33, No. 1 - 2016). 
Review essay of Barry Posen’s Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy – published in PRISM 
(Volume 5, Issue 3 - 2015). 
“Obama’s Strategy for Defeating ISIS is the Only Viable Option.  It Can Work.” –  published in the Small 
Wars Journal (12 Dec 2014). 
Book review of Davies and Gustafson’s Intelligence Elsewhere: Spies and Espionage Outside the 
Anglosphere – published in Parameters (Winter, 2014). 
Book review of Vali Nasr’s Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat – published in the 
American Intelligence Journal (Volume 31, No. 1 - 2013). 
 
 
